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ABSTRACT
This work argues that an interpretation of Eliade's 
thought as systematic, coherent, and finally rational is 
fully consistent with his writings. His thought is 
systematic in that the terms it utilises are 
inter-definable, although their relations are never 
explicitly clarified. Within this interpretation his 
thought is coherent and defensible. Particularly, it 
does not make unwarranted ontological assumptions but, 
through his a priori, taxonomic identification of the 
sacred with that which is apprehended as the real, defers 
to actual religious phenomena. That said, Eliade's 
method cannot be assimilated to phenomenology in any 
strict philosophical sense.
The resultant understanding of religion is 
well-defined and eminently practical for the study and 
teaching of the varied religious beliefs of our 
contemporary world. It makes sense of religion in three 
ways; firstly it presents as coherent religious 
expressions of the human existential situation; secondly 
it seeks to increase the (recognition of) meaning, 
significance, and relevance of such expressions; and 
thirdly it attempts to provide direction (Fr. sens) for 
scholars of religion in our efforts to interpret the data 
of religious phenomena.
Part one provides a concept-by-concept analysis of 
the terms of Eliade's understanding of religion, 
concluding with some observations on the implications of 
that understanding for the study of implicitly religious 
behaviour. Part two inspects and attempts to defend 
against the various criticisms which have been levelled 
against Eliade by other scholars in the field of the 
academic study of religion. It concludes with some 
observations on the significance of this interpretation 
for methodology in that study of a human phenomenon.
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MIRCEA ELIADE: MAKING SENSE OF RELIGION
Introduction
Eliade himself claims that his work is not
systematic, or rather it has never yet been
systematized.1 Yet he affirms that theoretical coherence
can prefigure systematic reflection. In an article of
1958, "Bi-unité et Totalité dans la Pensée Indienne"
Eliade states that
one must not think that theoretical coherence is 
necessarily the result of systematic reflection; it 
is already imposed at the stage of the image and the 
symbol, it is an integral part of mythic thought.2
Eliade was here talking specifically about Ananda
Coomaraswamy. However, the implication is, and I believe
1 No Souvenirs: Journal. 1957-1969, p. 313.
2 "Il ne faut pas croire que la cohérence théoretique 
est nécessairement le résultat d'une réflexion 
systématique; elle s'impose déjà au stade de l'image et 
du symbole, elle fait partie intégrante de la pensée 
mythique." My translation from "Bi-unité et Totalité 
dans la Pensée Indienne," p.l, n.l. Repeated in The Two 
and the One, p.89, n.l.
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it to be an acceptable implication, that theoretical
coherence can and often does precede the awareness of the
systematic thought which generates it. This can be
compared to the processes of language acquisition in
which a "grasp" of a rule-governed system precedes
conscious awareness of that system, as Noam Chomsky has
argued convincingly. It can also be compared to Charles
Hartshorne's contention that
the idea of "God" ... first reaches vivid 
consciousness in an emotional and practical, not in 
a logical or analytic, form and that this 
preanalytic form is not that simple.3
That Eliade was aware of the systematic nature of his own
work is indicated by his complaint that it is a prejudice
of the historians of religions that they must turn to
other specialists for a world-wide and "systematic"
interpretation of religious facts.4 Furthermore, in a
"fragment autobiographique" Eliade has said
I wrote literature for the pleasure (and the 
necessity) of writing freely, of inventing, of 
dreaming, of thinking at all, relieved of the 
strictures of systematic thought.5
Hence it seems he did regard his scholarly writings as at
least an attempt at systematic thought and a systematic
interpretation of religion, although he recognises that
3 Philosophers Speak of God, p.l.
4 The Two and the One, p.195.
5 "Je faisais la littérature pour le plaisir (ou le 
besoin) d'écrire librement, d'inventer, de rêver, de 
penser même, mais hors du corset de la pensée 
systématique." Quoted in the Introduction to Andronic et 
le Serpent, p.13, my translation from the French.
such a systematic nature could issue from pre-reflective 
thought and subsequently remain only implicit in his 
work.
Thus I feel justified in seeking a theoretical
coherence underlying Eliade's various expressions,
despite the lack of superficial systematization and
consistent, clear definition. In seeking to discover a
constant and systematic relation of concepts throughout
his writings I am quite deliberately seeking consistency
rather than attempting to disclose inconsistency. I feel
further justified in my conclusions since they have been
made with reference to a large selection of Eliade's
works, scholarly and otherwise. The consideration of
that additional material offers valuable assistance in
grasping his theoretical coherence. Eliade lamented that
Thomas Altizer, for example,
relied exclusively on my scholarly studies published 
in English and French [and] ignored the 
complementary part of my oeuvre written in 
Romanian.6
Although this Romanian portion of Eliade's writing has 
become increasingly available, particularly through the 
translations of Mac Linscott Ricketts, little analysis 
has yet been made of it.
Even without the help of this less accessible 
material it is evident that the major themes in Eliade's
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6 "Notes for a Dialogue." In J. B. Cobb (ed.), The 
Theology of T. J. J. Altizer. pp.235-6.
thought are symbol, myth, and ritual,7 hierophanies, the 
sacred and the profane, the coincidentia oppositorum, the 
repetition of archetypal structures,8 illud tempus and 
homo religiosus.
The recognition of a coherent system in Eliade's 
thought is not particularly new. It is the central theme 
in Douglas Allen's book, Structure and Creativity. 
However, despite the importance of that work, I feel that 
Allen over-emphasises phenomenology. Eliade had other 
influences aplenty; other writers stress his morphology 
as opposed to his phenomenology.9 Similarly Allen seeks 
to subsume under the two headings of the dialectic of the 
sacred and of symbolism all of the other elements of 
Eliade's thought. This drive to classify under a reduced 
number of headings or categories of increased 
significance is fundamentally foreign to Eliade's 
approach and hence finally inadequate to the exposition. 
The actual texts of Eliade's work emphasise meaning, not
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7 Throughout this work I have largely ignored the 
question of ritual as a separate issue. I am assuming 
ritual to be a dramatic, rather than a narrative, 
reactualisation of mythic structures and symbolic themes. 
This is mainly because of limitations of space, and I 
freely admit that it does not do full justice to the 
issue.
8 Not Jungian archetypes, v. 1958 preface to The Myth 
of the Eternal Return: Ordeal by Labyrinth, conversations 
with Claude-Henri Rocquet, p. 122; Ricketts, "The Nature 
and Extent of Eliade's 'Jungianism'." Union Seminary 
Quarterly Review 25, no.2 (1970), pp.211-234.
9 v. Allen, pp.109f.
phenomenology.10 That Allen's emphasis is foreign to 
Eliade's position is shown by the latter’s approving 
citation of Raffaele Pettazzoni’s statement that "the 
only way to escape the dangers" of a phenomenological 
interpretation "consists of constantly referring to 
history".11 It is also valuable to realise that Eliade 
considered that "Pettazzoni1s work seems to us more 
instructive than his theoretical position", (ibid.) It 
was evidently Eliade's position to underplay theory in 
favour of content.
Critical analysis and especially reductive critical 
analysis is not valorised by Eliade as highly as creative 
hermeneutics. The idea of the creative input of the 
scholar is recognised and valued more highly than the 
alternative image of revelatory analysis. Allen's 
approach finally falters by trying to apply the latter 
instead of the former. It is evident from the interest 
which Eliade showed in Allen's work, expressed by his 
writing an introduction to Structure and Creativity, that 
neither scholar was aware of the real discontinuity 
between Eliade and philosophical phenomenology.12
In the conversation which provided the text for 
Ordeal by Labyrinth published in 1982, Claude-Henri
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10 v. egs. Australian Religions, p.200; "The Sacred 
in the Secular World," p.101.
11 "Mythology and the History of Religions," p.100.
12 v. below, 7.3, pp.257-268, for a fuller discussion 
of Allen's treatment of Eliade.
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Rocquet suggested that the scholar of religion, in 
reading Eliade, is involved in
a hermeneutics without end, since even as we read
Eliade, we are interpreting him, just as he himself
is interpreting some Iranian symbol, (p. 130.)
Eliade does not object to this contention (except to 
point out the fundamental and recurrent significance of 
the great symbols) and thus accepts that even in his 
scholarly work he does not transmit an encapsulated 
meaning clearly retrievable independently of 
interpretation. He also accepts that the author is not 
exhaustively aware of the valid implications of his own 
writings.
In order to appreciate the thought of a hermeneut 
such as Eliade I suggest that it is not finally 
productive to apply logical criticism of the minutiae, 
but rather to question the coherence and consistency of 
the whole. Despite the unquestioned importance of 
critical discrimination the radically critical, 
iconoclastic approach of many contemporary scholars can 
all too easily prevent the comprehension of the central 
insights of a talented thinker with a web of Lilliputian 
objections. I would suggest that Eliade's thought, like 
that of Paul Tillich, is systematic, each element 
referring to, supported by, and reciprocally supporting 
every other element. The rejection of any one element, 
for whatever reason, can then result in a rejection of 
the whole. Despite his repeated insistence that he was
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not a theologian13 Eliade has often been described as 
having a hidden theological agenda, or more specifically 
of making an a priori assumption of the ontology of the 
sacred which disqualifies him from serious academic 
Reliqionswissenschaft.14 However, Paul Tillich has said 
that
the "scientific" theologian wants to be more than a 
philosopher of religion. He wants to interpret the 
Christian message generally with the help of his 
method. This puts before him two alternatives. He 
may subsume the Christian message under his concept 
of religion. Then Christianity is considered to be 
one example of religious life besides other 
examples, certainly the highest religion, but not 
the final one and not unique. Such a theology does 
not enter the theological circle. It keeps itself 
within the religious-philosophical circle and its 
indefinite horizons - horizons which beckon towards 
a future which is open for new and perhaps higher
examples of religion. The scientific theologian, in
spite of his desire to be a theologian, remains a 
philosopher of religion.15
Obviously, in these terms, Eliade did not even desire to
be a theologian, scientific or otherwise. Even accepting
that because of a "hidden agenda" he could still be a
theologian despite himself, one can see that since he
evidently "subsumes the Christian message under his
concept of religion" he thus cannot "enter the
theological circle" in Tillich's terms.
13 eg. "Preface" to Reflective Theology, by T. N. 
Munson; Images and Symbols. p.158.
14 Altizer, Hamilton, Penner, and Reno argue Eliade 
to make "theological assumptions". Baird, Saliba, 
Strenski, and to a lesser extent Allen argue Eliade to 
make unwarranted ontological assumptions. (v. my 
bibliography.)
15 Systematic Theology, vol.I, p.10.
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Furthermore it is doubtful that Eliade accepted the 
Christian message as "the highest religion". Douglas 
Allen has argued, with support from Eliade himself, that 
Eliade's evaluation of the "highest" types of spiritual 
manifestation is at least partially based on a position 
much more characteristic of Indian mysticism than Western 
religious traditions.16 It is specifically Eliade's 
refusal to valorise the Christian religion unequivocally 
above all others that simultaneously constitutes his 
escape from the theological circle17 and animates his 
academic study of religion. Tillich has said that 
"Christian theology is the theology in so far as it is 
based on the tension between the absolutely concrete and 
the absolutely universal".18 This attitude is, no doubt, 
exactly what Eliade had in mind when he stated that for 
the Christian the revelation of the Christ event is the 
highest.19 I emphasise "for the Christian", because it 
seems surprisingly easy for readers to miss the 
disclamatory thrust of his phraseology. Eliade is in no
16 "A Phenomenological Evaluation of Religious 
Mysticism." Revised in ch.7 of Structure and Creativity. 
v.p.222 and v. "Foreword" by Eliade. This contention is 
also supported by Sergiu Al-George, op. cit.
17 NB that throughout Patterns Eliade consistently 
qualifies his valorisations of the Christian Incarnation 
with phrases such as "one might say", "one could attempt 
to vindicate", and "from this standpoint". This fact is 
often ignored in analyses of Eliade's valuations.
(Patterns, pp.29f.)
18 Systematic Theology p.19.
V.Patterns. pp.29 and 30, n.l, "in the light of 
Christian theology", and "from this standpoint".
way claiming that Christianity is the absolutely highest
form of religion; rather that it has characteristics
which have allowed it to be convincingly perceived as
such by certain specific people.
Thus Eliade refuses to share with Tillich the focus
of his ultimate concern in the Christian religion.
Nonetheless he manifests undoubted similarities with the
thought and methods of Paul Tillich which have attracted
the criticisms of those would-be scientific scholars of
religion to whom the predisposition necessarily involved
in the theological approach is anathema, preventing all
possibility of genuinely creative, free research. I
contend that it is mainly because of the detection of
this predisposition to the acceptance of the reality of
the sacred that Eliade has become
a problem: to at least half of today's historians of 
religion he embodies the discipline; to the other 
half he is anathema.20
However, that such a predisposition is finally
incompatible with genuine research is an conception of
both reality and of the sacred which does not derive from
Eliade's work and which is finally incompatible with his
whole understanding of religion.
The similarities which Eliade does have with
Tillich, the implications of which I do not believe to
have been fully realised or researched, is the systematic
nature of the categories of the thought of both scholars.
po Ivan Strenski, "Love and Anarchy in Romania",
p. 391.
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Douglas Allen comes closest to this analysis of Eliade
and recognises its lack in other scholars when he says
before proceeding with our systematic treatment of 
Mircea Eliade's phenomenological approach, we may 
acknowledge that our analysis is in contrast with 
most of Eliade's interpreters, who seem to feel that 
Eliade has never developed a systematic 
methodology.21
To this extent I am in agreement with Allen; however, as
I have said, I disagree with Allen's emphasis on
phenomenology. Furthermore, I would like to consider why
it is that so many scholars have been unable to
appreciate the coherence of Eliade's thought.
Tillich expresses the nature of systematic thought
well in the statement,
neither the introduction nor any part of the 
theological system is the logical basis for the 
other parts. Every part is dependent on every other 
part. ... The arrangement is only a matter of 
expediency.22
But unlike Tillich, whose systematic mentality and 
approach was a source of wonderment and admiration for 
him,23 Eliade lacked the neatness and clarity of 
expression which would render the implicit system of his 
thought obvious to his readers. This does not mean that 
such inherent consistency is lacking.
Adrian Marino has made an admirable attempt to 
systematise Eliade's hermeneutics but I believe that this
21 Douglas Allen, Structure and Creativity p.106.
22 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology vol. I, p.11.
23 As expressed in "Paul Tillich and the History of 
Religions".
is yet to be done for the larger system of his thought.
It is not only Eliade's lack of neatness and clarity of 
thought which obscures his systematic conceptions, it is 
also a deliberate policy on his part, partly inherited 
from his philosophy teacher and mentor, Nae Ionescu, to 
avoid elaborated systematic thought as "the philosophers' 
tombstone" .24
No doubt the critics of Eliade who have cited his 
"hidden theological agenda" and his unwarranted 
ontological presumptions would be delighted to see this 
comparison of Eliade and Tillich. However, my point is 
not to indicate Eliade's theological status or a priori 
approach. Rather it is to indicate the presence of a 
systematic position, the rational defence of which is 
both possible and credible.25 As Steven Toulmin has 
pointed out, the inter-dependent nature of certain 
theoretical structures, such as Newtonian physics, is 
certainly not necessarily a weakness.26 As long as the 
categories of such a system can be appropriated and 
utilised then the whole system can be accepted.
The very fact that Eliade is rejected by both 
camps - denied entry into the "theological circle" by 
Tillich, yet accused of a "hidden theological agenda" by
24 On which v. M. L. Ricketts, The Romanian Roots.
p .862 .
25. See Systematic Theology vol.l, pp.65ff for 
Tillich's elaborate defence against attacks on systematic 
thought.
26 Stephen Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology p. 191.
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the "scientific" scholars of religion - is to my mind a 
promising sign that he has managed to walk the middle 
way, avoiding, as far as possible, commitment to any 
"orthodoxy", while still allowing religious behaviour to 
have the significance which it evidently does have to the 
believer.
Secondary scholars have all too often criticised 
what on closer inspection turns out to be their own 
interpretations of Eliade's thoughts on this matter 
rather than his actual thoughts. Eliade's fiction and 
some of his Journal entries reveal his dismay with the 
impossibility of the attempt to reveal certain "secrets" 
no matter how hard one tries.27 When one is dealing with 
fundamental categories of thought such as "reality" and 
"being" fundamental misapprehensions are, apparently, all 
too easy to make. I do not believe that we can ever
fully escape this. It is a fact of life that what I will
describe will never be anything other than my own 
(creative, I hope) interpretation of the thought of 
Mircea Eliade. To follow his example, I will attempt to 
mitigate the possible ill-effects of this fact by
referring as often as an acceptable style will allow to
the primary sources. Of course, even those suffer 
somewhat from the difficulties of translation and the 
subtle influences of the institutional context of the
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27 This theme occurs in Dayan. A Great Man. Uniformes 
de Général, Iphigenia, Adio. and The Old Man and the 
Bureaucrats, v. my bibliography.
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scholar. Even so, it is better to read and attempt to 
analyze what has actually been written rather than 
derived statements of my own construction. If this has 
led me to use overly long quotations it is due to my 
desire for accuracy and my efforts to avoid the dangers 
of "paraphraseology".
My approach will also be an attempt to clarify by 
application Eliade's creative hermeneutics. It may seem 
unsound to attempt to apply a hermeneutics before one has 
clarified exactly what that hermeneutics consists of. 
However, my point, and, I believe Eliade's point too, is 
that interpretation is an iterative and recursive action. 
One is constantly applying one's understanding in the act 
of formulating it, and formulating it in the act of its 
application. Understanding, comprehension, 
interpretation, is not a precise, step at a time, linear, 
sequential movement; rather, it is a dynamic, 
interactive, organic process involving all the 
coruscations of fractal geometry and the inexplicable 
leaps of quantum phenomena. While there may be a danger 
here of simply leaping on a bandwagon of the metaphorical 
application of fashionable cant, it must be borne in mind 
that understanding itself is a "metaphorical" process of 
the application of inexact and partial models, and that 
until such time as the more positivist theorists can 
actually provide us with a consistent, precise, linear, 
step-by-step, sequential description of what 
understanding and interpretation actually are, such
suggestive strategies are the most effective mode of 
communication open to us. Thus, rather than pretending 
to a linear development in my understanding and my 
interpretation of the thought of Mircea Eliade, I will 
openly apply my interpretation in the act of explicating 
it, in the knowledge that this reflects the actual 
process by which that understanding came about, and in 
the hope that this will prove the most effective method 
of communicating both Eliade's views and my 
interpretation of them. Ninian Smart has said that 
"Eliade's main position is shrouded in ambiguities".28 
It is my hope that this approach, informed by an 
extensive and close textual reading will resolve some of 
these ambiguities and reveal Eliade's main position more 
clearly.
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28 The Science of Religion and the Sociology of 
Knowledge. p.66.
I THE ELEMENTS OF ELIADE’S SYSTEM OF THOUGHT
Chapter One
Hierophany
As I suggested in the Introduction the various 
taxonomic elements of Eliade's thought are mutually 
dependent, thus each one can only be finally understood 
when the others are grasped. It makes, therefore, little 
difference in what order I attempt to explicate each 
concept; the explanation of one of these categories will 
always partially involve the explanation of all of the 
others. With this in mind, however, I have attempted to 
construct an exposition in which the earlier explanations 
involve the later ones as little as possible, and the 
later ones increasingly presuppose the earlier. I have 
found it quite impossible, for example, to discuss the 
Sacred and the coincidentia oppositorum without reference 
to Eliade's concept of "hierophany", and so it is with my 
attempt to clarify this deceptively simple word that I 
will begin.
Although it may be strange on first exposure this 
neologism of Eliade's is, as I say, deceptively simple. 
It is compounded, we can easily explain to a freshman 
student, of the Greek hiero, the holy, the sacred, and 
phainein, to show. Thus a "hierophany" is a perception 
of the sacred. Eliade himself says "the term in its 
widest sense [means] anything which manifests the 
sacred",1 and the entry from the Encyclopedia of Religion 
(credited to Eliade and L. E. Sullivan) insists that "the
1 Patterns in Comparative Religion, p.xiii.
term involves no further specification".2 Even so, the
matter is far from simple. Completely ignoring for the
moment the difficulties raised by the loaded term
"sacred" and thus the aporia caused by defining one
unknown in terms of another, let me first point out the
difficulties raised by Eliade's actual usage of his term.
Despite the clear, simple definitions quoted above, it
should be noted that the passive form of the verb,
phainesthai, means to appear, allowing an interpretation
of hierophany as an intransitive action by that which is
made manifest. Eliade's first introduction of the term
into his text is problematic. "Some hierophanies are not
at all clear, are indeed almost cryptic", he states, "in
that they only reveal the sacred meanings ... in part,
or, as it were, in code".3 Furthermore,
we must get used to the idea of recognizing 
hierophanies absolutely everywhere ... we cannot be 
sure that there is anything ... that has not at some 
time in human history been somewhere transformed 
into a hierophany. (ibid., p.11.)
So, not only are things "transformed" into hierophanies,
but anything can be so transformed, and yet, having been
so transformed the hierophany may remain "cryptic".
Furthermore, "every hierophany makes manifest the
coincidence of contrary essences".4 This is a far cry
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2 Encyclopedia of Religion. Vol. 6, p.313.
J Patterns. p.8.
4 Patterns, p.29. v. below 3.1, pp.62-77, on Eliade's 
idea of the coincidentia oppositorum.
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from the notion of an irresistible and unmistakable 
self-revelatory, lightning-like manifestation of the 
divine normally associated with the concept of 
revelation.
As the Encyclopedia goes on to explain, "the 
appearance of the sacred in a hierophany, however, does 
not eliminate its profane existence". The implication of 
this is that
whenever the sacred is manifest, it limits itself. 
Its appearance forms part of a dialectic that 
occults other possibilities. By appearing in the 
concrete form of a rock, plant, or incarnate being, 
the sacred ceases to be absolute, for the object in 
which it appears remains part of the worldly 
environment. In some respect, each hierophany 
expresses an incomprehensible paradox arising from 
the great mystery upon which every hierophany is 
centered: the very fact that the sacred is made 
manifest at all. ... The same paradox underlies 
every hierophany: in making itself manifest the 
sacred limits itself.5
Although the term is of crucial importance 
throughout Patterns and makes a considerable contribution 
to the argument of The Sacred and the Profane, it is used 
only five times in The Myth of the Eternal Return and 
does not occur in Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries, Rites and 
Symbols of Initiation. Myth and Reality. Zalmoxis, 
Australian Religions, nor, most notably, in A History of 
Religious Ideas. Perhaps this indicates a growing 
dissatisfaction on Eliade's part with either the 
complexities of the term itself or the reaction which it 
received. Nonetheless, its inclusion in the early works
5 Encyclopedia, p.314.
B, S. Rennie Hierophany 18
alone would encourage an attempt to understand it more
closely. The light which it casts on the whole structure
of Eliade's thought finally makes such an attempt
indispensable. To this end I want to consider the
history of the usage of the term by Eliade.
Actually it is not used in his earliest writings but
seems to spring fully formed into his vocabulary in
Patterns in 1949. Mac Ricketts6 points out a pivotal
period in Eliade's life towards the end of 1936. Before
this date his analysis of religions utilizes a relatively
simple structure of polarities. In the published version
of his thesis on Yoga, Essai sur 1'origin de la mystique
indienne (1936), for example, he
sought to interpret Yoga in terms of a few basic 
categories, chiefly two pairs of opposites: 
"magical/mystical" and "abstract/concrete". 
(Ricketts, op. cit., p.803.)
It is only after 1936 that Eliade starts to utilize the
terminology and categories of analysis familiar to his
Western Readers from 1949 onwards. His first article
published in the English language, "Cosmical Homology and
Yoga", (1937)7 marks most strongly this development of
thought. As Eliade had said in his thesis on Yoga, yogic
techniques express a tendency toward the concrete, they
are empirical in the sense that they emphasize practical
experience. The particular empirical experiences which
6 Romanian Roots. pp.798ff.
7 "Cosmical Homology and Yoga". Journal of the 
Indian Society of Oriental Art 5 (1937): 188-203. (V. 
Romanian Roots. pp.819-825.)
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are emphasized are identified as being absolutely "real"
in their nature, as experiences of true "Being".
Ricketts points out that "this equation of 'concrete
experience' with a quest for the metaphysical 'real' is
made only once, and without emphasis, in the Yoga
thesis",8 it is tacked on to the last page (p.311.)
almost like an afterthought. However, in the 1937
article it is immediately and emphatically stated that
this tendency toward the concrete, the effort 
towards the "real", means a way out from daily, 
profane, insignificant, "illusory" experience in 
which man lives.9
The experience of the real is now further identified as a
soteriology. Yogins seek to replace their experience of
the illusory, the unreal, with experience of the real.
Finally their effort "makes Being coincide with
Non-being, 'sat' with 'asat.'" (ibid., p.202.) Evidently
this is a préfiguration of what Eliade will later begin
to call the coincidentia oppositorum.
Previously, in his literature and personal
philosophy, Eliade had subscribed to Nae Ionescu's
philosophy, often referred to as "Trairism" (although not
by lonescu and his followers), the search for and
valorization of the "authentic" in and through lived
experience (Romanian, traire). In préfiguration of the
8 Romanian Roots, p.820.
9 "Cosmical Homology", p.188. It is in this same 
article that Eliade first makes explicit his equation of 
the real and the sacred, the importance of which will be 
discussed later in my chapter on the sacred.
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French existentialists the Romanian intellectual movement 
represented by the Criterion group10 had stressed actual 
personal lived-experience or Erlebnis as the only source 
of "authenticity".11 Eliade had militated for 
"authenticity" in 1932-33 in Fraamentarium and in 
Oceanoqrafie. However, in 1936 he published two "notes" 
on authenticity in the Bucharest journal, Vremea. In the 
first he graduates magic, idealism and authenticity by 
the power they ascribe to humanity (magic the most and 
authenticity the least), and identifies authenticity as 
"a vulgar popularization of idealism, and both 
authenticity and idealism are failures of the magical 
consciousness". In the second Ricketts describes Eliade 
as arguing authenticity to be "a reaction against the 
abstractions of both romanticism and positivism; it is 
part of a general trend toward the concrete ... and is 
the expression of a powerful metaphysical thirst".12 The 
implications of the "Cosmical Homology" article are 
clearly that now Eliade considers normal lived experience 
to be fundamentally unreal, illusory and inauthentic.
This does not, as it might at first seem, constitute a 
complete schism from Ionescu's thought. As Eliade made
10 V. Romanian Roots, pp.551-565.
11 V. ibid., pp.96f, and pp.98-126 on traire in the 
thought of Ionescu. v.also Sergiu Al-George, "India in 
the Cultural Destiny of Mircea Eliade", and Gunter 
Spaltmann's article on "Authenticity and History in the 
Literary Works of Mircea Eliade", in Kitagawa and Long
(eds.), Myth and Symbol.
12 ibid., p.982, nn. 55, 56.
plain in an article assessing Ionescu in 1937 he still 
considered his philosophy tutor to be the foremost 
thinker in contemporary Romania. On the contrary, Eliade 
still subscribes to the concept of traire as the source 
of authentic experience even though it is paradoxically 
regarded as simultaneously the source of illusion and the 
unreal. It would appear that this paradox was made clear 
to Eliade by the fact that the yogin who has attained to 
the experience of true Being, the Jivanmukta. 
nevertheless "goes on remaining in 'life,'" even though 
he "does not partake anymore in the human condition".13 
The whole exercise of the yogi's efforts Eliade sees as 
an attempt to nullify or escape the human condition, the 
"character sine qua non of 'life.'" (ibid.)
Thus normal, everyday experience is seen as 
illusory, unreal, profane. Eliade supports this 
perspective with copious textual examples, but to speak 
to the general student of religions, he is referring to 
the fact that the Christian tradition sees the phenomenal 
world as essentially "fallen", reduced by original sin 
from its original, divinely intended condition to a 
vitiated, lesser state; the Buddhist tradition sees the 
world as anitya, impermanent and perishable, and even the 
human self as negated in the doctrine of anatman: to the 
Hindu the temporal world is produced by maya, the magical 
power of illusion; for the Moslem "all that dwells upon
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the earth is perishing, yet still abides the face of thy 
Lord", (Qu'ran 55:26-27) and so on. Yet that same 
experience, when apprehended in a specific way, when 
interpreted in a certain manner, becomes authentic, real, 
sacred: it becomes an hierophany. This bears obvious 
similarities with Nagarjuna's sunyatavada in which 
nirvana and samsara are equated, a philosophy to which 
Eliade later referred as "one of the most original 
ontological creations known to the history of thought".14 
It also presupposes Eliade's attitude to the coincidentia 
oppositorum as the most profoundly meaningful symbol of 
the nature of absolute, unconditioned reality.
Precisely how Eliade made the shift in the late 
1930s from the basic notion of lived experience as the 
source of authenticity to this more subtle, paradoxical 
conception of the coincidence of the real and the unreal 
in the experience of human life is not clear. Ricketts' 
consideration of Eliade's publications from this period 
are of invaluable assistance, revealing, for example, 
that "authenticity is no longer a 'cause,1 but a 
'subject' to be pondered and debated". (983) However, 
the personal insights of Eliade's journals are sadly 
lacking. Unfortunately the journals which he kept for 
that period were lost during the war and the 
Autobiography is not helpful on that specific point. His 
published journals, dating from 1945 onwards, make one
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possibly valuable contribution to this problem. In 
October 1949 Eliade wrote, "I must divest myself of this 
remnant of immaturity, this superstition of 
'authenticity' at all costs".15 Specifically he was 
writing here of his difficulty in speaking from a 
prepared text. Only the initial confrontation of ideas 
seemed "inspired" to him, the considered and rehearsed 
seeming "artificial". Yet, by extension, one can detect 
here the dilution, the doubt, of traire as the only 
mediator of the authentic. As Eliade began to consider 
the value of the rehearsed (the artificial in the sense 
that it had been worked on), to consider that it was not 
actually immediate, unmediated experience which was the 
vehicle of the authentic, he was becoming more receptive 
to the concept of the reworked, mediated meanings of 
poesis as communicative of the real, the authentic; and 
of the actual lived experience as not inherently 
meaningful at all. Furthermore, he had recognized the 
thirst to transform ordinary, run-of-the-mill experience 
into "authentic" experience of the truly "real" as common 
to both his Criterion friends and the Indian Yogis.
This recognition opens out into his doctrine of 
hierophany; lived experience as simultaneously revealing 
and concealing the sacred. "Anything man has ever 
handled, felt, come in contact with or loved can become a
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hierophany16 Its inherent meaning is precisely nil, or 
rather is quite neutral, until it is considered and 
interpreted. This is simultaneously Kantian and Platonic 
in structure. The content of sensory experience 
participates in the sacred which is the source of all 
meaning, like the Platonic world of Forms, but, like the 
Kantian noumenal, experience is itself devoid of meaning 
until it has been "processed" by the interpretative 
psyche to become the phenomenal world. Lived experience, 
then, takes the place of the Kantian noumenal. It is not 
beyond all access; it is, on the contrary, immediately 
present to our senses, and yet its meaning, its 
significance is not accessible prior to the perceptual 
processes of interpretation which identify experience as 
either sacred or profane. Such an apprehension of the 
processes of perception and interpretation immediately 
begins to separate the concepts of external actuality and 
truth and this inherent reassessment of the constitutive 
characteristics of truth will be considered further.
This understanding of Eliade's hierophanies does not 
spring immediately from the data but must be finally 
inferred from the interrelations of the totality of his 
statements. A more direct and immediate interpretation 
is given by Jay J. Kim, in his 1972 article, "Hierophany 
and History". Kim's description of what he calls the 
"Ontological Locus of Hierophany" is so clear and
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straightforward that I can do no better than to reproduce 
it in extenso.
According to Eliade's analysis, each locus by its 
given constitutional nature provides specific meanings to 
hierophany and circumscribes the range of the possible 
modal variations of a given hierophany. Let us examine a 
few examples from Eliade's analysis.
The sky is even before man is. The sky is there 
before man, but the sky is not just there. The sky is 
high, transcendent, infinite, immovable for no other 
reason than that the sky is. As Eliade says,
let me repeat: even before any religious values have 
been set upon it the sky reveals its transcendence. 
The sky "symbolises" transcendence, power and 
changelessness simply by being there. It exists 
because it is high, infinite, immovable, powerful.17 
The essential point is that man does not project or 
attribute these "qualities" to the sky as a way of 
apprehending the sky, religiously, mythically, 
symbolically or otherwise.
The sky shows itself as it really is: infinite, 
transcendent. The value of heaven is, more than 
anything else, "something quite apart" from the tiny 
thing that is man and his span of life. The 
symbolism of its transcendence derives from the 
simple realisation of its infinite height.18 
We are aware of and can conceive of infinitude and 
transcendence only because the sky is there as it is.
Our primordial experience of it cannot be otherwise than 
it is .
Like any other ontological locus of the elementary 
or central hierophanies, the sky is an inexhaustible 
source of modal variations and permutations of the 
ouranic hierophany. Consequently, anything that happens 
among the stars or in the upper areas of the atmosphere - 
the rhythmic revolution of the stars, chasing clouds, 
thunderbolts, meteors, rainbows - is a moment in that 
hierophany.19
Another example is water. Water simply is without 
modal qualifications, for water has no intrinsic shape of 
its own. Water cannot be created - given a constitutive 
form - because "it can never get beyond its own mode of 
existence - can never express itself in forms".20 Since 
water cannot be created it always exists. This means
"17 ■ •ibid., p.39. I follow Kim's original footnotes.
18 ibid. , p . 38f .
19 ibid. , p . 40 .
20 ibid. , p. 212 .
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that water always and necessarily precedes all creation. 
And because it precedes all it is not alone. "Water is 
always germinative, containing the potentiality of all 
forms in their unbroken unity".21 It is the necessary 
matrix of all forms, the necessary basis which upholds 
all creation. To be created means then to be separated 
from water. Water can never pass beyond the condition of 
the potential, of seeds and hidden powers. Everything 
that has form is manifest above the waters, is separate 
from them.22
This primordial nature of water underlies all the 
innumerable variations on water symbolism. As Eliade 
emphatically states, "in whatever religious framework it 
appears the function of water is shown to be the same".23 
The ontological locus of the aquatic hierophany is as 
inexhaustible as the ouranic but there can be no 
confusion between them.24
There is an unavoidable conflation of hierophany and 
symbol apparent in Kim's description which I will for the 
moment pass over pending my separate treatment of symbols 
and myths. It is a fascinating thesis of Kim's that the 
ontological locus of the Hebraic hierophany is the 
community, people as a corporate body, a point which he 
argues compellingly. He also suggests that the 
ontological locus of hierophany for Christianity and 
Islam respectively might be the person and the word.25 
Unfortunately an inspection of these intriguing 
suggestions is tangential to this study. What must be 
considered carefully here is my contention that the 
hierophany is dependent on perception and interpretation
21 ibid. , p . 188 .
22 ibid. , p. 212 .
23 ibid. , p. 212 .
24 "Hierophany and History", pp.345-346.
25 ibid., pp.346-347.
to be an hierophany as opposed to Kim's insistence that 
"man does not project or attribute these 'qualities' to 
the sky as a way of apprehending the sky, religiously, 
mythically, symbolically or otherwise".
Clearly Eliade's position is that it is the true and 
accurate nature of the sky, for example, which is 
apprehended in the "ouranic" hierophany. However, it is 
equally clear that this nature need not be so 
apprehended. From the totally desacralised point of view 
the sky is not particularly high, about 3 miles; it is 
not particularly transcendent, being a relatively thin 
blanket of atmospheric gas on the surface of the 
terrestrial globe; it is not particularly powerful, since 
modern technology can adequately protect us from the 
weather, and anyway the human race could (nowadays) blow 
the atmosphere clean off the planet. Likewise water does 
not necessarily possess, for example, the characteristic 
of pre-existence attributed to it. Its "formlessness" is 
merely a characteristic of its normally fluid state and 
is shared by all fluids, heating or cooling will endow it 
with other properties; and as a fairly simple compound of 
hydrogen and oxygen it can be "created" by a number of 
chemical reactions.
It is not a case of simply apprehending the 
characteristics manifested by natural phenomena to 
appreciate the nature of an hierophany, and it is 
certainly not the case that "we are aware of and can 
conceive of infinitude and transcendence only because the
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sky is there as it is". If this were the case there 
would be no possible new hierophanies, nor would there be 
any disagreement as to the nature, meaning, or very 
existence of hierophanies. Eliade has sought to present 
his readers with those hierophanies most fundamental to 
known religious history, those hierophanies most 
accessible to contemporary humanity, and those 
hierophanies least likely to cause disagreement. But 
this has led Kim to over-simplify the relationship of 
humanity to the hierophany.26
While it is true that we do not simply "project" the 
qualities of infinitude and transcendence onto the sky it 
is misleading to assume then that we are simply given 
these concepts by our experience of the sky. Rather our 
experience of the world is a reciprocal affair. Without 
some pre-existent conception of infinitude we could never 
recognise the infinitude manifested to us by the sky.27 
Also the specific apprehensions of these sacred 
qualities, while not simply "projections", are dependent 
upon our specific embodied condition. Were we not
26 It should also be noted that Kim's analysis is 
based almost entirely on one book, Patterns in 
Comparative Religion. It is an unfortunate aspect of 
Eliade's thought that it is rather difficult to grasp 
without extensive reading.
27 It is by reference to earlier experience that 
later experiences are classified, hence the attraction of 
the concept of anamnesis for Eliade. Recognition of the 
hierophany is always a matter of reacquaintance with 
prior revelations of the sacred, hence also his emphasis 
on eternal return. However, these are elements of 
Eliade's thought to which I will have to return later.
sighted beings, would the sky manifest infinitude none 
the less? Perhaps this is not so compelling an argument 
in reference to the ouranic hierophany, but consider it 
in relation to the lunar hierophany, which as we shall 
see, is one of Eliade's most frequently cited and 
extensively elaborated loci of hierophany. Simply 
stated, the periodic waxing and waning of the moon 
acquaints humanity with a whole complex of manifestations 
of the nature of the cosmos; periodicity, cyclicality, 
the harmony of things celestial with things terrestrial 
(tides and menstrual cycles). But, of course, the moon 
does not grow and diminish as countless generations have 
perceived it to. This is an illusion brought about by 
the orbital arrangement of the solar system. Were we not 
sighted beings on the surface of this particular planet 
we would have been vouchsafed no such revelation of the 
nature of the sacred. The point is that our perceptions 
are the results of both the external state of affairs and 
our conditioned predispositions and abilities. As 
Coleridge has said "the world is half created, half 
perceived", (rendered into poetry in Wordsworth's 
Prelude, II, 258-260.) It is rather typical of Eliade's 
debt to his Romantic precursors that he should propose a 
schema anticipated by Coleridge, Romantic and longtime 
student of Kant.
One thing finally makes it clear that it must be 
perception which makes the event an hierophany: if all 
existence is capable of becoming a hierophany, (pp.16 and
B . S. Rennie Hierophany 29
23 above) a "manifestation of the sacred" then the 
difference which separates a profane from a sacred event 
is - must be - the perception of the event as such.
Remarkably, Eliade's understanding here coincides 
with Karl Barth's doctrine of the post facto 
interpretations of the partial traces left by the actual 
event of revelation. That is to say, the actual event 
being beyond our traire, we can only interpret the 
interpretations. The reality of the event becomes 
totally dependent on later interpretation, the sacrality 
of the event is dependent on belief. To that extent 
Eliade's ideas are remarkably consistent with Protestant 
Christian thought. However, insofar as Barth et al would 
seek to restrict revelation to the Christ event, to deny 
the actual manifestation of the real in all other worldly 
occurrences, Eliade cannot agree. It is fundamental to 
his whole vision of the world that all mundane 
manifestations are manifestations of the sacred, 
potential hierophanies, capable of being perceived as 
sacred and of revealing absolute Being if perceived and 
interpreted (deciphered) in a certain way. It is a 
particular feature of Eliade's thought that even the most 
horrifying of events (for him as for most of his 
generation, the concentration camps of the Second War) is 
capable of revealing the sacred. He insists that
the strangest, the most aberrant behaviour must be
considered as a human fact; if considered as a
zoological phenomenon or monstrosity it is not
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understood.28
He evidently considers that everything people do and 
everything we have done in the past is valid, if not 
indispensable, evidence of the meaning of our existential 
situation. One manifestation of this feature of his 
thought has been pointed out to me by Mac Ricketts; evil 
as such is entirely absent from Eliade's fictional work.
Even the Inspectors of the secret police who appear in 
The Old Man and the Bureaucrats and in Les Trois Graces 
are not characterised as evil people. In keeping with 
this Eliade is insistent that even the most aberrant 
phenomena of religious history must be recognised as 
genuine manifestations of the religious life of mankind.
Thus hierophany is established as any element of the 
experiential world of humanity which is perceived in such 
a way as to constitute a revelation of the sacred.29 
However, by virtue of the fact that it is an element of 
human experience the hierophany is simultaneously 
mundane, which is to say profane. Having delineated the 
experiential and the paradoxical nature of the concept of 
hierophany it is obviously necessary to pass immediately 
onto a consideration of precisely what the hierophany 
reveals, that is to say, onto a consideration of the 
sacred.
28 The Two and the One. p. 12.
29 As such it is comparable with R. M. Hare's 
notorious "blik". However, it is a "blik" with a 
specific external and given form. (v. "Theology and 
Falsification", in New Essays in Philosophical Theology.)
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Chapter Two 
The Sacred and the Dialectic 
of the Sacred and the Profane.
2.1. The Sacred.
One of the most fundamental and, as we shall see,
one of the most problematic of Eliade's categories for
understanding and explicating the phenomena and the
history of religion is that of the sacred. It is in
terms of and in relation to the sacred that almost all of
his other categories are described. And it is in
relation to the sacred that secondary scholars can most
often be seen to be criticising their own interpretations
rather than the writings of Mircea Eliade.
To begin, then, with one of Eliade's best known and
earliest works, Patterns in Comparative Religion, first
published in French in 1949 as Traité d'Histoire des
Religions. In Section 74, "Stones as Manifesting Power",
he states that,
the hardness, ruggedness, and permanence of matter 
was in itself a hierophany in the religious 
consciousness of the primitive. And nothing was 
more direct and autonomous in the completeness of 
its strength, nothing more noble or awe inspiring 
than a majestic rock, or a boldly standing block of
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granite. Above all, stone is. It always remains 
itself, and exists of itself. ... Rock shows him 
something than transcends the precariousness of his 
humanity: an absolute mode of being. Its strength, 
its motionlessness, its size, and its strange 
outlines are none of them human; they indicate the 
presence of something that fascinates, terrifies, 
attracts and threatens, all at once. In its 
grandeur, its hardness, its shape and its colour man 
is faced with a reality and a force that belong to 
some world other than the profane world of which he 
is himself a part.1
Already we begin to suffer from the lack of transparency
of the text, and the uncertainty of interpretation; but
worse, having said that, Eliade goes on to say that
the devotion of the primitive was in every case 
fastened on something beyond itself which the stone 
incorporated and expressed. A rock or pebble would 
be the object of reverent devotion because it 
represented or imitated something, because it came 
from somewhere. Its sacred value is always due to 
that something or that somewhere, never to its own 
actual existence. Men have always adored stones 
simply in as much as they represent something other 
than themselves.
This seems to be a contradiction; is it the self­
existence and autonomy of stone which effects the 
hierophany, its fundamental characteristics of strength, 
hardness, size and shape, or is it something other than 
the stone's inherent character? If this is not to be a 
simple contradiction then Eliade must mean that what is 
beyond the actual existence of stone, what is other. is 
the guality of strength of hardness, the concept of 
absoluteness, the implications of motionlessness, the
1 op. cit., p.216. Does Eliade's final pronoun here 
refer to the primitive, or to humanity in general? The 
context does not make this clear; Eliade was talking 
about the primitive, however, we all share this 
"precariousness of humanity", so now he is more than 
likely indicating humanity in general.
otherness of inhumanity. All abstract, notional, 
conceptual ideas. Although Eliade has frequently been 
criticised for making a priori assumptions of the 
ontological autonomy of the sacred it is rather the case 
that he is investigating an intentional object, to use 
the language of Husserlian phenomenology, without raising 
the question as to its proper or pure intentionality. It 
is an early assumption of Patterns that "we shall see 
each [manifestation of the sacred] as the manifestation 
in the mental world of those who believe in it".2 That 
this is not merely my rather forced interpretation is 
further borne out by his insistence that the structure of 
the primitive or archaic world was fundamentally 
Platonic.3 Of course he has been attacked for ascribing 
such abstractions outside of the culture and language to 
which they properly belong, but I tend to agree with his 
statement that "for our purpose, it is not the vocabulary 
which matters, it is the demeanour".4 The very fact that 
humanity, even in its earliest stages and least literate 
of manifestations, was capable of entering into as 
complex a relationship as religious reverence with as 
simple an object as a rock would seem to be a persuasive 
argument for the operation of powerful abstractions and
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4 "Sacred Architecture and Symbolism", in Symbolism, 
the Sacred, and the Arts. Diane Apostolos-Cappadona
(ed.), p.107.
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notional attitudes. In the somewhat later work, The
Sacred and the Profane. Eliade attempts clarification.
The sacred always manifests itself as a reality of a 
wholly different order from "natural" realities. It 
is true that language naively expresses the 
tremendum, or the maiestas, or the mysterium 
fascinans by terms borrowed from the world of nature 
or from man's secular mental life. But we know that 
this analogical terminology is due precisely to 
human inability to express the qanz andere; all that 
goes beyond man's natural experience, language is 
reduced to suggesting by terms taken from that 
experience. (p.10.)
This still, however, leaves us in a possible quandary as
to whether the ganz andere which is suffering from
imprecise terminology is an autonomous ontological
entity, an inherent property of the sacred object, or an
inherent property of the perception of sacrality. Nor
does his continued effort to clarify his definition bring
any real solution; "the first possible definition of the
sacred is that it is the opposite of the profane".
(ibid.) Yet he presses .on, "man becomes aware of the
sacred because it manifests itself, shows itself, as
something wholly different from the profane". (ibid.
p.11.) It must be pointed out here that Willard Trask,
the translator of The Sacred and the Profane from French
into English, seems to have been rather insensitive to
the common French (and Romanian) usage of the reflexive
to avoid the passive. A better translation of "le sacré
se manifeste", is "the sacred is manifested", rather than
"the sacred manifests itself". The former preserves the
original implication of the sacred as the passive object
of the phrase, rather than as the active subject. The
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perils of translation are many, as W. C. Smith clearly 
pointed out in his article, "On Mistranslated 
Booktitles",5 and even small insensitivities such as this 
can engender a resistance in the reader. I would 
suggest, however, that there is a greater emphasis on the 
human awareness of the sacred, and the sacred as the 
object of that awareness than the English translation 
allows.
By manifesting the sacred, any object becomes 
something else, yet it continues to remain itself, 
for it continues to participate in its surrounding 
cosmic milieu. A sacred stone remains a stone: 
apparently (or, more precisely, from the profane 
point of view), nothing distinguishes it from all 
other stones. But for those to whom a stone reveals 
itself as sacred, its immediate reality is 
transmuted into a supernatural reality. (ibid.
p. 12.)
Thus the object is not actually changed, "from the 
profane point of view ... nothing distinguishes it". 
Rather it must be the awareness of its sacrality, the 
perception of the sacred as manifest in that particular 
object which has wrought the transformation. As Eliade 
states in The Quest, for the historian of religions,
"our documents - be they myths or theologies [etc. the 
documents of the historian of religion are always 
manifestations of the sacred by definition] - constitute 
... creations of the human mind".
Furthermore, the revelation occurring in a 
hierophany is not irresistible, it can be perceived by 
some and simultaneously unrecognised by others.
5 Religious Studies 20 (1984):27-42.
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Awareness of a miracle is only straightforward for 
those who are prepared by their personal experience 
and their religious background to recognize it as 
such. To others the "miracle" is not evident, it 
does not exist.6
Thus it is unquestionably the perception of the sacred
which constitutes it as it is for those who perceive it.
What, then, is it that is perceived as sacred? Eliade is
quite clear and consistent about this: "the sacred is
pre-eminently the real, at once power, efficacy, the
source of life and fecundity". (Ibid. p.28) This is not
to say that the sacred is necessarily something
independent of this experience, rather
it is this experience of the sacred, that generates 
the idea of something which really exists and, in 
consequence the notion that there are absolute 
intangible values which confer a meaning upon human
existence.7
Again, "it is, then, through the experience of the sacred 
that the ideas of reality, truth, and significance first 
dawn".8
As Eliade uses it
the sacred does not necessarily imply belief in God 
or gods or spirits. I repeat, it is the experience 
of a reality and the source of an awareness of 
existing in the world.9
Eliade does appear to be discussing notional, rather than
independent realities: to use once again the language of
6 Mademoiselle Christina, from the French 
introduction of 1978, p. 7. My translation.
7 "Structure and Changes in the History of Religion", 
p . 3 6 6 .
8 Myth and Reality, p.139,
9 Ordeal by Labyrinth, p.154.
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Husserlian phenomenology (which Eliade himself did not
do), purely, rather than properly intentional objects.
In the article from which I have taken the first of
these two quotations, "Structure and Changes in the
History of Religion", Eliade tells us that "the sacred
is manifest in an infinity of forms", (p.353) It is
noteworthy that Eliade uses "infinity" not merely "great
variety" of forms. As we shall see later, Eliade is
clearly arguing that any and every historical/phenomenal
object and event can manifest the sacred. Similarly, in
Yoga he states that there are "countless modalities of
the sacred".10 Thus the only property necessary to
permit the manifestation of the sacred is existence.
Eliade repeatedly defines the sacred as the real.
The reader must be very careful here not to ascribe any
unwarranted assumptions to this real, not to read their
own real into Eliade's general interpretative category.
Like the sacred, the real is an intentional object, the
object of belief. As Eliade says, the believer
always believes that there is an absolute reality,
the sacred, which transcends this world but 
manifests itself in this world, thereby sanctifying 
it and making it real.11
The equation of the sacred and the real is 
consistent throughout Eliade's work.12 However, most 
scholars seem either to disregard it or mistakenly to
10 Yoga . p . 96 .
11 Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, p.202.
12 Since "Cosmical Homology", in 1937.
assume it to refer to a deity or a necessarily 
independent ontology. On the contrary, Eliade repeatedly 
states that "the sacred is an element in the structure of 
(human) consciousness".13 In other words, Eliade is not 
discussing an ontological substratum, like Aristotle's 
hyle or Kant's noumenal. but the psycho-phenomenological 
real - that which is apprehended as real by the 
consciousness of the aware, experiencing subject. It
is possible to be misled by Eliade's language, but close 
inspection reveals his consistency. For example, he 
states,
through the experience of the sacred, the human mind 
grasped the difference between that which reveals 
itself as real, powerful, rich and meaningful and 
that which does not.14
This could all too easily be read as granting external,
independent ontology to the sacred as the object of
experience. However, it is more consistent with Eliade's
thought to read the experience of the sacred to be the
experience of the real. In context, Eliade has made it
plain that he does not, as Robert Baird suggests, "assume
that there is something out there that corresponds to the
term 'religion' or 'the sacred.1"15 Rather he identifies
something in the structure of human consciousness and
concomitant phenomena in human history. This is not to
13 The Quest, p.i; No Souvenirs, p.l; and The History 
of Religious Ideas, vols. I-III, vol. 1. p. xiii.
14 The Quest, p.i.
15 Baird, op. cit., p.74. For a fuller discussion of 
Baird's critique v. below 7.4, pp.267-276.
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say that Eliade ever denies the ontological independence 
of the sacred; he does not. However, this is a question 
for theology or metaphysics, not for the history and 
phenomenology of religions.
This, then, is Eliade's view of the sacred. It is 
the intentional object of human experience which is 
apprehended as the real. His use of the term "sacred" in 
this way has led to all sorts of criticisms of 
prejudgment, theological bias, metaphysical assumptions 
etc. An etymological look at the word sacred might be 
worthwhile. It is, for example, "dedicated or set apart 
for the service or worship of deity", or "worthy of 
religious veneration".16 As "that which is venerated" or 
"that which is considered worthy of worship", the sacred 
unquestionably does exist. It exists as the object par 
excellence of the study of religion. To assume an 
ontological category existing independently of human 
involvement, however, is unnecessary and unhelpful to the 
study. And Eliade does not necessarily so assume. Thus 
his focus is on humanity, not on the disputed independent 
existence of a Divine Being.17
As we have seen,
16 Webster's 9th New Collegiate Dictionary.
17 Indeed this dispute is unnecessary, and is little 
more than a resurrection of Anselm's ontological 
argument; must God exist in order to be "that than which 
nothing greater can be thought?" Must the sacred exist 
(ie. possess independent ontology) in order to be worthy 
of worship? This question is discussed below, 7.5,
pp.277-292.
the sacred does not necessarily imply belief in God 
or gods or spirits. I repeat, it is the experience 
of a reality and the source of an awareness of 
existing in the world.18
That "reality" of which the sacred is an experience can
only be whatever one construes to be real. Contemporary
thought usually ascribes that reality to "the outside
world", that which exists independent of human creation
or construal, but that is an ascription which has a
historical source and far-reaching implications.
The narrative style which Eliade adopts in his
fiction (which he sees as continuous with though distinct
from his academic researches) constantly implies the
possibility of the recognition of the sacred in all the
objects and events of daily life. This is qualified by
the necessity of preparation by personal experience and
cultural religious background. Thus Eliade escapes the
possibly accurate but potentially ridiculous state of
affairs that any insignificant object may become the
locus of the sacred, a focus of worship. The converse of
this, that the significance of sacred objects is not
always and immediately recognised as such, adds weight to
Eliade's argument. The crucifix was not recognised by
the Christian church as a vehicle of the divine until
several centuries after the event in which it featured.
Likewise, representations of the Buddha did not attain to
significance until the cult of the Buddha had been
established for some considerable time, providing its
18 Ordeal by Labyrinth, p.154.
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followers with the personal experience and religious 
culture to recognise the sacred significance of a certain 
carved figure.
It would appear that on close investigation Eliade's 
sacred is a systematic rather than an ontological 
proposition. The sacred is, by definition, that which 
underlies all religious experience, possibly all human 
experience. It is not necessarily an object independent 
of that experience.19
However certain I may be of this conclusion, it is 
not one which many other critics of Eliade have reached. 
One example of a scholar who has particularly criticised 
the "ontological" aspect of Eliade's sacred is Antonio 
Barbosa da Silva. In dealing with the "special 
background" of Eliade's phenomenology of religion Barbosa 
da Silva studies Eliade's application of Rudolph Otto's 
terminology. It should be remembered in this context 
that Eliade's well-known work, The Sacred and the 
Profane, was first published in German as Das Heileae und 
Das Profane (1957), and is very much a response to and in 
many ways a continuation from Otto's Das Heileqe (The 
Idea of the Holy). Thus it is rather fruitless to point 
out, as Barbosa da Silva does, that Eliade "identifies 
the 'Sacred' with the 'Holy,'"20 since these are simply
19 v. Ordeal by Labyrinth, p.122, v. also Myths, 
Dreams and Mysteries, pp. 15, 123.
20 Barbosa da Silva, A. Phenomenology as a 
Philosophical Problem, p.177. v. my further discussion, 
below, 7.2, pp.246-254.
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alternative translations of the German "Heilege". There
is no doubt that Eliade accepts Otto's concept of the
sacred as ganz andere, the mysterium tremendum et
fascinans, which is seen as the source of numinous
experience. Yet Eliade was seeking to go further than
Otto in defining the sacred/holy in his specific
dialectic of the sacred and the profane.
Barbosa da Silva analyses Eliade's sacred as a
phenomenological term, which he further divides into
"evaluative" and "theological" phenomenological terms,
and as an ontological term, which he further divides into
"meta-cosmic" and "transcendental-ontological" senses.
These senses refer to the sacred as the cosmos as a whole
and to the sacred as "the ultimate principle (Ur-Datum)
of Eliade's creative hermeneutics", (ibid. p.175.) I am
broadly in agreement with Barbosa da Silva's evaluation
of the sacred as a phenomenological term. However, it is
his analysis of the sacred as an ontological term with
which I will take issue.
Robert Baird's response to Eliade's sacred in the
context of his analysis of "category formation" is
likewise to point out that, since Eliade accords
ontological status to the sacred without clear
definition, he thus "proceeds under the essential-
intuitional approach", (op. cit., p.74.) Thus Eliade
assumed that there is something out there that 
corresponds to the term "religion" or "the sacred", 
and also that the historian of religion can identify 
it intuitively, (ibid.)
B. S. Rennie The Sacred 44
Although Eliade did not give formal and dogmatic 
expression to his working definitions they are clearly 
present to the attentive reader as Baird himself came 
close to recognising when he equates "religion, the 
sacred, [and] man's response to the sacred", (ibid.) 
Religion is already defined as man's response to the 
sacred. Of course that is only meaningful if one has 
some notion of the meaning of the sacred. One of the 
institutional difficulties which militated against Eliade 
giving clear formal definitions in these terms was 
precisely the fact that many of the academic scholars of 
religion, especially between the 40s and 60s when he 
produced his major works, already had clear and 
unshakable ideas of the meaning of the sacred (and of the 
real). However, for those of us who are less convinced 
of our own knowledge of such categories Eliade's work 
provides an indication of what the sacred has been 
considered to be throughout the religious history of 
humanity.
The wary reader might note at this point that 
Eliade's procedure, too, is somewhat circular; by 
assuming religion to be the human response to the sacred 
he identifies the nature of the sacred as it is 
encountered in religious history. He is assuming the 
meaning of a word in order to identify the phenomena in 
which that term is involved, in order to discover the 
meaning of that term. However, he avoids a vicious 
circularity. Such "enabling prejudices" have been very
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credibly argued to be involved in all our understanding; 
one must invest a word with some meaning before one can 
proceed to refine and develop that meaning. It is the 
"prejudice against prejudice which denies tradition its 
power".21 Of course the circularity of Eliade's 
description (for it is that rather than an argument, 
although all descriptions are in part persuasive and 
supportive of the Weltanschauung for which they are true) 
is more attractive to the reader with some predisposition 
to accept it.
Baird concluded that Eliade's understanding "will 
appear useful to all those who share his ontological 
stance", (op.cit. p.91.) However, the reader whose 
predisposed notion of the sacred is of an exclusively 
Christian deity might equally find it difficult to accept 
the amorphousness of Eliade's sacred and the ubiquity of 
its manifestations. Certainly the reader whose 
predisposition is to resist any ascription of reality to 
traditional immaterial entities might find it difficult 
to enter into the play of meaning, to begin the process 
of refinement and development of the meaning of the 
sacred. For the latter the only options are to deny any 
meaning to such a term, or attempt to apprehend its 
significance through a different field, such as 
psychology or sociology, which has previously been 
apprehended as possessed of real significance. The major
21 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.270.
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question here is what benefits might be gained in the
endeavour to understand religious phenomena and homo
reliqiosus by an acceptance of the meaning of religion as
the response to the sacred. For if we cannot invest the
word "religion" and its fundamental category,
"sacredness", with some meaning then it seems utterly
fruitless to attempt to understand religion per se or
humanity in its "religious" aspect.
In his study Homo Reliqiosus in the Works of Mircea
Eliade. John Saliba has distinguished between
anthropologists and historians of religions specifically
on the grounds that
the historian of religions [as opposed to the 
anthropologist] assumes the existence of the sacred 
independent of man, and takes religious experience 
as the effect of the sacred on man. History of 
religions, in Wach1s words, "is the story of man's 
understanding and appreciation of the fact that God 
has revealed himself to man". The presence of the 
sacred and its manifestations are among the main 
assumptions of historians of religions.22
If Eliade can be shown to have expressed a coherent
understanding of religion which allows for the
identification of reality and the sacred, without
involving this assumption, he has surely made a unique
contribution to both fields.
Douglas Allen, who is certainly one of the more
sensitive and sympathetic of Eliade's critics and one who
discovers more benefit than most in Eliade's work, has
22 Homo Religiosus in the Works of Mircea Eliade. 
p.40. Quoting Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions.
p .135 .
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pointed out that
Eliade must not be confused with the numerous 
scholars who hold metaphysical positions concerning 
transcendence. He is not claiming that "the value 
of religious phenomena can be understood only if we 
keep in mind that religion is ultimately a 
realisation of a transcendent truth".23
Allen is also aware that Eliade "appears to have given us
a 'definition' of religion which is supposedly dependent
on the nature of the religious documents he has
investigated, but" he is forced to conclude, one "which
is not in fact open to change".24 This is obviously a
problem; if the "definition" is not open to change, if it
is set for all time in its own interdependent, systematic
sub-definitions and categories, can it be of any real use
in the changing world of human culture?
Allen sees Eliade as one who
has attempted to understand religion as a way that 
the human being is in the world; religion arises 
from existential crises and is understood as a mode 
of existence in the world. For homo reliqiosus the 
sacred "is the category of meaning in the world.
The Sacred is what is valid in the world, authentic, 
substantial, real, true, eternal". ...
Eliade, when he describes the profane as 
meaningless or nonbeing, is using a religious scale, 
is describing the profane qua profane, (Allen 
footnotes: we have written "profane qua profane" 
because the profane does have meaning and value for 
homo reliqiosus, but only in so far as it reveals 
the sacred) and is presenting the view of homo 
reliqiosus only after he or she has evaluated and 
chosen the sacred, after one has resolved his or her
23 "Structure and Creativity", p.122. Quoting C. J. 
Bleeker, "The Future Task of the History of Religions", 
p.227. NB. that Bleeker's normative statement was 
rejected in a statement signed by Eliade, V. Numen 7 
(1960) p.237.
24 "Structure and Creativity", p.123.
existential crisis.25
This clarifies further Eliade's appropriation of the 
religious language of the believer. In granting meaning 
to such language, that language also becomes meaningful 
to Eliade, and thus usable by him. It is this 
utilisation of the presuppositional language of religious 
believers which, I believe, has caused Eliade such 
hostile criticism. And yet, is not all language 
predispositional in this sense? Must not meaning be 
granted before understanding can be furthered?
This discussion of Eliade's notion of the sacred has 
already exceeded the space I had hoped to allow it 
without reaching a firm conclusion. I cannot immediately 
settle the problem of the importance which Eliade accords 
to the sacred. This is finally a matter of personal 
experience and predisposition. However, I hope that I 
have achieved my aim of clarifying what it is that Eliade 
indicates by the word "sacred". This is still a 
difficult term and one without which I do not believe one 
can clearly comprehend the shape of Eliade's thought.
Thus it will be worth further exposition of the term in 
its specific dialectical relation to its binary partner, 
the profane.
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25 ibid., pp.131, (quoting Ira Progoff, "Culture and 
Being", p.53) and p.133 n.55.
2.2. The Dialectic of the Sacred and the Profane.
One heuristic device which Eliade utilises in order 
to explicate his conception of the sacred is that of the 
dialectic of the sacred and the profane. The specific 
extension which he makes from Otto's expression of the 
sacred is to try further to clarify this numinous concept 
in its particular opposition to that which it is not; a 
sort of via neqativa. This dialectic was taken up by 
Thomas J. J. Altizer in the first book-length study of 
the thought of Mircea Eliade, Mircea Eliade and the 
Dialectics of the Sacred, written in 1963.
Altizer was considerably ahead of other scholars in 
this respect; Kitagawa and Long's edition, Myths and 
Symbols: Studies in Honour of Mircea Eliade. was not 
published until 1969, and the next full-length treatment, 
John Saliba’s Homo Reliqiosus in the Works of Mircea 
Eliade, not until 1976. This very hiatus in major 
secondary scholarship may indicate the lack of solid, 
self-confident reaction to Eliade's thought, although the
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articles of Penner and Leach, Radaza, Hamilton, Hudson, 
Rasmusen, Ricketts, and Welbon (the first two critical, 
the remainder broadly favourable) indicate that there was 
a core of assertive critical reaction to Eliade during 
the sixties.
I have attempted to limit the consideration of 
secondary scholarship in the first part of this work, 
holding it in abeyance while I attempt to give a clear 
exposition of Eliade's thought based on his own work. 
However, it will be beneficial at this point to make a 
detailed consideration of Altizer's description of 
Eliade's dialectic of the sacred because, while the 
former was by no means a severe critic of Eliade, he has 
none the less misunderstood that dialectic. His 
enlistment of Eliade's name to further his own "death-of- 
God" theology remained the only full-length exposition of 
Eliade's thought during a twenty-year period after his 
arrival in Chicago. As such it has set the scene for 
much of the ensuing understanding of that thought in the 
English-speaking world and an inspection of Altizer's 
analysis provides a convenient forum in which to debate 
this dialectic and, hopefully, to clarify its nature.
It is in agreement with Ricketts' assessment in 
"Eliade and Altizer: Very Different Outlooks", and in 
"Mircea Eliade and the Death of God", and with Eliade's 
own comments in "Notes for a Dialogue", in The Theology
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of T. J. J. Altizer,28 that I conclude that Altizer's
analysis is rather wide of the mark. Yet Altizer's clear
statement of intent brushes aside many potential
criticisms. "This book," he states,
is not a scholarly interpretation of Eliade's work. 
It is true that the first half of the book attempts 
to elucidate Eliade's understanding of the sacred, 
and in doing so, it explores various theological and 
philosophical implications of his thought about 
which he himself has chosen to be silent.29
Thus Altizer's work is confessedly speculative, and yet
he "nevertheless profess[es] to be in a large measure
[Eliade's] disciple", (op. cit, p.20.) and so the reader
must expect a fundamental consonance with his "master's"
thought. From the outset Altizer states that
Eliade posits a sacred that is the opposite of the 
profane: it is this very dialectical opposition of 
the sacred and the profane that makes the sacred 
meaningful to the profane consciousness, (ibid., 
p .18 . )
Certainly Eliade has said that "the first possible
definition of the sacred is that it is the opposite of
the profane",30 and that
all definitions up till now of the religious 
phenomenon have one thing in common: each has its 
own way of showing that the sacred and the religious 
life are the opposite of the profane and the secular 
life,31
but in both of these cases he has gone on to indicate 
that this opposition is problematic and in need of
28 Ed. John B. Cobb.
29 Altizer, op. cit., p.18.
30 The Sacred and the Profane, p.10.
31 Patterns, p.i. „
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clarification. In both of these cases the obvious,
primary opposition of the sacred and the profane is a
starting point from which Eliade progresses to expound
his own, more complex view.
In The Sacred and the Profane, the source of the
first of the two quotations given above and the major
location of Eliade's thought on this topic, he goes on
differentiate the sacred and the profane specifically
through the human reaction to these radically different
"modes of being", by the differentiation between
"historical" and "sacred" being. Altizer explains,
by purely "historical" being Eliade means a 
radically profane mode of existence, a mode of 
existence which has withdrawn itself from an 
awareness of the transcendent, and immersed itself 
in the immediate temporal moment.32
There is, no doubt, some truth in this. But is it as
simple as Altizer seems to imply? His "death-of-God"
theology is interesting and meaningful in its own right
and it is not my intention to criticise that here.
Rather I must question whether the analysis he gives of
Eliade's conception of the dialectic of the sacred and
the profane accurately reflects Eliade's thought. One
must consider the identification of the sacred and the
real, which I believe I have established adequately
enough in the preceding section to now take for granted
Can "historical" being accurately be said to have
"withdrawn itself from an awareness of the transcendent
32 Altizer, The Dialectics of the Sacred, p.23.
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(in this context that is the sacred, the real)? While 
there remains any awareness of "reality", how can 
"historical" humanity have achieved a "radically profane 
mode of existence?" Altizer continues that this 
"immersion is totally isolated from any meaning or 
reality that might lie beyond it", (ibid., p.23.) and 
herein, perhaps, lies the misapprehension. Meaning and 
reality are not sought beyond actual, empirical, 
historical experience, granted; they are, however, sought 
in the profane. Thus the sacred does not transcend the 
profane in that it "lies beyond" it. Rather for modern, 
historical humanity the sacred is the profane; empirical 
actuality is reality.
The question is: does modern humanity's choice to 
live exclusively in the profane world automatically and 
necessarily close us off from the realm of the sacred?
An analysis of Eliade's thought would indicate quite 
clearly otherwise. It does however close us off from the 
realm of the traditionally sacred, and it should be 
noticed that Eliade has differentiated modern from 
traditional humanity in precisely this way.33 Thus 
Altizer's perception of "a yawning void in even the most 
powerful expressions of contemporary religious life"
33 Eliade explains that "by this term [traditional 
cultures] we mean any culture, whether ethnographic 
('primitive') or literate, which is governed in its 
entirety by norms whose religious or cosmological 
(metaphysical) validity is not doubted by any members of 
the community". Barabadur. the Symbolic Temple, first 
published in 1937. V. Diane Apostolos-Cappadona ed. 
Symbolism, the Sacred and the Arts, p. 131, n.l.
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because "theology has lost all contact with the 
sacred",34 goes too far to have a real basis in Eliade's 
thought.
It is rather the contemporary identification of the
real with the historical/empirical which opens this void
between the traditionally sacred and that which is
contemporarily perceived as the real. Altizer's
contention that theology
must be prepared for the possibility that the most 
radical expression of profane existence will 
coincide with the highest expressions of the sacred, 
(ibid., p .17.)
would no doubt have found some agreement from Eliade, but 
to continue that "only the Christian can greet the 
radical profane with faith" is exclusivist, contradicting 
Eliade's valorisation of Asian and "primitive" religions. 
The insistence that the Christian can greet the profane 
with faith because "the Christian believes in both 
Creation and Incarnation ... in a Christ who is in some 
sense Creator and Redeemer at once",35 may be true, but 
that this is exclusively true of the Christian is not 
supported by anything Eliade has written. In fact the 
ability to recognise the sacred in the radically profane 
is precisely the central feature of all religion 
according to Eliade's analysis of the sacred as the real.
It would appear that Altizer has been misled by a 
superficial resemblance of Eliade's thought to his own.
34 Altizer, op. cit., p.14.
35 Altizer, op. cit., pp.17-18.
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Reading such statements as "the non-religious man refuses 
transcendence", or "modern man cannot be content until he 
has killed the last god",36 Altizer has either assumed a 
deeper consonance with the death-of-God theology than is 
actually the case, or he has deliberately made a one­
sided presentation of Eliade's thought in order to 
clarify his own position. Altizer's protestations that 
his book is "not a scholarly interpretation of Eliade's 
thought" (above, n.29) would seem to support the latter 
conclusion.
Certainly Eliade's reaction was one of 
disappointment. In his direct response, the "Notes for a 
Dialogue" mentioned above, which was published in 1970, 
Eliade expresses a desire to
express publically my friendship for the man and my 
admiration for the author. The issue of agreeing or 
disagreeing with his theological innovations is, at 
least in my case, irrelevant. I am interested in 
Altizer's writings for their own sake; I consider 
them original and important spiritual adventures.
(o p . cit., p.234.)
However, that he did disagree is the inevitable
conclusion, especially considering his 1968 denunciation
of the "Death-of-God" theology as part of "the
provincialism of the latest crisis, fashion or cliché of
Western religious language and traditions".37
As I have already mentioned, Eliade's main complaint
is that Altizer relied entirely on Eliade's scholarly
36 The Sacred and the Profane, pp.202, 203.
37 Preface to Reflective Theology by T. N. Munson, 
p.vii.
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production to the exclusion of his complementary 
fictional writings, (p.3 above) The very fact that 
Eliade makes such a complaint is alone sufficient to 
indicate that he considered Altizer's understanding of 
his (Eliade's) thought to be incomplete. As he says, he 
does not "recognise [his] thinking" in much of Altizer's 
description.38
Altizer clearly saw
an essential foundation of Eliade's understanding of 
the sacred: the sacred and the profane are human 
phenomena, they are created by man's existential 
choice.39
Yet he could not, apparently, follow this through to its 
logical conclusion that the opposition of the sacred and 
the profane lie within the human existential condition 
and not outside it in some ontological dichotomy. We 
cannot be completely closed to the sacred, we can only 
"choose" not to recognise the sacred in some particular, 
in the case of modern humanity, in the traditional- 
mythic, form.40
Modern man "accepts no model for humanity outside 
the human condition as it can be seen in the various 
historical situations".41 That is, he specifically
38 "Notes for a Dialogue", p.240, n.6.
39 Altizer, op. cit., p.24.
40 I write "choose" in inverted commas because, as we 
shall see, that "choice" is to a certain degree 
conditioned by the religious experience and cultural 
tradition of the individual.
41 The Sacred and the Profane, p. 2 03.
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rejects the other loci of paradigmatic models for 
humanity - traditional culture and its myths and the 
contemporary speculative imagination. However revealing 
the "various historical situations" of humanity might be 
they do not reveal an exemplary model, they do not reveal 
what humanity might be, what we ought to be, or what we 
could be. They reveal only what we were in fact, which 
is of no necessary significance for the future until it 
is interpreted, until some mythic structure is imposed 
upon it. (Here I am particularly including secular 
ideologies such as the Marxist dialectic as 
interpretative and mythic structures.) However, Eliade 
describes as a "malentendu" Altizer's contention that the 
older scholar "presents the 'situation' of the shaman, 
the yogi, the alchemist, and particularly the 'archaic 
mode of being in the world,’ as models for modern man".42
Eliade’s dissatisfaction with the modern restriction 
of (sacred) reality to historical time and physical space 
would seem to stem from internal considerations. The 
modern scientific world view is inherently incapable of 
providing humanity with adequate exemplary models. (It
should be pointed out that Eliade's acquaintance with and 
understanding of modern scientific concepts is indicated 
by, for example, his short story "Dayan" in which the 
protagonist is a mathematician who has found the 
[impossible?] solution to Godel's theorem.) It is modern
42 "Notes for a Dialogue", p. 237.
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science itself which has revealed these inadequacies.
For example, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle has shown 
us the necessary incompleteness of our knowledge of even 
the external, empirical world. The concept of the 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions revealed by 
Lorentz's research into the prediction of the weather has 
taught us that in complex systems such as global weather 
conditions and human life, even the fullest understanding 
of past actualities and present fact does not allow any 
meaningful predictions of the future without an 
applicable and necessarily fallible (because finite) 
interpretative structure.43 I repeat, history can only 
show us where we have been, not where we are (or should 
be) going.
A major disagreement of Altizer's perception of the 
dialectic of the sacred and the profane from that 
expressed by Eliade is that "neither can become fully 
itself apart from a total negation of the other; it is 
precisely the profane which is negated by the sacred".44 
On the contrary, Eliade states several times that a 
sacred tree, for example, remains precisely a tree. The 
revelation of the sacred is always in and through the
43 As James Gleick has put it, "you can make your 
model more complex and more faithful to reality, or you 
can make it simpler and easier to handle". James Gleick, 
Chaos: Making a New Science, p.278. V. ibid. p.11-31, on 
the sensitive dependence on initial conditions, known as 
the "butterfly effect". V. eg. Stephen Hawkin, A Brief 
History of Time, p.53-61 on Heisenberg's uncertainty 
principle.
44 Altizer, op. cit., p.26.
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specifically profane.45 The sacred does not abolish the
profane object in and through which it is manifested,
in fact hierophanies could not abolish the profane 
world, for it is the very manifestation of the 
sacred that establishes the world, i.e., transforms 
a formless, unintelligible and terrifying chaos into 
a cosmos. ... In short hierophany is ontophany - the
experience of the sacred gives reality, shape, and 
meaning to the world.46
Although the starting point for an understanding of
Eliade's sacred is its dialectical opposition to the
profane, it becomes apparent that the conclusion is not
one of simple opposition but one of complex
interdependence. Having pointed out that "anything man
has ever handled, felt, come into contact with or loved
can become a hierophany",47 Eliade is quite aware of the
difficulty this raises. If anything at all can reveal
the sacred, can the sacred/profane dichotomy stand? The
answer is affirmative because while all things can reveal
the sacred, not all things do. Not only is there no
culture which recognises all the manifestations of
sacrality which have been detected in various times and
locations, but also
while a certain class of things may be found fitting 
vehicles of the sacred, there always remain some 
things in the class which are not given this honour.
(ibid., p .13.)
Thus there is still a real and meaningful distinction to
45 egs. Mademoiselle Christina, Introduction, p.7. 
Patterns. p.29. The Sacred and the Profane, pp. 12, 14.
46 "Notes for a Dialogue", pp.238f.
47 Patterns , pp. 10 f .
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be made here. The sacred is still perceived as distinct
from the profane.
The sacred, the significant, is perceived to be
manifested in the profane, the mere. Whilst the object,
symbol, narrative, or person which is seen to manifest
this excess of reality, of meaning, or significance, is
thus itself sacred, it simultaneously, and paradoxically,
remains profane. The revelation of the sacred to
humanity in our embodied condition requires the
involvement of the profane. Eliade was most insistent
that all such revelations must occur in and through
historical time and material occurrence, (eg. ibid.,
pp.2f.) Thus despite the fundamental opposition of the
sacred and the profane, the one being what the other is
not, they are inextricably interconnected, they are each
other in a very real way. They are radically different
modes of being, but they are both modes of being.
Eliade's fictional form and style reflect and embody in
many ways his understanding of this paradoxical
relationship. I will content myself here with the
general observation that central to his style is the
revelation of the mysterious or fantastic concealed or
camouflaged in the quotidian. Eliade has admitted that
this technique to some extent reflects the 
dialectics of the sacred: it is characteristic of
what I have called "hierophany" that the sacred is 
thereby both revealed and concealed in the profane. 
To give but one example, a sacred tree which 
embodies the sacred to the worshippers of the 
religion under consideration remains merely a tree 
of a certain type to all others. The same 
dialectic: profane-sacred-profane, explains what I
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have called "the unrecognisable aspect of 
miracle" .48
Finally the dialectic of the sacred and the profane 
is the ultimate example of the coincidentia oppositorum, 
the coincidence of opposites, the being one of two 
apparently polar oppositions. The sacred/profane 
dichotomy is quoted as the religious dichotomy par 
excellence "which, as a matter of fact, signifies a total 
dichotomy, relating concurrently to cosmos, life, and 
human society".49 This very notion of the coincidence of 
opposites is one of Eliade's best loved and most used 
symbols of the nature of the sacred, the real, and must 
be inspected independently.
48 Mademoiselle Christina, 1978 Introduction, pp. 6- 
7. My translation.
49 The Quest, p . 174 .
Chapter Three 
The Coincidentia Oppositorum and Homo Reliqiosus
3.1. The Coincidentia Oppositorum.
In his PhD thesis on yoga, translated into French, 
revised, and published as Yoga: Essai sur les oriaines de 
la mystique Indienne in 1936, Eliade expounded yoga 
mainly through two pairs of opposites; magical/mystical 
and abs tract/concrete.1 However, he did not at that time 
consider (or at least not publically) the coincidence of 
opposites to be an important problem. I use the word 
"problem" advisedly here since Eliade refers to the 
"problem of the coincidentia oppositorum" which "will 
fascinate me till the end of my life".2 Evidently he did 
not consider the coincidentia a solution to the mystery 
of life, but itself a problem to be studied. He again 
referred to it as a "problem" which still engrosses him 
in Autobiography II, (p.194), written towards the end of
1 The polarity "magical/mystical" from the thesis on 
Yoga is carried on in Images and Symbols in the form 
"magic/religion". Unfortunately, this is hardly any more 
clear and one must rely heavily on Mac Rickett's 
interpretation in Romanian Roots, pp.502-504.
2 In Journal IV, p.2, a note made in 1979.
B. S. Rennie Coincidentia Oppositorum 63
his life.
The relationship of apparently polar oppositions
obviously concerned Eliade when he was writing Yoga and
he referred to its conceptual power in a radio talk given
on Good Friday of 1935;
Jesus penetrates into Death and conquers it. The 
light splits the darkness and scatters it. From 
this simple confrontation of contraries, the whole 
greatness of Christianity derives.3
In the same year as his thesis was published Eliade 
wrote an important article "Cosmic Homology and Yoga", 
his first published in English.4 Here he asserts as an 
extrapolation from his thesis that the yogin causes Being 
to coincide with Non-being. (p.202.) As I mentioned 
above (p.19, n.9.) it is in this article that Eliade 
first makes the explicit equation of the "sacred" with 
the "real" (Being) and the "profane" with the "unreal" 
(Non-being), (p.188.) It is here also that he first 
definitively states that the realisation of the 
coincidence of these two apparent opposites is a form of 
the absolute, a transcendence, an "abolition" of the 
human condition, (p.203.) These insights were 
incorporated into the later revised text of Yoga. 
immortalité, et liberté.5
The actual term, Coincidentia Oppositorum is not
3 Quoted by Ricketts, Romanian Roots, p.814.
4 Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art 5 
(1937): 188-203.
5 v. the English translation, pp.95-100.
used, as the researches of Mac Ricketts reveal,6 until an
article of 1938, although Eliade was well aware of it,
having taught a seminar on Nicolas of Cusa's De Docta
Icrnorantia at the University of Bucharest in 1934-35. In
the period 1938-39 he wrote several articles directly on
this problem, some were published in Mitul Reinteqrarii
and others used in Patterns and The Two and The One.7 By
the time of the publication of Patterns in 1949 the term
had assumed major importance. Although Thomas Altizer
remarked, and Douglas Allen concurred, that "the
coincidentia oppositorum is Eliade's favourite
symbolism",8 Eliade's critics and commentators do not
have so much to say on this important concept as they do
on, say, homo reliaiosus. John Saliba in his book of
that title affirms that
Eliade is ... correct in highlighting the concept of 
"coincidentia oppositorum" and in seeing it as a
necessary element in religion. ... Some of the key
concepts in religion unite apparently incompatible 
ideas. (p.172.)
Saliba refers to Evans-Pritchard who has agreed that "it
is in the nature of the subject [i.e. religion] that
there should be ambiguity and paradox".9 Yet despite his
realisation of the importance of the coincidentia Saliba
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6 Romanian Roots, p.821, n.54.
7 V. Autobiography II, p.82
8 Allen, Structure and Creativity, p.221, Altizer, 
Mircea Eliade and the Dialectic of the Sacred, p.17.
9 Saliba, p.172. Evans-Pritchard, Nuer Religion, 
pp.123f.
is quick to criticise Eliade for over-emphasising the
"withdrawn" (i.e. otiose) nature of God. Given this very
stress on the complementarity of opposites it should be
obvious that in Eliade's thought the "transcendence" of
the divine being is always complementary to its
immanence, as Saliba approvingly quotes John Mbiti as 
10saying.
For Guildford Dudley Eliade's coincidentia is a way 
in which "mythic language can also reconcile 
diametrically opposed motifs" and can, for example 
"present a God who is simultaneously gentle and terrible 
in a way that defies rational explanation". This Dudley 
attributes to Eliade's belief that "mythic language 
possesses the autonomous power of coincidentia 
oppositorum" .11 Altizer considers m a r  rne prmcipio ui 
unity behind the sacred rests on a "pretemporal and 
pre-cosmic Totality" to wn̂ -w*
oppositorum points "in its Hindu and specifically Tantric
form", (op. cit., p.17.) Evidently these critics have
recognised the importance of the concept for1 v> H-He coincidentia
understanding Eliade's thought, but they have made no 
great effort to clarify precisely what it is that Eliade 
means by it. To do this one must turn to a detailed 
examination of what Eliade himself has to say on the 
matter.
10 African Religions and Philosophy, p.33, Saliba, 
p.173.
11 Religion on Trial, p.150.
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The earliest prolonged exposition on the
coincidentia oppositorum occurs in Patterns, first
published in French in 1949, where Eliade gives credence
to Dudley's analysis by saying that
myth reveals more profoundly than any rational 
experience ever could, the actual structure of the 
divinity, which transcends all attributes and 
reconciles all contraries, (p.419.)
The coincidentia is here seen as a fundamental "mythic
pattern", which "enters into almost all the religious
experience of mankind", and is "one of the most primitive
ways of expressing the paradox of divine reality".(ibid.)
Part of the paradox of divine reality, as we have seen in
the chapter on "Hierophany" above, is that the sacred,
the really real, is always and necessarily detected in
the profane, the conditioned, the unreal. Not only is it
paradoxical that the profane should have the ability to
manifest that which exceeds it in significance and power,
but also that the sacred should limit itself through its
manifestation in the lesser, the quotidian. That is not
all, however;
this conception, in which all contraries are 
reconciled (or rather transcended), constitutes what 
is, in fact, the most basic definition of divinity, 
and shows how utterly different it is from humanity, 
the coincidentia oppositorum becomes nevertheless an 
archetypal model for certain types of religious men, 
or for certain of the forms religious experience 
takes. The coincidentia oppositorum or transcending 
of all attributes can be achieved by man in all 
sorts of ways. ... the orgy: for it symbolises a 
return to the amorphous and indistinct where all 
attributes disappear and contraries are merged. ... 
The ascetic, the sage, the Indian and Chinese 
"mystic" tries to wipe out of his experience and 
consciousness every sort of "extreme", to attain to 
a state of perfect indifference and neutrality. ...
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This transcending of extremes through asceticism and 
contemplation also results in the "coinciding of 
opposites"; [the ascetic, sage etc.] remakes within 
himself and for himself the primeval unity which was 
before the world was made; a unity which signifies 
not the chaos that existed before any forms were 
created but the undifferentiated being in which all 
forms are merged, (ibid., pp. 419f.)
Eliade cites the further examples of divine androgyny
familiar from Greek, Egyptian, and Indian myths and even
in some versions of the Adamic myth and also the
importance of maithuna, the pair, or sexual coupling, to
Tantrism, all of whose "real point ... is to express - in
biological terms - the coexistence of contraries". He
also refers to a series of rituals which he interprets as
"directed towards a periodic returning to this original
condition which is thought to be the perfect expression
of humanity", (ibid., pp.421-424.) Elsewhere he has
referred to the Chinese concept of yin and yang as an
example of the coincidentia and to Nagarjuna's
sunyatavada as containing "one of the most original
ontological creations known to the history of thought",
in that "one cannot say of sunyata that it exists or that
it does not exist or that it exists and at the same time
does not exist", which "carried to the extreme limit the
innate tendency of the Indian spirit towards the
coincidentia oppositorum".12 Eliade also cites the 13th
century Bonaventure and the 15th century Nicolas of Cusa
as exemplars of this thought. Towards the end of volume
12 The History of Religious Ideas, vol. II, pp. 17;
225f.
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II of The History of Religious Ideas, in describing
Tibetan Lamaist groups, Eliade baldly states that
as in India, it is above all the various Tantric 
schools which apply, and transmit in the strictest 
secrecy, the techniques of meditation and the 
rituals aiming at the realization of the 
coincidentia oppositorum at all levels of existence. 
(ibid., p .275.)
This is certainly the type of progression which has 
earned Eliade the opprobrium of his critical 
commentators. He presents myths widely separated in time 
and geography and then presents his own interpretation 
with the same force as the source material, and finally 
applies the conclusions of his interpretation to describe 
the primary material. Who is to say that the subjects of 
his original documentary evidence had any intention of 
returning to an original perfected expression of 
humanity? Or that their androgynous myths sought to 
express in biological terms the coexistence of 
contraries? Or that there is an innate tendency in "the 
Indian spirit" towards the coincidentia? And if his 
interpretation should be partial or inaccurate can he 
fairly describe Tantric sects as seeking to realise the 
coincidentia if they do not so describe themselves?
However, it should be accepted that, although 
Eliade's progression from data to interpretation and back 
to data certainly does not provide us with apodictic 
logical proof that his interpretation is correct, his 
evidence does indicate a temporally and geographically 
widespread phenomenon of the transmission and performance
of myths and rituals concerning the unification of a 
binary pair. It is thus not unreasonable to posit an 
interpretation of this fact suggesting a human 
(widespread if not actually universal) fascination with 
the coincidentia oppositorum as somehow representative of 
the sacrality which Eliade equates with that which is 
apprehended as the real, the significant, the true. The 
fact that the coincidentia can be detected in such 
disparate religious systems and in such a variety of 
forms indicates a lasting human recognition of the 
reality, significance and truth of this mythic structure. 
One of the suggestions which Eliade bases upon this 
recognition is explicitly revealed in Images and Symbols, 
published in 1952, about three years after Patterns♦
Here Eliade refers to the myth of Narada and Visnu 
(pp.70ff.) which he takes as indicating "that in the 
final reckoning the great cosmic Illusion is a 
hierophany". (p.91) That is to say that this fascination 
with the coincidentia oppositorum develops from an 
inherent recognition that the profane world in its 
entirety and in its diversity is itself revelatory of 
genuine ontology, real being, the sacred. Existence, as 
it presents itself to us, is itself a coincidence of 
opposites, it is both sacred and profane, both real and 
unreal. It is. both a concealment and a revelation of the 
real.13 This, in its positive form of the profane as
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inherently embodying the sacred, leads directly and 
definitively to a concept of general revelation which I 
believe to be crucial to an understanding of Eliade's 
thought.
While Eliade was unquestionably challenging the 
inability of modern thought to provide a meaningful 
escape from the terror of history, to invest modern life 
with significance and to escape the anomie of the 
existentialists, he could still, in perfect keeping with 
the concept of the coincidentia oppositorum as indicative 
of the nature of the real, recognise that the modern 
identification of the profane, the material, with the 
sacred, the truly real, was in fact accurate. Since the 
"great cosmic Illusion is a hierophany", what is revealed 
to modern man in his fascination with the material and 
the empirically manifest is still itself real. What 
Eliade objected to, I believe, was the arrogance which 
considered the empirical and/or the rational as the only 
contact with reality; to the evident inability of 
empiricism and concomitant historicism to provide real 
and meaningful interpretations to those who suffered at 
history's brutal hands; and to the amnesia which this 
total camouflage of the sacred within the profane brings 
about as regards traditionally transmitted truths.14
14 One should note in this context Seymour Cain's 
observation that, for Eliade "the most petty details 
become interesting in the hands of a writer so endowed, 
whose very urge to jot them down, to preserve these 
ephemeral moments in words, gives them light and life.
The simple fact of being written down raises up the
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One such traditionally transmitted truth is, of 
course, the coincidentia oppositorum itself, and one of 
the traditions which has transmitted it is the Indian, 
which
has distinguished two aspects of Brahman: apara and 
para, "inferior" and "superior", visible and 
invisible, manifest and nonmanifest. In other 
words, it is always the mystery of a polarity, all 
at once a biunity and a rhythmic alteration, that 
can be deciphered in the different mythological, 
religious, and philosophical "illustrations": Mitra 
and Varuna, the visible and invisible aspects of 
Brahman, Brahman and Maya, purusa and prakrti, and 
later on Siva and Sakti, or samsara and Nirvana.
But some of these polarities tend to annul 
themselves in a coincidentia oppositorum, in a 
paradoxical unity-totality, ... That it is not only 
a question of metaphysical speculations but also of 
formulas with the help of which India tried to 
circumscribe a particular mode of existence, is 
proved by the fact that coincidentia oppositorum is 
implied in iivanmukta, the "liberated in life", who 
continues to exist in the world even though he has 
attained final deliverance; or the "awakened one" 
for whom Nirvana and samsara appear to be one and 
the same thing. ... Now, however one may conceive 
the Absolute, it cannot be conceived except as 
beyond contraries and polarities. ... The summum
bonum is situated beyond polarities.15
Although Eliade derived his conception of the summum
bonum as being "beyond polarities" from ancient and
traditional religious data it was in fact somewhat "ahead
of its time". The whole movement of modern thought, or
arguably, post-modern thought, beyond polarity has been
seemingly insignificant to the meaningful. The act of 
writing is inherently transformative or revelatory". 
Imagination and Meaning, p.88. Also Culianu's 
observations that "at the limit" even the stains of 
moisture on a wall can reveal meaning (with reference to 
Eliade's short story, "Incognito a Buchenwald".) From 
"La Tortue Bourgne", in Homo Religiosus, eds. Arcade, 
Manea, and Stamatescu.
15 The Quest, p.169.
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gathering momentum for some time and is particularly
evident in the area of literary criticism and linguistic
philosophy. Yet it is not thereby simply validated and
concluded, as I said, Eliade regarded this matter as a
problem which he never satisfactorily resolved. That
some polarities "annul themselves in a coincidentia
oppositorum" is not clearly comprehensible. Did Eliade
simply mean that the opposition of polarities was
annulled in their coincidence? He had seemed to imply
earlier that it was the paradoxical nature of the unity-
in-opposition which empowered the coincidentia; thus
surely their opposition is not annulled. In what sense,
then, are they annulled? The answer is perhaps given in
The History of Religious Ideas where Eliade refers to
a conception, widely attested globally, according to 
which the cosmos and life, and also the function of 
the gods and the human condition, are governed by 
the same cyclic rhythm, a rhythm that is constituted 
of mutually self-implying alternating and 
complementary polarities which periodically resolve 
themselves into a union-totality of the coincidentia 
oppositorum type.16
Thus the opposition of the polarities is not "annulled"
as such, but is resolved, falls into an homogenous
totality which nonetheless contains the original
opposition.
A further difficulty arises in Eliade's explication 
of the thought of Nicolas of Cusa where he states that
16 The History of Religious Ideas, vol. Ill, p.267. 
This should be compared to Eliade's personal experience 
as alternating between the "nocturnal and diurnal" sides 
of his life, his fictional and analytic writings.
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in understanding the principle of the coincidentia 
oppositorum, our "ignorance" becomes "learned". But 
the coincidentia oppositorum must not be interpreted 
as a synthesis obtained through reason, for it
cannot be realised on the plane of finitude but only
in a conjectural fashion, on the plane of the 
infinite.
To which he adds the footnote
Let us note the difference between this conception -
i.e., the coincidentia oppositorum effected on the 
infinite plane - and the archaic and traditional 
formulas relating to the real unification of 
opposites (e.g., samsara and nirvana.)17
So Eliade clearly detects a difference between the
concrete, archaic "formulas" which relate, in fact
identify, opposites, and this doctrine of Nicolas which
conjecturally posits, "on the plane of the infinite" the
coincidence in God of complicatio and explicatio, in
other words that God envelopes (complicatio) all things,
but at the same time is in all things (explicatio). What
precisely is the difference? Even if the specific
difference is intended that Nicolas strove to utilise the
via neqativa which made possible the coincidence of
opposites and thus opened up the possibility of such a
theological conception, whereas the Indian thinkers,
Nagarjuna for example, were attempting to explicate
reality as it directly confronts us, surely both are
nonetheless examples of the coincidentia? In The Quest
Eliade distinguishes two types of polarities; "(1) the
groups of cosmic polarities and (2) those polarities
17 The History of Religious Ideas, p.211.
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related directly to the human condition".18 Yet he
states that there is a structural solidarity between them
and it should be pointed out that the sacred/profane
dichotomy is subsumed under the second group. Thus the
difference here is not one of an infinite, eternal as
opposed to a finite, temporal dichotomy. My tentative
suggestion is that Eliade did not finally consider the
coincidentia of Nicolas of Cusa to be a real coincidence
of opposites, since for that the sacred has to coincide
with the profane, but a coincidence of extreme attributes
(rather than polar opposites) to explicate the nature of
Nicolas' theological understanding.
The true coincidentia oppositorum consists in the
unification of utterly opposed poles which, apart from
this symbolic expression, could not be assimilated to
each other. The importance which Eliade attaches to this
form of the coincidentia is apparent.
One of the most important discoveries of the human 
spirit was naively anticipated when, through certain 
religious symbols, man guessed that the polarities 
and antinomies could be articulated as a unity.
Since then the negative and sinister aspects of the 
cosmos and the gods have not only found a 
justification, but have revealed themselves as an 
integral part of all reality or sacrality.19
It should be noted that in common with most, if not
all, of Eliade's interpretative categories, the
coincidentia oppositorum was more than just a scholarly
device.
18 The Quest, p.173.
19 "Methodological Remarks", p.102.
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My spiritual equilibrium - the condition which is 
indispensable for any creativity - was assured by 
this oscillation between researches of a scientific 
nature and literary imagination. Like many others I 
live alternatively in a diurnal mode of the spirit 
and in a nocturnal one. I know, of course, that 
these two categories of spiritual activity are 
interdependent and express a profound unity ... I 
know likewise from my own personal experience that 
some of my literary creations contributed to a more 
profound understanding of certain religious 
structures, and that, sometimes without my being 
conscious of the fact at the moment of writing 
fiction, the literary imagination utilised materials 
or meanings I had studied as a historian of 
religions.20
It is evident from this, and from the whole question of 
Eliade's "double approach", that the coincidentia 
oppositorum had an experiential basis in Eliade's life. 
Eliade's journals reveal an ongoing conflict between his 
desire to write fictional literature and his desire to 
produce scholarly works of analysis.21 He seems to have 
experienced his life as itself composed of separate, 
opposed aims and drives which, in their reconciliation, 
gave his life meaning and brought him his most profound 
insights. This personal experience of the coincidentia 
could sustain considerably more attention than I have 
given it here.
The coincidentia oppositorum may be the area where
20 Symbolism, the Sacred, and the Arts, p .173.
21 As discussed by eg. Seymour Cain, "Poetry and 
Truth", in Imagination and Meaning, eds. Ricketts and 
Girardot, pp.87-103, and by Adriana Berger, "Eliade's 
Double Approach", Religious Studies Review 11 (1985): 
9-12 .
Eliade makes a real ontological assumption;22 the final 
nature of uninterpreted reality (which must, by 
definition, be sacred for Eliade), is presented as having 
a nature in which all attributes coalesce, all 
oppositions are transcended and all differentiations 
achieve unity. Here is the only point in Eliade's whole 
structure of thought where the actual nature of 
existence, rather than the description of human 
perceptions, is presented as a datum; this is how reality 
is, which is both indicated by and explanatory of the 
constant presence of the coincidentia in manifest 
religious phenomena. Such an interpretation in which the 
nature of an apprehended reality is simultaneously 
indicated by and explanatory of a phenomenal occurrence, 
is itself an example of, or at least, made possible by 
the type of thought which supports, the coincidentia.
The relationship of the undifferentiated unity which is 
presented as underlying and transcending all material, 
historical forms, and those very forms, is not a simple 
one of cause and effect, or of signifier and signified.
It is both/and rather than either/or. Still, the logical 
validity of such a movement from clue to cause then back 
to the clue with the putative cause as explanation is 
quite obviously non-existent. If the widespread 
occurrence of examples of coincidentia in the historical 
religions is indicative of the actual nature of a
22 cf. "Douglas Allen: Eliade's Ontological 
Assumptions", below, 7.3, pp.257-268.
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non-differentiated ontological substrate, then of course 
the existence of such a substratum would explain those 
phenomena. If illness is seen as indicative of demon 
possession then, of course, demon possession will appear 
to be an excellent explanation of illness. The initial 
acceptance or rejection of such an interpretative 
stratagem is based on a priori, personal, almost 
aesthetic criteria, and cannot be itself validly proposed 
as a persuasive argument. Of course, the utility of such 
a stratagem is a secondary phenomenon, as is the number 
of adherents it finds and the uses to which they put it. 
All these factors can be seen as criteria of evaluation 
of the validity of the interpretation and thus of the 
experience which informs it and thus can be used as a 
logical form of persuasion.
Homo reliqiosus, humanity under our religious 
aspect, can be recognised precisely as humanity insofar 
as we adhere to a specific interpretative stratagem 
inspired and informed by particular hierophanies and the 
symbols which carry forward those hierophanies. It is to 
a consideration of homo reliaiosus in the works of Mircea 
Eliade that I now wish to turn.
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3.2. Homo Reliqiosus.
It is immediately noticeable on studying the term 
homo relicriosus in the writings of Mircea Eliade that the 
infrequency with which he actually employs it belies the 
degree of interest it has generated in secondary 
scholars. Although he was no doubt well aware of the 
term Eliade does not use it in such important works as 
Yoga, Patterns in Comparative Religion, nor in Cosmos and 
History nor Images and Symbols. Its earliest thorough 
application is in The Sacred and the Profane, Eliade's 
major exposition of his dialectical opposition of the 
sacred and the profane. Here it occurs only some ten 
times throughout that work, as compared to 20 occurrences 
of "religious man". This fact alone supports the 
analysis of Gregory Alles in The Encyclopedia of 
Religion, that Eliade uses homo reliqiosus generally to 
indicate "religious humanity" and specifically to 
contrast humanity in its religious aspect from humanity 
in its non-religious aspects.24 However easy this 
clarity may be to achieve in retrospect there has been 
some confusion along the way. For example, Douglas 
Allen, in his study of Eliade, stated simply that
24 The Encyclopedia of Religion, vol.6, p.442.
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throughout this study, the terms homo reliqiosus, 
premodern man, traditional, archaic, and primitive 
will be used interchangeably. By modern and 
nonreliqious, we refer to a characteristic attitude 
of contemporary Western society.25
The characteristic attitude of contemporary society is
the determination to be regarded as a purely historical
being, to live in a desacralised cosmos, which Eliade
expounds in various works.26 While I agree
wholeheartedly with Allen's recognition of this specific
usage of "modern", and therefore with his opposition of
homo reliqiosus to "modern", I cannot concur with his
identification of homo reliqiosus with "traditional",
"archaic", and "primitive". The people of traditional,
archaic, or "primitive" societies are featured in
Eliade's thought as exemplary illustrations of homo
reliqiosus. but they are not to be exhaustively
identified as such since homo reliqiosus (humanity in its
religious mode) can certainly exist outside of
traditional, archaic, or "primitive" societies. As
Eliade puts it,
the man of traditional societies is admittedly a 
homo reliqiosus, but his behaviour forms part of the 
general behaviour of mankind and hence is of concern 
to philosophical anthropology, to phenomenology, to 
psychology.27
Barbosa da Silva also makes this equation of homo 
reliqiosus and archaic man, although in a more qualified
25 Douglas Allen, Structure and Creativity, p.5.
26 Rites and Symbols p .ix. The Sacred and the 
Profane r p .100.
27 The Sacred and the Profane, p.15.
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form.
Eliade uses the term "homo religiosus" in at least 
two major senses. It occurs in Eliade's works in 
(1) an ideal sense, and (2) a concrete sense. In 
the sense (1), it designates archaic man who is 
regarded by Eliade as essentially religious and who, 
in Eliade's view, had the genuine or purest form of 
experience of the Sacred. In the sense (2), it 
designates religious individuals who, in different 
historico-cultural contexts, have actualised their 
religious capacities and experienced the Sacred 
• • •
In the ideal sense which da Silva detects, homo
reliqiosus actually applies to all of humanity rather
than to archaic man as he thought. As he realises, the
actual individuals who have "experienced the sacred" are
to be found in all "historico-cultural contexts" and
thus, even in its ideal sense, homo reliqiosus must be
capable of referring to all of humanity, but humanity qua
religious; the human being in so far as we apprehend and
thirst for the real.
John Cave in his soon-to-be-published PhD
dissertation, with the benefit of access to Alles'
article, actually comes closest to Eliade's meaning;
the usage of the term homo reliqiosus commonly 
refers to all of humanity, not just to a single 
charismatic individual, as it was used by 
Schleiermacher, Max Scheler, and also Joachim Wach. 
Homo Reliqiosus designates an aspect of the human 
condition. Gerardus van der Leeuw used it in this
29way. ̂
However, da Silva's recognition that Eliade also refers 
to homo reliqiosus in a concrete sense invalidates Cave's
28 Barbosa da Silva, Phenomenology as a Philosophical 
Problem", p .196.
29 John David Cave, The New Humanism, p.172.
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further criticism that
a limitation to Eliade's use of homo reliqiosus, 
however, is its non-reality and its abstractness for 
social and ethical relations. Homo reliqiosus is an 
archetypal postulate. There is no way to prove the 
existence of homo reliqiosus. (ibid., p.174.)
Robert Baird likewise assumes the abstract nature of
Homo reliqiosus.
It is true that Eliade's goal is to understand homo 
reliqiosus. But homo reliqiosus is not a historical 
but an archetypal religious man. Historical persons 
participate in this archetype to varying degrees.30
I am led to ask whether historical persons also
participate in the archetype of homo sapiens to varying
degrees?
Homo reliqiosus is in fact a systematic postulate, 
dependent on the acceptance of other parts of the system. 
If it be accepted that the religious person is the person 
in specific relation to the sacred, and it be accepted 
that the sacred is equated with the real, then homo 
reliqiosus must be seen as humanity in so far as we 
apprehend the real, and apprehend ourselves as standing 
in some specific relationship to reality. How then can 
this be contrasted to some form of "non-religious man?"
Is this not so broad as to encompass all of humanity? 
Certainly "Eliade is hospitable ... to including 
atheistic worldviews in the range of phenomena which the 
historian of religions ought to consider".31 Alles
30 Robert Baird, Category Formation, p.86.
31 Ninian Smart, Scottish Journal of Religious 
Studies 5 no.2 (1984) p.153.
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adequately describes Eliade's conception of religious 
humanity but his description of non-religious humanity is 
somewhat weaker. That "homo reliqiosus is driven by the 
desire for being; modern man lives under the dominion of 
becoming",32 is too simplistic and uninformative a 
conclusion. The mode of being of modern humanity is a 
complex and confusing one in which "the sacred" has 
become almost completely camouflaged and concealed within 
and identified with the profane. Matter. once the 
profane par excellence: mere, dead material stuff, is now 
seen as the ultimately real. For example, subatomic 
physics, the exhaustive study of the nature of the 
physical world, is often felt to hold the key to human 
salvation on the scientific level.33 Alles does 
recognise that, unlike homo reliqiosus, modern man thus 
experiences no discontinuity between the sacred and the 
profane. He also realises that finally,
the break between the two cannot be complete. ...
Determined by history, modern man is thus determined
by his unrenouncable precursor, homo reliqiosus.34
This diffusion of the concept of homo reliqiosus 
until it is so general as to seek to involve the entire 
human race is quite deliberate. Only those people who 
specifically and deliberately insist on their own
32 The Encyclopedia of Religions, loc. cit.
33 On this "confusion of the planes" of science and 
salvation see Midgeley's Science and Salvation, and 
Eliade's "Homo Faber and Homo Religiosus".
34 Encyclopedia of Religion, vol.6, p.442.
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determination in time by history, are temporarily allowed
to escape this classification, and they too are
eventually subsumed by the logical argument given concise
form by Alles here, and by the acknowledgment that their
insistence is itself religious in structure, still
claiming access to the ultimately real, but equating that
real with precisely that which was formerly regarded as
profane and therefore unreal.
Nonreligious man in the pure state is a 
comparatively rare phenomenon, even in the most 
desacralised of societies. The majority of the 
"irreligious" still behave religiously, even though 
they are not aware of the fact.
In "Homo Faber and Homo Religiosus", an article
published in 1985, only a year before his death, Eliade
made this identification of religious and "nonreligious"
humanity in somewhat clearer terms. His analysis
involves rock music from Bob Dylan to Blue Oyster Cult,
films, science fiction, Newton's involvement in alchemy,
and Raymond Ruyer's book on The Princeton Gnosis. He
concludes that
in the last analysis, we discover that the latest 
activities and conclusions of scientists and 
technologists - the direct descendants of homo faber 
- reactualise, on different levels and perspectives, 
the same fears, hopes and convictions that have 
dominated homo reliqiosus from the very beginning.36
It is particularly the apocalyptic trend exhibited by
these subjects which Eliade takes to be parallel to
religious conviction. This takes two forms, the
35 The Sacred and the Profane, p.204.
36 "Homo Faber and Homo Religiosus", p.11.
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pessimistic - nuclear holocaust, environmental or genetic
exhaustion - and the optimistic - technological or
political conquest of all human problems.
Of course, [he continues] the representatives of 
these two opposite trends are not aware of the
religious implications of their despair or their
hopes. What is significant is that all of them 
relate the inevitability and the immanence of our 
world's end to the fantastic realisations of human 
workmanship, (ibid., p.5.)
That is to say that it is the specific restriction of the
termination of history to human agency which
distinguishes these moderns from traditional homo
reliqiosus. And it is the artificial restriction of
humanity to the historical factors which condition our
nature which generates the illusion of a discontinuity
from traditionally religious humanity.
Everyone agrees that a spiritual fact, being a human 
fact, is necessarily conditioned by everything that 
works together to make a man, from his anatomy and 
physiology to language itself. In other words, a 
spiritual fact presupposes the whole human being - 
that is, the social man, the economic man, and so 
forth. But all these conditioning factors do not, 
of themselves, add up to the life of the spirit.37
As a historian of religions Eliade has thus made a
move to bring all of humanity within the purview of his
methodical perspective, just as, for example,
psychologists who began with the specific study of
mentally ill patients expanded their perspective to all
of humanity. It can be argued that as long as some
people are allowed to avoid classification within an
understanding of human religiousness then that
37 Images and Symbols , p . 32 .
understanding will never be complete. Just as, if 
certain (especially self-identified) people were allowed 
to be independent of the findings of psychology or 
sociology, then psychology and sociology could never 
achieve coherence as an academic subject. If it be 
suggested to, say, sociologists, that a certain group of 
people simply are not involved in sociological realities 
their scorn would be guaranteed. However, scholars of 
religion are all too willing to concede that certain 
people are not involved in religious realities, usually 
because they have a prior self-perception as either 
"religious" or "non-religious", and from their 
predisposed perspective the differences between 
"religious" and "non-religious" appear all too obvious, 
but are, in fact, secondary and partisan. Although this 
expansion of the classification of homo reliqiosus to 
cover all of humanity may at first appear illegitimate, 
it is actually the modern insistence that a certain group 
of people, the self-stvled non-religious humanity, simply 
steps out of the religiousness ubiquitous in the rest of 
human history, which exceeds its rational remit.
Some other scholars, notably Wilhelm Dupre, in his 
Religion in Primitive Cultures, have also argued for the 
inevitability of human religiosity. It does seem 
possible that Eliade was not aware of the radical 
importance for the academic study of religion of this 
conclusion, or perhaps he was not willing to take the 
considerable risk of making such a claim openly.
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However, it is apparent throughout The Sacred and the 
Profane that almost every time he mentions "non­
religious" man Eliade immediately proceeds to indicate 
the superficiality of the concept.38
Of course, this is not to say that the distinction 
religious/nonreligious is utterly devoid of meaning. It 
is precisely the meaning of that distinction which Eliade 
strives to clarify throughout The Sacred and the Profane. 
The most fundamental distinction is that of time and 
history; religious man "refuses to live solely in what, 
in modern terms, is called the historical present".39 
Humanity in its specifically religious aspect, rather, 
lives in a time which is
neither homogeneous nor continuous. On the one hand 
there are intervals of a sacred time, the time of 
festivals (by far the greater part of which are 
periodical); on the other there is profane time, 
ordinary temporal duration, in which acts without 
religious meaning have their setting. ... This 
attitude in regard to time suffices to distinguish 
religious from non-religious man.40
Thus the distinction between religious and nonreligious,
radically blurred in other ways, is re-established on a
meaningful level. Yet, as I hope to make plain, this is
38 V. esp. pp. 24, 186, and the conclusion, pp.201-
213.
39 The Sacred and the Profane, p.70.
40 ibid., pp.68, 70. Once again it is apparent that 
in order to fully understand one aspect of Eliade1s 
thought, it is necessary to consider another. Obviously, 
if this is the linchpin of the distinction of religious 
from nonreligious humanity, then in order to understand 
homo reliqiosus we must also consider Eliade's conception 
of time. v. below ch.5.
not finally a distinction between religious and 
nonreligious humanity, rather, since it is essentially 
religious distinction, it is a distinction among 
religious humanity. In the last analysis, modern 
humanity's self-imposed restriction to and final 
identification with historical time is itself an 
identification with the real. As such it is religious 
and obviously cannot constitute a distinctive 
characteristic of "non-religious" humanity.




One element of the study of religion which 
particularly supports and is clarified by the preceding 
analysis of homo reliaiosus as ubiquitous is that of 
symbol. Although symbols are themselves ubiquitous in 
the human world and play a role even in the life of the 
most secular of humanity, they are usually interpreted as 
having some specifically religious connotations. This 
tension between "religious" and "secular" symbolism has,
I would contend, contributed significantly to the 
difficulty and complexity of the debate over the nature 
of symbolism.
In order to get a clear idea as to the etymology and 
history of the word "symbol" and of the history of the 
study of symbolism one would be well advised to consult 
the entry on "Symbolism" in the Encyclopedia of Religion, 
vol. 14, pp.198-208, by James W. Heisig. However, as a 
probable influence on Eliade Goethe is notable by his 
absence from this entry. René Welleck, for example has 
asserted that the concept of symbol as we know it derives 
from the German romantics.1 the Belgian-American 
scholar, Gustaaf Van Cromphout, cites Gadamer, Todorov, 
and Cassirer amongst those who have attributed the modern
1 "Coleridge [for example] picked it up from Goethe, 
the Schlegels, and Schelling." Discriminations: Further 
Concepts in Criticism, p.139. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970.)
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concept of symbolism to Goethe. Goethe's idea of the
symbol was that it was not only representative, but was
also a "living, instantaneous (lebendig-auaenblickliche)
revelation of the inscrutable".2 This is certainly
similar to Eliade's conception of the symbol as
hierophany and, given his lifelong dedication to Goethe,
was doubtless influential in shaping that conception.3
Despite this lacuna it is significant that Heisig
describes Novalis (Freidrich von Hardenberg, 1772-1801, a
younger contemporary of Goethe, 1749-1832) as one who
defended the primacy of imagination and poetry as 
means to produce the symbolism of a higher reality, 
and drew special attention to the "magical" power of 
words. (p.199.)
Eliade has said of that same author that he
rediscovered "the dialectic of the sacred", to wit, 
that nature, such as it shows itself to us, does not 
represent absolute reality but is only a cipher.
His extraordinary intuition: that it is not 
necessary to die, to become "spirit", in order to be 
able to communicate with higher worlds, and that, 
beginning here below, one can know beatific 
experience. Some day someone must point out how 
ancient, even archaic, were the ideas of Novalis: 
one must also try to explain due to what 
circumstances these ideas were so long forgotten or 
voluntarily ignored.4
2 Quoted in Emerson's Modernity and the Example of 
Goethe. p .69.
3 Although Eliade does not make many references to 
Goethe in his scholarly work, the influence of the German 
author is clearly revealed in the Journals. A succinct
statement of that influence is made by Norman Girardot in 
the introduction to Imagination and Meaning, (eds. 
Girardot and Ricketts) pp.3-6. An important reference to 
Goethe as an exemplary figure is made in Myths, Dreams 
and Mysteries. p.33.
4 No Souvenirs, p.326.
This not only indicates the Romantic heritage of Eliade's 
thought but also gives an insight into the way in which 
he conceived of the function of symbols.
It is not my intention in this section to enter into 
a debate about symbolism and Romanticism, or to attempt 
to disclose Eliade's precise sources (an almost 
impossible task given the vast scope of his reading). 
Rather I hope to give a clear exposition of Eliade's 
conception of the symbol. Although some serious 
objections have been raised against Eliade's theory of 
symbolism, I will inspect these later in a section 
specifically devoted to such objections.
As was remarked earlier, (p.26) there is an evident 
connection between Eliade's conception of symbol and that 
of hierophany. They are both phenomena of the empirical 
world which are held to communicate or reveal something 
other than their own physical being. Francisco Demetrio 
y Radaza, S. J., in his work on religious symbols and the 
Georgies, gives an extensive (and broadly favourable) 
critique of Eliade in whose thought he recognises three 
dialectics at work. The dialectic of the sacred, the 
dialectic of hierophany, and the dialectic of symbol. 
Evidently Demetrio y Radaza detects here a progressive 
descent of the sacred into the profane world through its 
own dialectical opposition to profane reality, through 
its revelation in hierophany, and through its 
representation in symbol. However, he is not unaware of 
the difficulties of such an hierarchical organisation,
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since "some symbols are themselves hierophanies".5
The actual relationship of hierophany and symbol
does present some difficulty to reaching an understanding
of Eliade's work. In Patterns in Comparative Religion
Eliade says, "the symbol is carrying further the
dialectic of the hierophany", and "the majority of
hierophanies are capable of becoming symbols".6 This
implies that an hierophany is not automatically a symbol.
The relationship of these three dialectics may be simply
one of increasing dilution of the sacred in the profane
since Eliade contends that
the term "symbol" ought to be reserved for the 
symbols which either carry a hierophany further or 
themselves constitute a "revelation", (ibid., 
p . 448 . )
If this reservation be adhered to, while all hierophanies
are not symbols, all symbols are hierophanies or at least
"carry forward" the hierophanic revelation of the real.
However, a certain dependence of the hierophany on the
symbol seems to be implied by Eliade's statements that
"the symbolism of the moon makes clear the actual
structure of lunar hierophanies". And that "I have tried
... to interpret a given hierophany in the light of its
proper symbolism", (ibid., p.449.) As he later states,
a symbolism does not depend on being understood. ... 
[Symbolic meanings] make up a symbolic system which 
in a sense pre-existed them all. We are therefore
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p.26. In Symbols in Comparative Religion and the
Georgies.
6 Patterns, p.446.
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... justified in speaking of a "logic of symbols", 
of a logic borne out not only by magico-religious 
symbolism, but also in the symbolism expressed in 
the subconscious and transconscious activity of man. 
(ibid., p .450.)
Whereas the symbol or "symbolism" (which is used in such
a way as to indicate an interrelated "system" of symbols)
does not depend on understanding, the hierophany as we
have seen above, ¿s dependent on recognition to be
constituted as a hierophany.7 A closer look at Eliade's
understanding of symbol is required before the systematic
implications of this differentiation will become clear.
The best known source for Eliade's analysis of
symbol is his contribution to the volume of 1959 edited
with Joseph Kitagawa, The History of Religions: Essays in
Methodology. However, this article was reprinted in
Eliade's own work The Two and the One in 1962. I have
drawn from both editions in reproducing this analysis
and, although the discrepancies between the two are
slight, I have placed alternative renderings from the
later publication in [square] brackets, and given the
page numbering for both.
1. Religious symbols are capable of revealing a 
modality of the real or a structure of the world 
that is not evident on the level [plane] of 
immediate experience. ... a modality of the real 
which is inaccessible to human experience.
The example Eliade gives is that of water,
which is capable of expressing the pre-formal, the 
virtual [potential], and the chaotic. This is not a 
matter of rational knowledge [cognition]; rather 
does the living [active] consciousness grasp reality
7 "Hierophany," pp.2 4, 28-30.
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through the symbol, anterior to reflection.
2. Symbols are always religious because they point 
to something real or to a structure of the world 
[World-pattern].
3. An essential characteristic of religious 
symbolism is its multivalence, its ability to 
express simultaneously a number of meanings whose 
continuity is not evident on the plane of Immediate 
experience.
The multitude of meanings thus disclosed are
structurally coherent, although that coherence is 
neither constituted nor appreciated by a rational 
process or act of reason. It is disclosed by 
another order of knowledge [cognition].
4. The symbol is thus able to reveal a perspective 
in which heterogenous realities are susceptible of 
articulation into a whole [diverse realities can be 
fitted together], or even of integration into a 
"system". In other words the religious symbol 
allows man to discover a certain unity of the World 
and, at the same time, to disclose to himself his 
proper destiny as an integrating [integral] part of 
the World. ... Owing to the symbolism of the moon,8 
the world no longer appears as an arbitrary 
assemblage of heterogenous and divergent realities.
Symbols also have
5. a capacity for expressing paradoxical situations, 
or certain structures of ultimate reality, otherwise 
quite inexpressible.
Lastly,
6. a symbol always aims at a reality or a situation 
in which human existence is engaged [concerning 
human existence]. Symbols have a necessary 
existential dimension and existential value.9
These six points, although quite clearly stated, are
8 For example, which integrates lunar rhythms, 
temporal becoming, plant growth, the female principle, 
death and resurrection.
9 "Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious 
Symbolism"/"Observations on the Study of Religious 
Symbolism," pp.98-101/201-205.
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evidently not alone sufficient to clarify Eliade's theory
here. An inspection of his earlier work, Images and
Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism (1952) casts a
great deal of light upon the more difficult implications
of his thought.
The capacity of the symbol to reveal something not
evident to immediate experience (no.l above) is connected
with the creative processes of human thought.
Symbols cannot be reflections of cosmic rhythms as 
natural phenomena, for a symbol always reveals 
something more than the aspect of cosmic life it is 
thought to represent. The solar symbolisms and 
myths, for example, reveal to one also a 
"nocturnal", "evil" and "funerary" aspect of the 
sun, something that is not at first evident in the 
solar phenomenon as such.10
He goes on to say that since this side is not perceived
in the phenomenon but is "constitutive in" the symbolism
it is proven that the symbolism is a "creation of the
psyche", (ibid.) The coincidence of opposites (no.5),
likewise, is not given anywhere in the cosmos, it is not
accessible to immediate experience, but it is expressed
by symbols, and simply expressed. It is this way, as an
expression of the creative imagination, that the symbol
expresses an otherwise non-sensory modality of the real.
To "have imagination" is to enjoy a richness of 
interior life, an uninterrupted and spontaneous flow 
of images. But spontaneity does not mean arbitrary 
invention. Etymologically, "imagination" is related 
to both imago - a representation or imitation - and 
imitor, to imitate or reproduce. ... The imagination 
imitates the exemplary models - the Images - 
reproduces, reactualises and repeats them without 
end. To have imagination is to be able to see the
10 Images and Symbols, p.177.
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world in its totality, for the power and the mission 
of the Images is to show all that remains refractory 
to the concept, (ibid., p.20.)
In this same connection the ability of the symbol system
to express a structural solidarity of meaning (no.4) is
directly linked with its ability to express something not
immediate to perception.
One of the principal functions of the myth is to 
unify planes of reality which, to immediate 
consciousness and even to reflection, seem to be 
multiple and heterogenous, (ibid., p.99.)
In certain cases it is precisely that solidarity of
meaning, that potential homologisation, which was not
itself previously perceptible, which, through symbolism,
becomes susceptible to the human imagination. The
solidarity between the lunar rhythms, temporal becoming,
the female principle, and human mortality, for example,
is not immediately accessible to human experience. But
once grasped, once revealed by lunar symbolism, it then
becomes an accessible and communicable reality.
The implication that such coherent "systems" are
"creations of the psyche" or the imagination in no way
lessens their potential impact on human life. It is a
major tenet of Eliade's thought that the valorisation of
the material and the independently extant, and the
accompanying dévalorisation of the abstract and dependent
(i.e. the creations of the human imagination, or poesis),
is a specific and religious perspective of modern
humanity, intimately instrumental in what he calls the
concealment or camouflage of the sacred in the profane.
Once one begins to combine the various points of
Eliade's analysis in various ways, as I have combined
sections 1, 4, and 5 above, certain deeper implications
begin to appear. For example, section 2 states that
symbols are religious because they "always point to
something real or to a structure of the world", and
section 6 that "a symbol always aims at a reality or a
situation in which human existence is engaged". In an
article of 1968 Eliade has said,
contrary to what may be called "cosmic symbols" - 
stars, waters, the seasons, vegetation, etc. - which 
reveal both the structures of the universe and the 
human mode of being in the world, the symbolism of 
tools and weapons discloses specific existential 
situations .11
Since (no.2) symbols always point to some thing real or 
to a structure of the world, and since (no.6) symbols 
always aim at a real existential situation, then the 
something real at which they always aim must be an 
existential situation. Cosmic symbols indicate both 
(existential situation and structure of universe) tool 
symbols (for example) indicate only, but necessarily, an 
aspect or element of the human existential situation.
Thus it would seem that the reality of the human 
existential situation is finally indispensable to 
symbolism. It is the very reality of the situational 
element thus revealed which sacralises a particular 
symbol. The Christian crucifix, for example, can be seen 
as indicative of the immediate helplessness of the human
B. S. Rennie Symbol 96
11 "Notes on the Symbolism of the Arrow," p.465.
existential situation, pinned down by the brutal
realities of physical existence, but also of the
hopefulness of our situation, redeemed by the ultimate
sacrifice, the involvement of the deity itself, and thus
capable of escaping the doom determined by pure
physicality, of "escaping from history". (And here the
cosmic function of the cross as cosmic tree, ensuring the
connection of earth and heaven, of profane and sacred, of
conditioned and free, comes into play.) However, the
reality and therefore the sacrality of this symbolic
significance is determined by the individual reaction to
the cross as hierophany. Should this apprehension of the
human condition strike one as revelatory of the real,
then the symbolism of the cross will be self-evident.
However, to a mind constrained to the physical
determinatives of the human condition; a mind which does
not perceive that condition as essentially hopeful,
connected with sacred realities which surpass it, and
possessed of real freedom, the symbolic reference of the
crucifix is lost, and with it its sacrality.
However, it must also be considered that in an
article first published in 1960, Eliade states that
the symbol translates a human situation into 
cosmological terms; and reciprocally, more 
precisely, it discloses the interdependence between 
the structures of human existence and cosmic 
structures.12
So cosmic structures are not finally dispensable from
12 "The Symbolism of Shadows," p.13, in Symbolism, 
the Sacred, and the Arts.
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symbolism, nor is the human situation alone finally 
sufficient thereto. Rather it is specifically the 
relationship of the two which is at issue here. In fact, 
in order to be a real existential situation of humanity a 
given structure must also be a structure of the world or 
cosmic structure. It is a further function of the symbol 
that it unifies the human and the cosmic levels of 
reality.
Symbolic thought makes it possible for man to move 
freely from one level of reality to another.
Indeed, "to move freely" is an understatement: 
symbols, as we have seen, identify, assimilate, and 
unify diverse levels and realities that are to all 
appearances incompatible.13
And he concludes Patterns in Comparative Religion, from
the final paragraph of which the preceding quotation is
also taken, with the observation that,
thanks chiefly to his symbols, the real existence of 
primitive man was not the broken and alienated 
existence lived by civilised man today, (ibid., 
p. 456 . )
This has constituted something of a difficulty in
the appreciation of Eliade's thought. Not only does it
appear to be a polemical valorisation of the archaic over
the modern, it also appears to be finally incoherent in
the light of Eliade's repeated claims that
symbols never disappear from the reality of the 
psyche. The aspect of them may change, but their 
function remains the same; one has only to look 
behind their latest masks.14
Or again that
13 Patterns in Comparative Religion, p.455.
14 Images and Symbols, p.16.
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symbols and myths come from such depths : they are 
part and parcel of the human being, and it is 
impossible that they should not be found again in 
any and every existential situation of man in the 
Cosmos, (ibid., p.25.)
If this is indeed the case then how can modern humanity
suffer so much from the "broken and alienated existence"
caused by the lack of symbols?
I believe that the only possible coherent
explanation of this difficulty lies with Eliade's
constant pressure upon the radical concealment of the
sacred within the profane in the modern mentality. For
the modern, empirical reality and historical actuality
have become exhaustive of the real, the sacred. As
remarked above, this involves a simultaneous
dévalorisation of the abstract and the imaginary.
However,
although it is true that man is always found "in 
situation", his situation is not, for all that, 
always a historical one in the sense of being 
conditioned solely by the contemporaneous historical 
moment. The man in his totality is aware of other 
situations over and above his historical condition; 
for example, he knows the state of dreaming, or of 
the waking dream, or of melancholy, or of 
detachment, or of aesthetic bliss, or of escape, 
etc. - and none of these states is historical, 
although they are as authentic and as important for 
human existence as man's historical existence is.
(ibid., p .33.)
Eliade makes this point all the more strongly in the 1968
article mentioned above:
human creativity and, ultimately, the history of 
human culture is more directly related to what man 
has dreamt, believed and thought of his specific 
mode of being in the world than to the works which 
he has undertaken in order to promote and validate
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this mode of being.15
The alienation in the modern mind is thus not directly
caused by a lack of symbolic material, but by an
inability to perceive the reality of that material, to
perceive it as hierophany and thus actually to appreciate
it as symbolic. That is to say that in attempting to
totally restrict our existence to the plane of the
spatio-temporal, modern humanity has lost the ability to
apprehend the meanings of other planes of existence as
true expressions of our existential situation. Symbolism
has become opaque to us because we have refused, or
become unable, to make the fundamental pre-rational
assumptions which empower it as a lanqauqe. It is,
finally, as a sort of pre-verbal language that Eliade
conceives of symbolism, as can most clearly be seen from
the following;
the symbol reveals a pre-systematic ontology to us, 
which is to say an expression of thought from a 
period when conceptual vocabularies had not yet been 
constituted. To give only one example, the terms 
designated "becoming" appear fairly late in history, 
and only in some languages of high culture:
Sanskrit, Greek, Chinese. But the symbolism of 
"becoming", the images and the myths which place it 
in motion are already evidenced in the archaic 
strata of culture. All the images of the spiral, of 
weaving, of the emergence of light from shadow, of 
the phases of the moon, of the wave, etc. ... [are] 
symbols and myths of "becoming".16
Thus symbols are a type of language capable of
expressing, to those who use that language, complex
15 "Notes on the Symbolism of the Arrow," p.474.
16 "The Symbolism of Shadows in Archaic Religions,"
p. 3f.
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relationships and concealed truths which have not
received verbal expression.
I must point out that Eliade does not directly use
these words. However, that he constantly emphasises the
coherent nature of symbols is consistent with its status
as a language.
Certain groups of symbols, at least, prove to be 
coherent, logically connected with one another; in a 
word, they can be systematically formulated, 
translated into rational terms.
Furthermore, speaking of Freud, (whose originality and
contribution to the thought of the twentieth century
Eliade respects, despite his frequent statements
concerning the scientific inadequacy of Totem and Taboo)
Eliade states that
Freud substantiated the gnoseological values of the 
products of fantasy, which, until then, were 
considered meaningless or opaque. Once the 
expressions of the Unconscious became articulated in 
a meaning-system comparable to a non-verbal 
language, the immense number of imaginary universes 
reflected in literary creations disclosed a deeper, 
and secret significance.18
Certainly the imaginary universes of symbolism, since
they can in fact be reflected by quotidian experiences
such as "any immersion in darkness, any irruption of
light ... any experience of mountaineering, flying,
swimming underwater, or any long journey", etc. (ibid.,
pp.43f.) are precisely those imaginary universes
reflected in literary creations and so are themselves
17 Images and Symbols. p.37.
18 Occultism. Witchcraft and Cultural Fashions, p.54.
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"comparable to a non-verbal language".
It is in terms of linguistic analysis that I would 
finally like to suggest an applicable differentiation 
between the concepts of symbol and hierophany. Part of 
the difficulty, as we saw above (p.91, n.6), is that 
Eliade finally wants to identify hierophany and symbol. 
Really the difference is between symbol (with which the 
hierophany can easily be equated) and symbolism (with 
which it cannot). This is, I think, best seen as the 
distinction between lanque and parole made by Saussure in 
his Course in General Linguistics.19
Eliade states that for symbolic thought "the 
Universe is not closed, no object is isolated in its own 
existentialness; everything holds together in a closed 
system of correspondences and assimilations".20 The 
applicability of the image of language, in which all the 
linguistic elements similarly hold together, to a 
universe conceived in this way is self-evident. Meaning 
is thus not the "fundamental" to which all possible 
significations are reduced, but is itself profoundly 
symbolic of the relations of elements in a coherent 
reality.
19 I am aware of Gregory Alles criticism that "the 
preoccupation with meaning - with parole and with 
langue - projects upon all religions the goal for which 
so many Western theologians, philosophers, scholars, and 
litterateurs have taught us to yearn ... : the recovery 
of meaning". "Wach, Eliade and the Critique from 
Totality." I hope to answer it below, 7.6, pp.295-305.
20 The Sacred. Symbolism, and the Arts, p .6.
The hierophany, then, is the specific spatio- 
temporal phenomenon which effectively reveals such an 
otherwise imperceptible modality of the real. If it is 
not recognised as such then an hierophany has not 
occurred. However, the potential is still present if the 
language of symbolism constitutes that phenomenon as 
symbolic. The best example which occurs to me, although 
perhaps rather trite and simplistic, is that of a joke.
A joke remains a joke, at least in potentia, even if the 
audience does not "get" it. And a symbol remains a 
symbol, even if an hierophany has not occurred.
The hierophany is the paradoxically limited 
revelation of the real in history, the symbol is the 
(possibly non-verbal) linguistic element in an extended 
and coherent system of such elements (symbolism) which 
makes such a revelation comprehensible, which dictates 
its meaning.
The notion of the coherence of symbolic structures 
is fundamental to Eliade's interpretations. As well as 
the system of lunar symbolism and all it entails (as 
mentioned above, p.93, n.8), he expounds the coherence of 
the symbolisms of the centre; of time and eternity; of 
shells; of knots; of shadows; of ascension and flight; of 
death; light; bodily fluids; of the
cosmos/city/temple/dwelling/body; and of water and the 
flood (which is assimilated to lunar symbolism).
At one point Eliade says that,
in the present state of our knowledge, it is
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difficult to specify whether their uniformity 
proceeds from imitation - from "historic" 
borrowings, in the sense given to this term by the 
historico-cultural school - or whether it is to be 
explained by the fact that they all follow from the 
very situation of man in the world - so that they 
are all variants of one and the same archetype
realising itself on many planes and in different
cultural areas.21
This passage is of considerable significance. Firstly,
it calls into question the contention of, for example,
Ingvild Gilhus. In her article on the gnostic symbolism
of the trees of life and death Gilhus remarks on two
extremes in the analysis of myth in the history of
religion. The first insists on the examination of a
symbol "as a part of one cultural system of symbols".
The second "as a part of a universal system of symbols".
In the first case, the religious symbol is seen as 
meaningful only in relation to other symbols in the 
cultural system. In the second case, the meaning of 
the symbol is clarified only by comparison with 
similar symbols in a universal system of symbols.
The second approach is especially advocated by 
Mircea Eliade.22
Obviously Eliade is aware of both possibilities in his
treatment of symbolism and does not restrict his
examination to only a single universal system, although
his contention that the symbol can develop from the
actual physical situation of humanity does allow for the
possibility of symbolism as a human universal.
Furthermore, although Eliade argues for the universality
of certain symbols, one of which is that of the
21 Images and Symbols, p. 118.
22 "The Tree of Life and the Tree of Death: a Study 
of Gnostic Symbols," p.346.
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experience of light whose existential basis is only too
evident (light is a symbol because human beings can see).
He none the less accepts that
certainly, we do not find universally a 
well-articulated theology or metaphysics of the 
divine light, comparable, for instance, with the 
Indian, Iranian, or Gnostic systems. But one cannot 
doubt the "experiential" character of the majority 
of mythologies, theologies and gnoses based on the 
equivalence: light-divinity-spirit-life.23
Secondly Eliade can be seen to connect the concept
of symbol to that of archetype and gives us a conception
of "archetype" reminiscent of the passage from The
History of Religious Ideas (vol.I, p.3), which describes
the paradigmatic nature of the orientatio in three
dimensions as based on the human upright, bipedal form.
It is based solidly in the actual embodied nature of the
human existential condition and not on any conceptual a
priori or uncritical assumption. This clarifies his
continuing contention in Images and Symbols that it is
the
tendency of every "historical form" to approximate 
as nearly as possible to its archetype, even when it 
has been realised at a secondary or insignificant 
level: this can be verified everywhere in the 
religious history of humanity. Any local goddess 
tends to become the Great Goddess; any village 
anywhere is the "Centre of the World", and any 
wizard whatever pretends, at the height of his 
ritual, to be the Universal Sovereign. It is this 
same tendency towards the archetype, towards the 
restoration of the perfect form - of which any myth 
or rite or divinity is only a variant, and often a 
rather pale one - that makes the history of 
religions possible. Without this, magico-religious 
experience would be continually creating transitory 
or evanescent forms of gods, myths, dogmas, etc.;
23 Occultism, p . 95 .
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and the student would be faced by a proliferation of 
ever new types impossible to set in order. But when 
once it is "realised" - "historicised" - the 
religious form tends to disengage itself from its 
conditions in time and space and to become
universal, to return to the archetype.24
There is an inherent twofold justification here; firstly
the archetype, which can be seen as the existential basis
of each symbol, is based in the "very situation of man in
the world" and is thus a genuine universal, although
every communicable form of that situation is
"historicised" or socially conditioned; secondly, unless
some such archetype be assumed for the purposes of
classification, the study of religion, indeed any study,
falls foul of what Ibn al-Arabi called the "sea of names"
and cannot hope to deal with the phenomenal proliferation
of specifics.
Despite the morphological connection of symbols to
an archetypal event or situation of humanity upon which
he wants to insist, Eliade accepts that
this is not to say that ... one cannot distinguish 
certain groups that are historically interconnected, 
or that we have no right to regard them as dependent 
upon one another, or as derived from a common 
source, (ibid., p.121.)
He recognises full well that certain symbols
are not, as such, spontaneous discoveries of archaic 
man, but creations of a well defined cultural 
complex, elaborated and carried on in certain human 
societies: such creations have been diffused very 
far from their original home and have been 
assimilated by peoples who would not otherwise have 
known them, (ibid., p.34.)
However, this category is by no means exhaustive of the
24 Images and Symbols , pp. 12 0f .
B. S. Rennie Symbol 107
stock of symbols. To give but one example;
the symbolism of climbing up stairs recurs often 
enough in psychoanalytic literature, an indication 
that it belongs to the archaic content of the human 
psyche and is not a "historical" creation, not an 
innovation dating from a certain historical moment 
(say, from ancient Egypt or Vedic India, etc.).
(ibid., p .50.)
Evidently, if Eliade considers the symbolism of ascending 
a staircase to be sufficiently widespread and 
automatically recurrent to be basically autonomous of 
historically conditioned sources, he must consider the 
vast bulk of symbols to be independent of this historical 
"diffusionist" origin. Certainly the references he makes 
to the kulturkreis school associated with Schmidt and 
Koppers are often dismissive, although he otherwise 
respects their scholarship.25
Yet the symbol is not simply a reflection of the 
natural world as we saw in connection with cosmic 
rhythms, they are also reflective of human creativity and 
imagination. As he says in Patterns on the symbolism of 
the Pearl,
what constitutes the manifold significance of the 
pearl is primarily the framework of symbolism 
surrounding it. ... The "origins" of the symbolism 
of the pearl, then, were not empirical but 
theoretical.26
In this instance Eliade clearly puts theory before fact 
in the development of a symbol, once again it is the 
creative human agency which is emphasised rather than any
25 ibid., p.121, n.74; Patterns, p.38; Australian 
Religion, pp.17, 19f.
26 Patterns , p. 44 0.
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external power, even the existential situation.
There is a confusing shift in emphasis between the 
statement from Patterns immediately above stressing the 
theoretical origins, and the statements from Images and 
Symbols stressing the existential origins of symbol. 
Eliade's point seems to be that our power to theorise, 
"what man thought of his specific mode of being in the 
world", (p.100 above) is itself an immeasurably 
significant element of our existential situation, and one 
which is both conditioned and yet free (through the power 
of creative imagination). This is itself symbolic, 
assimilable to all the symbolism of the coincidentia 
oppositorum discussed above. It is possibly this 
symbolic aspect of human nature which prompted Eliade to 
suggest that
by envisioning the study of man not only inasmuch as 
he is a historic being, but also as a living symbol, 
the history of religions could become a 
metapsychoanalysis.
Certainly, when symbolism is seen as a pre-reflective
system of communication of the most complex and the
truest elements of the human existential situation, the
notion of the study of the history of religions as a
"metapsychoanalysis" makes more sense. It should be
recalled that, as Kim pointed out, Rudolf Otto
insists that the cognition or rather the 
re-cognition of the Holy cannot be derived from 
"experience" or "history". As he argues throughout 
the book, the Holy as an a priori category must be 
assumed in order for anything religious to appear
27 Images and Symbols , p . 35 .
"in history" and for us to recognise it as such.28 
It is Eliade's contrary contention that the sacred 
imposes itself on us in the form of fundamental 
hierophanies which are apprehensions of existential 
situations and thereafter it is the creatively 
constructed symbolic systems which continue the 
revelation of the real to what extent they can. The 
innate human desire which he detects to live in proximity 
and constant contact with the real produces symbolisms 
which extend the hierophanies throughout otherwise 
profane human existence. Paradoxically this has 
eventually led to a complete identification of the 
profane with the sacred and a concomitant difficulty in 
recognising the real even in the primordial hierophanies. 
This I hope has gradually become clear as the primary 
characteristic of modern secular humanity.
The study of religions, through the study of symbol 
and myth, can then be seen as the total analysis (total 
hermeneutic) of the creative spirit (creative 
hermeneutic) of humanity in our embodied existential 
situation in the world. It is to the study of myth that 
I now wish to turn.
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28 "Hierophany and History," p.339, quoting Otto, The 
Idea of the Holy, p.175.
4.2. Myths.
Myth is one of the most tangled of concepts, not
only in Eliade's writings, but in the broader arena of
academic study, involving the Classics, comparative
mythology, regional studies, literary criticism, and the
study of religion. To paraphrase a notorious quip on the
phenomenology of religion, there are as many
interpretations of myth as there are students of myth.
As Eliade himself said,
it is not without fear and trembling that a 
historian of religion approaches the problem of 
myth. This is not only because of that preliminary 
embarrassing question: what is intended by myth? It 
is also because the answers given depend for the 
most part on the documents selected. 9
The "innumerable definitions of myth" which preceded
Eliade, he claims, "have one thing in common: they are
based on the analysis of Greek mythology", (ibid.) While
this may have been obviously true in 1966 when Eliade
first delivered the lecture which later became this
29 "Cosmogonic Myth and 'Sacred History'," Quest, 
ch.5, p.72
chapter of The Quest, it is less so now. Thus it may 
appear questionable that I have elected to explicate 
Eliade's understanding of myth and the mythic through a 
specific consideration of the work of G. S. Kirk, the 
well-known classicist. However, Kirk provides not only a 
broad-based analysis of recent theoretical approaches to 
myth but also a specific critique of the unique elements 
of Eliade's endeavours in this area. Myth has been 
generally under attack at least since Xenophanes (565-470 
B.C.E.) criticised the activities of the gods as related 
by the Homeric tradition and Hesiod.30 More recently 
Ivan Strenski has argued that myth is, in fact, 
non-existent and that the only real products of the 
academic "myth factory" are theories and "applied 
writings" about this otherwise non-existent category.31 
Somewhat more conservatively but in much the same vein,
G. S. Kirk has said of books about myth that, "if they 
add anything at all in the way of interpretation it tends 
to be arbitrary and intuitive - in other words, 
valueless".32 This is the sort of charge frequently 
levelled against Eliade: that, like Frazer and other
B. S. Rennie Myth
30 Myth and Reality, p.148.
31 Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth Century 
History, p.2. I shall return to Strenski's intriguing 
point of view later, ch.8.
Ill
32 The Nature of Greek Myths, p.13. Abbreviated as 
Greek Myths.
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"armchair anthropologists",33 he merely adduces examples 
to support his original intuitive insight. The fact is 
that examples are so many and various that support can be 
found for almost any number of conflicting insights. 
However, Kirk's statement is typical of those who reject 
the intuitive as worthless, immediately identifying 
intuition with the arbitrary, and I believe this attitude 
to be instrumental in the continuing inability to 
appreciate fully both Eliade's assessment and myth 
itself.
On the contrary, intuition can be seen as the 
invaluable basis of all research, the combination of 
insight and intention, based on personal experience, 
which provides both direction and meaning to our 
inquiries. Alone and unsupported one person's intuition 
has no more weight or sway than any other conflicting 
opinion, but the conclusion that intuition per se is 
valueless is not entailed. Even in the hard sciences 
intuition (as guesswork or hunches) is seen to be a 
necessary part of the whole process of setting up a 
program of research and experimentation to produce valid 
conclusions in our inquiry into the nature of reality.
In the humanities, where the very complexity and
33 I should point out that I do not consider Eliade 
to be an "armchair" anthropologist. Not only does his 
three year stay in India constitute valuable fieldwork, 
but also his position in a theological faculty was a 
prime location for ongoing practical research. In fact, 
to one who considers religion a human universal, all 
rigorous observation of one's fellows could be argued to 
represent fieldwork.
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individuality of our objects of inquiry (people) render 
experimentation problematic on many levels and often 
unrepeatable, the role of intuition is of primary 
importance. Intuition is also involved in the Kantian 
sense of actual sensory perception. As we have seen, 
several of the key elements of Eliade1s perspective are 
grounded in experiential perceptions. The task of 
increasing our familiarity with actual examples drawn 
ultimately from sensory perception in order to render our 
insights increasingly accurate involves both senses of 
intuition. Unfortunately, this task is practically 
infinite; not only does complete familiarity with the 
actual data of a field as extensive as mythology exceed 
the capabilities of any individual; not only are all data 
increasingly recognised as "theory-laden; 1,34 but it is 
almost universally accepted (since the work of Karl 
Popper) that an infinitude of data is needed to validate 
any general hypothesis. This not only necessitates the 
move from validation to falsification; it also implies 
that any given hypothesis must be in some degree 
intuitively derived - any chain of induction leading to a 
conclusion must be incomplete, every hypothesis remain 
only thus far unfalsified. This is not the place for a
34 As Goethe pointed out, Maximen und Reflexionen, 
no. 575, in Gedenkausgabe der Werke. Briefe und 
Gespräche. (ed. Ernst Beutler) Zurich: Artemis Verlag, 
vol.9, p.574. J. Z. Smith suggests that Goethe's 
influence on Eliade is apparent for example in the 
latter's concept of morphology, Map is not Territory, 
p.225.
detailed digression into the role of intuition in theory 
formation. Suffice it to say at the moment that 
intuition is not simply arbitrary but is conditioned by 
prior experience in a way which is (thus far) supra- 
rational. Certainly both intuition and reason are 
necessary elements of human thought, and it is the 
utility, applicability, and credibility of any given 
intuition which best validates it. That is to say the 
degree to which it commends itself to and is in 
correspondence with the intuitions of others, rather than 
the degree to which it is held to correspond to or derive 
from "facts".
In accordance with his conceptions regarding 
authenticity and hierophany_Eliade certainly has made his 
personal intuitions the basis of his understanding of 
myth. This cannot be made an a priori criticism but must 
be considered in the light of the significance which that 
understanding can assume in our confrontation with myth.
We cannot know apodictically and exhaustively the 
significance of a myth (or any other religious 
manifestation) to any single individual, certainly not of 
all myths to all individuals at all times. We can only 
generate speculative35 generalisations and attempt 
specific understandings. It will clarify Eliade's 
understanding of myth at this point to compare it in more 
detail with Kirk's analysis. Kirk considers that
35 i.e., based on observations, speculari, as Eliade 
points out, v. No Souvenirs, p.261.
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"myth" is such a general term, and its etymology and 
early applications are so unspecific, that one is 
compelled to take some notice of contemporary 
u s a g e M o s t  people" assume that myths are a 
special kind of traditional tale, and that the 
qualities that make them special are those that 
distinguish them as profound, imaginative, 
other-worldly, universal or larger-than-life.36
By Eliade's lights, these qualities are truth and
reality, in the sense that, as we will see, fables can
exceed historical reality in truth value. Through its
"truth" myth becomes hierophany and reveals the real, the
sacred, to the listener. "The cosmogonic myth is 'true'
because the existence of the world is there to prove it."
That is to say, that "myth narrates a sacred history"; it
"tells only of that which really happened"; it relates
the
breakthrough of the sacred that really establishes 
the World and makes it what it is today. ... The 
Myth is regarded as a sacred story, and hence a 
"true history", because it always deals with 
realities.
Association with the primordial period of creation is an 
archetypal persuasive argument. "The cosmogeny is true 
because the world is there to prove it".37
Kirk admits that "on the whole I feel that the 
attempt to isolate some central specific quality of myths 
is misdirected. There are too many obvious exceptions".
36 Greek Myths , p . 2 5 .
37 v. Myth and Reality, pp. 1,5,6; Myths. Dreams and 
Mysteries. p. 23; The Quest, pp. 72f. It seems likely 
that Eliade shared this opinion with Pettazzoni, v. 
"Mythology and the History of Religions", p.101: "as 
Prof. Pettazzoni remarks, a myth is always a true story 
because it is a sacred story".
However, he goes on to say that the distinguishing 
features of myth must be "not just one such 
characteristic like sacredness in some sense, but a whole 
range of possibilities".38 Among the phrases Kirk uses 
to describe the possible distinguishing features of myth 
are;
1. narrative force, power or charm.
2. offering an explanation for some important 
phenomenon or custom.
3. palliating in some way a recurring social 
dilemma.
4. recording and establishing a useful institution.
5. expressing an emotion in some way that satisfies 
some need in the individual.
6. reinforcing a religious feeling.
7. acting as a powerful support or precedent for an 
established ritual or cult practice.
Eliade's attitude seems to generally agree with
Kirk's analysis thus far; firstly, the force or charm of
the narrative can be assimilated to Eliade's concept of
the "truth" of the narrative. Secondly, he positively
insists on the etiological aspect of myth. Features 2,
4, and 7 can be grouped together here; explanation,
recording, and support flow together in the positive
valorisation of the etiological myth.
To tell how things came into existence is to explain 
them and at the same time indirectly to answer
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another question: Why did they come into 
existence?39
Thus transmitting the mythic origins of an institution or
phenomenon performs all three functions. Features 5 and
6 are intriguing but so vague as to be of little use. I
am not sufficiently familiar with Kirk's other work to
know if he clarifies these concepts elsewhere but they
remain unclear here. Whatever may be the precise import
of these functions, it seems clear that they can be
fulfilled by other narratives than myths and other
religious elements than the mythic, that is to say they
are not unique characteristics of myth.
The third of Kirk's features can be assimilated to
Eliade's notion of a consolation from the terror of
history and will be discussed elsewhere. Kirk concludes
his introductory section on "Problems of Definition" with
the declaration that
the position at which we have arrived is that myths 
are on the one hand good stories, on the other hand 
bearers of important messages about life in general 
and life within society in particular.40
The whole question of aesthetics is raised here; what is
the exact relationship of the "important message" to the
"good story"? In retrospect the two are obviously
connected, but is that connection teleological (the
messages considered important being deliberately
associated with powerful vehicles of transmission to
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ensure their propagation and preservation), or causal 
(the importance of the message naturally generating a 
successful vehicle), or the reverse (the aesthetic power 
of the vehicle ensuring that its message is perceived and 
transmitted as important). An answer to this question 
would undoubtedly explain the perennial association of 
religious themes and (at least pre-Rennaisance) art.
A revealing statement of Kirk's analysis is that 
myths must "possess both exceptional narrative power and 
clear functional relevance to some important aspect of 
life beyond mere entertainment", (ibid., p.28.) The 
problem here is more clearly one of disentangling the two 
characteristics. In order to "possess exceptional 
narrative power" must not a story have some a priori 
relevance to some important aspect of life? Further, can 
that relevance be anything but functional? That is to 
say the myth will explain, establish, support, reinforce, 
or express that to which it has relevance. It should be 
noticed in this connection that the types of relevance 
listed by Kirk are always positive. He, too, sees myth 
as a positive rhetorical device, whose function is 
supportive, establishing, etc. rather than destructive or 
hostile. It would seem that the analytic method of 
philosophy gradually established since the Socratics 
serves the negative side more readily. However, positive 
valorizations are made by more mythic means. Kirk points 
out that in pre-Socratic Greece myths, as powerful 
narrative pieces, were used as supportive material for
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philosophic standpoints. Even Plato, although reviling 
this poesis of myth as the enemy of philosophy falls back 
on this tradition. As Kirk says, "probably the habit of 
falling back on myths as an emotive form of persuasion 
belonged to Socrates himself", (ibid., p.108.) In the 
post-Socratic tradition the reliance on "rational" rather 
than "mythic" forms of persuasion can be seen as 
developing from an increased valorisation of the 
historical as the "real". This provides a convenient 
touchstone to determine the "reality" of an argument: 
that which actually historically occurred would be seen 
as more "real" (ie. sacred; more powerful, meaningful, 
significant, etc., therefore more credible), than that 
which was a human fabrication. Thus rational discourse 
upon elements of common human experience would become 
more esteemed than mythic persuasion which does "not set 
out to give philosophical proofs, rather to effect an 
altered emotional response to an aspect of our 
existence", (ibid., p.83.) This is entirely consistent 
with Eliade's insistence that myth is the true story par 
excellence.
In developing his own theory of myth Kirk gives a 
resumé of the most influential alternative theories, 
isolating "five monolithic theories of myth". The first 
of these theories is that made famous by Max Muller:
"all myths are nature myths, that is they refer to 
meteorological and cosmological phenomena", (ibid., 
p.43.) This theory Kirk sees as having been exploded
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largely by Andrew Lang, (ibid., p.17.) For his own part
Kirk states that
exactly how and why the earliest myth makers thought 
about the world as they did, and what particular 
kind of anthropocentric and symbolic motives 
persuaded them to imagine the gods in the form of 
the sky, or the sky as behaving in some respects 
like a man, must remain unknown, (ibid., p.49.)
However, the idea that myths are allegories of nature or
meteorological events must have corresponded to the
intuitions of the 19th century Europeans who so readily
accepted it. To Kirk it may now seem "incredible that
many of the best minds in 19th century Europe could
envisage myths as encoded descriptions of clouds passing
over the sun etc", (ibid., p.17.) Yet this "strange
exaggeration" evidently was acceptable at that time, in
that place; it accorded with the prevalent view of human
nature. In his journal Eliade commented similarly on the
acceptance of Freud's theories on myth despite the
paucity of supportive evidence. However, he has a
partial explanation;
the interpretations of Freud are more and more 
successful because they are among the myths 
accessible to modern man. The myth of the murdered 
father, among others, reconstituted and interpreted 
in Totem and Taboo. It would be impossible to 
ferret out a single example of slaying the father in 
primitive religions or mythologies. This myth was 
created by Freud. And what is more interesting: the 
intellectual élite accept it (is it because they 
understand it? Or because it is "true" for modern 
man? )41
The implication of Eliade's thought here is that the 
19th century, naturalistic explanation of myths was, like
41 No Souvenirs , p . 117 .
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Freud's primordial parricide, a myth itself. Eliade's 
usage of the term can be seen to be diametrically opposed 
to one aspect of the "contemporary usage" of the term 
which Kirk commended to our notice.42 It is not in the 
sense of "falsehood" or "fable" that Eliade uses the word 
"myth". This he considers a "semantic inheritance from 
the Christian polemic against the pagan world".43 Myth 
is seen rather as a narrative "considered to reveal the 
truth par excellence".44
Evidently the type of truth intended in Eliade's 
description of myth is quite distinct from historical 
actuality. This is actually consistent with the common 
alternative usages of "true" given in any sizeable 
dictionary, for example, "being that which is the case 
rather than that which is manifest or assumed" .43 The 
sense of true as being in accordance with an actual, 
historical state of affairs, is a rather recent and 
specialised usage. To give an example; even the most 
hardline of Christian fundamentalists who argue for the 
absolute historical veracity of the Bible would not
42 Greek Myths , p . 2 5 .
43 Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, p.23, although 
elsewhere he says, "if in every European language the 
word 'myth' denotes a 'fiction,' it is because the Greeks 
proclaimed it to be such twenty-five centuries ago". 
(Quest, p .72)
44 Eliade, The Quest, p.73, and v. esp. Myth, Dreams 
and Mysteries, p.23 on his opposition to myth as 
"untrue".
43 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary.
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insist that it necessarily occurred on some historical
occasion that a certain traveller was robbed and beaten
by specific thieves, neglected by an actual levite
priest, and rescued by an historical Samaritan for the
parable of the Good Samaritan to be a story revelatory of
the truth. This usage of the concept of truth is further
clarified in Eliade's journals. For example, he states
that "the Bucharest of my novella Pe Strada Mantuleasa,
although legendary, is truer than the city I went through
for the last time in August 1942".44 And in his
narration of the story of Savonarola and Lorenzo de
Medici from the same source one can read more clearly
Eliade's dissociation of truth from history. Popular
legend had it that Savonarola eventually denied extreme
unction to Medici when the latter would not restore
liberty to Florence, and, apparently, learned critics
accepted the historicity of this version. This Eliade
takes to be because the
archetypal image - Savonarola the prophet of civil 
liberties, Lorenzo the absolute tyrant - was too 
"true", too suggestive, to be invalidated by 
documents and specific testimony. It was "truer" in 
legend than in history. In history Savonarola 
conducted himself as any Christian monk and absolved 
the repentant sinner.45
Thus mythic truth is seen as independent of, but 
certainly not in opposition to, historical actuality. As 
we saw in the preceding exposition on hierophany, Eliade
44 No Souvenirs, p . 51.
45 Greek Myths , p.57.
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considers the experience of historical actualities to be
the perennial source and auditor of the truth which is
expressed in creative interpretation.
The next theory which Kirk inspects is the
etiological theory, attributed particularly to Andrew
Lang - "all myths offer a cause or explanation of
something in the real world", (ibid., p.53.) It is
remarkable that Kirk does not consider Eliade in the
context of etiological myth. In one of his most widely
read books Eliade states his opinion clearly that "every
myth shows how a reality came into existence, whether it
be the total reality, the cosmos, or only a fragment - an
island, a species of plant, a human institution".46
Furthermore, it is one of the central tenets of the
Eliade's understanding of myth that the cosmogonic myth
is the pattern of all myths as the exemplar of all
genesis stories. It is a fundamental characteristic of a
myth that it is
always related to a "creation", it tells how
something came into existence, or how a pattern of
behaviour, an institution, a manner of working were 
established; this is why myths constitute the 
paradigms for all significant human acts.47
And again.
In general, one can say that any myth tells how
something came into being, the world, or man, or an
animal species, or a social institution, and so on. 
But by the very fact that the creation of the world 
precedes everything else, the cosmogony enjoys a 
special prestige. In fact, as I have tried to show
46 Sacred and the Profane, p . 97.
47 Myth and Reality, p . 18 .
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elsewhere, [Eliade footnotes The Myth of the Eternal 
Return and Myth and Reality] the cosmogonic myth 
furnishes the model for all myths of origin.
Perhaps Kirk's reading of Eliade is not extensive, this
is not meant as a serious criticism of Kirk: on the one
hand it is a perennial problem in this field that one
cannot cover all available sources, on the other it is a
difficulty with Eliade that one should need to read him
so extensively in order to appreciate his thought.
Although he does not make the point himself, Kirk's
objection stands as well for Eliade as it does for Lang.
"Myths," he says, "are obviously not concerned just with
that [etiology]; they plainly encompass such things as
the emotional valuation of many aspects of personal
life."49 The only possible reply here is that it would
seem that, by Eliade's definition, stories which do not
encompass these etiological concerns are excluded from
the category of myth. Yet stories which "encompass the
emotional valuation" of phenomena can be interpreted as
giving the origin of that emotional valuation and will
thus not be excluded.
Thirdly, Kirk considers the theory that myths are
"charters" for customs, institutions, or beliefs. This
was the theory forwarded by Bronislav Malinowski, whose
idea that the "serious" uses of myth are neither 
emotional nor reflective, but rather are connected 
with the mechanical functions of social life, became 
the core of the exaggerated theory known as
48 Quest, p . 75 .
49 Greek Myths , p . 5 3 .
"functionalism" that developed into an orthodoxy in
the circle of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and Edmund
Leach, (ibid., p.32.)
Although he evidently opposes this "orthodoxy", Kirk is 
more favourably disposed to Malinowski's understanding, 
conceding that Malinowski was right in requiring more 
observations of myth "in action" rather than theoretical 
speculation. It will soon become clear in what ways 
Eliade's understanding of myth encourages a broader 
observation of myth "in action" in the contemporary 
world. Also, Eliade quotes from Malinowski's Myth in 
Primitive Psychology, pp.101, 108 at some length, to the 
effect that myth is "a narrative resurrection of a 
primeval reality", and "supplies man with the motive for 
ritual and moral actions", finding here support for the 
concepts of the internal coherence and exemplary status 
of myth.50 Robert Baird has pointed out that Eliade and 
Malinowski are in agreement that "men in archaic cultures 
justify their actions in terms of the prior acts of the 
gods", although the significance of this differs for the 
two scholars.51
To a certain extent the etiological and the 
"charter" concepts of myth overlap. As we have seen, 
Eliade points out that insofar as a myth describes the 
origin of a given institution or phenomenon it thereby 
supports it. Mythology
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relates how things came into being, providing the 
exemplary model and also the justification of man's 
activities. One understands what one is - mortal 
and of a certain sex - and how that came about, 
because the myths tell how death and sexuality made 
their appearance.52
That is to say that the "accidents" of one's personal
life experience are orientated within a given extended
matrix of significations and thus "justified". As with
any language, from the most natural to the most formal,
each element is defined in terms of other elements in the
whole structure of meaning. Thus the act of description
in the mythic framework simultaneously operates as
justification. The significance of a number, for
example, is not fixed, not essential, but is given by its
relationship to other elements of the mathematical
system.53 Similarly the significance of one's own
existence is not given a priori by its form, it lacks
essential significance. Only by orientating the various
experiential elements of one's own existence (mortality,
sexuality, social duty, alimentation, in short, one's
existential situation, as Eliade often refers to it), in
52 Quest, p . 76 .
53 For example, 10 can = 8 x 2 ,  as it does in the 
hexadecimal mathematics used for computers, where the 
base number is sixteen rather than ten. Usually 10 = 5 x 
2, because suffixing the zero to any number indicates 
that that number is thus multiplied by the base number, 
that, in the decimal system, having counted all the 
fingers on both hands one begins the sequence over again, 
adding each number to the total which becomes the base.
It is a fundamental assumption of Sausurrian linguistics 
that words are likewise defined, their meaning being 
given and justified by their relationships to other 
elements of the language.
an extended matrix of interrelated significant entities, 
can one appreciate its significance and escape the 
dreadful social and psychological consequences of an 
otherwise utterly insignificant existence. In this 
aspect of myth Kirk's concept of "palliating a recurring 
social dilemma" and Eliade's concept of countering the 
terror of history combine. To escape further from the 
implication that this extended matrix is itself 
insignificant, no more than a palliative, in fact a 
placebo, it must be grounded as frequently and firmly as 
possible in reality, in the sacred. However, as I have 
argued, reality itself is an element in the existential 
situation of the individual, or rather a concept therein, 
the actual experience of which is necessarily beyond our 
empirical senses. It too is given significance by its 
relationship to the various elements of our experience. 
Our concept of the real is grounded in those experiences 
which we hold to reveal most clearly that which is real, 
in hierophanies and archetypal intuitions, yet our 
experience of certain phenomena as hierophanic or 
ontophanic is determined by our "personal experience and 
religious background";54 thus our very apprehension of 
the significance of the elements of our personal 
experience takes shape within a hermeneutical cycle of 
object-observation-subject-observation-object. This type 
of constructivist attitude which ultimately makes
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humanity instrumental in its perceptions of reality, is 
implicit in both the Italian humanist insistence on the 
coherence of "primitive thought" [eg. Vico] and in 
Goethe's observation that all facts are theory-laden, 
both of which certainly influenced Eliade's thought.
The fourth of the "monolithic" theories of myth 
presented by Kirk is the one which he attributes 
specifically to Eliade; that "the purpose of myths is to 
evoke or actually re-establish in some sense, the 
creative era".55 Certainly this is an important and 
original element of Eliade's thought, but as we have 
seen, it does not exhaust his understanding of myth. 
Although Kirk does not himself make such a claim the 
reader could give him the benefit of the doubt here by 
assuming that this "theory" which he derives from 
Eliade's writings is that element of Eliade's theory of 
myth which is unique and original to him. As we have 
seen Eliade also subscribes to the etiological theory, 
and to some extent to the charter theory and even allows 
some truth to the "primordial physics" concept. Yet it 
is the "Myth of the Eternal Return" which is particular 
to Eliade's interpretation, and it is that which Kirk 
critiques.
"Many myths of many societies are not of this kind 
and do not respond to any such interpretation", Kirk 
states, (ibid., p.64.) However, even in the Amerindian
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myth which he offers as a specific exception as proof of 
this he accepts that the action takes place in "a 
mythical epoch that was, admittedly, the time when things 
were put in order", (ibid.) It is Eliade's point that 
myths refer to such an "other time" in which the cosmos 
was either created or ordered. "Such works constitute 
properly speaking a cosmogony; the ancestors did not 
create the earth, but they gave form to a pre-existent 
materia prima."56 Furthermore, in establishing his own 
distinctions between myth and folklore Kirk himself had 
accepted that myth takes place in a "timeless" past, 
rather than a remote chronological era or an anonymous 
period.57 Since the action of myths "take place" in such 
a timeless, eternal period it seems pointless to deny 
that the telling of these myths "evokes" that period, and 
Eliade's numerous examples must stand as their own 
evidence that this is seen as the creative period par 
excellence. Whether or not the myths actually seek to 
re-establish that timeless period here and now is a more 
complex argument and will be considered later. When 
Kirk turns to the area of his own expertise, the Greek 
myths, to cast doubt on Eliade's theory he occasionally 
adduces examples which support it.
Greek myths, too, utterly fail to support Eliade's
universal theory. [Writes Kirk] The whole range of
Greek heroic myths lies outside any true "creative"
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era. (ibid., p .65.)
Yet later in his exposition Kirk states that for Pindar
the "excellence" ... that he celebrates in his 
victors seems to him to owe its value precisely to 
its heroic and divine connections, to its roots in a 
radical mythical past of which the Olympic Games, 
above all other occasions, are seen as a rare 
surviving relic. ... For Pindar, at least, the myths 
represented a past that was of higher value than the 
present. ... In this use of myths as an active force 
for conserving a semi-divine past Pindar returns to 
a function that is more than merely literary, and 
reproduces in a way the evocative function of 
certain myths that was discussed on page 63". (I.e., 
Eliade's theory of the evocation of the creative 
era. (ibid., pp.101-102.)
This certainly does not "utterly fail to support Eliade's
universal theory", even when the aspect of the
reinstatement of the primordial, creative period is
artificially separated from its properly accompanying
elements. As a highly valorised timeless time which is
the object of nostalgia and of periodic re-establishment
Pindar's attitude to the Olympic Games is a clear example
of Eliade's mythic nostalgia for paradise and eternal
return to the primordial sacred time.
It is apparently Kirk's desire to isolate and
criticise some "monolithic" and "universal" theory of
myth and his resultant restriction of Eliade's theory to
the notion of a re-establishment of a creative era which
makes his criticism appear credible. The point is that
Eliade's "definition" of myth is systematic and
taxonomic. It is a deliberate attempt to classify so as
to render comprehensible an extremely complex phenomenon.
As Kirk says,
myths are not uniform, logical and internally 
consistent, they are multiform, imaginative and 
loose in their details. Moreover their emphases 
change from one year, or generation to the next.
(ibid., p.29.)
Thus accepting the complexity and polyvalence of myth
(which is always and unavoidably a human classification
of the broader category of narrative, itself a subset of
human communication) Kirk is hardly justified in using
Eliade's failure to cover all myths as a serious negative
criticism. Eliade makes an attempt to restrict the
classification to a particular group of narratives having
the characteristics which he highlights. Certainly he
thus cannot cover all tales, stories, records, and so
forth which stake a claim to the title of "myth". The
classification which Kirk produces, motivated by his
desire to create a "guide to the understanding of all of
them", (ibid.) is so broad that it "does not turn out to
be an analytic category of any great usefulness", as Jack
Goody said of Kirk's earlier work on myth.58 In order to
make one's analytic category of any value in this area
one must necessarily exclude some candidates from the
field of mythology. Simply accepting the complexity of
myth will always result in some such broad and unusable
definition. Eliade, on the other hand, in his desire to
establish the coherence and the exemplary status of myth
has perhaps been too willing to impose upon that category
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its Meaning and Function in Ancient and Other Cultures, 
v. Greek Myths, p.38.
a description which would not be immediately meaningful 
to those for whom a given myth is current. However, as I 
said earlier, the value of his intuitions concerning myth 
should be assessed in the light of the significance they 
reveal to his readers in their own confrontation with the 
mythic.
If Eliade's concept of myth appears more restrictive 
than Kirk's we must look further to ascertain what it is 
that qualifies the myth beyond its narrative charm and 
functional relevance. The clearest expositions of 
Eliade's thought in this area are in Myth and Reality, 
ch. 9, "Survivals and Camouflages of Myth" and in Myths, 
Dreams and Mysteries, ch. 1, "The Myths of the Modern 
World". In the former, Eliade discusses first the 
continuation of mythic thought in Christianity and then 
he outlines specifically mythic elements in "secular" 
thought. The obsession with "the return to the origins" 
in modern society is related to the etiological function 
of myth. The "eschatological and millennialist 
structures" of Marxism are described as mythic. Perhaps 
more surprisingly in such a scholar is the perception of 
mythic structures in the mass media, comic art, modern 
art, the obsession with success, the exodus to the 
suburbs, the "automobile cult", the "myth of the élite", 
and in the novel. These are seen as the surviving, if 
camouflaged, myths of the modern world. This is where 
modern man finds his true reality, the meaningful, the 
powerful.
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Despite the chapter heading of "Survivals and
Camouflages of Myths", Eliade warns that these mythic
elements do not
represent "survivals" of an archaic mentality ... 
[rather] certain aspects and functions of mythic 
thought are constituents of the human being.59
This pronouncement might at first sound enigmatic and
unclear, however, its implications were already clarified
in his work of six years earlier. There, although he
warns of the enormous scope of myths in the modern world,
he seeks to trace the general survival of myth. He
writes,
of what is essential in mythic behaviour--the 
exemplary pattern, the repetition, the break with 
profane duration and integration into primordial 
time— the first two at least are consubstantial with 
every human condition.60
What is seen as essential to myth beyond its narrative
power and relevance is the specific recognition of and
response to exemplary patterns. Eliade considers that
"the foremost function of myth is to reveal the exemplary
models for all human rites and all significant human
activities".61 The response to, the repetition of,
these exemplary pattern constitutes a repetition of a
segment of the primordial time and thus a break with
profane, historical time. This is, in fact, integral to
the "truth" of the myth. It is the exemplary, imitable
59 Myth and Reality, p . 181 f .
60 Myths, Dreams and Mysteries, p . 31.
61 Myth and Reality, p . 8 .
elements of the narrative which give a story mythic 
status. (Allow me to emphasise once again that Eliade is 
using "true" in a sense which has more in common to the 
Classical Greek arete, virtue or excellence, and less in 
common with the notion of propositional truth or 
historical accuracy. This is, of course, consistent with 
the whole body of his thought.) It is the perception 
that the myth is exemplary that gives rise to the concept 
of the "reactualisation" of the primordial, creative era. 
Insofar as a mythic act is open to imitation, insofar as 
we can narrate or reenact the events of the mythic era, 
the time of illud tempus is open to re-establishment, we 
can re-discover and thus re-actualise its meaning and its 
power.
The greatest suspicion of myth which Kirk expresses 
in his study is of myth "as a collective term" because 
this, and other forms such as "mythology",
misleadingly imply that what one should be defining
is some absolute essence of all myths, some Platonic
Idea of "that which is truly mythic".
However, "myths are a vague and uncertain category, and 
one man's myth is another man's legend, or folktale, or 
oral tradition".62 This sort of suspicion is given 
greater rein in Strenski's complete rejection of myth as 
a reality. However, it can readily be seen that in 
Eliade's understanding, myth is determined by the 
prevalent attitude to a popular narrative. Myth is the
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popular narrative which is uncritically (or with 
reference to other myths!) held to be true, to represent 
the real, and thus to be exemplary. In Eliadean terms, 
to be sacred. No doubt the hostile attitude to myth from 
Xenophanes to Strenski is grounded in a justifiable 
rejection of the a priori, uncritically positive 
valorisation characteristic of myth. It is a typical and 
admirable characteristic of science and the "scientific" 
approach that everything, especially traditionally 
established values, should be open to rigorous criticism.
It is this specific characteristic of criticism of 
tradition which Eliade has cited as definitive of "modern 
man", (p.53, n.33) The problem here resides in the 
concomitant claim or belief that for the scientific or 
critical modern nothing is received from tradition 
without prior critical analysis; that "modern man" "does 
not believe in myths", that is, has no myths of his own, 
an assertion with which Eliade is in fundamental 
disagreement. The implication of his thought is that 
myth is functional as much when the myth is concealed in 
the message as when the message is concealed in the myth.
The reliance upon nonrational, narrative, "emotive forms 
of persuasion" will always draw upon mythic sources of 
power. Thus, for example, it could be said that when a 
specious statistical argument is utilised, one which 
strictly speaking is not rational, that appeal is being 
made to the myth of mathematics, that is to the popular 
association of number and truth.
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Only if all of one's persuasions are formed on the 
basis of fully rational support can one be said to have 
transcended all myth. One of the gains made by such an 
acceptance of our own mythic influences is that the 
problem of a "Platonic Idea" of the truly mythic is 
completely avoided. It is the intentional attitude of 
the believer which makes a myth a myth, not some 
necessary participation in an ideal form. In terms of 
Eliade's sacred it is the perceived participation in or 
revelation of the real which makes a particular narrative 
mythic for a particular believer. However, it is not 
necessary that the student of myth be party to that 
participation or revelation to recognise the mythic 
status of that narrative. It can thus be accepted that 
"one man's myth is another man's legend", as Kirk puts 
it, while simultaneously recognising the truly mythic 
status of the narrative in its relationship to its 
hearers.
Given the preceding observations the foundationalism 
characteristic of much of modern thought, especially 
since Descartes, can itself be seen as a form of 
"nostalgia for paradise". The prevalent mythology of 
pre-modern society was not seriously challenged, one's 
firm location within a particular culture would ensure a 
certitude, a reality, a sacrality, to the mores of that 
culture. Nowadays, however, with the entry of the Orient 
into History as Eliade has it and the propagation of the 
mass media the "sacred" standards of the traditional
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religion of the West are challenged. That is to say, not
simply the doctrines of Christianity, but all the heirs
of our culture's positive valorizations. As Eliade
states in his conclusion to "Cosmogonic Myth and 'Sacred
History’", "it is with such myths of sacred history -
still alive in many traditional societies - that the
Judaeo-Christian idea of history has to vie".63
Secular modern Westerners are no more justified in
their complacent acceptance of their idea of history than
are Christians in their acceptance of the Atonement.
Both are traditionally transmitted and in their
apprehension as powerful, relevant and exemplary, with
its self-referentially positive valorisation, both can be
seen as mythic.
It is only through the discovery of History - more 
precisely by the awakening of the historical 
consciousness in Judaeo-Christianity and its 
propagation by Hegel and his successors - it is only 
through the radical assimilation of the new mode of 
being represented by human existence in the world 
that myth could be left behind. But we hesitate to 
say that mythical thought has been abolished. As we 
shall soon see, it managed to survive, though 
radically changed (if not perfectly camouflaged).
And the astonishing fact is that, more than anywhere 
else it survives in historiography!64
Paradoxically myth tends to re-establish itself as a
fable, an illusion. As in the story of Visnu and
Narada,65 what is the ultimately seductive fault is
accepting one's own myths as real, and yet in order to
63 Greek Myths , p . 8 7 .
64 Myth and Reality, p . 113 .
65 Related in Images and Symbols, pp.70f.
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reach this conclusion, we had to begin with the 
recognition that the myth is the true story par 
excellence. Perhaps the paradox can be resolved in the 
recognition that the myth is a true representation of 
reality in the sense that it is honest and has integrity, 
and excellence but is not a reiteration of reality 
itself.
The hearer of myth, regardless of his level of 
culture, when he is listening to a myth, forgets, as 
it were, his particular situation and is projected 
into another world, into another universe which is 
no longer his poor little universe of every day. ... 
The myths are true because they are sacred, because 
they tell him about sacred beings and events. 
Consequently, in reciting or listening to a myth, 
one resumes contact with the sacred and with 
reality, and in so doing one transcends the profane 
condition, the "historical situation". In other 
words one goes beyond the temporal condition and the 
dull self-sufficiency which is the lot of every 
human being simply because every human being is 
"ignorant" - in the sense that he is identifying 
himself, and Reality, with his own particular 
situation. And ignorance is, first of all, this 
false identification of Reality with what each one 
of us appears to be or to possess, (ibid., p.59.)
As he makes clear later on, this does not deny the
relevance of the historical situation, or the reality of
personal experience. In Indian terms he points out that
"the great cosmic illusion is a hierophany". (ibid.,
p.91.)
If Time, seen as Maya, is itself a manifestation of 
the Divinity, to live in Time is not itself a "bad 
action": "bad action" is to believe that nothing 
else exists, nothing outside of Time. One is 
devoured by Time, not because one lives in Time, but 
because one believes in its reality, and therefore 
forgets or despises eternity.(91)
In other words, the primary fault is not in perception
itself, but in mistakenly assuming perception to be
B. S. Rennie Myth 139
itself the Real rather than a secondary manifestation, a 
representation or imitation of the real, to mistake the 
illusion for reality.
The emphases of myth have changed drastically, as 
has so much else of human life since the industrial 
revolution. So radical is the change that it is often 
difficult to recognise the connection of modern myths 
with archaic ones. The mythic importance of the 
narrative form has been much reduced; stories are now in 
enormously greater supply. This has resulted in a 
general demythologisation of narrative and the occasional 
sundering of myth from its familiar narrative setting. 
Thus ideology, cosmology, ontology, and other, strictly 
metaphysical assumptions can bear no obvious trace of the 
"good story", but nevertheless be of degraded mythic 
status because of their perception as self-evident 
truths, their highly effective emotional persuasiveness, 
and their etiological character. Although superficially 
distinct, popular forms of media such as films and comic 
books66 still share common characteristics of myth of 
etiology, entertainment value, positive valorisation but 
above all, exemplary status. If it is at first difficult 
to accept popular media as myth, it should be borne in 
mind that both Franz Boas and E. E. Evans-Pritchard
66 Certainly, fantastic creations such as strip 
cartoon super heroes cannot be excluded from this later 
category. (cf. Eliade's photograph with Jack Kirby's 
comic art Asgardians, Waiting for the Dawn, pp.66-67), 
and v. Myth and Reality, p.185 on the "myth of Superman."
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refused to make any absolute distinction between myth and 
folktale, and that Kirk agrees that "the data show a 
continual flow of material from mythology and folktale 
and vice versa, and that neither group can claim 
priority".67 Also of interest in this context is the 
widespread belief that the violence in children's 
cartoons is responsible for the violence in society, that 
the directly exemplary status of these tales is still 
effective.
One possible weakness of Kirk's analysis (in common
with many other commentators) is his insistence that "it
cannot be repeated too often" that myths are traditional
tales, (ibid., p.38.) thus underplaying this concept of
contemporary myths, and disabling any attempts to observe
"myth in action" in our own society. This would imply
that our modern society is in this respect radically
different from all others in that it would be the only
society ever known to exist without myths. It is a
conceit typical of "modern" thought that we in the
contemporary West are somehow essentially different from
all other societies. Against this, Eliade has said,
a restriction of the inquiry to "primitive" 
mythologies risks giving the impression that there 
is no continuity between archaic thought and the 
thought of the peoples who played an important role 
in ancient history. Now, such a solution of 
continuity does not exist.68
I would argue that Eliade's universal humanism is one of
67 Greek Myths , pp. 31 - 3 3 .
68 Quest, p . 7 3 .
the elements which makes him a precursor of the 
"postmodern" rather than himself a typical modern. In 
defence of Kirk, however, it must be said that the 
cultural matrix which empowers a myth as a form of 
persuasion independently of its rationality is 
necessarily traditional, that is to say that the positive 
emotional response to a myth is received rather than 
innate. It is intuitive in the sense mentioned above.
(p.114.) Unfortunately, with the dévalorisation of the 
"reality" of such a form of persuasion and such 
uninspected "truths", (that is to say, with the 
association of myth and the unreal and the concomitant 
devaluation of nonrational, intuitive insights), these 
received persuasions have largely become concealed and 
the traditions which support them largely unrecognised.
One major cause of this unwarranted association is the 
longstanding tendency to study as myths exactly those 
narratives which are held by other peoples to be 
revelatory of the real, but are not so held by ourselves.
The concept of "myth" was thus formed as "other peoples' 
myths" rather than as "myths" tout court,69 and it is in 
correcting this misapprehension that Eliade's 
consideration of myths has diverged from the conventional 
understanding of the word.
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review in Style, 24, no.4 (1990):642-645.
Chapter Five 
Time, History, and Illud Tempus
5.1. Introduction
The terms of the preceding analyses are either 
neologisms of Eliade's own construction or specialist 
terms of the study of religio-cultural phenomena; 
hierophany, symbols etc. However, now the object of 
analysis is a group of terms which are of a much more 
broad and common usage; history and time. Although 
Eliade's characteristic use of the Latin illud tempus 
clearly indicates an idiosyncratic application of the 
concept of time it is precisely the tension between this 
idiosyncrasy and the deeply ingrained assumptions of the 
reader which generates many of the difficulties of 
comprehension of this aspect of Eliade's thought. As 
anyone who has tangled with Heidegger's Sein und Zeit 
knows only too well, it is the common and fundamental
terms of our conceptual vocabulary which generate the 
most crucial and labyrinthine problems, time no less than 
being. Eliade, too, was aware that The Myth of the 
Eternal Return, which "had we not feared to appear 
overambitious, we should have given ... the subtitle: 
Introduction to a Philosophy of History",1 was "the most 
significant of my books; and when I am asked in what 
order they should be read, I always recommend beginning 
with the present work".2 First published as Le Mythe de 
l'éternel retour: archétypes et répétition by Gallimard 
in 1949, this work was translated into English as Cosmos 
and History (Harper Torchbooks, 1959) and reprinted as 
The Myth of the Eternal Return or Cosmos and History from 
1965 onwards. It certainly contains the most detailed 
exposition of the interpretation of the attitude to time 
and history which Eliade based on his notoriously broad 
readings of religious documents.
The notions of time and history as they are applied 
by Eliade himself, as they are manifest in the documents 
of the study of religion, and as they are commonly 
applied in the West today are of fundamental importance 
to this study in every respect. As Eliade applies them 
they condition the meaning of his entire oeuvre; as they 
are manifest in the documents of the study of religion 
(as Eliade conceived it) they represent an expression of
1 The Myth of the Eternal Return, Foreword, p.ix.
2 ibid., p.xv, preface to the English edition, dated 
November 1958.
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the existential situation of humanity other than our own; 
and as they are commonly applied in the West today they 
represent the realities of our own existential situation 
as it differs from but is conditioned by our cultural 
precedents. As sacred or sacralisable, as hierophanies, 
the documents of religious studies are by definition 
expressions of that which was apprehended as the real. 
Thus the attitude to time expressed in the sacred 
traditions of humanity past and present represent the 
actual apprehensions of those alternative modes of 
(human) being. Eliade's interpretations of time and 
history simultaneously condition and are the products of 
his implicit system and its concomitant methodology.
5.2. The Archaic and the Modern Conceptions of Time
Although Eliade admits the difficulty of describing
concisely the nature of time for modern humanity3, he
characterises clearly the conception of time which he has
abstracted from religious documents. For humanity in its
religious aspect,
profane temporal duration can be periodically 
arrested; for certain rituals have the power to 
interrupt it by periods of a sacred time that is 
nonhistorical (in the sense that it does not belong 
to the historical present), (ibid., pp.7If.)
Thus,
religious man lives in two kinds of time, of which 
the most important, sacred time, appears under the 
paradoxical aspect of a circular time, reversible 
and recoverable, a sort of eternal mythical present
3 The Sacred and the Profane, p.70.
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that is periodically regenerated by means of rites.
(ibid., p.70.)
This, as we saw, was Eliade's main means of
distinguishing religious, archaic humanity from modern,
nonreligious humanity, (above, p.86) and finally reflects
the thesis of The Myth of the Eternal Return. However,
before I attempt to clarify Eliade's position by close
reference to that work, let me immediately emphasise one
point which he makes in The Sacred and the Profane. This
sacred time "is a mythical time, that is a primordial
time, not to be found in the historical past".4
Obviously this "primordial time" is not located in any
long-gone historical era of our known world, but is in
empirical terms notional, conceptual or imaginary.
Eliade is certain that
the nostalgia for the lost paradise excludes any 
desire to restore the "paradise of animality". 
Everything that we know about the mythic memories of 
"paradise" confronts us, on the contrary, with the 
image of an ideal humanity enjoying a beatitude and 
spiritual plenitude forever unrealisable in the 
present state of "fallen man".5
That is to say, the nostalgia is not for a chronological
past, an actual or historical condition, rather it is for
an imaginary ideal which none the less functions as an
exemplar. Once again, as in my interpretation of
Eliade's sacred, the ontological status of Eliade’s
analysis should not be assumed. In the very opening
words to The Myth of the Eternal Return he states that
4 The Sacred and the Profane, p.72. Emphasis added.
5 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p.91.
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this book undertakes to study certain aspects of 
archaic ontology - more precisely, the conceptions 
of being and reality that can be read off from the 
behaviour of the man of premodern societies.6
Thus it can be seen that at no point is he necessarily
discussing archaic ontology; how things were in premodern
societies, but rather archaic conceptions of ontology;
how things were thought to be, or, to be more factually
accurate; how things were said to be.
Eliade's thesis, supported as ever by a formidable
array of textual references, is that the "archaic"
mentality, seen as typically representative of humanity
in its religious mode, apprehended sacred time (as "a
primordial mythical time made present")7 as the locus of
real significance, of the sacred, of the real. Thus it
was felt that
neither the objects of the external world nor human 
acts, properly speaking, have any autonomous 
intrinsic value. Objects or acts acquire a value, 
and in so doing become real, because they 
participate, after one fashion or another, in a 
reality that transcends them.8
Time is one of the primary categories of knowledge or of
humanity's knowledge of the world which is subject to the
sociologisation of knowledge.9 Levy-Bruhl, in his
Primitive Mentality pointed out that the linear and
unrepeatable nature of time was a feature of the modern,
6 ibid., p.3. Emphasis added.
7 The Sacred and the Profane, p.68.
8 The Myth of the Eternal Return, pp.3f.
9 v. eg., The Sociology of Knowledge, David Glover 
and Sheelagh Strawbridge, ch.l.
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"civilized" time-consciousness. Despite the fact that he
was forced to retract his postulate of a "primitive
mentality" Levy-Bruhl's recognition of the recent nature
of the specific apprehension of time as "dimensional" is
still borne out by an overwhelming number of sources and
theories. As usual, Eliade supports this perspective
with copious textual examples, but he is once again
referring to the fact that the Christian tradition sees
the phenomenal world as essentially "fallen", reduced by
original sin from its original, divinely intended
condition to a vitiated, lesser state, and so on.10 All
known religious traditions posit a realm or mode of being
which is infinitely more significant than the world of
everyday personal experience. George Stirrat has agreed,
Eliade's formulation of the sacred as existing 
outside of time ... is a fair characterisation of 
much that is claimed within the religious discourses 
of most, if not all, the world religions. Thus, in 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Catholicism, it can be 
argued that what is most sacred, that which is 
concerned with salvation, is that which is outside 
time.11
The religious person can gain access to this 
alternative time through performance of ritual, narration 
of myth, and in "archaic" and "primitive" societies, by 
the performance of sacralised human functions, such as 
hunting, fishing, construction, and the more obvious 
sacraments (to the modern Westerner) of birth, marriage,
10 For similar examples from other traditions, v. 
above, pp.2If.
11 "Sacred Models," p. 2 02.
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and death. Eliade suggests that what all of these 
observances have in common is that they constitute, and 
are sacralised by, repetitions of a sacred model. This 
includes, but is not exhausted by, the imitatio dei 
familiar to the Christian West. The implications of the 
concept that imitation can confer ontic weight upon the 
activities of humanity implies a certain understanding of 
time:
insofar as an act (or an object) acquires a certain 
reality through the repetition of certain 
paradigmatic gestures, and acquires it through that 
alone, there is an implicit abolition of profane 
time, of duration, of "history"; and he who 
reproduces the exemplary gesture thus finds himself 
transported into the mythical epoch in which its 
revelation took place. 2
The concept of the specific imitation or repetition
of divine mythical models is not the only indicator of
this alternative attitude to time, "the traditional
societies (that is, all societies down to those which
make up the modern world) knew and applied still other
methods to bring about the regeneration of time", (ibid.,
p.76.) Nor is this attitude utterly foreign to
contemporary humanity. It can be most easily recognised
in New Year scenarios which feature a return to
primordial chaos and a repetition of the creation and in
the Christian liturgical year [which] is based upon 
a periodic and real repetition of the Nativity, 
Passion, death, and Resurrection of Jesus, ... that 
is, personal and cosmic regeneration through 
reactualisation in concreto of the birth, death, and 
resurrection of the Saviour, (ibid., p.130.)
12 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p.35.
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This is of no small significance and emphasises Eliade's 
frequent insistence that there is no "solution of 
continuity" between archaic and modern. However, the 
present point is that "for traditional man, the imitation 
of an archetypal model is a reactualisation of the 
mythical moment when the archetype was revealed for the 
first time", (ibid., p.76.) These sacred models Eliade 
refers to as "archetypal" and as "archetypes", although 
he expresses regret at this choice of words, which has 
led to a common equation of his thought with that of C.
G. Jung.13 As we have seen, the sacred models do not 
belong to the profane, historical realm, no more do they 
belong to the un- or sub-conscious mind. They issue from 
the alternative realm, considered to be the locus of the 
real and the true and the significant. This realm is 
illud tempus, the continuum of a different, sacred time, 
of which, by repetition of the sacred model, be it an 
act, bodily function, or narrative structure, the 
religious person reactualises, repeats a segment.14
13 v. the Preface to the Torchbook edition of Cosmos 
and History, and for a discussion of the problem v. M. L. 
Rickett's, "The Nature and Extent of Eliade's
'Jungianism.’"
14 For readers unfamiliar with Latin, it is 
worthwhile to point out that illud tempus simply means 
"that time." It occurs in Jerome's Vulgate where it 
usually indicates the heilsqeschichte in which God's 
actions were seen as unquestionably decisive for 
humanity. The alternative, in illo tempore, is simply 
the locative case of the same phrase, in that time. In 
many ways it is a narrative device comparable with "once 
upon a time," although indicative of far greater 
sacrality.
Hence this alternative time is repeatable as well as 
intensely real.
As has already been mentioned, the concomitant of 
this attitude to illud tempus was an inability to 
perceive ordinary events and objects as possessed of any 
real value. Since the objects and events of much of 
one's everyday experience do not have mythical models, do 
not reactualise the continuum of real time, they are not 
in and of themselves of any significance. Since they are 
not specifically orientated in an extended matrix of 
familiar, interconnected structures and events of 
predetermined value, they themselves lack value, they 
lack a determined response, and hence they lack meaning. 
This has immediate implications for the concept of 
"history".
As Eliade describes it, "'historical' memory, that 
is the recollection of events that derive from no 
archetype, [is] the recollection of personal events".15 
Thus it can be seen that he equates history with personal 
event. George Weckman, in "Mircea Eliade on the Role of 
History in Religion", concludes that Eliade actually uses 
the word "history" to refer primarily to "contemporary 
event" as opposed to "the past", and that this is tied to 
what Weckman calls "Eliade's rejection of religion based 
on history", (op. cit., p.17.) The fact is that Eliade 
is specifically referring to history as Erlebnis,
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actually lived experience, which is directly contiguous
with his early interest in trairism, authentic, lived
experience. As Eliade says,
the expressions "history" and "historic" can 
occasion much confusion; they indicate, on the one 
hand, all that is concrete and authentic in a given 
human existence.16
It is this lived experience, rather than history as a
record of past events which are perhaps not within the
orbit of personal experience, to which Eliade commonly
refers as "history". Actually history is "the totality
of the human experiences provoked by inevitable
geographical conditions, social structures, political
conjunctures, and so on".17 Of course, the totality of
that experience is not actually accessible to us, it
cannot become part of our own experience, it cannot
become our own personal history. We are restricted to
the study of the documents, activities, and relics which
express that experience, the texts (in the broadest sense
of the word) of the student of religion. And so, as
Seymour Cain has pointed out,
the term "history" for Eliade stands for the 
concrete actuality with which the religico- 
historical scholar must deal, for which he must 
account in his interpretations, and to which he has 
access through the historical documents. But 
historical data by themselves are not enough for the 
historian of religions. The facts ... do not tell 
us what they mean.18
16 Images and Symbols, p.l71f., n.13.
17 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p.119.
18 "Mircea Eliade: Attitudes Towards History," p.14.
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This locates Eliade's understanding of history neatly 
within his overall thought, dovetailing as it does with 
his concepts of hierophany and the dialectic of the 
sacred. The real (the sacred) is revealed (and 
concealed) within the actual historical documentary 
evidence which confronts the scholar (or anyone else in 
so far as they seek to discover truth). These documents, 
in becoming part of our personal experience, part of our 
history, become potentially hierophanic, depending on our 
background and personal religious experience to recognise 
the real which is revealed in and through them.
The unquestionable implication is that traditional 
humanity had been unable to adequately valorise their 
actual lived experience without specific reference to 
some independent, non-historical reality. That reality 
is illud tempus, the non-temporal time, the primordial 
creative epoch, a "reality" which, since this "time" does 
not partake of historical actuality, the modern would say 
was merely imaginary since it is accessible only through 
the imagination or, so it is said, through rare and 
difficult religious experience. However, in The Myth of 
the Eternal Return Eliade collected certain facts for the 
specific purpose of revealing the "reality" of illud 
tempus:
1. Facts which show us that, for archaic man, 
reality is a function of the imitation of a 
celestial archetype.
2. Facts which show us how reality is conferred 
through participation in the "symbolism of the
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Centre".19
It would have been simpler, more accessible to his 
readers, given Eliade's equation of reality and the 
sacred, if he had said "sacrality is a function... 
sacrality is conferred..." He does stress this equation 
shortly after, "the outstanding reality is the sacred; 
for only the sacred is in an absolute fashion, acts 
effectively, creates things and makes them endure", 
(ibid., p.11.) The fact that he insists that it is 
reality which is in question here is a deliberate attempt 
to alert the reader to the fact that, for the archaic and 
religious mind under consideration, the actual 
perceptions of the real differ from those of the modern 
mind for whom the actual experience of everyday life, 
that is to say whose history, has been evaluated as the 
real.
It matters little if the formulas and images through 
which the primitive expresses "reality" seem 
childish and even absurd to us. It is the profound 
meaning of primitive behaviour that is revelatory; 
this behaviour is governed by belief in an absolute 
reality opposed to the profane world of 
"unrealities"; in the last analysis, the latter does 
not constitute a "world'" properly speaking; it is 
the "unreal" par excellence, the uncreated, the 
nonexistent: the void.
Hence we are justified in speaking of an 
archaic ontology, and it is only by taking this 
ontology into consideration that we can succeed in 
understanding - and hence in not scornfully 
dismissing - even the most extravagant behaviour on 
the part of the primitive world; in fact, this 
behaviour corresponds to a desperate effort not to 
lose contact with being. (ibid., p.92.)
Once again it is emphasised that the archaic ontology is
19 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p.5.
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not posited as an independent, autonomous reality, but as
the Being within which certain people are, the
conceptions (cf. Eliade's opening sentence quoted above,
p. 146, n.6.) of reality which condition the perceptions,
the belief which governs the behaviour.
Opposed to this archaic, traditional, and religious
humanity is "historical man" who is equated with the
modern "who consciously and voluntarily creates history".
(ibid., p.141.)
The crucial difference between the man of the 
archaic civilisations and modern, historical man 
lies in the increasing value the latter gives to 
historical events, that is, to the "novelties" that, 
for traditional man, represented either meaningless 
conjunctures or infractions of norms (hence 
"faults", "sins", and so on) and that, as such, 
required to be expelled (abolished) periodically.
The man who adopts the historical viewpoint would be 
justified in regarding the traditional conception of 
archetypes and repetition as an aberrant 
reidentification of history (that is, of "freedom" 
and "novelty") with nature (in which everything 
repeats itself), (ibid., p.154.)
However, the modern world is
not entirely converted to historicism; we are even 
witnessing a conflict between the two views: the 
archaic conception, which we should designate as 
archetypal and anhistorical; and the modern, post- 
Hegelian conception, which seeks to be historical.20
In The Myth of the Eternal Return Eliade wants to
restrict his examination to "the solutions offered by the
20 ibid., p.141. What Eliade specifically denotes as 
"historicism" is indicated elsewhere. "In the various 
historicist and existentialist currents of thought, 
'history' and 'historic' seems to imply that human 
existence is authentic only insofar as it is reduced to 
the awakened consciousness of its historic moment. It is 
to the latter 'totalitarian' meaning of history that I am 
referring when I take issue against 'historicisms.'" 
Images and Symbols, p.172.
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historicistic view to enable man to tolerate the
increasingly powerful pressure of contemporary history".
(p.141.) This examination takes the form of a comparison
of the way in which these two attitudes offer resistance
to "the terror of history". For the modern mind "history
could be tolerated, not only because it had a meaning but
also because it was, in the last analysis, necessary".21
Although this might at first appear to say very little,
our very reaction that of course history is "necessary",
that is to us a self-evident truth, indicates our
acquiescence to this view that history is tolerable
because it is necessary. For the alternative mindset
historical events could be given value by the 
expedient of ... myths... Adapted to a particular 
myth theory ..., catastrophes could not only be 
tolerated by their contemporaries but also 
positively accorded a value immediately after their 
appearance, (ibid., p.136.)
Those events which could be so adapted gained ontology
and significance by their assimilation to the sacred time
of mythic origins and, as such, were no longer seen as
history in the strict sense of irreversible events of
autonomous value. Against this history traditional
civilisations "defended themselves",
either by periodically abolishing it through 
repetition of the cosmogony and a periodic 
regeneration of time or by giving historical events 
a metahistorical meaning, a meaning that was not 
only consoling but was above all coherent, that is, 
capable of being fitted into a well consolidated 
system in which the cosmos and man's existence each
21 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p. 132.
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had its raison d'être.22
This periodic repetition of the cosmogony is the major
characteristic of Eliade's "eternal return" along with
the whole concept of a time which was not linear but
cyclic and thus accessible to reactualisation.
The stated point of chapter three of The Myth of the
Eternal Return. "Misfortune and History", is
to learn how this "history" was tolerated by archaic 
man; that is, how he endured the calamities, the 
mishaps, and the "sufferings" that entered into the 
lot of each individual and each collectivity.
(ibid., p.95.)
His initial observation is that "his suffering had a
meaning; it corresponded, if not always to a prototype,
at least to an order whose value was not contested".
(ibid., p.96.) That is, to a mythic order as we have
described myth.
Thus "archaic man also knows a history, although it
is a primordial history, placed in a mythical time".
(ibid., p.155.) Here again Eliade uses "history" in the
sense of antecedent events which have led to and
condition the present, without any overt attempt to
distinguish this usage from his idiosyncratic usage of
history as personally experienced actuality. It is a
matter of pure conjecture whether this is deliberate
22 ibid., p.142. Of particular interest here, beyond 
this description of the way in which traditional 
societies counter history, is this emphasis on meaning as 
"coherent," which in turn is defined as being fitted into 
a system. As we saw above, p.150, orientation within a 
system is precisely what the ordinary historical event 
lacked for premodern humanity.
stylistic policy to reproduce the conditions of an 
archaic text in need of decipherment, or an unfortunate 
oversight born from the lack of methodological rigour in 
an area of complex speculation. The effects in general 
have, I believe, been negative, resulting in the 
suspicion and opposition of those thinkers of a more 
rigorous disposition and the frequent failure of even 
those who recognised their agreement with Eliade's 
thought to fully appreciate its ramifications.
However this may be, it is Eliade's contention that 
"suffering becomes intelligible and hence tolerable", 
(ibid., p.98.) through mythic and non-historical 
treatment. It is specifically by explaining hardships, 
by accounting for adversities, that humanity manages to 
tolerate them. This too is a claim which the critical 
modern mind might find hard to accept without support or 
clarification. Is it implied that without explanation 
suffering cannot be tolerated? That unless the ailment 
is made intelligible there is no hope of recovery? 
Obviously this goes too far, such an unconditional 
reading simply does not find accord with our intuitions 
of the real, our experience of history. Yet we are all 
familiar with the phenomenon of the increase of human 
tolerance with the increase of understanding; anguished 
children seek understanding of nettle rash and 
stomachache just as terminally ill patients seek 
understanding of their disease, and both seem to find in 
the proffered explanations the strength to regain control
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of their actions, to stem the tears and continue to live
in the face of our present mortality. It is an
undeniable fact of modern medical practice that placebos
work. A clear strategy is often effective in what is now
referred to as "pain management" even if the causal
processes are dubious. Arguably knowing what response to
make in the face of hardship is more important than what
the response actually is. The "will" is just as
important as the "free" in freewill. That is to say, the
fact that we will something, and that we have a clear
vision of the desired end, and that we believe that we
can attain that end,23 is just as important to the
"integral man" as the "freedom" to attain that end.
It is certainly a common enough apprehension of
religion to see it as a diagnosis and therapy for the
ailment which is the incarnate human condition. Eliade
sees popular refusals of the hierophanisation of history,
of historicism, as having occurred because
it was more consoling and easier, in misfortunes and 
times of trial, to go on accusing an "accident" 
(e.g., a spell) or a "negligence" (e.g., a ritual 
fault) that could be easily made good by a 
sacrifice ,24
Obviously the "ills that flesh is heir to" cannot be
23 Which, if one accepts Wilfred Cantwell Smith's 
analysis of belief (v. Belief and History, ch.2), simply 
means that we really want to attain that end and to 
remain loyal to that desire. The effectiveness of an
ability to conceptualise and to believe in an end has 
been pointed out by psychological studies such as Martin 
Seligman's Helplessness.
24 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p .108.
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"made good" by a simple sacrifice, but the implication is
that the archaic conception that these ills were caused
by specific archetypal acts (or their negligence)
provided a more easily accessible explanation and one
which prompted a clearer response. This is why
the great majority of so-called Christian 
populations continue, down to our day, to preserve 
themselves from history by ignoring it and by 
tolerating it rather than by giving it the meaning 
of a negative or positive theophany. (ibid., p.111.)
Alternative means of preserving oneself from history or
"abolishing" the significance of its effects are:
1. "consciousness of living in an eternal present 
(coincidence with the atemporal instant of the 
revelation of archetypes)"
2. "periodically repeated ritual (for example, the 
rites for the beginning of the year)", and
3. the future abolition of time, as in eschatology.
(ibid.)
These are present even in those "historical" religions 
which do recognise the value of the unique, experienced 
and irreversible event and, in common with the "pre- 
historicist" religions they do not "abolish" the event in 
any ontological sense, but re-establish the importance of 
a nontemporal, idealised moment, located and orientated 
within the extended matrix of mythical meanings. They do 
not "do away with" history as experience; rather they 
give another significance to those events which can be 
assimilated to archetypal models and drastically, if not 
totally, reduce the significance of those events which do 
not. To use a metaphor from radio reception, they filter 
out the noise of personal experience in favour of the 
signal, the message, of the impersonal, non-experiential,
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and mythological.
Whatever else may be the implications of this
discussion of the archaic and modern attitudes to
history, Eliade's explicit conclusion is that "none of
the historicistic philosophies is able to defend him
[historical man] from the terror of history", (ibid.,
p.159.) In context this implies that historicism leaves
the details of personal experience as unique,
unrepeatable, individual events, accidents in the stream
of time. They are thus incapable of location in a
coherent, consolidated system capable of explaining the
raison d'etre of man and the cosmos. Because of this
they are meaningless, insignificant, and thus
"intolerable". Eliade does
imagine a final attempt: to save history and 
establish an ontology of history, events would be 
regarded as a series of "situations" by virtue of 
which the human spirit should attain knowledge of 
levels of reality otherwise inaccessible to it.
(ibid., p .159.)
In a footnote he continues that
it is only through some such reasoning that it would 
be possible to found a sociology of knowledge that 
should not lead to relativism and scepticism. ...
But it goes without saying that a sociology of 
knowledge, that is, the study of the social 
conditioning of ideologies, could avoid relativism 
only by affirming the autonomy of the spirit - 
which, if we understand him aright, Karl Mannheim 
did not dare to affirm, (ibid. n.15.)
In light of these considerations, and from the point of
view of modern historicism, it would seem that Eliade can
be seen to propose a sociology of knowledge conditioned
by the creativity and autonomy of the human spirit.
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Simply put, a holistic or integral sociology of knowledge
in which the spirit as the product of the confluence of
conditioning factors (culture and tradition and belief
which is the individual response to tradition) is yet
seen as autonomous, capable of altering and partially
controlling the factors which condition it.
Such a suggestion sees Eliade as moving forward,
attempting to add newly created modes of thought, if not
being, to contemporary humanity. He is thus not simply
attempting to reactualise the archaic ontology. Although
Eliade has been criticised for being a "champion" of the
archaic attitude and he is certainly ready to recognise
the values of this alternative to the modern view of
history and time, he is not totally uncritical of it.
The need these [archaic] societies also feel for a 
periodic regeneration is a proof that they too 
cannot perpetually maintain their position in what 
we have just called the paradise of archetypes, and 
that their memory is capable (though doubtless far 
less intensely than that of a modern man) of 
revealing the irreversibility of events, that is, of 
recording history, (ibid., p.75.)
This stands against the contention that Eliade valorised
the archaic over the modern, a priori. Both visions
ultimately fail to "maintain their position"
independently of some concept of regeneration.
Furthermore,
in the last analysis, modern man, who accepts 
history or claims to accept it, can reproach archaic 
man, imprisoned within the mythical horizon of 
archetypes and repetition, with his creative 
impotence, or, what amounts to the same thing, his 
inability to accept the risks entailed by every 
creative act. (ibid., pp.l55f.)
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It is true, however, that in the final "dialogue between
archaic man and modern man"25 Eliade gives more credence
and more space to the archaic point of view. It could be
credibly argued that he was simply supporting the
underdog, however, since he does finally indicate
strengths and weaknesses in both points of view and seems
ultimately to support a synthesis.
All that is needed is a modern man with a
sensibility less closed to the miracle of life; and
the experience of renewal would revive for him when 
he built a house or entered it for the first time
(just as, in the modern world, the New Year still
preserves the prestige of the end of a past and the 
fresh beginning of a new life), (ibid., p.77.)
One thing that Eliade is certain of is that
the life of archaic man (a life reduced to the 
repetition of archetypal acts, that is, to 
categories and not to events, to the unceasing 
rehearsal of the same primordial myths),although it 
takes place in time, does not bear the burden of 
time, does not record time's irreversibility; in 
other words, completely ignores what is especially 
characteristic and decisive in a consciousness of 
time. Like the mystic, like the religious man in 
general, the primitive lives in a continual present, 
(ibid., p.86.)
This in itself constitutes a cushion between such a
mindset and the impact of brute historical event. This
superiority in enabling a toleration of history is
perceived as the major virtue of the archaic attitude.
The major vice of the modern is perceived to be its self-
deceptive nature. "Modern man's boasted freedom to make
history is illusory for nearly the whole of the human
race." (ibid., p.156.) This is because it is in truth a
25 ibid., p.159, and v.p.155-159.
small minority of people drawn from a small minority of 
nations who have any real effect in the "making of 
history", that is to say, a very small effect on the 
creation of those events which predate and condition the 
present. However, on the events which are anyone else's 
experience, on history as Eliade uses the word, everyone 
of us has an effect. Since we cannot live in isolation 
we all do have a positive contribution to make to the 
history whose conception underlies the whole of Eliade's 
theoretical edifice. It is Eliade's innate dlitism, his 
refusal to recognise the contribution of the masses to 
the creation of history which conditions this flaw in his 
thinking. If history is taken on this personal, 
experiential level, which I believe it clearly must be in 
order to render the main body of Eliade's thought 
coherent, then humanity is unavoidably free to make 
history since we are all intimately (albeit not totally, 
deliberately, or in a fully controlled manner) 
responsible for the personal experiences of others.
5.3. The Development of Conceptions of Time
Eliade does not simply posit this archaic or 
religious attitude to time and support it with examples, 
he also attempts a detailed explanation of its 
development from the universal existential situation of 
humanity in the world. For example,
if the moon in fact serves to "measure" time, if the
moon's phases - long before the solar year and far
more concretely - reveal a unit of time (the month),
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the moon at the same time reveals the "eternal 
return", (ibid., p.86.)
As this "eternal return" is experienced in human life it
is evidently cyclical as opposed to circular. That is to
say it is nowhere claimed that every actual physical
being recommences with the new moon. Obviously, each
individual still ages and the solar year still
progresses. To think otherwise is to equate history (as
personal experience) with time, an identification which
Eliade does not make, and which he claims that archaic
humanity repudiated. An analysis of his thought in this
area reveals that this identification is part of the
characteristic matrix of "modern" thought. For archaic
man, on the other hand, the assimilation of temporal
duration and human life to the lunar cycle
is important not only because it shows us the 
"lunar" structure of universal becoming but also 
because of its optimistic consequences: for, just as 
the disappearance of the moon is never final, since 
it is necessarily followed by a new moon, the 
disappearance of man is not final either; in 
particular the disappearance of an entire humanity 
(deluge, flood, [sic] submersion of a continent, 
and so on) is never total, for a new humanity is 
born from a pair of survivors, (ibid., p.87.)
The primitive, by conferring a cyclical direction upon
time. annuls its irreversibility. Everything begins over
again at its commencement every instant, (ibid., p.89.)
Yet the insignificance and the arbitrary nature of
history (as experience) cannot be annulled.
The process or development which Eliade seems to
envision leading to the modern "historical" view of time
is that archaic cyclically repeated time gives way to a
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single time cycle from Creation to Apocalypse, from illud
tempus to illud tempus. in which every historical event
is seen as of hierophanic value since it is under the
direct control of the one true God. This conception is
permitted by the novel religious attitude of faith, which
emphasises that "for God everything is possible".26
For the first time, the prophets placed a value on 
history, succeeded in transcending the traditional 
vision of the cycle (the conception that ensures all 
things will be repeated forever), and discovered a 
one-way time. ... for the first time we find 
affirmed, and increasingly accepted, the idea that 
historical events have a value in themselves, 
insofar as they are determined by the will of God.
... Historical facts thus become "situations" of man 
in respect to God, and as such they acquire a 
religious value that nothing had previously been 
able to confer on them. ... the Hebrews were the 
first to discover the meaning of history as the 
epiphany of God.27
Thus the Judaeo-Christian tradition, for Eliade, 
provides a bridge between the two types of, or attitudes 
to, time.
Christianity radically changed the experience and 
the concept of liturgical time, and this is due to 
the fact that Christianity affirms the historicity 
of the person of Christ. The Christian liturgy 
unfolds in a historical time sanctified by the 
incarnation~of the son of God.28
This valorisation of historical time continues the trend
26 ibid., p.160, and v. pp.108-110 on the novelty of 
faith.
27 ibid., p.104. It is interesting to note that 
Eliade repeats this section almost verbatim in his 
History of Religious Ideas, p.356, some thirty years 
later. Although he omits the references to cyclical time 
and archetypes these are mentioned elsewhere in that 
volume and so do appear to still have currency in his 
thought.
28 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p .72.
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which Eliade argues to have begun "among the Hebrews" for
whom, "every new historical calamity was regarded as a
punishment from Yahweh". In this way there first
occurred "History regarded as Theophany", (ibid., p.102.)
and this eventually leads to the situation of modern man
who insists that he is "constituted only by human
history",29 and in that very insistence is distinguished
from traditional homo reliqiosus. It is not my purpose
at the moment to perform a detailed analysis of the
accuracy of Eliade's argument, rather to inspect and
clarify his conclusions. George Weckman has pointed out
that other scholars do not agree with Eliade's
restriction of the source of this valorisation of the
historical to the Jewish tradition. For example, Helmer
Ringgren "does not want to get caught in asserting that
Israel was unique in regarding historical events as acts
of God".30 Also Ninian Smart has remarked that
"historical events were considered important by the
Chinese".31 However, as Weckman continues,
it remains distinctive and consequential that 
ancient Israel first developed a style of religion 
on the basis of a special comprehension of 
historical events, (ibid.)
While Weckman's unease is perfectly understandable at
this point since Eliade does make strong claims for the
29 The Sacred and the Profane, p.100.
30 Weckman, "Mircea Eliade and the Role of History in 
Religion," p.13.
31 "Eliade and the History of Religious Ideas," p.70.
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priority of the Hebrew valorisation of history, it should 
be pointed out that Eliade does accept a broader base 
than the purely Jewish for its source. "Those with whom 
history, properly speaking, begins," he writes, " - that 
is the Babylonians, Egyptians, Hebrews, Iranians."32 
Even if he is wrong as to the specific source of this 
valorisation in the Hebrew tradition, as some scholars 
would insist, Eliade's recognition of the phenomena of 
the sacralisation of the previously profane in the 
valorisation of historical time can still be valid.
This valorisation of the historical event has 
several implications. Firstly it leads to the 
concomitant de-valorisation of the traditionally 
valorised, religious real, "emptied of every religious 
value or meaning nature could become the 'object' par 
excellence of scientific investigation".33 Although this 
is not an explicit doctrine Eliade takes it to be an 
unavoidable implication of the structure of the Hebrew 
revelation:
we may even ask ourselves if monotheism, based on 
the direct and personal revelation of the divinity, 
does not necessarily entail the "salvation" of time, 
its value within the frame of history. Doubtless 
the idea of revelation is found ... in all religions 
... but these revelations occurred in mythical time.
. .. The situation is altogether different in the 
case of the monotheistic revelation. This takes 
place in time, in historical duration.34
32 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p . 74 .
33 Symbolism, the Sacred, and the Arts, p . 83
34 The Myth of the Eternal Return, pp.104-5.
The implications of this are borne out by the development 
of the secular, "post-Christian" West. The concept of 
"general revelation" implied by the valorisation of 
historical time eventually comes to confront that of the 
"special revelation" of the Biblical text (egs.
Copernicus and Biblical criticism).
Secondly, "history as the epiphany of God" leads to 
a linear notion of time as once-and-for-all. This 
crystallises in Christianity with the belief in the 
Incarnation as the ultimate hierophany hapax, ephapax, 
semel.55 Not only is the singular unrepeatable notion of 
historical event emphasised, it is sacralised, and with 
it the whole of historical time is "redeemed". Also the 
teleological linearity of time leads irresistibly to the 
notion of evolution whose "mythical" aspect, that of 
continual improvement, proves more tenacious than its 
scientific aspect of the chance viability of random 
mutations.36 Time is increasingly perceived as a linear 
progression, a direction, a single continuum outside of 
eternity (illud tempus ̂ , rather than an oscillation in 
eternity. With the concomitant increasing dévalorisation 
of the traditional concepts of the sacred this time was 
even extended ad infinitum. Rather than a closed cycle 
returning to illud tempus the cosmos was for a while seen 
as infinite in extent and duration. However, this
35 Hebrews 912. Eliade also refers to 1 Peter 318.
36 v. particularly Mary Midgeley Evolution as a 
Religion, on this aspect of evolution.
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extension has itself fallen prey to the hierophanisation
of the manifest. Observation has indicated that the
universe is not infinite either in time or space. The
consensus of scientific opinion is that our universe had
a temporal commencement, it is finite, and it may well
have a temporal end. This scientific return to a theory
of temporal cycles was not lost on Eliade.
In connection with this rehabilitation of cyclical 
conceptions, Sorokin rightly observes that present 
theories concerning the death of the universe do not 
exclude the hypothesis of the creation of a new 
universe, somewhat after the fashion of the Great 
Year in Greco-Oriental speculation or of the yuga 
cycle in the thought of India.37
The Big Bang/Big Crunch concept of time as a closed cycle
has certainly gained in scientific support since Sorokin
published his observations in 1928,38 however, the
question of a continuous re-creation is not clearly
established.
Weckman concludes that "because Eliade thinks of 
history as contemporary event he has ignored the 
important role of history as stories about the human past 
which can function like myth".39 But this fails to grasp 
the point. History which "functions like myth" is by 
that very definition sacred history. Eliade's contention 
is that it is by virtue of a spiritual development of the
37 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p . 146 .
38 Contemporary Sociological Theories. New York. For 
a modern conception of the closed cycle of time v.
Stephen Hawkin, A Brief History of Time, p.138.
39 Weckman, op. cit., p. 17.
most far-reaching implications that modern humanity has 
been able to see historical events as themselves 
exemplary, revelatory, possessed of real meaning. It is 
in any event historiography and not actual history which 
so functions, and so is not actually a temporal reality. 
Thus it is that Eliade recognises the survival of 
mythology "more than anywhere else" in historiography.40 
This is the specific characteristic by which Eliade 
distinguishes "modern" humanity. We have "sacralised" 
history; that is, that we have specifically assumed that 
real-time, historical actualities can function as 
exemplary, that is sacred, history, and in so doing have 
"camouflaged" or "confused" the sacred with the profane.
5.4. The Linearity of the Modern Conception of Time
In an article of 1985, "Homo Faber and Homo 
Religiosus" ,41 Eliade once again makes important 
reference to time in his analysis of the religious aspect 
of human life. He reiterates and emphasises the point he 
first made in The Forge and the Crucible that the labour 
of homo faber "replaces the work of time". For homo 
faber, who in the contemporary western world has become 
"modern man", the identification with historical time has 
become complete and humanity takes the place of time.
Not only is humanity the product solely of history,
40 Myth and Reality, p . 113 .
41 In The History of Religions: Retrospect and 
Prospect. ed. J. Kitagawa.
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created and determined purely in historical time, but
humanity is now seen as the final judge and arbiter of
our destiny; racial death or technological glory. This
identification with historical time, which alone is real
and thus sacred, is from this perspective a religious act
or awareness. Once again "modern man" is not the
antithesis of religious man but a very specific (and
possibly rather aberrant) example.
In this same edition Paul Ricoeur presents a paper
in which he describes how Steven Toulmin and Judith
Goodfield in The Discovery of Time
tell the story of [the] progressive expansion of a 
uniform timescale from human history to geology, to 
thermodynamics, and finally to the gigantic changes 
among galaxies.
Ricoeur concludes that "cyclical time appears
paradoxically as a particular case of, and not an
alternative term for linear time".42 However, he has
already pointed out that linear time seems to have begun
from the Judaeo-Christian notion of time as a 6,000 year
period which was then extended to make room for the large
scale phenomena that together constitute the history of
mankind, of the earth, of the universe, and even of
matter itself, (ibid.)
Although teleologically a straight-line progression
from Creation to Eschaton this 6,000 year period was a
manifestation of cyclical time since it proceeded from
42 "The History of Religions and the Phenomenology of 
Time Consciousness," p.14.
and returned to the eternal illud tempus. We are all 
familiar with the phenomena whereby an arc of a circle, 
if sufficiently short in relation to the radius of 
curvature, or viewed from a sufficiently close range or 
small scale, is perceived to be a straight line. Rather 
than cyclical time being a particular case of linear time 
the converse would appear to be more credible. Linear 
time is a particular case of cyclical time viewed from 
the limited human perspective. Not only does the narrow 
localism of the original Judaeo-Christian viewpoint 
explain the perception of (microcosmic) time as linear, 
but the speculations of astrophysics concerning a "big 
bang" leading, via the expansion and contraction of the 
universe, to a "big crunch", re-establishes the view of 
(macrocosmic) time as cyclical. Thus "repetition of some 
pattern" is not merely "a complexity superimposed on the 
linear character of chronological time", (ibid., p.15.) 
linearity is rather a perceptual phenomenon, generated by 
the scale of embodied human existence, which is then 
expanded into the abstract notion of linear time as 
Ricoeur describes it. (ibid.)
Once again the perception of modern man as a 
specific example of the pan-human homo reliaiosus is 
justified by such a consideration of time-consciousness.
It is only the intensely focused self-consciousness 
(which is admirably utilitarian in certain ways) of 
modern humanity which has contracted the scale of time 
consciousness to make our historical time appear linear.
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Even Eliade's distinction of modern from religious 
humanity through their alternative perceptions of time 
begins to blur.
5.5. Some Problems in Eliade's Usage of History
It is not only in direct confrontation with 
religious dogma, nor in scientific theories that this 
developing conception of time manifests itself. It is 
especially active and effective in philosophy. As Eliade 
states,
Hegel affirmed that in nature things repeat 
themselves for ever and that there is "nothing New 
under the sun". All that we have so far 
demonstrated confirms the existence of a similar 
conception in the man of archaic societies:43 for 
these things repeat themselves for ever and nothing 
new happens under the sun. But this repetition has 
a meaning, ... events repeat themselves because they 
imitate an archetype - the exemplary event. 
Furthermore, through this repetition, time is 
suspended, or at least its virulence is diminished. 
But Hegel's observation is significant for another 
reason: Hegel endeavour to establish a philosophy of 
history in which the historical event, although 
irreversible and autonomous, can nevertheless be 
placed in a dialectic which remains open. For 
Hegel, history is "free" and always "new", it does 
not repeat itself; nevertheless, it conforms to the 
plans of providence; hence it has a model (ideal but 
none the less a model) in the dialectic of the 
spirit itself. To this history which does not 
repeat itself, Hegel opposes nature, in which things 
are reproduced ad infinitum. But we have seen that, 
during a considerable period, humanity opposed 
history by all possible means.44
43 I feel it necessary to point out that for Hegel it
is nature, for the archaic, it is Time which repeats. It 
seems likely that, rather than not having detached 
himself from nature, archaic man had simply not detached 
his concept of time from nature.
44 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p . 90 .
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This is confusing because Eliade has not clearly
established a base concept of history for his reader, he
has not distinguished his working definition of "history"
from the archaic concept of "history", or from the common
sense of antecedent events. How can archaic humanity
"oppose history" if they lack the concept? How can the
"unreal", "uncreated" elements of the profane world be
detected, let alone opposed and refused? (v. ibid.,
p.92.) His terminology is unclear and confusing. A few
pages later he states that
archaic man, as has been shown, tends to set himself 
in opposition, by every means in his power, to 
history, regarded as a succession of events that are 
irreversible, unforeseeable, possessed of autonomous 
value. He refuses to accept it and grant it value 
as such, as history, (ibid., p.95.)
This clarifies "history" as such a succession of events
but it also clarifies the problem. How can archaic man,
how can anyone, set themselves in opposition to history,
regarded as something which they refuse to regard as
history? In one sentence the reader must accept both
Eliade's conception of history as profane personal
experience and the concept of history as the proper
conditioning antecedents, before the meaning becomes
clearer. What is opposed in this proposed archaic
mentality is personal experience which cannot be
assimilated to an archetypal model or exemplary pattern,
events which cannot be located in a system and are thus
without sacred significance or real meaning. They can be
detected. as can any meaningless combination of
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consonants and vowels. As we have seen, archaic 
humanity's
memory is capable (though doubtless far less 
intensely than that of modern man) of revealing the 
irreversibility of events, that is, of recording 
history, (ibid., p.75.)
But once inspected for meaning, i.e. for correspondence
to an exemplary model, for a positive orientation in the
mythical world which is the source of meaning, for a
graspable significance and a clearly required response,
they will be refused, rejected, opposed, as mere
experiential "noise", and thus cannot be apprehended as
real antecedents. Archaic and religious humanity does
have history, but it is "sacred history". It consists of
myths regarding illud tempus rather than records of
temporal antecedents. This sacred history seeks to give
an authoritative explanation of phenomena and their
origins, but does not seek for that authority in what
"modern" humanity recognises as the "real world".
Weckman considers this another flaw in Eliade's
thought since it
confuses us by using the term "sacred history" to 
refer to myths about illo tempore, the time before 
time, and not as a translation of Heilsgeschichte as 
it is commonly used to refer restrictively to 
Israel's perception of God's role in human events.45
However, as we have seen, Eliade's concept is broader.
"Sacred history" refers to that which is perceived as the
real conditioning antecedent, thus myths about illud
tempus, the Hebrew Heilsgeschichte, and finally the
45 Weckman, op. cit., p. 11.
B . S . Rennie Time, History, and Illud Tempus 176
plenary history of the historicists, are all "sacred 
history."
5.6. The Sources of Eliade's "History"
In the opening section of this final Chapter, "The
Terror of History", Eliade's Romanian roots show quite
clearly. It is still, he states, the traditional defence
against history which
continues to console the agricultural (=traditional) 
societies of Europe, which obstinately adhere to an 
anhistorical position and are, by that fact, exposed 
to the violent attacks of all revolutionary 
ideologies. The Christianity of the popular 
European strata never succeeded in abolishing either 
the theory of the archetype (which transformed a 
historical personage into an exemplary hero and a 
historical event into a mythical category) or the 
cyclical and astral theories (according to which 
history was justified and the sufferings provoked by 
it assumed an eschatological meaning).
Virgil Nemoianu has noted that Eliade and Vladimir
Nabokov
were both lifelong émigrés; both are East Europeans. 
In consequence, the literary work of both is marked 
by an obsession with the injustice and 
destructiveness of historical Time which has wreaked 
havoc in their lives and in that of their family, 
class, or nation. Their work can be seen as an 
attempt at a historical retaliation. [And thus that] 
in the struggle between normal time and mythical 
time the first is usually the villain and more often 
than not the loser.47
Nemoianu is no doubt right that Eliade's life experience
had a decisive effect upon his later apprehensions. It
46 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p . 142 .
47 Virgil Nemoianu, "Wrestling with Time: Some 
Tendencies in Nabokov's and Eliade's Later Works," p.82.
was surely the senseless and unstoppable events of his 
life as a citizen, and a very proud one, of a "secondary" 
culture which was constantly victim to the irresistible 
currents of history, which gave him the perspective of 
experiential history, the "existential situation" of the 
majority of humanity, as inherently without meaning. It 
is only through the "sacred histories", the mythological 
narratives and religious beliefs, that meaning can be 
invested in the otherwise vacuously horrible and horribly 
vacuous events of life itself. This in no way lessens 
the importance or validity of that viewpoint. History 
(both sacred and profane) is too often written by the 
victorious, the triumphant, the conquerors; founders of 
empires and inheritors of a powerful culture. For such 
people, their own historiography is. sufficient to invest 
the motions of "real-time" history with coherent meaning. 
Certainly on the social and cultural level and also, to a 
lesser extent on the personal level. However, it is very 
much time that we listened to the point of view of the 
other, those from the "lesser" cultures; the victims of 
empire, whose cultures are constantly under threat from 
some "superpower" or other. These are, after all, the 
great majority of humanity, even among the "superpowers". 
How do such as they (we, for I am a Scot) invest our 
lives with meaning? It is not always the history of some 
successful, vigorous culture with which the individual 
can identify, which lends form and significance to human 
life. Eliade points out the ubiquitous human tendency to
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defer to the sacred history, the mythological time, (and
also, by extension, to the socially constructed
historiography) by means of which human life (both
individual and collective) can be interpreted as
meaningful and coherent. It may be true that Eliade is,
as Nemoianu suggests, "devoted to Language as opposed to
Time", (ibid., p.89.) but in a society in which time can
only be grasped either directly through personal
experience or indirectly through language, should not a
great deal of attention go to that language through which
impersonal Time is expressed, rather than to lionise that
which we can never really know?
This is not a simple retreat into fantasy. As
Charles Long has pointed out,
Eliade accepts the fact that historical reality 
defines reality par excellence for many in the 
modern world, but he is unwilling to accept the 
imperialism of the historicistic and rationalistic 
modes of interpretation as the only valid approaches 
to the real.48
In other words, the meaning conferred upon historical
time by mythic interpretations is also real. By way of
explanation Long continues that
a materialistic approach to history can explain the 
progress of man's technology and account for the 
abundance of material goods in our life, but it 
cannot tell us why we cannot truly enjoy our life; 
it cannot tell us why we have lost our sense of 
meaning, (ibid., p.142.)
This obviously comes from a modern Western man for whom
the historiography of his own culture manifestly fails to
48 Charles Long, "The Significance for Modern Man of 
Mircea Eliade's Work," p.136.
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invest life with sufficient meaning, hence his "loss of a
sense of meaning". It is Eliade's contention that modern
humanity's only possible reply to this loss of meaning,
orientated as we are to the historical as the real, is
hermeneutics, the increase of significance through the
interpretation of historical data.
This is precisely what Eliade does in interpreting
the historical background of his native country and it is
also worthy of note at this point that Eliade had an even
more personal experiential basis for his notion of
reactualisable, alternative, and significant time. At
the very beginning of his Autobiography he quite candidly
tells of an event when he was four or five years old,
walking with his grandfather on the Strada Mare in
Bucharest, when his eyes met those of a fellow toddler,
also walking with her grandfather.
For several seconds we stared at each other before 
our grandfathers pulled us on down the street. I 
didn't know what had happened to me; I felt only 
that something extraordinary and decisive had 
occurred. In fact, that very evening I discovered 
that it was enough for me to visualise the image 
from the Strada Mare in order to feel myself 
slipping into a state of bliss I had never known.
... For years the image of the girl on the Strada 
Mare was a kind of secret talisman for me, because 
it allowed me to take refuge instantly in that 
fragment of incomparable time.49
Shortly thereafter, although the occasion seems to be
chronologically earlier, Eliade relates another incident
in which he entered a room into which he was not normally
allowed to go:
49 Autobiography, vol. I, p. 4.
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the next moment I was transfixed with emotion. It 
was as if I had entered a fairy-tale palace. The 
roller-blinds and the heavy curtains of green velvet 
were drawn. The room was pervaded by an eerie 
iridescent light. ... As was true also of the image 
of the little girl from Strada Mare, I could later 
evoke at will that green fairyland. ... I practised 
for many years this exercise of recapturing the 
epiphanic moment, and would always find again the 
same plenitude. I would slip into it as into a 
fragment of time devoid of duration - without 
beginning and without end. (ibid., p.7.)
The very phrases are obviously meant to recall his theory
of eternal return: the "fragment of incomparable time",
the "epiphanic moment", "devoid of duration", which he
can later "evoke at will" is evidently an echo of illud
tempus which later animates his apprehension of religious
life. This is not to say that Eliade's theories are
based on mere subjective experience, grotesquely expanded
to subsume all of the spiritual experiences of humanity.
The Autobiography was not written until the 1970s, and
these events were supposed to have taken place in 1910 or
1911,50 it is rather the vocabulary of his theories which
shapes his later descriptions. Nor would Eliade, after a
lifetime of academic involvement, be ignorant of the
accusations such a description could evoke. I believe
that he is quite deliberately revealing that he
considered this subjective experience of reactualisable,
non-chronological time to be an elementary human
experience, and furthermore that subjective experience is
50 Although Eliade did utilise the description of his 
experience in the iridescent room in his Noaptea de 
Sanziene (The Forbidden Forest 1 written between 1949 and 
1954.
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not "mere" but is in fact the source of hierophany, in 
Judaeo-Christian terms it is a "terrifying dialogue with 
Yahweh" .51
5.7. Eliade as Anti-Historian
When history as personal experience is seen as the 
source of all hierophany the question of Eliade's "anti- 
historicism" takes on a wholly different aspect. In a 
recent discussion of this criticism Douglas Allen has 
said,
while demonstrating the primacy of the nonhistorical 
in Eliade's history and phenomenology of religion, 
even showing that this approach does indeed have an 
antihistorical normative basis, I shall argue that 
simply to dismiss or praise Eliade as antihistorical 
is to neglect what is essentially historical in his 
method and theory of religion. I shall argue, in 
other words, for the need to recognise a complex, 
dynamic, historical-nonhistorical, dialectical 
interaction if one is to do justice to Eliade's 
hermeneutical approach.52
Allen's discussion of the critical appraisal of Eliade as
"antihistorical" points out Wallace, Lord Raglan, Lessa,
Leach, and Saliba as anthropologists who support this
contention and Strenski and Baird as scholars of religion
who do likewise, (ibid., p.547.) Allen accurately traces
much of this reaction to the response to Patterns, in
which
critics noted that this synchronic, morphological 
study was not historical; religious structures were 
detached from their historical and cultural 
contexts, (ibid., p.563.)
51 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p.108.
52 Douglas Allen. "Eliade and History," p.547.
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He would insist that
Eliade affirms that one must do justice to both the 
historical particular and the universal structure, 
there can be little doubt that his approach 
emphasises the nonhistorical universal structure 
rather than the concrete historical particular and 
that he conceives of his primary task as the 
interpretation of transhistorical religious 
meanings, (ibid., p.559f.)
Allen even goes on to say that
without a recognition of the historical dimension of 
the data, there would be no appreciation of the 
contrary historicising movement; there would be no 
understanding of the structurally necessary 
dialectical tension existing between the contrary 
but interacting dialectical movements. In short, 
without the dynamic historical-nonhistorical 
interaction, there would be no process of 
sacralisation as the universal structure of 
religious experience, (ibid., p.561.)
I think this could be even more directly phrased: without
an incarnate existence involving the physical experience
of the external world (history) we could not perceive
those structures and relationships which we recognise as
real (the morphology of the sacred), but without this
latter, which is abstract, hence non-temporal, non-
empirical, and unmanifest, we could not react coherently
with that world. That is to say we could not survive,
could not be.
Still, Allen concludes that "Eliade's approach does
indeed have an antihistorical normative basis", (ibid.,
p.564.) which, I think goes too far. Eliade is
unquestionably anti-historicist. in that he repudiates
that restriction of humanity to a purely historico-
temporal, physical reality.
It seems to me, indeed, that the authenticity of an
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existence cannot be limited to the consciousness of 
its own historicity; one cannot regard as "evasive" 
or "unauthentic", the fundamental experiences of 
love, anxiety, joy, melancholy, etc. Each one of 
these makes use of a temporal rhythm proper to 
itself, and all combine to constitute what might be 
called the integral man, who neither denies himself 
to his historic moment, nor consents to be 
identified with it.53
The motivations, the reasons, the justifications, for any
action ultimately lie on an ideal or abstract plane.
Very few human actions can be satisfactorily or fully
explained by physical determinatives. The reasons why we
act in a certain way are almost always grounded in ideal
structures of good and bad, right and wrong, normative
notions which form archetypal, exemplary structures
which, in their ideality, exist quite independently of
the actuality of human experience which for Eliade
constitutes history, and which are thus e-ternal.
Although we cannot be said to be actually repeating an
archetypal act we can still be said to be following an
archetypal morphology. As Eliade pointed out in
connection with Hegel, use of the ideal as model still
follows the exemplary morphology of the sacred.54 It is
an important "methodological presupposition" of Eliade's
that
human creativity and, ultimately, the history of 
human culture is more directly related to what man 
has dreamt, believed and thought of his specific 
mode of being in the world than to the works which 
he has undertaken in order to promote and validate
53 Images and Symbols , pp. 171 f . , n . 13 .
54 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p.90, v.n.44, 
above.
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this mode of being.55
Thus the alternative to a reality restricted to 
physical space and historical time, while allowing for 
the reality of the religious, while insisting, in fact, 
on the reality of God, the Dharma, the Tao, Allah, and so 
on, could none the less be explained in terms of the 
autonomy and creativity of the human spirit. Hence 
Eliade's terminology of hermeneutics as a 
"metapsychoanalysis" and his drive towards a "new 
humanism". Eliade cannot accurately be called 
"antihistorical" since the human condition still admits 
of the possibility of having its plenary existence in 
historical time and since he undoubtedly takes history to 
by the source of hierophany, the actual revelation of the 
real. Eliade certainly conducts a polemic against the 
valorisation of history as the only real as provincial, 
Western, pseudo-religious, spawned as a "decomposition 
product of Christianity",56 and capable of fulfilling a 
soteriological function only through an omniscient and 
omnipotent deity ("God for whom everything is 
possible",)57 yet incapable of supporting belief in such 
a deity.
55 "Notes on the Symbolism of the Arrow," p.474.
56 The Sacred and the Profane, p.112. V. also Images 
and Symbols, p.170; "Historicism as such is a product of 
the decomposition of Christianity: it could only come 
about insofar as we had lost faith in the 
trans-historical reality of the historical event."
57 v. The Myth of the Eternal Return, p.160, History 
of Religious Ideas, vol.I, p.176.
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Seymour Cain echoes Charles Long's insistence on
Eliade's historical basis.
There is a firm commitment on Eliade's part to 
starting with the scholarly sources, directly or 
secondarily, through the work - translation, textual 
and historical criticism, etc. - of other scholars. 
"To the historical sources" would seem to be his 
motto.58
But whether these historical sources are personal 
experience in Romania, or the learned observations of his 
fellow intellectuals (eg. the story of the mythicisation 
of an accidental death in the mountains)59, in fact, 
whether his other particular observations are right or 
wrong, the principle still stands. Humanity observably 
attempts to inhabit a cosmos in which those elements 
which fit into a well consolidated system capable of 
describing and explaining the existence of humanity, the 
cosmos, and humanity in the cosmos, are emphasised and 
those which do not so fit are repressed. The alteration 
of our perception of time and history is a particularly 
influential factor in our overall conception of the 
cosmos and construction of such systems of meaning. The 
substitution of a linear and singular structure of time 
for a cyclical and repetitive one has far-reaching 
implications in any attempt to decipher the meanings of 
any religious reality.
58 Seymour Cain, op. cit., p.13, v. n.48 above for 
Long's statement.
59 The Myth of the Eternal Return, pp . 44-4 6 .
In the section on "The Difficulties of 
Historicism",60 Eliade does, perhaps, outstep the bounds 
of his philosophical remit in depreciating historicism 
and appreciating the archaic outlook on time. His 
proposed examination, as we have seen, is of the ability 
of the two conflicting attitudes to "enable man to 
tolerate the increasingly powerful pressure of 
contemporary history", (ibid., p.141.) and there can be 
no doubt that he considers the archaic approach to be 
superior in this respect. As we have seen the ability to 
enable toleration is equated with the ability to explain 
or describe meaningfully, which in turn is equated with 
an appropriate orientation or coherent fit into a 
consolidated system. Thus inconsistencies or self- 
contradictions are reductive of meaning and therefore of 
the ability to tolerate history as so defined. Eliade's 
major criticism is of the historicism of Hegel which 
emphasises the unalterability and thus the necessity of 
historical events. Hegel had long been a fascination of 
Eliade's. In the Journals he writes, "I return to Hegel. 
This has been happening for the past five or six years, 
since I've been wrestling with the meaning of 
'history. ' "61 His conclusion was that in order to know 
what was "necessary" in history,
Hegel believed that he knew what the Universal
Spirit wanted. We shall not insist on the audacity
60 The Myth of the Eternal Return, pp.147-154.
61 Journal I, p. 174, entry for Sept. 1952.
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of this thesis, which, after all, abolishes 
precisely what Hegel wanted to save in history - 
human freedom. But there is an aspect of Hegel's 
philosophy of history that interests us because it 
still preserves something of the Judaeo-Christian 
conception: for Hegel, the historical event was the 
manifestation of the Universal Spirit. Now it is 
possible to discern a parallel between Hegel's 
philosophy of history and the Hebrew prophets: for 
the latter, as for Hegel, an event is irreversible 
and valid in itself inasmuch as it is a new 
manifestation of the will of God - a proposition 
really revolutionary ... from the viewpoint of 
traditional societies dominated by the eternal 
repetition of archetypes.62
Although Eliade's major point seems to be to emphasise
the dependence of Hegelian philosophy of history on the
spiritual insights of the Hebrew prophets, he also points
out the contradiction in this philosophy of its own
declared end, that of retaining human freedom. This
poses a serious challenge to the adequacy of such a
philosophy to the task of increasing the ability to
tolerate history. Of course, Eliade was aware that
Hegel's was not the only philosophy of history, not the
only "historicism", and he also crams the mention of
Rickert, Troeltsch, Dilthey, Simmel, Croce, Karl
Mannheim, Ortega y Gasset, Meinecke, Heidegger, Gentile
and Karl Lowith onto one page, (ibid., p.150.) He states
that
this essay does not require us to discuss either the 
philosophical value of historicism as such or the 
possibility of establishing a "philosophy of 
history" that should definitely transcend 
relativism.
And he repeats,
62 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p . 148 .
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again, there is no question of judging the validity 
of a historicistic philosophy, but only of 
establishing to what extent such a philosophy can 
exorcise the terror of history, (ibid., pp.150,
160.)
However, it would seem that in the last analysis that is 
precisely what is required. As he repeatedly says, "only 
one question concerns us: How can the 'terror of history’ 
be tolerated from the viewpoint of historicism?". (ibid., 
p.150.) Since the ability to tolerate history is 
intimately connected with internal coherence and the 
uncovering of raisons d'etre65 this question cannot be 
answered independently of an assessment of the 
philosophical validity and transcendence of apparent 
internal difficulties. Despite his manifest 
philosophical timidity here, Eliade does, in fact, 
attempt a concise attack on the philosophy of the 
historicist position; the substance of which is that 
Dilthey and Meinecke failed to surpass the problems of 
relativism and that Heidegger showed "that the
historicity of human existence forbids all hope of
transcending time and history", (ibid., p.150.) 
Furthermore,
justification of a historical event by the simple 
fact that it is a historical event, in other words, 
by the simple fact that "it happened that way", will 
not go far toward freeing humanity from the terror 
that the event inspires, (ibid., p.150.)
Eliade immediately goes on to explain that this is
because beyond the historical event per se the suffering
63 ibid., p. 142, and v. above p. 155.
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man
can see no sign, no transhistorical meaning. ... In 
the past, humanity has been able to endure the 
sufferings we have enumerated: they were regarded as 
a punishment inflicted by God, the syndrome of the 
decline of the "age", and so on. And it was 
possible to accept them precisely because, for the 
greater part of mankind, still clinging to the 
traditional viewpoint, history did not have, and 
could not have, value in itself. Every hero 
repeated the archetypal gesture, every war rehearsed 
the struggle between good and evil, every fresh 
social injustice was identified with the sufferings 
of the saviour, etc. (ibid., p.151.)
This is to say that historicism fails to answer this need
in the endurance of the human condition because it does
not orientate the historical event in an extended system
of recognisable evaluations, a mythic matrix of meanings.
Accurate description of the event does not fully suffice
to this end, it merely re-presents the event rather than
revealing its significance, it reforms it rather than
transforms it. Of course, if you say that an event has
no significance then it has no significance; this mythic
significance must be a construct of socialised knowledge
and as such is always open to refusal.
While fulfilling the requirements of coherence a
purely factual description neglects the question of the
raison d'etre. The modern, historicist attitude states
finally, "that is how it is because that is how it is",
which is no account at all. The archaic attitude is,
"that's how it is because that's how the Gods made it, or
because when Siva passed this way with the dead Satl a
drop of her blood fell here". This is an account which
appeals to mythic structures to reveal the correct
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evaluative response and thus to provide a specific
relation to the phenomena in question and a means of
dealing with, "enduring" or "tolerating" it. While the
historicist might reply that such an explanation induces
complacency and unnecessary languishing in a situation
which might be improved, Eliade's counter is that
by virtue of this view, tens of millions of men were 
able, century after century, to endure great 
historical pressures without despairing, without 
committing suicide or falling into that spiritual 
aridity that always brings with it the relativistic 
or nihilistic view of history, (ibid., p.152.)
5.8. Conclusions
This is an argument which will not be easily
settled. The fact is that much of humanity, both in the
past and in the present, has survived without the
benefits of a "modern" civilisation. It is also a fact
that "modern" humanity is not committing suicide in
droves, although given the material benefits of
contemporary Western civilisation, suicide and other acts
of palpable despair do seem troublingly common. It is
Eliade's contention that the despair of modern humanity
is a despair provoked not by his own human 
existentiality, but by his presence in a historical 
universe in which almost the whole of mankind lives 
prey to a continual terror (even if not always 
conscious of it), (ibid., p.162.)
I cannot hope to deal with the question of the
relative adequacy of the historicist as opposed to the
mythic attitudes to explanation of the harsh realities of
life any more than Eliade could. I take my lead from the
footnote which he adds to his discussion in which he
points out that
"historicism" was created and professed above all by 
thinkers belonging to nations for which history has 
never been a continuous terror. These thinkers 
would perhaps have adopted another viewpoint had 
they belonged to nations marked by the "fatality of 
history", (ibid., p.152, n.ll.)
It seems likely that historicistic positivism is a
philosophy which is adequate for those societies and
individuals who can "afford" it, that is, who are not
suffering from the continuous vicissitudes and turmoils
of political, social, economic or geographical crises.
If this were the case then those societies which are so
troubled would not only be marked by the mythic attitude
of return to the "horizon of archetypes and repetition",
they would, in fact, be sustained by it. The twin
difficulty which arises is then, how does a crisis-ridden
"traditional" society escape the complacent acceptance of
historical event as divinely ordained which ensures the
continuation of its condition, and how do the members of
a modern secular society endure the personal existential
crises which historicism and positivism fail to
adequately account for? The only answer would seem to
lie in a struggle for equilibrium between the two;
whenever one attitude becomes prevalent or achieves a
monopoly, society is dependent for its health and
improvement on the reassertion of the alternative. Such
an account would not only recognise the value of both
attitudes to history but would also account for Eliade's
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staunch defence of the traditional attitude in a world
(the Europe of 1948) where the modern historicist-
positivist attitude seemed to be in danger of sweeping
all before it and burying all spiritual values completely
beneath an adamantine crust of empirically assured and
materially manifestable dicta. His conclusion, that
humanity must have "faith or despair"64 stems from these
considerations.
Faith, in this context, as in many others, means 
absolute emancipation from any kind of natural "law" 
and hence the highest freedom that man can imagine: 
freedom to intervene even in the ontological 
constitution of the universe.65
It should be recalled that "archaic man takes part in the
repetition of the cosmogony, the creative act par
excellence". (ibid., p.158.) and is thus also involved in
the ontological constitution of the universe.
As a propaedeutics to a sociology of knowledge which
posits the autonomy of the human spirit Eliade's thought
can be seen to reveal a potentially valid dynamic which
conditions and produces positive evaluations of history
as experience. In so doing Eliade could attempt a
restitution of "faith" without the total abandonment of
the critical attitude. In order to have such faith in
one's religious tradition one need not relinquish all
criteria of recognition of the historically real, but
must see these apparently conflicting and mutually
64 the title of the final section of this chapter.
65 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p . 161.
exclusive attitudes as rather different planes of 
reality, possibly different paradigms which apply 
independently, different models which both partially and 
incompletely represent the totality which language, as a 
closed system is inadequate to express.66
It is my hope that this prolonged and rather 
laboured discussion of Eliade's treatment of time and 
history has served not only to clarify his meaning but 
also his implicit method. As we have seen it is crucial 
at certain points that one accept his definitions, even 
though they remain only implicit, before one can grasp 
his meaning. The given relationships of the elements of 
his analysis must be accepted as given before the meaning 
of the whole becomes transparent. Credo ut intelleqam 
becomes a methodological device relating at least to the 
temporary suspension of one's disbelief if not the active 
engagement of one's acceptance. The interrelations of 
the elements of a mythic matrix must be accepted as they 
are before they can be understood for what they imply.
This does not mean that I must become a Buddhist with all 
that that entails in order to understand Buddhism, any 
more than that I must become French in order to 
understand French. It does mean that I must accept that 
lapin means rabbit and that sauvaqe means undomesticated 
rather than vicious, before I will understand the meaning 
of un lapin sauvaqe. (And it could be argued that in so
66 Both Godel's theorem and deconstruction point to 
the truth of this contention.
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doing I do become that little bit more francais, but 
that's another story.) The point is that in order to 
come to an understanding of the religious meanings of 
other peoples' beliefs scholars of religion must not 
"isolate themselves in their own beliefs".67 We cannot 
commence by insisting on our own intuitions of the real 
and thus denying the reference of others1 hierophanies to 
reality any more than we could arrive at an understanding 
of Eliade's meaning here if we commenced by insisting on 
the accepted usage of the word history and denying his 
alternative usages of the word as personally experienced 
events or as determinative antecedents. If we insist on 
our own usual interpretations of sauvaqe, then un lapin 
sauvaqe becomes quite ridiculous. Similarly, if we 
insist on our own intuitions of the real, conditioned by 
our own personal experience of our own culture, then the 
expressions of different modes of human being, be they 
exotic or merely alternative, will remain opaque to our 
interpretation.
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67 No Souvenirs , p . 2 3 3 .
Chapter Six 
The Implicit Religion of Meaning.
Having considered in some detail the major elements 
of the system of thought involved in Eliade's writings I 
now wish to consider some of the further implications of 
that thought. The device which I shall employ to do this 
was suggested to me by an article by Edward Bailey about 
"implicit religion". (Although, of course, I take full 
responsibility for any inconsistencies in the conclusions 
reached in this chapter.) Implicit religion as a topic 
of study has attracted an increasing amount of attention 
in works such as Thomas Luckmann's Invisible Religion and 
Andrew Greeley's Unsecular Man; the Persistence of 
Religion.1 and the conferences of Edward Bailey's Network
1 Luckmann, T. The Invisible Religion: the Problem 
of Religion in Modern Society. Greeley, Andrew M. 
Unsecular Man: the Persistence of Religion.
for the Study of Implicit Religion2 have attracted a wide 
variety of scholars from around the world. In October 
and November of 1991 a major conference on this topic was 
organised by the University of Leiden in Holland.
The very term "implicit religion" must indicate an 
inappropriate definition or understanding of religion 
whereby something thought to be non-religious is in fact 
religious. Its religious nature is undetected. While 
Mircea Eliade did not, to my knowledge, use the term 
"implicit religion", he did quite frequently apply the 
adjectives "concealed, camouflaged, hidden, unconscious 
or unrecognizable" to religious phenomena. It is my 
intention to clarify his concept of those aspects of the 
religious which might be called implicit, and my further 
hope to elucidate his understanding of meaning as itself 
implicitly religious.
Eliade's work became the subject of academic enquiry 
as early as 1962,3 and many scholars have focused 
critical attention upon him. However, I tend to agree 
with Mac Linscott Ricketts, author of the painstakingly 
researched Mircea Eliade: The Romanian Roots, that not 
only is a short, plainly written introduction to his 
thought not yet available but that Eliade is often
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2 V. Edward Bailey, "The Implicit Religion Of 
Contemporary Society: an Orientation and Plea for its 
Study."
3 Altizer, "Mircea Eliade and the Recovery of the 
Sacred."
misunderstood.4 This will become clearer in the second 
part of this dissertation. It is Ricketts' conclusion 
that the "Unifying Theme" of all Eliade's writings is 
"the unrecognisibility of miracle", (ibid., p.1209.) The 
Romanian literary critic Matei Calinescu has likewise 
said that "the problem of miracle and the disguises 
through which it renders itself unrecognizable is 
central"5 to some of Eliade's fiction. It is my 
intention in this chapter to discuss the meaning and 
implication of the unrecognizable aspect of religious 
phenomena and its centrality to Eliade's work.
As we have seen above, it is Eliade's understanding 
that ritual, myth, and symbol are hierophanies, that is 
to say manifestations or revelations of the sacred, which 
is the real, the true, the powerful and the meaningful.6 
I have emphasized this definition - the sacred is the 
real - and I will return to it again. It is made 
repeatedly by Eliade, yet most commentators either insist 
that he fails to define the sacred or assume a facile 
identification either with the Judaeo-Christian God or 
with some indeterminate but autonomous "transcendent" 
ontology. The sacred for Eliade exists in a dialectical
4 Mac Linscott Ricketts, Mircea Eliade; the Romanian 
Roots, p .1.
5 Calinescu, M. "The Disguises of Miracle; notes on 
Mircea Eliade's Fiction," p.561.
6 Egs. "Cosmical Homology and Yoga," p.188; Myths. 
Dreams and Mysteries, pp.14,23; "The Structure of 
Religious Symbols," p.506; The Sacred and the Profane, 
pp.12, 28.
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relationship with the profane. This relationship is 
paradoxical, the sacred being both concealed in and 
revealed through the profane. It is the coincidentia 
oppositoruin in which all opposites are united.
Hierophany acquaints the believer, homo religiosus, with 
archetypal structures, paradigmatic models, or exemplary 
patterns. The repetition of these exemplary patterns 
ensures the believer's participation in or connection 
with the sacred. It should be said that in so far as 
Eliade was an historian of religion, rather than a 
metaphysician or theologian, his approach to the sacred 
was as "the something intended in ritual actions, in 
mythical speech, in belief or in mystical feeling".7 
Here I am using the words of Paul Ricoeur, a close 
colleague of Eliade. As that which is worshipped, 
whatever it might be, the question of the existence of 
the sacred does not occur.8 In studying religion one 
cannot deny that humanity worships. That which is 
worshipped, the intentional object of reverence, whatever 
it may be, whatever ontological status it might be 
afforded, is a real and meaningful category of the study. 
The sacred exists qua the intentional object of worship
and qua an element of the study of religion. To debate
its existence is no more meaningful than to challenge the 
existence of psychosis or affection or any other
7 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, p.29.
8 It is a telling fact that "worship" is from 
weorthscipe. Old English for worthiness.
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intangible or abstract category.
Eliade's major themes are investigated through his
tripartite methodology of history, phenomenology, and
hermeneutics; or, in clearer language, the discovery,
description, and decipherment of the meaning, of
religious phenomena. Throughout his work Eliade
maintains this emphasis;
there is no such thing as a "pure" religious fact. 
Such a fact is always also an historical, 
sociological, cultural, and psychological fact, to 
name only the most important contexts.9
However,
a religious phenomenon will only be recognized as 
such if it is grasped at its own level, that is to 
say, if it is studied as something religious.10
Eliade repeatedly insists that a religious phenomenon
cannot be "reduced" to one of its other aspects. This is
of little assistance if one lacks a functional definition
of the religious, and as Eliade "doubt[s] the value of
starting with a definition of the religious
phenomenon",11 this does seem to be the case. Even
Ricketts, by far the best informed scholar on Eliade,
mentions this lack of definition.12 However, it is my
perception that there is an underlying concept of
religion which is theoretically coherent in Eliade's
thought although it lacks deliberate expression.
9 The Quest, p.19.
in  • • •Patterns, p . x m .
11 Patterns, p.xiv.
12 Ricketts, op. cit., p. 186.
Succinctly it is this: religion always concerns the
manifestation (hierophany) of the sacred in the profane.
Apparently this only succeeds in defining one unknown in
terms of another: what is the sacred? As I have said
Eliade repeatedly defines the sacred as the real and I
repeat: the reader must be very careful not to ascribe
any unwarranted assumptions to this real.
Since Eliade views the sacred as the intentional
object of human experience which is apprehended as the
real13 it is not surprising that he can then state that
modern man, radically secularized, believes himself, 
or styles himself, atheist, areligious, or, at 
least, indifferent. But he is wrong. He has not 
yet succeeded in abolishing the homo reliqiosus that 
is in him: he has only done away with (if he ever 
was) the christianus. That means that he is left 
with being "pagan" without knowing it.14
"Modern man" is frequently juxtaposed with homo
reliqiosus in this way, but as Eliade says, modern man
has not succeeded in abolishing the homo reliqiosus
within him. If modern man is not the antithesis of homo
reliqiosus. what exactly is he conceived to be?
Certainly he is not simply "contemporary man". In a
paper originally given to the Eranos conference in 1955
Eliade contrasted the contemporary "popular soul" with
the man of the modern society.15 Although the dubious
accuracy of the term "primitive" has been recognized and
13 v. pp. 38-4 0 above.
14 No Souvenirs , p.164.
15 Eliade, "La Vertu Creatrice Du Mythe," p.76. 
Reprinted in Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, ch.2.
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it is now usually placed in inverted commas, the
concomitant truth has not been assimilated that "modern"
should receive similar treatment. However, I suspect
that Eliade has a specific usage for this term and I
shall return to it later.
Eliade is not particularly explicit about the
survival of "religion" by that name in the modern world.
He is, however, more forthcoming about the survival of
myth. Lest this be thought an unacceptable substitution
or a diminution of the significance of our topic, it must
be emphasized that in Eliade's thought the two categories
are inseparable: where there is religion, there is myth;
where there is myth, there is religion. Firstly, it is
not in the sense of "falsehood" or "fable" that he uses
the word "myth" but, on the contrary, as a narrative
which he describes as "considered to reveal the truth par
excellence".16 That is to say, that "myth narrates a
sacred history"; it "tells only of that which really
happened"; it relates the
breakthrough of the sacred that really establishes 
the World and makes it what it is today. ... The 
Myth is regarded as a sacred story, and hence a 
"true history", because it always deals with 
realities. The cosmogonic myth is "true" because 
the existence of the world is there to prove it.17
Thus myths are inseparable from that which is apprehended
as the real, from the sacred and from religion. Where
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myths survive in the secular milieu, there we have 
implicit religion, and as we have seen18 Eliade considers 
the recognition of and response to an exemplary pattern 
to be not only essential to mythic behaviour but also 
"consubstantial with every human condition".19 By way of 
the connection between myth, the sacred, and religion, 
one can detect an understanding of the response to an 
exemplary pattern as religious behaviour. Religion is 
the response to the sacred. The sacred is that which is 
apprehended as the real, which is expressed in "sacred 
history", or myth. The essential element in mythic 
behaviour is the response to the exemplary pattern. Thus 
the response to an example is religious. By these lights 
the influence of any cultural form over human behaviour 
is religious. It should be pointed out that such a 
systematic analysis of terms is analytic in the Kantian 
sense; it is tautological or "circular" in the reciprocal 
dynamic of the hermeneutical circle. Eliade was well 
aware of this circularity in interpretation. Nor does 
"interdefinability" undercut the explanatory power of a 
theory, Newton's physics is also interdefinable.20 
Although this may seem an extreme and possibly
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p.176. V. also Adrian Marino, "Mircea Eliade's 
Hermeneutics," p.33, in Norman Girardot and Mac Linscott 
Ricketts eds., Imagination and Meaning, for Eliade's self 
awareness in this area.
procrustean reading of Eliade it must be remembered that 
he insists that "non-religious man descends from homo 
reliqiosus and, whether he likes it or not, he is also 
the work of religious man",21 and that "an areligious 
society does not yet exist".22 He also insists upon the 
ubiquity of religious phenomena which follows from this 
reading. "To be - or rather to become - a man means to 
be 'religious'."23 It would seem that the converse 
applies to Eliade's constant emphasis on the concrete 
manifestations of religious fact. Not only is there no 
such thing as a "pure" religious fact, all religious 
facts being also historical, psychological, etc.; but 
there is no such thing as a "pure" historical fact, for 
example. All human facts, historical, sociological, 
psychological, are also implicitly religious. Everything 
is, or has been, or could be, religious.24 But the 
specific areas in which we will find religious realities 
involve the uncritical valorisation of socially 
constructed realities and the response to exemplary 
models.
The fundamental interconnection of religion and the 
response to exemplary patterns of behaviour is reinforced 
in an important article of 1973, "The Sacred in the
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23 The Quest, p.ii.
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Secular World". Once again Eliade insists that modern,
secularized man still occupies a sacred dimension. The
sacred is said to be
part of the human mode of being in the world, the 
expression 'being in the world' is not used here in 
the post-Heideggerian sense. ... It means that man 
simply discovers himself in the world, that the 
structure of his consciousness is such that 
somewhere in his experience there is something 
absolutely real and meaningful, something that is a 
source of value for him. (p.101.)
What is of value is that
so long as modern man is interested in discovering 
the meaning of life, that meaning can serve as a 
model for human life, and thus is in the same family 
as the archaic myth which presented the exemplary 
model for ritual repetition.(p .102.)
Modern man "looks for being and does not immediately call
it being, but meaning or goals; ... we do not see
anything religious here; we just see a man behaving as a
human being".(p.103.) But Eliade's work finally insists
that this is religious. He writes,
when man becomes aware of his specific mode of being 
in the world, he realizes that he is a mortal being, 
that he is created. His creation is recounted 
mythically in a sacred history and he realizes that 
he is merely the result of what happened, (pp.101- 
2 .)
This is not necessarily to say that humanity was created 
by an omnipotent, omniscient creator deity. That is a 
specific anthropogeny. Rather it is the realization that 
human existence is finite and conditioned. "Sacred 
history" is that narration of that conditioning that is 
held to best account for what humanity is and why we are 
so and is thus accorded a positive value. To certain 
people biological evolution, as the true account of the
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factors which produced and conditioned humanity, is their 
sacred history.25 To others socio-psychological 
histories seem more apt, to others economic or 
theological, or combinations of several styles. "The 
world of meaning of modern man plays the same function 
that myth plays among the primitive," says Eliade, and 
thus he cannot believe someone immediately when he 
consciously says that he is not a religious man.26
One's initial reaction to this might be to object 
that this is merely an extension of inclusivist theology 
of Karl Rahner's "anonymous Christian" variety.27 This 
may be construed as a fallacious universalization of 
certain specific categories of thought. However,
Eliade's case is based upon extensive research and the 
elevation is not of any specific or provincial 
categories, but of the generic, human tendency to invest 
experience with meaning, to find in our environment 
adequate sources for a coherent response. It is worthy 
of note that the present incumbent of the Mircea Eliade 
Chair at the University of Chicago, Wendy Doniger, makes
25 The tendency of evolutionism to slide over into 
the area of the overtly religious is well documented in 
Mary Midgeley, Evolution as a Religion, and the general 
tendency of narrow scientific explanation to be expanded 
into cosmology in Toulmin, op. cit.
26 "The Sacred in the Secular World," p.102.
27 v. eg. Frank Whaling, Christian Theology and World 
Religions. pp.87ff. Rahner, Schriften zür Theologie, 
vol. 6, pp.545-54; vol. 5, pp.136-58; vol. 8, pp.187-212. 
(Trans, as Theological Investigations. Baltimore:
Helicon Press, 1961.)
a similar correlation of myth, the sacred, and meaning.
"To say that a myth is a sacred story is to say that it 
must have a religious meaning (though it need not be a 
story about the gods)." Myths, she says, "are about the 
sorts of questions that religions ask, ... basically 
about meaning itself".28
As we have seen the concept of meaning expounded in 
the article of 1973 is directly related to human 
behaviour, to activity rather than merely to 
signification. Something - a text, a narrative, or an 
event, some element of experience - is invested with 
meaning in so far as one can detect in it an exemplary 
model or paradigm upon which one can base one's 
behaviour, often through repetition of the sacred act, or 
imitation of the sacred characteristics, as in the 
imitatio Christi. However, Eliade does not restrict such 
bases for behaviour to clearly recognisable religious 
examples. He often speaks with astonishment and 
admiration of people finding meaning in incarceration.29
Such a theory of meaning requires a careful 
consideration to situate it amongst the variety of recent 
theories. It is evidently similar to the theories of 
American pragmatists, such as Charles Sanders Pierce, or 
William James. As James has said, "to develop a
28 Other Peoples' Myths, p.28. v. my review in 
Style. 24, no.4 (1990): 642-645.
29 For example Constantin Noica, Harry Brauer and his 
wife, Lena Constante. v. Journal II. 1957-1969. p.315 
and Journal III, 1970-1978. p.124.
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thought's meaning we need therefore only determine what 
conduct it is fitted to produce".30 However, Eliade goes 
further than they, conceiving a sort of "religious 
pragmatism" which never reduces the thought/behaviour 
dichotomy to a simple polarity but keeps the iterative, 
reciprocal interaction open as a human unity as Adrian 
Marino recognises with his text-interpreter-text, 
interpreter-text-interpreter cycle.31 I would suggest, 
however, that the iterative cycle is somewhat more 
complex, involving an ongoing evolution of the 
interpreter, effected in part by the interpretation; 
interpreter-interpretation-text-interpretation- 
interpreter.
Eliade's thought here can also be compared to that 
of philosophers such as, for example, Hans Georg Gadamer, 
who connects hermeneutics with praxis. Richard Bernstein 
has said that "the most intriguing and most central theme 
in Gadamer's understanding of philosophical hermeneutics 
is the fusion of hermeneutics and praxis".32 Gadamer 
argues that the three subdisciplines of the older 
tradition of hermeneutics (understanding, interpretation, 
application), are three moments of a single process.
Thus genuine understanding always involves application.
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(eds.), p .20.
32 Philosophical Profiles: Essays in a Pragmatic 
Mode, p .61.
B. S. Rennie The Implicit Religion of Meaning 208
"Application is neither subsequent nor a merely
occasional part of the phenomenon of understanding but
codetermines it as a whole from the beginning."33 This
not only involves behaviour with meaning, but does so in
the same recursive, iterative fashion I have indicated
above, which refuses to give either one priority.
Eliade's affinities with the phenomenological school
of interpretation to which Gadamer belonged are to be
expected. On the other hand, how does he relate to, say,
the deconstructionist followers of Jacques Derrida, whose
concept of meaning seems to be largely restricted to the
play of signs, the inter-relationship of signifier and
signified, and finally to the denial of any
transcendental signified and to the infinite deferral of
meaning? Colin Falck has pointed out
that the much-mentioned "aporias", and the "abyss", 
along with the rest of the transcendence free 
vocabulary of post-Saussurian literary theory 
represent only post-Saussurian theory's 
uncomprehending encounter with the inherent mystery 
of all life and all experience.34
Such uncomprehending encounters are by definition the
failure of the understanding of the critic and are
identical with the inability to detect meaning. They
33 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p.289, quoted in 
Bernstein, loc. cit. This concept of "application" has 
some affinity with Eliade's concept of response to an 
exemplary pattern. Does this imply that one has not 
genuinely understood the meaning of a myth unless one 
responds to it by applying it as some kind of 
paradigmatic model?
34 Colin Falck, Myth, Truth, and Literature; Towards 
a True Postmodernism, p.25.
usually lead to an insistence of non-ontology (what Falck 
refers to as the "Abolition of Reality"). That is, an 
insistence that there is nothing there to understand, 
hence the lack of meaning (like the linguistic 
philosophers' rejection of "God-talk"), because the 
"signified" is assumed to have a merely a priori 
existence. However, Falck also draws attention to the 
fact that
the Derridean notion of differance takes us beyond 
both Kant and Saussure in its recognition of the 
essential inseparability of the a priori and the 
empirical, (ibid., p.21.)
Such a notion would be quite familiar to a student of
Goethe such as Eliade, from Goethe's insistence on the
theory-laden nature of the fact.35 Despite the evident
tension between Eliade's humanist conception of meaning
and this semiotic scheme, there are other possible
connections; for example, the relationship of Derrida's
recognition of the desire for a centre in his idea of
"logocentrism" (Of Grammatology, p.12) and Eliade's
emphasis on the symbolism of the centre. loan Culianu's
conclusion that for Eliade the interpretation of
religious mysteries is efficacious only on condition that
one does not succeed in deciphering the message is also
reminiscent of deconstruction's infinite deferral of
meaning.36
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36 "Mircea Eliade et La Tortue Borgne." In Arcade, 
Manea, and Stamatescu eds., Homo Reliaiosus, p.82.
However such affinities may be seen, one thing is 
quite clear; for Eliade, the "living" myth is a myth 
specifically in so far as "it supplies models for human 
behaviour and, by that very fact, gives meaning and value 
to life".37 By that very fact also, I might add, the 
myth is sacred. It is the apprehension of the myth as 
conveying "the truth par excellence", as being the 
repository of the real, the true, and the meaningful 
which simultaneously empowers it as an exemplary model 
and makes it a "sacred history". Although Eliade has 
said that "on the archaic levels of culture, the real - 
that is the powerful, the significative, the living - is 
equivalent to the sacred",38 he has also said that there 
is no resolution of the continuity between the 
"primitive" world and the modern West.39 To say, as we 
do modernly, that "real" is equivalent to historically 
actual is, in Eliade's terms, to grant sacred 
significance to the empirically manifest. Concomitant 
with this emphasis on the significance of the materially 
extant is an emphasis on its independence. Human 
creation is not independently extant and so is considered 
"less real", less significant than independent empirical 
phenomena. However, such views may not themselves be 
coherent. Firstly, one cannot deny human responsibility
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in shaping human history; the history of the human race
is a product of the human race. I do not mean the
"historiography" but the actual events of the past. If
human history is seen as significant then other creations
of human activity cannot be denied significance.
Secondly, any imaginary construct, a theoretical model of
the atom, a speculative reconstruction of geological
history, a religious belief, or an ideology, may have no
independent ontology or empirical manifestation. It
nonetheless exists and may be effective. As Eliade
clearly states,
human creativity and, ultimately, the history of 
human culture is more directly related to what man 
has dreamt, believed and thought of his specific 
mode of being in the world than to the works which 
he has undertaken in order to promote and validate 
this mode of being.40
In fact, Eliade insists that in the modern world "the
'sacred' is present and active mainly in the imaginary
universes".41 Whether something is an epiphany of the
real, an hierophany in Eliade's terms, is clearly held to
be a matter of personal perception.
It is characteristic of what I have called 
"hierophany" that the sacred is thereby both 
revealed and concealed in the profane. To give but 
one example, a sacred tree which embodies the sacred 
to the worshippers of the religion under 
consideration remains merely a tree of a certain 
type to all others. The same dialectics profane- 
sacred-profane, explains what I have called "the 
unrecognizable aspect of miracle", awareness of a 
miracle is only straightforward for those who are 
prepared, by their personal experience and their
40 "Notes on the Symbolism of the Arrow," p.474.
41 The Quest, p.128.
religious background to recognize it as such. To 
others the "miracle" is not evident, it does not 
exist; in fact, it is concealed in everyday objects 
and events.42
This is also revealing as regards the question of 
"modern man". In the final analysis of Eliade's thought, 
"modern man", or non-religious humanity, is either those 
of us who recognize no sacred, no real, find no meaning 
and thus have nothing upon which to model their behaviour 
(and, as such, exist only as an hypothetical construct), 
or represents those of us with the specific 
characteristic of valorizing empirical being as "the 
real". Modern western people find it almost impossible 
not to accord automatically the greatest significance to, 
for example, that speculative reconstruction which is 
deemed to conform to the actual event. This, we think, 
is the real, the true, the powerful. But is this 
necessarily the case? Newtonian mechanics was once 
considered to conform to the actual but has been 
superseded by relativity, which itself is challenged for 
accuracy by quantum theory, yet classical Newtonian 
mathematics was enough to put men on the moon,43 enough 
to alter radically the situation of man in the world. 
Historical studies frequently refer to the impossibility
42 Mademoiselle Christina, 1978 introduction p.7. My 
translation.
43 Although quantum mechanics was necessary to 
produce the computers used in the space program, the 
actual programs which they ran were Newtonian. As Ilya 
Prigogine puts it, "space trip experiments. . .confirm 
Newton's equations to a high degree." Order Out of 
Chaos. p.251.
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of an unbiased account, an objective reconstruction, of 
history. Chaos theory stresses the superiority of the 
simple, manipulable, theoretical model rather than the 
complex model which attempts to faithfully correspond to 
external reality.44 The advances of technology have 
proved as threatening as they have benevolent. Theory 
does not need to be understood or even accurate to be 
practically applicable.45 Yet still modern humanity 
clings to its conviction that the real, the true, the 
powerful, is the historically accurate, the independently 
extant, the empirical. Whether or not this attitude is 
finally justified is not at issue here; the point is that 
this constitutes a belief of a basically religious nature 
characteristic of modern humanity. Whereas archaic 
humanity considered their sacred myths to recount the 
real, much of contemporary humanity considers the 
observable to be the real. It is in the discoveries of 
contemporary physics that modern man seeks for meaning. 
The works of such writers as John Gribbin, Fred Alan 
Wolf, Gary Zukav, Carl Sagan, Fritjof Capra, and other 
popularisers of science are increasingly read by the 
ordinary seekers after truth. As Stephen Toulmin pointed 
out, "the popular scientist has won over the audience of 
the popular preacher".46
44 James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science, p.278.
45 John Gribbin, In Search of Schrödinger's Cat, 
pp.123, 134.
46 Toulmin, op. cit., p. 21.
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If the sacred is seen simply as that which is 
worshipped, that which is considered worthy of respect, 
that which reveals real being and has real meaning, then 
modern humanity's sacred is the material. The actual 
events of the external world are considered to be more 
worthy of attention, to reveal greater truth, to be more 
meaningful than traditional cultural forms. This is not 
a generic shift from religion to non-religion as is 
usually thought to be the case in a consideration of 
secularization. Rather it is the triumph of a 
particular, concealed religious attitude of valorization 
of the empirical as the major manifestation of the real. 
However, when meaning is seen in this sense of exemplary 
behaviour, one must wonder whether the cryptic traces in 
a cloud chamber at the end of a particle accelerator can 
effectively be more meaningful than a religious text.47
I would like to conclude this chapter by mentioning 
some of the positive possibilities of Eliade's implicit 
system. Firstly, one of the greatest barriers to an 
adequate definition of religion has thus been removed. 
The belief that certain people, specifically modern 
rationalist-empiricists, are not religious has
47 Culianu has pointed out that "the object of this 
mechanism [of interpretation] is of no real importance: 
in the extreme, water stains on the walls will serve."
["Ce sur quoi ce mdchanisme s'exercise n'a pas vraiment 
¿'importance: a la limite, on peut se servir des taches 
de moisissure sur un mur (Incognito a Buchenwald)". My 
translation.] However, it should be remembered that this 
is "a la limite". Such restriction is neither normal nor 
beneficial. (Culianu, loc. cit. v. p.208 above.)
necessarily entailed the rejection of all definitions 
broad enough to include, say, early Buddhism or Marxism. 
Such definitions are also broad enough to include the 
rationalist-empiricists, and their categorical denial of 
religious motivation appears to invalidate this 
inclusion. However, it is typically religious behaviour 
for the newly emerged sect to attempt to divorce itself 
radically from previous religious forms. Barth's 
rejection of all religion as idolatry, compared with the 
true divine revelation of Christianity, calls into doubt 
any self-styled divorce from "religion" as an attempt to 
distinguish a tribe from a species, to claim as essential 
differences which are finally superficial. Observable 
fact seems to concur with Eliade that all humanity 
everywhere throughout history has been classifiable as 
"religious" in some, possibly unrecognized, way and that 
"modern man" is no different, despite a unique 
existential situation and an unshakable conviction in the 
meaning and significance of material, non-human 
phenomena. One must wonder whether psychology could ever 
coherently present itself if some people were allowed to 
have no psyche, or sociology if some people had no 
society.
A second positive implication of Eliade's thought is 
that truth, reality, power, meaningfulness, in short his 
"sacred", are not necessarily tied to historical 
actuality and ontological independence. The occasional 
frantic attempts to establish the historical veracity of
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religious texts, encountered in varying degrees from 
fundamentalism to religiously motivated archaeological 
speculations, may be called into question. They would 
seem to be attempts to reconcile two different 
traditions, that of modern historicism and that of an 
earlier traditional belief. As Eliade pointed out in Les 
Trois Graces,48 theological or mythological systems of 
thought can be utilized in "integrating the 
presuppositions and conclusions" of one's experiences of 
reality, regardless of the historical accuracy of their 
contents.
Thirdly such an understanding would serve to stand 
against all sweeping rejections of religion per se as 
meaningless reference to a non-existent realm. The 
insistence upon empirical, manifest, poke-it-with-a-stick 
"reality" as the ultimate locus of meaning is itself a 
recent belief of a religious nature. It has no more 
inherent authority than any traditional religious system. 
Its powerful compulsion resides, in fact, in its breadth 
of acceptance, its spread as a faith. Symptomatic of 
this is the ease with which we accept the non-empirical 
and mysterious trappings of modern science, from viruses 
to quantum interconnectedness. As Robert Towler has 
pointed out, we now inhabit a world more densely stocked 
with accepted invisible entities than ever did the most
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superstitious of medievals.49 As I have said, Eliade 
agrees that the sacred (and therefore the real) is 
present and active in the imaginary universes of modern 
humanity. Yet our imagination is often exercised in 
realms which are so radically divorced from that of human 
experience that meaning, in the sense I have discussed 
here of exemplary structures requiring a human response, 
is increasingly difficult to find, and the meanings of 
traditional religious expressions have tended to be 
increasingly occluded. They are not thus meaningless but 
their messages may have been forgotten. However, as with 
any structured narrative, the point of a parable, like 
the wit of a joke or the meaning of a myth, can be 
reactualised, re-realised, by scholarship which involves 
the creative involvement of the active imagination, 
informed by experience with a coherent sense of the 
reality or sacrality implicit in the structure.
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II ELIADE'S THOUGHT IN THE ARENA OF THE ACADEMIC
STUDY OF RELIGION
Introduction: Some Comments on Eliade's History of 
Religions
It is not my purpose in this introduction to 
orientate the thought of Mircea Eliade in the historical 
development of the academic study of religion. This has 
been admirably and clearly done by others; for example, 
Douglas Allen, in Part One of Structure and Creativity. 
For another, longer analysis of the history of the study 
of religion one could consult Frank Whaling's edition, 
Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Religion, and its 
companion volume, Classical Approaches ..., edited by 
Jacques Waardenberg. For a briefer "potted history", 
Eliade's own accounts in The Sacred and the Profane,
(pp.216-232) and in "Comparative Religion: Its Past and 
Future", (in Knowledge and the Future of Man. edited by 
Walter J. Ong) are concise and informative. Instead I 
wish to make some comments on what the history of 
religions must be conceived to be, given the preceding
B. S. Rennie Part II. Introduction 2
analysis of Eliade's categories of the study, before 
considering in some detail the criticisms of other 
scholars of religion of his approach.
As William Baird has pointed out
ethnologists [among others] are sometimes confused 
by Eliade's "history of religions" since it is 
unlike any "history" with which they are familiar.1
I have argued above that Eliade had a specific, and
rather idiosyncratic, understanding of history which did
not, however, prevent him from using the word in its
common sense of temporal antecedents. So his "history of
religions" is the study of the historical antecedents of
the human phenomenon referred to as "religion", but it is
also the interpretation of the data which present
themselves to the individual scholar and thus become part
of his or her actual lived experience (history in his
personal sense).
Insofar as the scholar can recognise the real
revealed by these data, they constitute hierophanies for
him or her. That this makes the history of religions
itself a religious exercise is no adverse criticism since
it is held that "living as a human being is in itself a
religious act".2 The historian of religions can thus
realise the meanings of archaic, exotic, or contemporary
religious phenomena; which is to say, can realise both
the significance of that religious phenomenon for the
1 Category Formation and the History of Religions,
p. 77.
2 The Quest, preface.
B. S. Rennie Part II. Introduction 220
actual life of the believer and the significance of that 
particular phenomenon for the general existential 
situation of humanity in our confrontation with our 
environment. In order to do this, it would seem that a 
certain commitment is necessary to the acceptance that 
those data are (or were) actually and realistically 
meaningful to the believer and that this meaning is 
capable of reactualisation. Given this commitment, an 
extensive exposure to the actual historical data is 
absolutely necessary in order to "ground", as it were, 
one1s interpretations with the external realities implied 
in one's texts, as opposed to the internal realities of 
one's other personal experience. This is equivalent to 
both Eliade's much criticised principle of the 
non-reduction of religious experience and his insistence 
on the dependence of the scholar on accurate historical 
information. The religious phenomena must be understood 
in their own terms in order for their real meaning, both 
for the believer and for the present scholar, to be 
realised. It is precisely this principle of understanding 
one's object of study in its own terms that I am seeking 
to apply in understanding Eliade in his own terms as he 
used those terms.
Isiah Berlin, in his book on Vico and Herder, 
indicates seven theses thought to be Vico's main 
creations; the fifth of these is that
the creations of man - laws, institutions,
religions, rituals, works of art, language, song,
rules of conduct, and the like - are not artificial
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products created to please, or to exalt, or teach 
wisdom, nor weapons deliberately invented to 
manipulate or dominate men, or promote social 
stability or security, but are natural forms of 
self-expression, of communication with other human 
beings or with God. The myths and fables, the 
ceremonies and monuments of early man, according to 
the view prevalent in Vico's day, were absurd 
fantasies of helpless primitives, or deliberate 
inventions designed to delude the masses and secure 
their obedience to cunning and unscrupulous masters. 
This he regarded as a fundamental fallacy. Like 
anthropic metaphors of early speech, myth and ritual 
are for Vico so many natural ways of conveying a 
coherent view of the world as it was seen and 
interpreted by primitive men. (p.xviii.)
This explains as clearly as any words could Eliade's
attitude of "nonreduction". It should be borne in mind
that Eliade's Master's thesis at the University of
Bucharest was written on Italian Renaissance Philosophers
from Ficino to Bruno, and that Italian Renaissance
Humanism was one of the major influences on the young
Eliade before he set off for India in order to
"universalise" the "provincial" philosophy he had
inherited from his European education.3 Berlin sees this
principle of Vico as leading directly to a nonreductive
type of aesthetics in which
works of art must be understood, interpreted, 
evaluated, not in terms of timeless principles and 
standards valid for all men everywhere, but by 
correct grasp of the purpose and therefore the 
peculiar use of symbols, especially of language, 
which belonged uniquely to their own time and place. 
(p .xix.)
This was the same banner which Eliade carried forward in
3 On Eliade's master's thesis, v. Ricketts, Romanian 
Roots. pp.319-324. On his motivations for visiting 
India, v. Al-George, "India in the Cultural Destiny of 
Mircea Eliade", pp.!24f.
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his attempt to understand religion "in its own terms".
A further thrust of Eliade's thought on the history
of religions is clearly evident in his criticism of van
der Leeuw, who
thought, wrongly, that he could reduce the totality 
of all religious structure to three Grundstructuren: 
Dynamism, Animism, and Deism. However, he was not 
interested in the history of religious structures, 
here lies the most serious inadequacy of his 
approach; for even the most elevated religious 
expression (a mystical ecstasy, for example,) 
presents itself through specific structures and 
cultural expressions, which are historically 
conditioned.4
Thus Eliade strongly affirms the significance of history 
(i.e., both erlebte Zeit and recorded history) as 
established, as he would have it, by the Abrahamic 
traditions. He is in no way denying the importance of 
the "desacralised cosmos", but seems to be saying that it 
is one among many loci of significance, and that, in 
accordance with his dialectic of the sacred, significance 
is in everything in which it is apprehended. Only our 
failure to appreciate it as sacred makes a thing profane. 
His writings are so profuse on one hand, and 
unsystematised on the other, that there is sometimes a 
tendency to read into Eliade things he may not have 
intended. However, it is also quite possible to miss in 
the huge haystack of his oeuvre radically some very 
significant needles, and his insistence on the importance 
of historically accurate data has been one of the most 
critical.
4 The Quest, p.35.
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Eliade's conclusions are in favour of an integral
study of religion:
if the "phenomenologists" are interested in the 
meanings of religious data, the "historians" on 
their side attempt to show how these meanings have 
been experienced and lived in the various cultures 
and historical moments,
This can provoke a tension by means of which
Reliqionswissensehaft escapes dogmatism and stagnation.
Unfortunately, as is so often the case, his concluding
sentence of this section of The Quest (p.9.) imparts an
almost mystical tone: "the history of religious meanings
must always be regarded as forming part of the history of
the human spirit". This is a vague caveat whose meaning
is unclear. It may be that Eliade merely seeks to remind
us that, on the one hand, the history of religions is a
process of self-understanding for humanity rather than an
attempt to reveal any transcendent ontology. On the
other hand, such terms as "spirit" are not without
significance to the latter process.
He repeatedly states that the ultimate aim of his
research is to discover the meaning of religious facts
and particularly of the change and development of
religious facts through history. Rather than seeking an
accurate "archeological" reconstruction or
phenomenological description of religious data, Eliade is
attempting to discover the meanings of these data. It is
typical of a hermeneutical approach to assume there to be
a "meaning" in a certain datum. In literary theory,
"positive" hermeneutics assumes a singular meaning to
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have been deliberately and consciously embedded in a text 
by an author. The aim of interpretation is to recover 
that meaning unchanged. "Negative" hermeneutics, on the 
other hand, assumes that the meaning is derived from the 
text but is also dependent on the act of interpretation.5 
Eliade certainly agrees with the latter, but his 
"creative hermeneutics" of religious data reflects a 
development in which the response of the interpreter, 
conditioned by historical influences but liberated from 
determinism by the creativity of human imagination, is 
recognised as crucial to the interpretation of all lived 
experience, not purely of the literary text.
Possibly a major source of this conviction is the 
Romanian folk ballad, the Mioritza. discussed by Eliade 
in his Zalmoxis, the Vanishing God (pp.226-256). To 
relate briefly and simplistically the point salient to my 
argument here, a shepherd is warned of his own impending 
murder at the hands of rival shepherds by a clairvoyant 
ewe-lamb. Rather than bemoaning his fate, the shepherd 
imaginatively valorises his death as a celestial 
marriage. This is, in fact, a grossly over-simplified 
reading of a complex issue and Eliade's discussion should 
be consulted for an introduction to the themes involved. 
However, this theme of an imaginative reappraisal of an 
unavoidable death is repeated in Eliade's play Iphigenia.
5 This division of hermeneutics can be attributed to 
Wolfgang Iser, v. eg. "The Reading Process: A 
Phenomenological Approach." New Literary History. 3 
(1972):279-299.
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based on Euripides play Iphiqenia in Aulis. Iphigenia,
daughter of Agamemnon, is sacrificed to pacify the gods
whose winds held the ships of the Acheans and their
allies pinned on the shore at Aulis, unable to depart for
Troy. Once again the victim, to the complete
incomprehension of the other characters, manages to see
her fate as positive if not glorious. Once again the
point seems to be (or, rather, one of a complex of points
seems to be) that the exercise of the creative
imagination can render meaningful (which is to say, can
provide an adequate and satisfactory personal response
to) the most grossly determined of historical events.
Another factor of Eliade's history of religions is
indicated by his statement that
the contribution made by the historian of religions 
seems to me crucial. It lays bare the unity of the 
human condition, and it does so in our modern world, 
which is becoming a "planetary" one.6
This is to say that, although specific individual
experience and personal history condition (and are
reciprocally conditioned by) the individual creative
imagination, Eliade recognises a basic unity of the human
race revealed in universal religious structures even
though the capability to apprehend certain meanings in
certain events is itself culturally conditioned. Not
only the common anthropological biology, but the location
of that biology in a common world and the possession by
that biology of a creativity of the imagination, ensures
6 Ordeal by Labyrinth, p.122.
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a human unity to the history of religion.
This fundamental unity of religion ensures that the
understanding of religious phenomena is finally a self-
understanding. Eliade speaks of "profound changes in
religious concepts and behaviour", and recognises that
"religious structures are susceptible to radical
changes".7 Such a change
indicates modifications in man's existential 
situation. It is part and parcel of the discoveries 
which man has been led to make about himself and his 
world. These discoveries are of a religious nature. 
The task of the historian of religions is to show 
how they are articulated in the total process of 
history, (ibid., pp.354-5)
Thus he sees the task of the historian of religions to be
to show how humanity's progressive discoveries about
ourselves in the world lead to changes in our existential
condition, expressed as changes in the history of
religion. Finally, Eliade sees this process as a way to
increase our awareness of our contemporary existential
situation,8 a task some might consider more suited to
philosophy. But it must be remembered that Eliade
considered the history of religions to be an essentially
philosophical task.9
7 "Structures and Changes in the History of 
Religion," p.353.
8 v . The Two and the One, p .13.
9 v. the 1952 Foreword to The Myth of the Eternal 
Return.
7.1. R. F. Brown: Some General Criticisms.
The survey of criticisms given by R. F. Brown in his 
article of 1981,1 although he insists it is not 
exhaustive, is full and informative and makes an 
excellent basis for a general consideration of the 
criticisms addressed to Eliade. Thus I have abstracted 
briefly the central salient points in the various 
shortcomings that have been detected in Eliade's work.
Professor Brown identifies two main areas of 
criticism. Firstly, "a number of ways in which [critics] 
find [Eliade's] general methodology wanting". In this he 
recognises seven separate criticisms of Eliade's 
approach;
1. His use of anthropological source material is 
irresponsible. Specifically: (a) He often neglects 
to evaluate the quality of his sources and therefore 
uses data which contemporary anthropologists 
repudiate as inaccurate or outdated by later or more 
thorough fieldwork. (b) He fails to take sufficient 
account of the interpretative bias of authors, 
treating secondary sources as if they were usable in 
the same way as primary data. (c) He lumps together
1 "Eliade on Archaic Religions: Some Old and New 
Criticisms," Sciences Religieuses 10 no.4 
(1981):429-449.
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the most heterogeneous kinds of data (scriptures, 
artifacts, ethnographic reports, etc.), deploying 
them as if they were uniform in meaning and 
evidential value.
2. Eliade's use of the comparative method is 
defective.
3. The procedures of generalisation which Eliade 
employs are not properly inductive and fail to 
satisfy scientific criteria.
4. Eliade utilises Ldvy-Bruhl's discredited theory 
that non-literate peoples lack the scientific 
attitude because their mental structure and logical 
thought differs fundamentally from that of modern 
Western people.
5. To construct his profile of the archaic religious 
mind Eliade groups living non-literate peoples 
together with ancient cultures no longer extant.
6. Anthropologists are sharply critical of Eliade's 
"descending approach".2 which begins with the 
assumption that in religious phenomena one has to do 
with a transcendent sacred reality disclosing 
itself.
7. Many censure Eliade's "science" as not value 
free. ... His overriding personal wish to recover 
and preserve the religious values of the archaic 
perspective, ... is itself a religious programme of 
the sort that ought not to be distorting a genuine 
quest for knowledge.
The second area or type of criticism concerns 
objections to Eliade's particular theories and 
explanations, of which Brown highlights a further six 
arguments.
8. The sacred/profane contrast is not an 
all-important category for non-literate peoples.
9. Non-literate peoples are not constantly 
preoccupied with religion, with myth, or with 
origins.
2 This term is taken from John Saliba's book, Homo 
Religiosus. p.40.
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10. Eliade presents a one-sided portrait of religion 
as an effort to escape from the profane sphere. 
However, in most societies religion involves a 
variety of rites and techniques employed to cope 
directly with the challenges of ordinary life, taken 
on their own terms.
11. His interpretation of myth largely ignores its 
social functions and consequently treats it in a 
one-dimensional manner as almost exclusively 
religious in orientation.
12. In his treatment of symbolism Eliade is guilty 
of ignoring two levels of investigation and 
concentrating only on the third. ... [he ignores the 
ethnographic and exegetical level in favour of the 
explanatory level]. His procedure needs to be 
emended by attending to how the people themselves 
use these [symbolic] objects, and what they say 
about the structure and meaning of their own 
symbols.
13. In particular, Eliade dwells far too much on 
death/rebirth symbolism, (pp.432-434.)
Before passing onto the following sections which
deal with specific criticisms, made by particular authors
in more detailed commentaries, I would like to make a
brief reply to each of these criticisms outlined by Prof.
Brown. I would be more confident in doing so if I could
draw directly on the writings of Mircea Eliade, for this
is my historical source data, and I do not wish to
encounter the criticism that I, too, treat secondary
sources as if they were the same as primary data, (lb,
above.) However, despite the fact that Eliade several
times wrote of his awareness of critics and his intention
to answer them,3 he does not often do so. Unfortunately,
3 eg. "I plan someday to dedicate an entire work to 
discussing the objections put forth by some of my 
critics, those who are responsible and acting in all good 
faith." "Foreword" to Douglas Allen's Structure and 
Creativity." p.vii.
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with the ongoing pressure of the Encyclopedia, and of the 
History of Religious Ideas, which Eliade considered his 
chef d'oeuvre, and with the increasing arthritic 
disability of his hands, (Eliade continued to write 
longhand throughout his life) combining with his personal 
dislike of polemics, his direct replies to critics are 
few.4 Thus usable quotations may not always be 
forthcoming, and I will have to resort to my own 
interpretative abilities. As I have said in my 
introduction this is unavoidable in any case, since even 
the editorial selection of quotations influences their 
received meaning. I have always insisted that what is 
expressed here is my interpretation of Eliade rather than 
some immaculate reconstruction of his mental operations. 
Lastly, I hope it is perfectly clear when I am quoting 
Eliade and when I am interpreting him, and I will 
otherwise attempt to avoid "paraphrases".
One of the clearest statements Eliade makes against 
these criticisms comes from his Images and Symbols. 
Although written in French in 1952 the English 
translation was published in 1961, and so considerably 
anticipated these critiques. Here he states,
we have now gone beyond the "confusionist" position
of a Tylor or a Frazer, who, in their
4 v. Ricketts Romanian Roots, pp.134-139. At the age 
of 19, after having written a critical review of Nicolai 
Iorga’s Essai de synthèse de l'histoire de l'humanité 
Eliade was obliged to resign as a student journalist on 
the Bucharest University Review. "Nor did Eliade's 
resignation end the controversy." Thereafter he seems to 
have avoided polemics.
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anthropological and ethnographical researches, 
accumulated examples which had no geographical or 
historical contiguity, and would cite an Australian 
myth together with one from Siberia, Africa, or 
North America, persuaded as they were that always 
and everywhere they were dealing with the same 
"uniform reaction of the human mind before the 
phenomena of Nature". Compared with this position, 
so similar to that of a naturalist of the Darwinian 
epoch, the historico-cultural school of Graebner- 
Schmidt and the other historicist schools represent 
an undeniable progress. It was important, however, 
not to let ourselves become fixed in the historico- 
cultural point of view, and to inquire whether, in 
addition to its own history, a symbol, a myth or a 
ritual, might not reveal something of the human 
condition regarded in its own right as a mode of 
existence in the universe. ... Thus, when leaving on 
one side the "history" that divides them, we compare 
an Oceanian symbol with a symbol from northern Asia, 
we think we are entitled to do so, not because both 
the one and the other are products of the same 
"infantile mentality", but because the symbol in 
itself expresses an awakening to the knowledge of a 
"limit situation".5
Elsewhere he explains further that
it is somewhat as if, in order to gain a better 
understanding of the poetic phenomenon, we should 
have recourse to a mass of heterogeneous examples,
... From the point of view of literary history, such 
juxtapositions are to be viewed with suspicion; but 
they are valid if our object is to describe the 
poetic phenomenon as such, if we propose to show the 
essential differences between poetic language and 
the utilitarian language of everyday life.6
Thus Eliade himself replies to points lc, 4, and 5. The
related, and interrelated, points la and lb, are only
indirectly countered, however. No scholar can be utterly
unaware that the texts we read are written by other
scholars and are thus subject to their interpretive bias.
Nor can we hope to become exhaustivly acquainted with our
5 Images and Symbols. p,175f.
6 The Sacred and The Profane, p.16.
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subject materials. The acceptance of such unrealistic
aspirations results in statements such as John Saliba's
final insistence that
formulation of generalisations can only be reliably 
reached after many individual studies have been 
carried out. ... It is not an easy task to decide 
when there are enough studies at one's disposal. ... 
The task of the scholar is to take into account all 
available literature and at the same time be aware 
of its contributions and limitations.7
Obviously this sets the historian of religions (and most
other scholars) a quite impossible task.
It must be recognised that specific criticisms made
by, for example J. Z. Smith and Richard Gombrich,do
reveal real faults in Eliade's interpretations.8
However, that Eliade makes occasional misinterpretations
and accepts the descriptions of Western scholars as true
descriptions of the beliefs of other peoples merely
reflects the fallible and interdependent nature of the
scholarly endeavour and does not seriously compromise the
coherence of his thought. That these errors are made
uncritically is simply untrue. He minimises the risk of
being egregiously misled by broadening the scope of his
readings as much as possible in a considerable number of
languages, thereby avoiding serious misapprehensions
contracted through concealed bias. Furthermore, an
inspection of his writings reveals that Eliade was in
7 Saliba, Homo Reliqiosus in the Works of Mircea 
Eliade, pp.142, 143, 149.
8 v. eg. Gombrich's article, "Eliade on Buddhism" and 
Smith's criticisms in Map is not Territory, pp.91-95 and 
in Towards Theory in Ritual, p.122, n.2.
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fact extremely critical of the majority of Western
authors, and of their interpretative biases, even of
those who most impressed him.
That Eliade accepted Ldvy-Bruhl's discredited theory
is a rather ludicrous suggestion in view of the former's
criticisms.9 Although he does cite Levy-Bruhl quite
extensively in Patterns (20 times, in fact), Eliade was
well aware of the untenability of his "prelogical
mentality", and takes every opportunity to mention it.
For example, In The Sacred and the Profane:
Ldvy-Bruhl sought to prove that religious behaviour 
could be explained by the prelogical mentality of 
primitives - a hypothesis that he renounced towards 
the end of his life. (p.231)
In The Two and the One:
at the end of his life Levy-Bruhl abandoned the 
hypothesis of a primitive mentality pre-logical and 
radically different from the modern mentality, and 
actually argued against it. (pp.l89f.)
Even in Patterns. although he refers to Ldvy-Bruhl's
L"Experience mystique et les symboles chez les primitifs
as an "excellent book" (p.444), Eliade uses such works
mainly as a source book for the beliefs of native peoples
rather than a source of theoretical understanding. He
even suggests a disagreement with Ldvy-Bruhl's original
restriction of the "primitive mentality" to "primitive"
people. Speaking of an example of "infantilised magic"
9 Apparently he did accept, at the age of 19, that 
magic "represents a primitive rudimentary mentality," (v. 
Ricketts, op. cit., p.141.) However, this does not 
indicate that he was unaware of the critical shortcomings 
of the "pre-logical mentality" as we will see.
B. S. Rennie General Criticisms 234
among Romanian peasants Eliade compared it to an African
belief cited by Ldvy-Bruhl.
In the minds of the natives, the symbol communicates 
itself concretely by participation, just as ... , in 
the infantilised magic just quoted ... This, I must 
repeat, is only one instance of an infantilism of 
which there are great numbers of examples in the 
religious experience of every civilised people.
(p.445)
In fact, of "primitive man" in general, Eliade insists
their mind was neither "pre-logical" nor paralysed 
by a participation mystique. It was a fully human 
mind. But this also means that every significant 
act was validated and valorised both on the level of 
empirical experience and in a Universe of images, 
symbols and myths. No conquest of the material 
world was effected without a corresponding impact on 
human imagination and behaviour.10
Not only does Eliade specifically repudiate the
pre-logical fallacy, he also reveals how he considers the
pre-rational or pre-systematic to operate in all of us
through imagination and behaviour.
Eliade's criticism of Levy-Bruhl seems to be that
there is some kind of alternative mentality; an ability
to grasp a coherence in a system of symbolism prior to
its logical or verbal extrapolation. However, this
mentality, this ability, is far from absent in
"civilised" peoples. In fact, "every historical man
carries on, within himself, a great deal of prehistoric
humanity".11 It was precisely the untenable contention
that the "pre-logical" mentality historically preceded
10 Notes on the Symbolism of the Arrow," p.465, and
v. The Quest, p.16, where he refers to the pre-logical 
mentality as "an erroneous hypothesis."
11 Images and Symbols, p.12.
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and radically differed from the mentality of modern, 
logical humanity which finally forced Ldvy-Bruhl, and E. 
B. Tylor, to abandon the concept. Eliade's recognition 
of some kind of "pre-verbal", symbolic mentality (v.p.100 
above) in which communication is achieved "concretely by 
participation", is considerably more critical than Ldvy- 
Bruhl's concept, although it is doubtlessly the cause of 
this disparaging contention.
Points lc and 3 above seem to combine to produce the 
second criticism. That Eliade "lumps together 
heterogenous material" and uses improper induction in his 
procedures of generalisation is surely the cause of an 
apprehension of a "defective comparative method" in his 
work. As we have seen, Eliade makes his own defence 
against lc. In support of the procedures of 
generalisation employed by Eliade, Brown discusses the 
alteration of the conceptions regarding scientific theory 
formation, the new paradigm becoming that of the creative 
and imaginative insight rather than the step-by-step 
linear deduction/induction. New paradigms are not formed 
from the integration of new data, but rather from a 
relinquishing of the old paradigm (which necessarily 
implies an immersion in the chaos of undifferentiated 
perceptions), in order to come up with a new way of 
seeing the problem. From such a point of view Eliade's 
procedures, idiosyncratic as they may be, are not 
immediately open to criticism simply because they lack a 
repeatable linear progression.
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Of the criticism of Eliade's "descending approach" 
(point 6 above), I will simply state here that Eliade's 
"assumption" concerning the ontological status of the 
sacred has been the source of most of the criticism 
marshalled against him. It is integral to the criticisms 
of Barbosa da Silva and Douglas Allen, which I inspect in 
the following sections, and I will leave those sections 
to answer it.
Similarly the 7th point is integral to the 
consideration of Robert Baird's criticism of "Normative 
Elements" and so may be passed over here. I would, 
however, like to point out that Brown passes with 
remarkable ease from "not value free" to "itself a 
religious programme". While an increasing number of 
scholars would accept that no investigation, and perhaps 
even no perception, can be value free, few of them would 
insist on the religious dimensions of that fact.
However, in their eagerness to criticise Eliade, several 
scholars have argued precisely that; that because he is 
not utterly objective, he is religious (and vice versa).
I rather doubt that Eliade could consider this a 
criticism, especially in the light of his claim that "to 
be - or, rather, to become - a man means to be 
'religious.'"12 Furthermore, a reading of Eliade's works 
suggests very strongly to me that his overriding personal 
concern is not to recover the religious values of the
12 The Quest, preface.
archaic perspective.13 Rather it is to combat personal 
and collective despair, to generate individually and 
socially meaningful optimistic understandings of human 
existential conditions. He seems to perceive the modern 
secular values as having left humanity with little more 
than the common slogan, "the one who dies with the most 
toys wins".
Against points 8 and 9 Eliade accepts that
the great god of Heaven, the Supreme Being, Creator 
omnipotent, plays a quite insignificant part in the 
religious life of the tribe.14
It is not religion or myth as we commonly conceive them, 
anymore than it is the specific sacred/profane dichotomy 
as expounded by Eliade, which is held to preoccupy non­
literate peoples. Rather it is the common human trait of 
focusing exclusively upon those elements of our 
experience which we have been predisposed to recognise as 
manifesting the real, the meaningful, the significant, 
and the powerful: that which Eliade recognises to be the 
sacred.
In fact, the difficulties of points 8 to 11 are 
largely terminological. To say that the sacred/profane 
dichotomy is not all-important, or that people are not 
preoccupied with religion, or that Eliade's treatment of 
myth is inaccurate because exclusively religious, depends 
very much on the prior understanding of the terms
13 cf. his denial in "Notes for a Dialogue" that he 
held the archaic to be exemplary, v.p. 57 above.
14 Patterns . p.47.
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involved. It is quite clear in point 10 that anyone who 
levels such a criticism has simply failed to grasp 
Eliade's use of his terms. He obviously equates 
"tolerating" or "withstanding" the terror of history with 
"escape" from profane time. His critics do not. It must 
be remembered that the iivanmukta does remain in 
historical time, paradoxically transcending it. Escape 
does not imply removal from time but avoidance of the 
causal distress of temporal existence.15 Thus in fact 
"escape" is "coping with" time although this might be 
difficult to appreciate if escape is held to imply 
avoiding dealing with that which one escapes. As Eliade 
repeatedly states, this state is paradoxical, it partakes 
of the exemplary structure of the coincidentia 
oppositorum. it is by escaping time that one deals with 
it.
Similarly, if the inclusive meanings of 
sacred/profane, myth, and religion are grasped, these 
points are not problematic. Since both religion and myth 
lack pre-determined and widely accepted definitions, it 
is part of the task of the religion scholar to establish 
their own. Eliade's definitions, as we have seen, are 
mutually supportive and imply a ubiquity of religious 
orientations. In these terms myth is exclusively 
religious in orientation and the social functions are 
secondary (although not unimportant) to the religious
15 On the paradoxical state of the iivanmukta v. The 
Quest. p.169 and Images and Symbols, p.89.
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orientation of the apprehension of the real in the myth.
However, the 12th point immediately becomes involved
here. Can Eliade simply pass off his interpretative
categories and his implicit definitions despite the
conscious refusal of many of his subjects? Must he not
defer to what religious people themselves say about
themselves? Eliade himself said of Durkheim that he
"would have done better had he taken into account the
work of his ethnological and anthropological
colleagues".16 Brown considers Eliade's own defence
against these pointed questions, and he states the
latter's case for him.
First, he concurs with depth psychology that often 
persons grasp symbolism unconsciously while they are 
simultaneously unaware of it explicitly in the 
conscious mind. This working assumption probably 
accounts for his scant interest in the 
anthropologists' demand that one take as the primary 
control a people's explicit interpretation of its 
own symbols. Second, Eliade asserts that religious 
symbols, even those standing for the most inward 
human experiences, possess "cosmological values" 
which correlate closely with the objective features 
of the natural environment. These environmental 
features are directly accessible to inspection by 
the interpreter and are significantly uniform from 
the experience of one culture to that of another. 
Therefore,the interpreter can turn directly to them 
and not be stymied by an inability to occupy the 
subjective posture of the particular believer, nor 
predisposed to find only isolated and unique 
meanings for particular symbols when several diverse 
cultures are in view. Finally, Eliade believes that 
there is a "spiritual unity" to the human race more 
fundamental than its accidental historical divisions 
and differences. This belief demands that the 
interpreter deliberately stress those elements 
common to separate instances of a particular type of 
symbolism and play down their differences. Even if 
Eliade cannot convince his critics to share them,
16 Images and Symbols, p.23.
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all three of these assumptions in concert show that 
he is well aware of how and why he handles the data 
as he does. (p.436.)
Despite his support in these areas Professor Brown
considers two "systematic issues" as problematic in
understanding Eliade. Firstly, Eliade's anti-
reductionism, the "problematic assumption that
religious phenomena are sui generis and not reducible to
mere natural events", (p.435.) As I have indicated
(especially concerning points 7, 10, 11 above) Brown has
not fully grasped Eliade's theories as coherent. His
understanding of religion as sui generis and of Eliade as
anti-reductionist suffer the same lack of a coherent
interpretation. It is rather the case that "religion" is
not susceptible to one explanation since religion itself
is an attempt to construct a total explanation of the
human encounter with the real.
Secondly Brown considers Dudley's argument that
Eliade's methodology should be reconceived as a research
programme. One of the points which Brown goes on to make
is of interest and can best be made by direct quotation.
If the interpreter should discount completely the 
possibility that the sacred (as an object of belief) 
actually could be a transcendent reality distinct 
from the believer's own consciousness and distinct 
from the natural and social environment itself, then 
his or her naturalistic interpretation would violate 
the integrity of that very human belief which is to 
be understood. The limited extent to which Eliade 
can pass muster as a phenomenologist in any very 
definite philosophical sense appears in this 
determination to honour rather than to dissolve the 
intentional structure of religious consciousness.
But wholesale dissolution is just what the 
reductionistic social scientists demand when they 
insist a priori that the sum and substance of
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religion comprises merely natural events and human 
cultural creativity. For them, one captures the 
true meaning and purpose of each rite and belief by 
giving an account of its purely natural functions in 
the life of the group or the individual. Against 
this naturalistic bias Eliade poses as a defender of 
the sacred as autonomous, as sui generis as 
something which must not be banished by a 
reductionist prestidigitation if one intends to take 
seriously the structure of belief as it is actually 
found in human experience. Because of his 
conviction that the independent reality of the 
sacred should be accepted as a "given", and also 
because he regards the sacred as having specific and 
relatively invariant structures Eliade does not see 
the historian of religions as bound to the narrow 
orthodoxies which constrain empirical social 
scientists. His perspective is broader and 
therefore presumably superior because it does not 
overlook the essence of religion as he thinks theirs 
does. Moreover, he is confident that by examining a 
sufficient number of examples he can get a handle on 
the essential structures of the sacred. All these 
assumptions taken together enable him to feel 
justified in "reading into" certain anthropological 
data more or different symbolic meanings than those 
which the anthropologists themselves find there by 
operating cautiously within narrowly empirical 
criteria, (pp.436-437.)
Firstly I agree wholeheartedly with Brown's analysis of
the value of phenomenology in respect of the intentional
structures of religious consciousness. The contentious
nature of all descriptions, the theory-laden nature of
fact, unavoidably implies the self-assertive nature of
description. Even if one intends no more than a
completely accurate description of a rite or belief then
one's own intentional apprehension of complete accuracy
will condition that description and make its truth
dependent upon the "truth" of that apprehension. For the
believer a description cannot be complete if it omits the
essentially true relation of the creature to the creator,
the fundamental dependence on the real, the conditional
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and imperfect nature of human existence. In order to 
redeem our descriptions there must be a recognition of, a 
willingness to defer to, the intentional structure of 
those beliefs which we would describe. Actually this 
redemptive willingness is present, albeit muted, in the 
social sciences (as Brown describes them) in their desire 
to include "human cultural creativity" along with natural 
events. The recognition of the creativity of humanity, 
in Eliade's archaic terms, our imitation of and 
involvement in the primordial and archetypal creative 
event, the cosmogony, saves both humanity itself and the 
social scientific attempt to comprehend it from a total 
"fall into history". Strict bio-physical determinism 
cannot account for either the human will or the human 
ability to create.17 Creativity itself is a 
participation in Eliade's sacred time, a reactualisation 
of the mythic realities, evincing the structures of the 
emergence of form out of chaos, the re-emergence of life 
from its own dissolution.
However, caution must be exercised in seeing Eliade 
as a "defender of the sacred as autonomous". Brown is 
quite insistent on this phrase, repeating it at intervals 
throughout the remainder of his analysis: "the autonomous 
integrity of the sacred", (p.437) And
Eliade routinely supposes that uniformities in
meaning of separate instances of religious symbolism
derive from the nature of the sacred power
17 not yet, at least. I will consider the 
possibility of such an account later.
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presenting itself through the symbolic objects.
(p.443)
I think it more consonant with Eliade's actual words to 
conclude that what he regards as autonomous and sui 
generis is the existential situation which constitutes 
and conditions the actual perception of this or that 
religious phenomena as real, as sacred.
Brown's mistake is quite apparent if one pays close 
attention to his words. He has himself fallen into the 
trap which he lists as argument lb; he has interpreted an 
interpretation rather than the primary source. It is 
Dudley's insistence on the sacred as autonomous and 
independent which seems to have influenced Brown's 
vocabulary here rather than Eliade's own writing. The 
alternative interpretation, which is closer to the actual 
words of the original scholar, is that the sacred is 
eternal supreme reality and therefore that which 
manifests it or partakes of its structures possesses 
power. (Rather than "the sacred is an eternally real 
power".)
As it is the reality in which we dwell we cannot in 
any way possess the sacred, nor exhaustively describe it. 
Perhaps we could aspire to an exhaustive description of 
present spatio-temporal reality. However, the whole 
point here is that this is not exhaustive of the real; 
there are also subjective and even imaginary realities 
which are of enormous significance, and future realities 
which necessarily surpass our powers to predict because
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the predictive models we can construct cannot bring about
the result any faster than the reality being modelled.
So Brown's question
might not these common features which are purported 
to be manifestations of a supernatural reality, more 
appropriately be attributed to uniformities in the 
biological and psychological constitution of homo 
sapiens as it interacts with relatively constant 
features of natural objects which make up our 
environment, (p.428.)
once again misses the implications here. Those concepts
which are used to represent the real, that which the real
is said to be or thought to be, that which it is believed
to be, are, of course, socially, culturally, and
historically conditioned, including the biology,
psychology, and physics to which Brown would appeal. As
such they are not autonomous, not independent. That is
to say that while the sacred as absolute reality might be
fairly said to be independent, expressions of the sacred
such as "God", "Jahweh", "Brahma", or "scientific fact"
are not. The problem is that "absolute reality" is
itself such an expression and so, in the last analysis,
is not itself autonomous. What is held to be autonomous
and independent is the human experience which constitutes
the perception of the real and the human creativity which
constitutes those expressions of the sacred which are
capable of communicating that reality to others correctly
predisposed to be able to decipher the communication.
Since religion is based on these self-authenticating
perceptions and the total orientation based on them in
turn, religion is sui generis in the sense that any claim
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for the reality of a theory is thus itself religious and 
only the total study of all such self-authenticating 
intuitions of the real (the history of religions) can 
claim to be the unpredisposed interrogation of the real.
The fact that Brown interprets Dudley, and in so 
doing utilises the vocabulary determined by Dudley 
determines his own interpretation.18 Eliade's own 
vocabulary and terminology must be used to understand his 
intentionality. There is an important lesson to be 
learned here about the process of interpretation; one 
must become engaged with the vocabulary of a religion, on 
its own grounds, before one will understand the 
intentionality being represented. Even then one might 
still not share the intuition of the real intended, but 
it is a fundamental assumption of Eliade's analysis that 
it is the real which is intended in any religious 
expression.
This still leaves the problem of differentiating 
possible pseudo-religions. For example, what if L. Ron 
Hubbard, the founder of Scientology, did not himself 
perceive the reality of their main scripture, Dianetics 
as he wrote it? The point is that, whatever he 
perceived, certain of his followers do perceive the real
18 This is not to reject Dudley's important work on 
Eliade. I do not consider it in detail because the issue 
of the ontology and autonomy of the sacred is discussed 
with reference to other scholars. Other differences 
between Dudley's interpretation and mine are not at issue 
here. However, his important question as to the goals of 
"Eliade's Research Program" should be constantly borne in 
mind as my interpretation progresses.
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here and it must be interpreted accordingly. This does 
concur with Eliade's insistence that anything can become 
a hierophany, which itself implies that the real is the 
undifferentiated sum total of all possibility. (So 
Eliade's system is not an "answer" itself but a method of 
allowing other answers to become accessible, meaningful, 
for one's consideration or simply for one's education.)
So Eliade's perception of the historian of religions 
as unconstrained by the narrowness of "orthodoxies which 
constrain empirical social scientists" is rather because 
of the insistence of the latter on a specific and a 
priori limitation of the working concept of the real. Of 
course, in exactly the same way, if historians of 
religions limit their working definition of reality to 
the dogmatic expressions of any one religious tradition, 
they too are narrowly constrained and, in fact, fail to 
be historians of religion so conceived.
In these lights, Brown's question, "does Eliade 
himself believe that the sacred is objectively real?" 
and even the statement of Ricketts that "as to what the 
real 'really' is, Eliade never ventures an answer"19 
reveal a failure to comprehend Eliade's systematic 
thought and its implications. Eliade has made an a 
priori identification of the phenomenally real and the 
transcendent sacred. Obviously he cannot but believe 
then that the sacred is actually real. It is real both
19 op. cit., p.438 and Ricketts, "In Defense of 
Eliade," p.28.
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on the level of the expressions of the sacred which are 
(or have been) apprehensions of the truly real and on the 
level of the final Being which is everything. Only if it 
be denied that humanity has believed in contrasting 
realities and that there is something real can these be 
seen as unwarranted assumptions.
7.2. Barbosa da Silva: the Ontology of the Sacred.
As mentioned in my chapter on "The Sacred" above, 
Antonio Barbosa da Silva analyses Eliade's sacred as a 
phenomenological term, which he further divides into 
"evaluative" and "theological" phenomenological terms, 
and as an ontological term, which he further divides into 
"meta-cosmic" and "transcendental-ontological" senses. 
These senses refer to the sacred as the cosmos as a whole 
and to the sacred as "the ultimate principle (Ur-Datum) 
of Eliade's creative hermeneutics".17 As I have said, I 
am broadly in agreement with da Silva's evaluation of the 
sacred as a phenomenological term, although he does not 
fully clarify what he means by the sacred as a 
"theological" phenomenological term. However, it is his 
analysis of the sacred as an ontological term with which 
I take issue.
Even as "the cosmos as a whole" and the "Ur-datum of 
Eliade's creative hermeneutics" one must question to what 
degree the sacred is given a necessary and independent 
ontology. As the cosmos as a whole it is undoubtedly
17 Barbosa da Silva, A. Phenomenology as a 
Philosophical Problem, 1982, p.175.
true that Eliade regards every minute element of cosmic 
existence as capable of revealing the sacred, as 
sacralisable, as potentially and inherently sacred, and 
thus as "real", simply because it exists. The sacred is 
disclosed in the manifest realm of historical being, in 
the existential world of historical time and physical 
space, which itself is ontological. To this extent it 
unquestionably partakes of the characteristic of being.
Similarly with the sacred as the ur-datum, the 
presuppositional given of Eliade's hermeneutics, this 
notion of the sacred is adjectival rather than 
substantial. It should be remebered that only after 
Durkheim's usage of the term as a noun was commonly 
employed in this way. In Eliade's use it evidently 
refers to a mode of experience, "a structure of the human 
consciousness",18 a relationship with the real, rather 
than the real itself. It is the very fact that the
sacred as the real is perceived in so many modes, and
that we carry our own inner certainty as to what is and
is not "real" that permits, in fact positively
encourages, so many varied interpretations of Eliade's 
thought and generates the almost unavoidable impression 
that he is describing an autonomous, independent 
ontology. However, detailed analysis of Eliade's 
writings without any prior assumption as to the referent 
of the sacred reveals that the sacred does not occur in
18 The Quest, p.i; No Souvenirs, p.l; and The History 
of Religious Ideas, vols. I-III, 1978, vol. 1. p. xiii.
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any context independently of human perception. It is 
always presented as occurring in and through the act of 
its perception. It is always presented as an intentional 
object, without the question of its pure or proper 
intentionality actually being raised.
Again, this is by no means to deny its autonomy, but 
in the familiar Kantian structure of the
noumenal/phenomenal dichotomy, it insists that the sacred 
is accessible only through its manifestations in 
historical forms. The function of the historian of 
religions is presumed to be the study of the historical 
manifestations of the sacred, which exist exclusively 
(for the historian of religions qua historian of 
religions) in those historical manifestations. For the 
committed religious believer the sacred might also be 
held to exist as an element of immediate experience, but 
that experience per se is the object of mystical 
theology. The expression of that experience as a 
historical datum is the proper object of the history of 
religions.
To affirm the independent ontology of the sacred as 
it is described by any individual, group, or tradition as 
a given is to step immediately beyond the bounds of the 
study of religion into the practice of a particular 
religion. And this Eliade does not do. However, the 
temptation to read Eliade as doing precisely that is 
enormous because of the language which he employs, 
identifying the sacred as the real. Yet the fact is that
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he does not seem to conceive of sacrality independent of
the act of its perception, leaving the sacred as a
potential of human experience, possibly an abstract idea,
but one which is nevertheless ubiquitous and unimaginably
significant throughout human history.
Da Silva states that "an important question in this
context is whether [a sacred object] really possesses
some intrinsic properties which constitute a necessary
condition for the sacredness of [that object] or not".
He concludes that this must be the case as far as Eliade
is concerned. He rejects the interpretation that
"'sacred' means the same as that there is a religious
person [who] ... perceives [some object] as sacred",
(p.179.) on the grounds that the necessary condition for
the perception of any object as sacred is that the object
posses some intrinsic property which evokes or causes the
numinous experience. Thus he concludes that
to say that an object is "sacred" means the same as 
that the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
object to manifest the sacred (to cause numinous 
experience) is that the object possess some inherent 
property, in virtue of which it will evoke numinous 
experience when it is contemplated by the religious 
person, (p.180.)
This leads further into the conviction that Eliade
attributes some necessary independence to sacrality as a
manifest property of sacred objects. However, both
interpretations can be reconciled when it is realised
that the only necessary inherent property that an object
must posses in order to be sacralisable is existence, its
own objecthood. "All nature is capable of revealing
itself as cosmic sacrality" for Eliade.19 Further, that
there is no inherent property which is a sufficient
condition to evoke numinous experience to any and all
religious people. I repeat;
awareness of a miracle is only straightforward for 
those who are prepared, by their personal experience 
and their religious background to recognize it as 
such. To others the "miracle" is not evident, it 
does not exist.20
Thus there need be no identifiable "inherent property"
(apart from the fundamental one of existence) in the
sacred object which could be equated with an
ontologically independent sacrality. Thus the rejection
of the former interpretation is not necessitated; the
fact that an object exists and is perceived as sacred is
the necessary and sufficient condition for its sacrality
in Eliade's terms.
However, Eliade never actually stated this, and such
a method of formulating a derived proposition and
attributing it to Eliade can only lead to difficulties of
interpretation. For example, da Silva directly
attributes to Eliade the equation of archaic, "primitive"
man with homo reliqiosus. (p.183.) Eliade never makes
that statement per se and to limit his understanding of
the religious person to archaic man is another unfounded
supposition, undermined by Eliade's insistence that there
is no solution of continuity between modern man and
19 The Sacred and the Profane, p.12.
20 Mademoiselle Christina, from the French 
introduction of 1978, p.7. My translation.
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primitive man, and that modern man "has not yet succeeded 
in abolishing the homo reliqiosus that is in him". 21 
Eliade's fundamental point is that the perception of the 
sacred qua the real (and the real qua the sacred) is the 
primary characteristic of homo reliqiosus, humanity in 
the religious mode. Thus da Silva's apprehension of 
Eliade as contrasting modern with archaic humanity is 
also inaccurate. Eliade is comparing rather than 
contrasting. Archaic man reveals more clearly than does 
modern man the mechanisms whereby the apprehension of the 
sacred gives value to the elements of mundane existence. 
This is not to say that herein lies the difference, the 
characteristic separation of archaic from modern, but 
that here is a concealed similarity, a continuity in all 
of humanity.
Of course this does, as da Silva recognises, leave
the problem of
how to prove that the numinous experience is not an 
exclusive product of man's mind. If it is so, and 
if it has only a purely intended object, it can be 
regarded as a merely subjective experience, (p.182.)
I would suggest that the lack of "proof" of the
independent existence of the sacred as the source of
numinous experience is firstly itself characteristic of
Eliade's self-imposed restriction to the history of
religions as eschewing personal theological statements.
It is thus evidence that Eliade does not insist on the
sacred as a specific autonomous ontological entity,
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although his methodical openness to that possibility 
permits the alternative interpretation. Secondly this 
lack of proof is completely consistent with his 
morphology of religious history in which the sacred can 
only be manifest in historical actualities. Since it 
cannot otherwise be manifest, that is it cannot otherwise 
be experienced, it is not susceptible of proof either 
logically or empirically. The direct experience of 
believers is not itself communicable, and their 
subsequent expressions are always and necessarily 
historical and conditioned and thus proof of nothing but 
an experience whose intentionality cannot be established 
unless it be shared.22
Da Silva has already accepted that
whether it [religious experience of the Divine Being 
as meta-cosmic reality] has a proper intentional 
object is a very controversial question into which 
we cannot go here. (p.70.)
He has made precisely the same evasion of the theological
problem of the pure or proper intentionality of numinous
experience as I insist that Eliade does. Yet he accuses
Eliade both of assuming the proper intentionality of the
sacred and of failing to provide any proof for this
assumption. My point is that Eliade does not provide any
proof for this assumption because he does not make it.
In this same context I would point out that da Silva's
22 This lack of susceptibility to empirical proof 
leads to the criticism that religion finally lacks a 
proper object. This is further discussed in 7.5 below 
pp.279-294.
application of the subject/object dichotomy, especially 
his reduction to "merely subjective experience", (my 
emphasis) does not accurately reflect Eliade's thought.
I hope to make my case elsewhere that Eliade make some 
moves towards transcending this occasionally unhelpful 
polarity, and would recognise nothing mere about 
subjective experience.
It is notable that da Silva has to introduce 
difficult qualifications into his use of the word 
ontology, such as the concept of "ontological objectivity 
in a non-empirical sense", (p.23.) He has also said that 
he will use the word in the strict sense of Husserl's 
material as opposed to formal ontology23 and he describes 
these categories as ontological and phenomenal 
objectivity respectively. Thus it is something of a 
contradiction to speak of non-empirical ontology rather 
than utilising Husserl's formal ontology or his own term 
of phenomenal objectivity. In these terms Eliade's 
sacred would be a phenomenal object or formally rather 
than materially ontological. This is characteristic of 
the lengths to which one must go when one seeks to 
ascribe independent ontology to the sacred as it is 
conceived here.
The ontological senses of the sacred have become so 
qualified as to be of questionable validity. However, it 
cannot be proven to have properly intentional status and
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evidently does not partake of material ontology in the 
Husserlian sense. Those senses in which the sacred can 
be said to be ontological "can be used in a purely 
phenomenological description, provided such a description 
makes clear whose intention they express, i.e. that of 
the scholar or that of the believer", (da Silva,p.185.)
In what way, then, does it differ from the phenomenal 
sense of the term? It is a major feature of Eliade's 
writings that he never clearly expresses his own 
religious intention in this sense. His expressions are 
always on behalf of the believer. It must be allowed 
that he often does not make perfectly clear his 
appropriation of the intentional language of the believer 
in his attempt to reveal the truth or the "deep meaning" 
of the belief. Yet it is quite evident that Eliade 
cannot personally hold all the beliefs which he expresses 
and later critics have been all too ready to give 
quotations out of context and omit qualifying phrases 
such as "it might be said that", and "for the 
Christian..." thus giving the false impression of 
personal support for the statements which follow. This 
is especially true of the passage in Patterns relating to 
the Christian Incarnation as the supreme hierophany which 
"could be said to be" prefigured and thus predicted by 
all earlier examples of the hierophany of the sacred in 
the profane.24
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7.3 Douglas Allen: Eliade's Ontological Assumptions.
This will be a necessarily limited treatment of
Douglas Allen's excellent book on Eliade, which cannot
hope to substitute for the reading of that work. My
intention is to isolate and assess the most crucial
central criticism of the thought of Mircea Eliade and
determine whether it can be answered from within that
thought as I have perceived it to be.
The fundamental criticism put forward in Allen's
Structure and Creativity is that
Eliade's more-than-historical-explanation claim 
involves ontological judgements about the nature of 
the human being and experience, (p.178.)
The "non-historical" elements in Eliade's writings are
considered to be finally unwarranted ontological
"universals". For example in his essay on "Recent Works
on Shamanism", Eliade stated that
as an experience, ecstasy is a non-historical 
phenomenon; it is a primordial phenomenon in that it 
is co-extensive with human nature, (p.154.)
Allen's suspicion of unwarranted ontological assumption
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is supported by two related criticisms:
1. if Eliade insists that he has inductively 
generalised from the particular religious facts to 
his universal religious structures, then the 
aforementioned criticisms of his methodology seem 
justified. [i.e.,that he makes hasty and uncritical 
generalisation and "reads into" the data meanings 
not actually present] (p.196.)
Secondly,
2. one may notice a certain ambiguity throughout 
Eliade's phenomenological analysis of what is 
revealed in religious experience. On the one hand 
Eliade usually interprets the revelatory experience 
by emphasising a fundamental "givenness" in 
experience and a definite passivity on the part of 
homo reliqiosus. ...
On the other hand, Eliade sometimes analyses 
the revelatory experience by emphasising a sense of 
activity and creativity on the part of homo 
reliqiosus. (p.181.)
That is to say that, if Eliade claims that he has
logically induced the existence of universal entities,
and that these universal entities are autonomous of
humanity, capable of imposing their perceptions on a
receptive and essentially passive observer, then he has
thus made assumptions which are ontological and
unwarranted by the available data, which would
take[s] him far beyond the descriptive and 
involvefs] highly normative judgements based on an 
assumed ontological position, (p.160.)
In order to understand this criticism it is
advisable to consider Allen's approach to Eliade as a
whole. Douglas Allen was broadly favourable to Eliade:
my position is that if Mircea Eliade, who is 
considered the foremost contemporary phenomenologist 
of religion, represents a methodological improvement 
over previous approaches, this is because of an 
impressive hermeneutical framework which serves as 
the foundation for his phenomenological approach to 
religious phenomena. (Author's Preface, p.xi.)
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Thus it would seem that Allen's desire to ally Eliade
with the phenomenological cause was essentially
benevolent towards the older scholar. However, the whole
question of whether or not Eliade actually was a
"phenomenologist" is problematic, as Allen is well aware.
Neither Eliade nor his interpreters usually identify 
his approach with phenomenology. We are aware of no 
interpreter who has shown a relationship between 
Eliade's methodology and philosophical 
phenomenology, (p. 108.)25
However, Allen received Eliade's approval, as Eliade's
foreword to this work clearly shows. Eliade doubtless
concurred with Allen that the phenomenology of religion
was more rationally respectable than the theological
approach which Kenneth Hamilton had detected in Eliade's
work and especially more so than the "mystical" approach
which T. J. J. Altizer had found there.26
However, neither of them could, at that stage, have
been aware of the full implications of the attempt to
assimilate Eliade to phenomenology. He is evidently not
a phenomenologist in any strict sense of the word. He is
not a follower of Husserl, and while influenced by the
leading phenomenologists of religion, Otto, van der
Leeuw, and Wach, he does not deliberately pursue any line
25 Here Allen rather surprisingly neglects Baird's 
chapter "Phenomenological Understanding: Mircea Eliade," 
published in his Category Formation and the History of 
Religions in 1971, one year before Allen's first article 
was published, and in the same Religion and Reason series 
as published Allen's book seven years later. Allen does 
mention this later, p.176, n.5, p.230, n.31.
26 V. Allen p.129 and my bibliography.
of research instituted by these scholars. Nor is 
Eliade's vocabulary indicative of the characteristic foci 
of phenomenology, epoche, for example, or eidetic vision. 
Although he does repeatedly express the opinion that the 
student of religious phenomena is interested in 
deciphering the meanings of religious phenomena, this is 
always done to emphasise the goal of meaning rather than 
any specific method of phenomenology. Eliade several 
times emphasises this goal of meaning without reference 
to the method of phenomenology.27 That Eliade had 
initial reservations about the phenomenological approach 
is indicated by his approving citation in 1955 of 
Raffaele Pettazzoni as revealing that "the only way to 
escape the dangers" of a phenomenological interpretation 
"consists of constantly referring to history".28
In fact, it would seem that the attraction of 
"phenomenology" for the scholar of religion resides 
almost exclusively in the emphasis which the term places 
upon the object of study as actual, extant phenomena of 
the external world as opposed to purely internal states 
or beliefs. Eliade's position as a phenomenologist 
consists almost entirely in the fact that he insists that 
our interpretations of religious data must be based on 
the data, on actual historical sources, i.e. from the 
phenomena of religion. The stress placed upon the
27 egs. Australian Religions., pp.xvi, 200; "The 
Sacred in the Secular World," pp.lOlff.
28 "Mythology and the History of Religions," p.100.
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intentional structures of the religious consciousness is 
also an important area of common ground, (v.p.240 above) 
Both can be seen to be drawn as much from Eliade's 
deliberations concerning the Trairist movement in inter­
war Romania, and from his own personal philosophy, as 
from any influence by Husserlian or any other kind of 
philosophical phenomenology.29
This is not to reject Allen's careful analysis of 
the similarities between Eliade's methodology, or his 
hermeneutical framework, and phenomenology, but it is to 
warn against the procrustean fitting of the former to the 
latter. For example, although there is a movement from 
the individual to the universal in both it should not 
then be simplistically assumed that the meaning of a 
religious phenomenon for Eliade is the same as the 
essence of the phenomenon for the philosophical 
phenomenologist.
Eliade has said that religion "does not necessarily 
imply belief in God, gods, or ghosts, but refers to the 
experience of the sacred".30 Allen has gone on to 
inquire as to what precisely the sacred is, 
phenomenologically speaking. He then draws his 
understanding of this element of Eliade's thought, not 
wholly from Eliade's writings, but in part from 
phenomenologists of religion who are held a priori to
29 v. above pp.19-21 and n.ll, also Ricketts,
Romanian Roots. pp.96-98.
30 Preface to The Quest, p.i.
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have ideas in common with Eliade. The sacred may be 
described as a "Power", (van der Leeuw), as "wholly 
other", (Otto), as "ultimate reality", (Wach). (pp.l20f.)
Allen recognises Eliade's usage of a wide variety of 
terms related to the sacred, such as "absolute reality, 
being, eternity, divine, and also metacultural, 
transhistorical, transhuman, transmundane, and the source 
of all life and fecundity".31 He concludes that "Eliade 
seems to be indicating that religion always entails some 
aspect of transcendence". (p.121.) This may in fact be
correct, the second group of terms do indicate 
transcendence, but transcendence of specific, known 
"modes of being;" the cultural, the historical, the 
human, and the mundane. This is no way necessarily 
involves an ontological transcendent: the transcendent, 
which goes beyond everything and thus has independent, 
unconditioned existence. While it does not exclude such 
a possibility, it does not posit it as a necessary 
assumption.32 In fact, the even simpler interpretation 
is to assume that by transhistorical Eliade meant "not 
subject to historical dissemination"; by transhuman, 
"common to the human condition"; and by transmundane, 
"ubiquitous".
31 v. Allen, p.121, and eg. Rites and Symbols, p.130, 
Yoga, p.165, The Sacred and the Profane, p.28.
32 In fact, that Jay Kim can infer from Eliade's 
understanding of hierophanies that we can only conceive 
of transcendence because the sky is there (p.25 above), 
militates towards a dependent, conceptual transcendence.
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In terms of such an interpretation, it is no real 
criticism to comment that "Eliade intends this sense of 
transcendence to be viewed as a universal structure of 
religion", (p.121.) The concept of exceeding the merely 
historical, the mundane, and the biologically human is, 
by definition, universal in Eliade's understanding of 
religion. In order to challenge such a contention, one 
would need to adduce some religious phenomena which had 
no conceivable reference to the transcendence of human 
and temporal limitations or conditions, and successfully 
defend its status as religious.
Allen recognises that "Eliade must not be confused 
with the numerous scholars who hold metaphysical 
positions concerning transcendence". (p.122.) For 
example, Eliade is distinguished from C. J. Bleeker who 
held that "the value of the religious phenomena can be 
understood only if we keep in mind that religion is 
ultimately a realisation of a transcendent truth".33 
Eliade put his name to a document, the so-called "Marburg 
platform" drafted by Zwi Werblowski, which includes a 
positive and direct refutation of Bleeker's statement as 
"outside the terms of reference of 
Reliqionswis sense haft".34
33 "The Future Task of the History of Religions," 
p.227. Quoted by Allen, p.122.
34 Numen 7 (1960), p.237, v. ibid., pp.215-240 for a 
discussion of the platform taken by certain scholars at 
the 10th International Congress of the International 
Association for the History of Religions in Marburg, 
September 11-17, 1960.
Although he is aware of the possibility of "a purely 
descriptive and secular sense of transcendence", (p.121.) 
without actual textual support, Allen insists on a 
differentiated "religious" sense of transcendence. "What 
differentiates the religious sense of transcendence is 
its special normative basis for homo reliqiosus." (ibid.) 
What Allen seems to have done is to have constructed a 
possible descriptive characteristic of the sacred - its 
"special normative basis for homo reliqiosus", but then 
to introduce another term, "transcendence", (not actually 
employed by Eliade who talked of transhistorical, 
transhuman, as we have seen), under the influence of the 
"other" phenomenologists of religion. In so doing Allen 
destroys his own interpretation of Eliade as a 
phenomenologist by insisting upon a necessarily abstract 
and thus non-phenomenal category, the transcendent, as a 
universal structure of religion. Eliade himself does not 
appear to do so in his writings. For example, that the 
sky gods, whose primary characteristic is transcendence, 
tend to become dei otiosi rather undermines this emphasis 
on transcendence.
It must be granted that the section which Allen 
quotes from The Sacred and the Profane (pp.202ff., Allen, 
p.122.) does define and differentiate religious and non­
religious humanity in terms of transcendence: "homo 
reliaiosus always believes that there is an absolute 
reality, the sacred, which transcends this world but 
manifests in this world, thereby sanctifying it", and
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"non-religious man refuses transcendence, ... In other 
words, he accepts no model for humanity outside the human 
condition". However, it can be seen that the 
"transcendence" involved is the relatively simple 
transcendence of actual, determined, conditioned human 
existence by some exemplary model. Once again, this does 
not imply any independently ontological transcendent 
entity; any fictional hero can fulfil these requirements.
Furthermore, as I pointed out above (p.86 and ch.5, 
§.2.) the most fundamental distinction applied by Eliade 
throughout The Sacred and the Profane is actually that of 
the homogeneity and the heterogeneity of time, a 
distinction which Allen almost totally ignores. As the 
most basic of handbooks on the social construction of 
ideas or of reality will immediately inform the reader, 
time is one of the categories most susceptible to the 
active construction of human conceptualisation.35 In 
emphasising this distinction as fundamental to religious 
humanity Eliade answers Allen's debate over the 
"givenness" of the hierophany or the "creativity" of the 
believer (pp.181-190.) quite positively on the side of 
creativity. It must be concluded that Allen's insistence 
on Eliade as a phenomenologist has resulted in his over­
emphasis on the ontology of the transcendent and a 
concomitant de-emphasis on the active role of humanity in 
our religious aspect in constituting the hierophany.
35 v. eg. The Sociology of Knowledge. David Glover 
and Sheelagh Strawbridge, pp.2-7.
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However, Allen's conclusion is none the less
problematic. It is that Eliade
is making general judgments about the human mode of 
being in the world and the human condition as such; 
and on the basis of such judgments, he is claiming 
that the "historicistic philosophies" of Hegel,
Marx, Dilthey, and others cannot defend the modern 
Western human being from the terror of history.
Now such a procedure clearly involves an 
ontological stance. On what basis can Mircea Eliade 
proceed beyond his perspectival limitations? Isn't 
he guilty of the same reductionism he attacked ...? 
It would appear that Eliade assumes that the 
structures of religious experience ... reveal 
fundamental structures of the human mode of being 
generally, (p.236.)
Allen's own defence against these troubling questions is
that "such an ontological move is founded on and informed
by the primary symbolic structures", (p.237, italics
original.) That is to say that
symbols serve as "ciphers" of reality. We can 
decipher the meanings of such ciphers in an infinite 
variety of ways and on many planes of 
interpretation, (p.238.)
However, he has to continue that
Mircea Eliade, on his levels of greatest 
generalisation, is involved in a reductionist 
analysis, which, if he upholds his previously 
elucidated methodological principles, probably 
pushes his phenomenology of religion beyond the 
proper domain of the History of Religions, (p.242.)
While I am immediately suspicious of any statements
about the "proper domain" of the study of religion,
because such statements frequently conceal uncritical a
priori judgements, and while I maintain that Eliade is a
phenomenologist in only the loosest sense of the word, it
must be recognised that Allen has uncovered a real
difficulty here. There is an inescapable circularity to
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the fact that Eliade has moved from the "primary symbolic
structures" to conclusions about the real nature of human
existence and the actual existential condition of
humanity. According to Eliade's own thought (or rather,
my exposition of it so far), the symbols of flight, of
the moon, of the lost paradise, actually constitute
hierophanies for Eliade. That is to say they are
apprehended by him as self-authenticating revelations of
the real. To refer to analogies I have used elsewhere,
he claims to "get the joke" or to understand the language
of symbolism. But how can this be verified?
Ultimately I cannot imagine how such a claim can be
liable to rational verification. However, it is
indicative of Eliade's success that he identifies the
real as the source of meaning and meaning as the
significant ordering of elements within a cosmos. I
believe that Eliade would agree with Charles Long's
assessment of revelation as an "ordering principle".
Man's world is an ordered world of meaning, but the 
organising principle is interpreted as a revelation 
which comes from a source outside his ordinary life. 
It is the source which is given (revealed) and [itl 
defines any future possibility of man's existence.
Thus, the fact that that which Eliade has apprehended as
the real has allowed him to order a massive amount of
data into a coherent oeuvre militates towards the
recognition of the truth of his vision. Of course, I am
aware of the circularity of this defense; if Eliade's
36 Alpha: the Myths of Creation. N.Y.: George 
Brazilier Inc., 1963, plO-11. Quoted by Allen, p.128.
oeuvre be initially apprehended as incoherent, then he 
must have failed to have perceived the real in what he 
apprehended as hierophanies and his whole structure 
topples. To put it bluntly; just because he wrote a lot 
about a lot doesn't make him right. However, I hope I 
have allayed a certain amount of the suspicion often felt 
against such circularity of argument in my discussion.37
In conclusion of this specific section I can only 
say that if the final ontological status of the sacred be 
held in abeyance as a problem for theology or the 
philosophy of religions, then those ontological claims 
which Eliade does undoubtedly make do not seem excessive. 
It is a necessary concomitant of this refusal of the 
indubitable autonomous ontology of the transcendent as it 
is apprehended by an individual or group, that the 
active, creative role of humanity in the apprehension of 
reality will be increasingly emphasised.
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37 v. eg. pp. 127, 202, 206, 373, 397f.
7.4. Robert Baird. Normative Elements.
Robert Baird's chapter on "The Category of 
Understanding" in his book entitled, Category Formation 
and the History of Religions, includes a section on 
"Phenomenological Understanding: Mircea Eliade". This 
section is well worth reading in its own right and 
explains Eliade's understanding of symbols, myths, and 
rites well, up to a certain point. However, Baird has 
failed fully to appreciate Eliade's meanings, as we shall 
see.
His major criticism of Eliade is that not only does 
he make an unwarranted assumption of the ontology of the 
sacred as da Silva and Allen have both claimed, but that 
this leads him to "normative" statements which are 
unsupportable and unacceptable in a supposedly unbiased 
academic study. Firstly, Eliade "proceeds under the 
essential-intuitional approach", (p.74.) That is to say 
he employs
a method in which the historian of religions does
not recognise a need to begin his work with a
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definition of "religion", thereby marking the limits 
and extent of his study. This method assumes that 
we all know what is meant by the word, and that, 
given room for accidental differences, "religion" is 
essentially unambiguous. This introduces the other 
aspect of this method: essentialism or realism. It 
means (by implication and by method) that religion 
is something out there whose "essence" can be 
apprehended by the historian of religions, (p.2.)
Eliade proceeds to accord ontological status to religion
and to the sacred without clear definition. His
assertions concerning the structures formed by symbols
are
based on an implied ontology which is nowhere 
philosophically defended. This ontological stance 
is most apparent when clear hierophanies are used to 
clarify the intention of obscure "hierophanies".
Such a hermeneutic is possible only if one assumes 
not only that the sacred has ontological status, but 
also that its structures (and hence the system of 
symbolism) also have ontological status, (p.77.)
The final flaw in Eliade's analysis comes, as Baird sees
when it is suggested that modern man is poorer 
because his cosmos has been desacralised, because 
the human body or the process of eating is no longer 
a sacrament, a shift has been effected - a shift 
made possible only because an ontological basis has 
already been posited. If not before, then at least 
here it is clear that Eliade is not dealing with 
what men have held to be sacred, but with the 
structures of the sacred. His focal point is not 
only the subjective, but also the objective and 
hence ontological. Not only are the hierophanies 
which he describes hierophanies for those involved, 
but they are in fact hierophanies. One would 
normally expect further argumentation when a shift 
is made from the apparently descriptive to the 
normative. Here, however, an ontology has been 
posited from the start, (p.87.)
Here Eliade has moved, provoked by his assumption of the
real ontology of the sacred and of those symbolic
structures which reveal that reality, to an assumption
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that "archaic man is the most authentic", and thus
provides the norm of human behaviour. He has moved from
a description and analysis of historico-religious
phenomena to a stance on how things ought to be and to an
attempt to influence the behaviour of his readers. This
is not only unacceptable for a detached scholar, but
as with all normative understanding, if the norm 
proves erroneous, one no longer has understanding at 
all, but rather misunderstanding. Hence if the 
universal structures on which Eliade bases his 
understanding of the religious data should turn out 
to be non-existent, then his approach would result 
in misunderstanding as well. (p.91.)
This apparently strong argument, however, proves
specious on close inspection. Firstly, as I argued above
in connection with Barbosa da Silva's apprehension of
archaic man as fundamentally differentiated from modern
man, this is simply not the case. Homo reliqiosus
represents humanity in its religious aspect and is the
connecting, and not the differentiating characteristic
between modern and archaic man. So archaic man is
certainly not seen as the "norm", although there is a
sound reason in the structured thought of Mircea Eliade
for suggesting that the traditional and archaic is more
authentic, as we shall see.
Secondly, the suggestion that modern man is the
poorer for the desacralisation of his cosmos, which
Eliade certainly does make, is not a value judgement
based on the assumed ontology of the sacred. Rather it
is a lamentation for the confusion of sacred and profane,
for the concealment of the sacred within the profane, and
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at the very least, for the concomitant lack of self-
awareness. As Douglas Allen puts it, Eliade
maintains that our limiting views of the human mode 
of being in the world and the human condition have 
not allowed us to understand our own behaviour.
This has led to self-deception and impoverished 
sensitivity and creativity.37
This may be compared to what Gadamer calls "the tyranny 
of hidden prejudice".38 In the identification of the 
sacred and the profane modern man has lost the capacity 
to recognise clearly the different levels of significance 
involved, and the processes whereby they are 
differentiated. Eliade's focal point can still be the 
subjective; it is a personal impoverishment by a 
subjective lack of understanding which he is bemoaning.
Thirdly, the hierophanies which he describes he 
quite positively states, do not exist for those who are 
not prepared to recognise them.39 Again there is no 
shift from the descriptive to the normative, apart from 
the fact that all descriptions are persuasive and theory­
laden as I have said, and thus all description assumes a 
normative base in one's ability to talk about reality at 
all.
Fourthly there is no necessary assumption of an 
independent ontology as I have consistently argued. Once 
again Eliade is opened up to the superficially accurate
37 Structure and Creativity, p . 244 .
38 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 27 0.
39 Eg. the quotation from the introduction to 
Mistress Christina given above p.210.
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criticism that he fails to support an assumption, when he
has not in fact made such an assumption. It should be
borne in mind that, while Eliade can be accurately-
described as insisting that hierophanies are not only
hierophanies for the believer but are in fact revelations
of the real, behind his assertion is the structure which
insists that everything could be a hierophany. Any
object which exists, any event which occurs could be an
hierophany. Everything which is, reveals the true nature
of being because it is. Of course, the true nature of
being is only partially revealed in each event or object,
it is simultaneously partially occluded. This is
precisely Eliade's understanding of the dialectic of
hierophany. It is based on no more of an ontological
assumption than that something exists, that the world we
inhabit is real. Only if he were to deny the validity of
such an assertion could Baird finally maintain his claim
that Eliade's posited ontology is unacceptable.
However, the question remains as to the "normative"
nature of Eliade's judgements as to the benefits or
detriments of the recognition or refusal of specific
hierophanies as being revelatory of the true nature of
the human mode of being. As Baird says,
once one sees "the sacred" or "religion" as an 
ontological reality and once one operates as though 
its structures are also ontologically real, having 
identified these structures one has discovered 
reality. It then follows that those whose lives are 
lived in the sacred as completely as possible are 
the most authentic since they exist closest to 
reality, (p.87.)
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This is a remarkable example of Eliade's concept that one 
need not understand the meaning of a revelation to 
communicate it, that meaning can be independent of 
authorial intention. From the context it is not 
unreasonable to assume that Baird intends this statement 
as a refutation of Eliade's ideas. He intends to reveal 
the unwarranted arrogance of the "normative" stance which 
insists that religious believers are in some wise 
superior to their fellow, but secular, humanity.
However, Baird has not fully understood the meanings of 
Eliade's thought and so is unaware of the implications of 
his own statement. It is true that, according to 
Eliade's definitions, "those whose lives are lived in the 
sacred as completely as possible are the most authentic 
since they exist closest to reality". But, in order to 
be consonant with those definitions, this should be 
interpreted as follows: Once one recognises the reality 
of the sacred for the believer and once one has 
identified the structures which transmit and maintain 
that specific apprehension (this sacred = the real) then 
one has discovered a fact of human existence. It then 
follows that those who recognise the structures which 
identify the real in their own lives have the most 
authentic existence since they exist in the awareness of 
the facts, i. e., more completely in the real, the 
sacred. It is the mistaken apprehension of an 
ontological distinction between religious and "non­
religious" humanity which implies a normative judgement.
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Eliade is not insisting that humanity should be 
religious. He is pointing out that, in truth, we are 
religious.
To live one's life as fully as possible in the 
sacred is then to be aware of the sources of one's own 
apprehensions of the real, of one's own hierophanies, 
one's own religion.
In the end Baird's striking and often repeated 
accusation that Eliade "assumed that there is something 
out there that corresponds to the term 'religion' or 'the 
sacred,' and also that the historian of religion can 
identify it intuitively" (p.74.) can be seen to be a 
procedural assumption of his own analysis. It relies 
entirely on the assumption that Eliade proceeds under the 
essential-intuitional approach described above, in other 
words that he does not attempt to define religion or the 
sacred. Baird's reasoning is in fact tautological, 
viciously circular. Eliade is accused of presuming the 
ontology of the sacred because he must assume that he can 
intuit its essence because he uses the essential- 
intuitional approach, which is to say that he gives no 
definition of his object, because he assumes its prior 
ontology. It could equally be argued that Eliade does 
not need to presume the independent ontology of the 
sacred because he assumes that the word religion, and 
also the word sacred, has a meaning and can thus be used 
meaningfully whether its referent is autonomous or not, 
and that its meaning will be revealed through its use.
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However, such tautological argument as this is 
convincing only to people with a predisposition to be 
convinced by it. I would argue that it is Baird's 
predisposition to refuse to recognise the definitions 
given throughout Eliade's writings which is most clearly 
revealed here.
Baird accepts that Eliade's goal is the 
understanding of homo religiosus, but he sees that 
category "not as an historical but an archetypal 
religious man", of whom "no one person is the complete 
embodiment" but "archaic man comes closest to this model 
of authentic existence", (p.86.) Thus Baird's 
predisposition to recognise a radical distinction between 
religious and non-religious man has prepared the ground 
for his major argument that Eliade assumes archaic 
humanity to be the norm of human existence; the way we 
ought to be. It is indicative that Baird uses language 
like "modern man has been guilty of desacralising the 
universe and is reaping the just deserts", (p.77.) which 
Eliade nowhere employs, when the context suggests that 
Baird is simply paraphrasing Eliade.
Rather it is the case that Eliade's history of 
religions indicates that there are structures which 
dictate or determine the immediate apprehension of a 
given experience as "real" or "unreal". These 
structurally determined apprehensions condition human 
activity. To insist that our particular apprehensions of 
reality, conditioned as they are by structures of meaning
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or significance, are reality is simplistically to deny 
the relevance of the data of the history of religions. 
Also it is to conceal or reduce the reverence properly 
felt for the revelatory sources of the real. One final 
outcome of this is that we could not possibly hope to 
appreciate the significance of the ritual-mythical- 
symbolic elements of religions other than our own as 
hierophanies, that is to say, as actual perceptions of 
significance greater than the mere significance of random 
or accidental phenomena.
The affirmation or denial of the ontological reality 
of the sacred as expressed in a specific religious 
tradition is actually irrelevant to the study of 
religions. As an expression the ontology is open to 
verification. (Or falsification, if it be preferred.)
For example, that some people have considered a black­
skinned, voluptuous female with bloodied lips, decorated 
with a garland of dead infants and human heads to be the 
highest expression of divinity, the one most worthy of 
worship, can be factually verified. Once verified, its 
ontology as an expression of the real is no longer open 
to doubt. This expression is seen as exemplary, 
determinative of the behaviour of some people.
Obviously, it is no simple imitatio dei which is implied 
here. The believer does not attempt to simply and 
directly emulate the figure which expresses the nature of 
the real, (there are intermediate religious figures which 
court direct imitation). However, having conceived of
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the great goddess in this form one acts accordingly; as 
if life were ultimately benevolent and desirable, but 
also ultimately intimidating, capable of terrible 
violence, especially when set on the path of violence by 
conflicting forces.40 Thus the hierophany has ontology 
as an hierophany, and it has effect as exemplary, but at 
no point is it necessary to debate the independent 
ontological existence of the sacred behind the 
hierophany. In fact it could be argued that such a 
debate is not only irresolvable, but is finally 
impossible, since it is only the expressions of the 
sacred, of the real, which can be brought under scrutiny, 
never the sacred itself.
40 cf. my article, "Kali: the Terrible Goddess of 
Hindu Tantra." Journal of Religious Studies of the 
University of Patiala, 42 no.2 (1989):27-34.
7.5 Hans Penner: Symbolism Without an Object.
Hans Penner's critique of Eliade's understanding of
symbols was published in German in 1967 in the journal
Antaios under the title "Bedeutung und Probleme der
Religiösen Symbolik bei Tillich und Eliade".41 Although
it was originally written in English I have worked from
the German. I am sure that Bridgitte Weitbrecht's
translation is quite adequate and so any weaknesses in
the re-translation are my own.
To follow Penner's example and plunge directly into
the substance of his critique, it is this:
both [Tillich's and Eliade's] opinions have the same 
problem based on the so-called monopolar fallacy 
(monopolaren Trugschluß) which leads to a 
pansymbolism without a proper object (Bezugsobjekt), 
in short, it is the problem of a phenomenology of 
religion without a defined (beschribendes) object, 
for the object is, and remains, "wholly other".
(p.127.)
This concept of the monopolar fallacy is derived from the 
introduction to Philosophers Speak of God, by Charles 
Hartshorne and Willian Reese, pp.1-25, where it is most 
commonly referred to as the monopolar prejudice. 
Hartshorne describes a "crude and one-sided" tendency in 
the history of the philosophy of religion which consists 
of
taking each pair of ultimate contraries, such as one 
and many, permanence and change, being and becoming, 
necessity and contingency, the self-sufficient or 
non-relative versus the dependent or relative, the
41 Antaios 9 ( 1967 ): 127-143 .
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actual versus the potential, one decides in each 
case which member of the pair is good or admirable 
and then attributes it ... to deity, (pp.If.)
Thus one makes
the assumption that the highest form of reality is 
to be indicated by separating or purifying one pole 
of the ultimate contrasts from the other pole. ... 
This may be called the "monopolar" conception of 
deity - and the principle involved, that of 
"monopolarity", (p.2.)
The preceding inspection of Eliade's interest in the
coincidentia oppositorum should suffice to give the
reader confidence that this is not a crudity that can be
attributed to Eliade. In fact, Eliade's notion of the
sacred as that in which all attributes coincide and in
which all distinctions are surpassed clearly concurs with
Hartshorne's recommendation that "we must equally affirm
both poles of each pair of ultimate contraries", (p.4.)
and resembles what the latter calls the "theory of
dipolarity" much more closely than the monopolar
prejudice. However, it would not be prudent to sweep
aside Hans Penner's objection in this way. He has
obviously seen some one-sidedness in Eliade's position
which needs careful consideration.
After boldly stating his conclusions on his first
page, Penner goes on to outline Tillich's understanding
of symbols as follows;
1. they have a pictorial quality (Bildqualitat) in 
so far as their deeper meaning is always contained 
in them, so they are always self-evident. They give 
access to a level of reality not accessible to the 
empirical, conceivable world.
2. they are graphic rather than sensible, 
confrontational, or notional structures of meaning.
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3. they have inherent significance which is neither 
arbitrarily based nor accidentally arrived at; they 
are not liable to the characteristic arbitrariness 
of signs.
5. they make clear that which notional, sensible, 
and manifest reality leaves implicit, they represent 
or are transparent to the final essential ground of 
Being itself.42
Tillich's analysis does have certain points in
common with Eliade's, particulary the first, but also
considerable differences. For example, Eliade avoids the
problematic claim of transparency which leads Penner to
point out that, according to Tillich,
all religious expressions for the "unconditioned 
transcendent" or Being-in-itself are transparent. 
There are no religious phenomena which are not 
symbolic in this way, so it is only while some 
non-figurative expression of their proper object is 
possible that god is Being-in-itself.
Penner concludes specifically of Tillich's analysis that
"God exists only as a symbol"; God is not Being-in-itself
because that would be a non-figurative expression, while
it is agreed that all statements about God are, in fact,
symbolic. Of both Tillich and Eliade, he later says,
the monopolar emphasis leads in Tillich and in 
Eliade to a limitation to experience. This one- 
sidedly stressed dualism levels the way for 
pansymbolism which excludes nonsymbolic description 
of the proper object of the symbol.43
After his treatment of Tillich, Penner goes on to
outline Eliade's description of religious symbols from
"Methodological Remarks". Since that outline is given
42 Abstracted from Penner, p.128, and in turn from
various works of Tillich, v. Penner, op. cit., p.142 n.2.
43 ibid., pp. 129, 130, 142.
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above in greater detail I will not reproduce it here.
(pp.93f.) Penner, however, includes an ongoing critique.
In connection with Eliade's first contention (religious
symbols are capable of revealing a modality of the real
not evident on the level of immediate experience),
Penner points out that
the statement that symbolic significance precedes 
reflection implies that the rational process itself 
presumes a symbolic meaning. In other words 
conscious reflection is supported on a symbolic 
foundation which contributes to an understanding of 
reality and promotes an orientation in the world.
The symbolic orientation is extended to or leads to 
later reflection, (p.135.)
Of 2. (Symbols are always religious because they
point to something real or to a structure of the world):
a symbol is in so far as it signifies something, but 
in and of itself it is not the signified being.
This significance of the symbol includes for Eliade 
an ontology even if, as in an archaic tradition, 
that ontology is not systematised. As we will see, 
this ontology is connected closely with that of 
Tillich and with the same monopolar problem.
(p.136.)
Penner does not really criticise 3. (which insists 
on the multivalence of the symbol) but contents himself 
with a simple restatement.
Of 4. (the symbol is able to reveal a perspective in 
which heterogenous realities are susceptible of 
articulation into a whole): Penner points out that 
Eliade's
presentation of the meaning of religious symbols 
forms an exact parallel to his description of the 
problem of the history of religions. To my mind the 
best example of this is the significance of 
religious symbols as an integrated coherent unity 
and the work of interpretation as the integration of 
the various phenomena of religion into a unified
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coherent correlation. This exemplifies the 
principle that "the method must fit the phenomenon". 
(ibid. )
Having made these specific points Penner goes on to
say that Eliade "employs the expression 'religious
symbol1 in at least three ways". Firstly, any object can
become a symbol.
Objects, the sun, the moon, a river, a tree, a name, 
are symbols of a specific religious history. They 
spring from the world of everyday experience and 
come to bear a new significance. The second usage 
of symbol in Eliade1s thought is connected with the 
notion of archetypes. Eliade represents these 
archetypes as universal models generated from a 
unified, coherent system. Symbolic objects reveal 
or manifest these universal patterns. From reading 
Eliade's books and articles one finds that one is 
first and foremost concerned with this plane of 
symbolism, (p.137.)
In this connection Penner mentions the cosmic tree,
ascension, water symbolism, lunar and solar symbolism.
Furthermore, both preceding uses of symbolism appeal
to the sacred.
The sacred as such is the unmeditated, 
unapproachable experience. It is paradoxical that 
it can be made manifest at all. Eliade understands 
this paradox as the manifestation of being, of the 
absolute, the unconditioned, and the eternal in the 
profane. It is opposed to becoming, to the 
relative, the conditioned, and the finite world.
Here it becomes apparent that Eliade shares 
Tillich's monopolar notion of the sacred as the 
final proper object of all religious symbols. This 
use of the term symbol is the central premise of 
Eliade's interpretation of the history of religions. 
The dialectic between the duality of the sacred and 
the profane modes of being does not allow the 
profane to become the sacred. That means that the 
profane never becomes the sacred.44
44 ibid., p. 139. This statement is an almost 
verbatim repetition of the misapprehension of the 
dialectic of the sacred made by Thomas Altizer discussed 
(and, I think, refuted) above, pp.50ff. I quote the
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Penner continues,
it should now be clear that immediate, everyday 
experience is equivalent to the profane. The 
profane mode of being is equivalent to becoming, the 
unreal, non-being, subjective reality, and illusion. 
Between the two worlds is the experience of humanity 
in its prevalent factual alienation.45 At this 
boundary the delineated ontological premises stay 
explicitly on the side of Being and the eternal, 
which in itself is wholly other than becoming and 
the temporal world.
Each structure of religious symbolism from the 
individual symbol to the universal archetype and the 
hermeneutics of the sacred inhere within the 
symbolic significance. The symbol indicates 
something which is also symbolic. The sacred can be 
only symbolic and have no object. ... The circle is 
complete, the dilemma of pansymbolism appears 
expressed in this opinion of symbols with reference 
to a hierarchy of symbolic significance. The 
monopolar misjudgment resides in the one-sided 
understanding of the sacred as Being, the Absolute, 
and wholly other, (p.140.)
Nor, indeed, is this powerful critique reserved for 
the understanding of symbolism as expressed by Paul 
Tillich and Mircea Eliade. Penner forges ahead to state 
that
a phenomenological enquiry into religion which 
grounds itself in the sacred, the meta-empirical 
(the wholly other) cannot, by definition, describe 
the object which religious symbols characterise or 
indicate. As we see, it is thus wrong to speak of a 
religious or sacred object at all as we once again 
apprehend these expressions symbolically. Such a 
phenomenology of religion remains pansymbolic and 
the development of this phenomenology into a
German here to ensure that there is no mistaking the 
sense. »Die Dialektik zwischen der Dualität der heiligen 
und der profanen Seinsweise verwandelt das Profane nicht 
in das Heilige. Das bedeutet, daß das Profane nie zum 
Heiligen wird.«
45 ibid., p.140. There is some problem with the text 
here: it reads, »Zwischen den beiden Welten und der 
Erfahrung des Menschen in ihnen herrsicht tatsächlich 
Entfremdung«. Since there is no verb I assume the 
erroneous substitution of »und« for »ist«.
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metaphysical system, explicit in Tillich, implicit 
in Eliade, only further reveals this pansymbolism to 
defer to a very abstract, notionally contrived 
symbolism, (p.141.)
Here it becomes evident that this article is a precursor
of Penner's piece of three years later, "Is Phenomenology
a Method for the Study of Religion".46 Here, following
the same logic, he concludes that
if, then, a phenomenology of religion can be 
actualised, it would seem that the sacred as a 
subject, or reality wholly other must be denied.
Or, conversely, if the history of religions is 
grounded upon the sacred as in principle wholly 
other, being-in-itself, then a phenomenology of 
religion becomes an impossibility. A phenomenology 
of religion as a pure description only prolongs the 
problem; it does not overcome it. (ibid., p.38.)
It would appear that Hans Penner has, to a certain
extent, anticipated my defence of Eliade against the
ontological accusations of his other critics. It would
seem that the only way to avoid these criticisms is to
deny the ontological reality of the sacred, which leaves
religion devoid of a proper object, and symbolism with
nothing to symbolise. In response to this I would argue
that, finally, the autonomous existence of the sacred is
a matter for theology and is irrelevant to a
phenomenology of religion. Real existence is itself an
interpretative category which becomes applicable only in
interpretation based on personal subjective intuition
(which is all interpretation). The history of religions
as conceived by Eliade is founded upon the sacred qua the
taxonomic assumption of a reality inherent in all
46 The Bucknell Review. 18 no.3 (1970):29-54.
religious phenomena. However, the applied taxonomy is 
based on the actual experience or perception of reality 
which is itself conditioned by previous experience, by 
culture, and by "archetypal intuitions".
It should further be said that if conscious 
reflection is supported by a symbolic foundation, as 
Penner understands Eliade to suppose, then nothing 
escapes Penner's critique. Nothing can finally be 
described other than symbolically. This seems to be in 
accordance with the deconstructionist critique of the 
limitations of language.47 Thus Eliade's symbolism is 
not especially vulnerable to this claim of pansymbolism. 
The fact that the referent of religious symbols can never 
be apprehended on the empirical plane as other than the 
referent of symbolism does not immediately deny it real 
existence. Objects of experience can be genuine 
intentional objects even if they are experienced as an 
element of inward subjective reality.48 It is central to 
Eliade's position that to deny reality to subjective 
experience, or even to hierarchise ontology with 
"subjective" as lesser than "objective" experience is a 
religious perception characteristic of modern Western 
humanity, and is putative. The exhaustive identification 
of ontology, of being, with material manifest existence, 
is what Eliade identifies as the complete concealment of
47 v. eg. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology.
48 v. eg. Berger and Luckmann, The Social 
Construction of Reality, p.20.
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the sacred in the profane.
Penner's insistence on the restriction of the 
referent of religious symbolism itself to the level of 
symbol is finally no criticism. Since the true symbol is 
a hierophany, the symbol is a manifestation of the real, 
the real has initially been restricted to the level of 
the symbol. The fact that Penner does not himself 
perceive any true ontology inherent in symbols merely 
indicates his acquiesence in the mindset of the modern. 
The contention that both symbols and the phenomenology of 
religion lack a proper object can be seen as an 
insistence that God, for example, is "merely" 
imaginary,49 that symbols have an imaginary reference 
only, that people only imagine that god exists. In fact, 
this is another example of reduction, of contending that 
symbolism is just symbolism, "pansymbolism" and nothing 
else. Eliade would not agree with this, nor does he say 
that religion is just hierophany or just meaning.50 To 
say that it is just some (or any) such thing is to 
attempt to reduce its ontological significance, to limit 
its becoming to mere mental image. On the contrary 
Eliade seeks to increase the ontological impact of
49 or Allah, Brahman, etc. I use the English word 
"god" as a specific and conditioned concept involved in 
the religious mythology of my own culture.
50 In fact, "the interpretation of symbols by this 
reductive method, that is to say the reduction of all 
possible significations to only one proclaimed 
"fundamental," appears erroneous to us." Symbolism, the 
Sacred, and the Arts, p.6.
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religion in general both by his insistence on the sacred
as the real and by his stress on the imaginary as
effective. For example, he has said,
no conquest of the material world was effected 
without a corresponding impact on human imagination 
and behaviour. And I am inclined to add that the 
reflections of the objective conquests upon such 
imaginary Universes are perhaps even more important 
for an understanding of man.5
To Eliade's mind it has been a quite recent, and very
positive, development that "we are now beginning to
acknowledge the importance of that mysterious sur-réalité
revealed by any imaginary universe".52 He clarifies this
in his History of Religious Ideas where he states that
the empirical value of [practical] inventions is 
evident. What is less so is the importance of the 
imaginative activity inspired by familiarity with 
the different modalities of matter. ... The 
imagination discovers hitherto unsuspected analogies 
among the different levels of the real. (vol.I, 
p . 34 . )
For the history of religions it is the actual phenomenon 
of belief which is the proper object of our study, not 
the putative ontological status of the object of belief. 
The existence of religious concepts as imaginary objects 
is not open to doubt, although the significance of such 
concepts undoubtedly is. Evidently religious symbolism, 
religious behaviour, and religious concepts are extremely 
resilient, adaptable, and (especially if Eliade's 
understanding be accepted) ubiquitous. This empirical 
fact alone should secure the recognition of their
51 "Notes on the Symbolism of the Arrow," p. 465.
52 Occultism, p. 88.
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significance.
That imagination is not only of great importance but
that it is also considered to be an integral part of
religious life is indicated by Eliade's statement that
insofar as one is able to act "spiritually", insofar 
as one possesses imagination and intelligence and, 
consequently, is capable of detaching oneself from 
immediate reality".
This clearly identifies "spiritual" existence with
imagination and intelligence and, specifically, with the
ability to "detach oneself from immediate reality". This
shows an identification of soul or spirit and mind which
might escape the normal English speaking reader, although
it will be familiar enough to German speakers as geist.
The concomitant implication is that, for Eliade, it is
the specific human imaginative ability to become detached
from immediately experienced reality, Erlebnis, or
"history" as he conceives it, which constitutes
"spiritual" existence. This is the "escape from
history", nothing more (or less) mystical than the
ability to learn from that which one has not oneself
experienced and to avoid via mental (spiritual)
discipline the purely physical effects of causal
determination. At the extremes this may be sitting naked
on a glacier for three days, or simply not allowing the
quotidian pressures of life to "get you down". In such
an interpretation one "escapes from history" every time
one smiles in the face of adversity.
53 "Methodological Remarks," p.101.
The ability to do so is directly conditioned by 
(among other things) our relationship to imaginative 
narrative. In an empirically controlled experiment 
Martin Seligman has reported that "merely telling a human 
subject about controllability duplicates the effects of 
actual controllability".54 This implies that a story 
which one is told, a narrative structure to which one is 
exposed (and Seligman is quite clear that it does not 
have to be "true", in the sense that it does not have to 
correspond to the actual state of affairs in the world of 
experience), can have the same effect as if it were a 
part of the world of real experience. Once again, by 
dint of intelligence and imagination the human spirit can 
be seen to "escape history", to be "detached from the 
immediate reality". In other words, and to this degree, 
the human spirit is "autonomous" in that it is not wholly 
determined by its physical environment but contributes, 
particularly through the imaginative generation of 
narrative, to the construction of its own determining 
environment. In terms of archaic mythology, humanity 
participates in the cosmogony.
Even as a concept, an imaginative fiction in the 
sense indicated here, God etc. is an infinitely creative 
entity, a being of unbounded imaginative fertility, 
capable of supporting a wealth of imaginary universes.
Once the idea of God has been conceived, for example, it
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54 Helplessness , p . 48 .
is eminently possible to conceive the idea of heaven,
paradise, etc., that is to say a mode of being in which
humanity is not conditioned or limited by our actual,
physical state. It can quite credibly be suggested that
if one cannot imagine an eternal and flawless state of
human existence then one cannot have imaginatively
realised the idea of god. Yet it seems to be precisely
those people who cannot even imaginatively realise the
possibility of a heaven (etc.) who insist on the (merely)
imaginary nature of the deity.
Eliade constantly, if rather quietly, insists on the
importance of this imaginary realm. For example, in The
Quest he points out that initiatory motifs and symbols
"partake of an imaginary universe, and this universe is
no less important for human existence than the world of
everyday life". (p.121.) And in Images and Symbols:
"that essential and indescribable part of man that is
called imagination dwells in realms of symbolism and
still lives upon archaic myths and theologies", (p.19.)
On a slightly different note which serves to explain his
meaning somewhat further, he states that
the novel must tell something, because narrative 
(that is, literary invention) enriches the world no 
more and no less than history, although on another 
level.55
The point is that imaginative, narrative creations of the 
human mind, which can be enormously increased by the 
infinite creativity of the divine being, themselves
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become a conditioning factor in human experience, and one 
which is historically revealed to be of the greatest 
significance. In this way Eliade seeks to increase the 
ontological weight of the sacred, which is itself an 
argument against those scholars who have detected a 
reductionist tendency in his work. "Reducing" the study 
of religion to the categories of the sacred (i.e. the 
really real) and to meaning, in no way "reduces" its 
ontological significance, rather its whole dynamic is to 
increase the significance of religious phenomena.
This itself may raise two objections. Firstly, it 
is not the task of scholarship to increase the 
significance of the objects of study, but to reveal what 
significance they inherently possess. However, the post­
structuralist thought of, for example, Roland Barthes and 
Jacques Derrida, has suggested strongly that significance 
is not an inherent characteristic of objects or events, 
but is a creation of human interpretation. Thus the 
creation of significance is precisely the aim of 
interpretative scholarship. Secondly, it could also be 
said that Eliade has ultimately failed in his aim since 
he has certainly not increased the ontological 
significance of the sacred for his critics. To those who 
insist on the self-evident nature of the manifest as the 
real, the creative hermeneutics of Eliade's history of 
religions must remain the unwarranted proliferation of 
imaginary non-entities. Although this argument is itself 
subjective and relativist, insisting that lack of meaning
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for a certain group of people indicates actual lack of 
meaning, it is currently impossible to refute. Only time 
will tell whether Eliade's detractors will have more 
influence than his admirers, and thus whether he will 
finally be seen as succeeding in increasing the 
significance of the sacred or otherwise.
One indication would seem to be that the 
characterisation of the study of religion as the mere 
proliferation of imaginary non-entities is a deliberate 
restriction of imagination, the denial of meaning, the 
refusal of creativity and little else. If it be accepted 
that the creative imagination has an effective role in 
assessing reality then symbols, as creative, meaningful, 
pre-reflective devices, are not just symbols but also 
effective tools of the pre-reflective imagination. Only 
by denying the effective role of the symbolic imagination 
can you support an argument which concludes that symbols 
are no more than symbols and that therefore such an 
analysis as Eliade's has made a mistake, ein Trugschluß. 
Either Penner's critique is totally unimaginative, 
(imagination not being required to see that symbols are 
just symbols, this is simply an observation not a 
creative act) or it is wrong. It could likewise be 
suggested that if one is capable of imagining that 
imaginary ideas have real effects then the restriction of 
an idea capable of infinite effects to the imaginary is 
finally no restriction.
However, such a suggestion has more appeal to those
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who are disposed to accept it than to those predisposed 
to reject it. It is finally a statement of personal 
predisposition rather than an impersonal datum of 
evidence. In fact, this entire discussion has come down 
to a statement of personal predisposition, in other 
words, to theology. Finally, the argument has taken a 
familiar turn. It is the return to the initial 
affirmation, it is the self-enclosed closed turn of the 
theological circle. It is the inevitable turn of all 
arguments for (and against) the existence of God.56 The 
notable thing here is that it is a circle into which 
Eliade did not step. Despite his almost certain knowledge 
of Penner's articles57 Eliade does not choose to take up 
the challenge. This may be partly of his aversion to 
polemics (v.p.229, n.4 above) but also in part because it 
is a thinly veiled argument against the existence of god 
and as such may be valid subject matter for religious 
interpretation, but to attempt to answer Penner's 
critique is unavoidably to enter into a theological 
debate.
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56 It should be borne in mind that since the advent 
of Popperian falsification, the argument against now has 
an a priori weight, and since the development of 
deconstruction, arguments against significance are 
inherently more credible than those for.
57 Although he does not mention them directly, 
Eliade's journals show that he was aware of his critics, 
and the fact that the journal Antaios was produced under 
the supervision of himself and Ernst Jünger means that he 
was almost certainly aware of this one.
Gregory D. Alles, whose PhD dissertation, "Epic 
Persuasion: Religion and Rhetoric in the Iliad and 
Valmlki's Ramayana", was accepted at the University of 
Chicago in 1986, contributed "Dynamism", "Homo 
Religiosus", and "Sanctuary" to the Encyclopedia of 
Religion. Alles conducts a rather strident critique of 
Eliade which concludes that the latter's analyses are 
procrustean and inadequate, subordinating the acts which 
condition both the content and interpretation to the 
meaning of the text.58 Not only that, but Eliade is seen 
as representative of those historians of religion who 
"long for a position at the centre of European and 
American culture, indeed, at the centre of an emerging 
global culture", (p.132.) Not only does Alles challenge 
Eliade's thought but he further seeks to impugn Eliade's 
motives as a concealed egoism.
The basis of Alles' critique is that
the Chicago school conjoined a perspective with a
claim. Endorsing the perspective of hermeneutics,
58 Gregory D. Alles. "Wach, Eliade and the Critique 
from Totality," p.124.
7.6. The Tyranny of Meaning
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its exemplars [Wach and Eliade] viewed religion as 
fashioned in the image of meaning. At the same time 
they claimed to study - and demanded that others 
study - religion in its totality. The compound that 
resulted from their fabrications is unstable. 
Measured against the claim, the perspective is 
inadequate. Hermeneutics cannot study religion in 
its totality, (p.116.)
Alles goes on to quote Rudiger Bubner, a dialectical
theorist, to the effect that,
if the claim to totality is made, concepts become, 
despite their differences in content, incompatible 
with each other ... one concept stands to the other 
in the peculiar relation of denying its claim to 
totality in order to assert the same claim on its 
own behalf.59
The critique from totality that results Alles considers 
to have a direct bearing upon the Chicago school's 
attempt to articulate the totality of religion via 
hermeneutics. Not only is their claim to have access to 
the totality of religion unsupportable in the first case, 
but their approach to that supposed totality is 
inadequate.
Hermeneutics - the drive to "decipher" "deeper 
meanings" - overwhelms the impulse to totality. 
Concerned to do justice to what he sees as the one 
irreducible element of religion, its intended 
object, Eliade writes a history of religions capable 
of doing justice virtually to that element alone.
He has in effect drafted the "objectivist" 
counterpart to the earlier "Psychologismus", and he 
is subject to the same critique. Religion is not 
just hierophany; it is not simply the dialectic of 
the sacred, (p.119.)
The critique to which Alles refers is that of 
Joachim Wach, who accused the purveyors of psychologism 
of being never so happy as when they can claim that some
59 Alles, p.119, quoting from Bubner, Modern German 
Philosophy, p.164-165.
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phenomenon is just something else.60 As Alles goes on to
say, "there is always more to religion than just
meaning", (p.123.) Evidently Alles is contributing to
the idea that Eliade falls foul of his own critique of
reductionism and himself reduces religion to an overly
narrow category. Not only that, but
hermeneutics in and of itself suffers when it is 
conjoined with the emphasis on totality that the 
history of religion requires, for religion is 
greater than meaning as life is greater than 
language. The history of religions must be more 
than a hermeneutical enterprise.61
Alles has made this progression from religion being
more than just hierophany to religion being more than
just meaning by reference to Eliade's statement in
Patterns (p.126.) that we may summarily define religious
life "as the experience of kratophanies, hierophanies and
theophanies", and by an identification of Wach's
Reliqionswissenschaft as "a vast monument to meaning
conceived as the systematic ordering of parts in a
whole", (p.112.) Wach followed Dilthey in making meaning
the highest category of human value; he derived 
meaning from the objectification of lived experience 
(Erlebnis); and under the rubric of Nacherleben - 
"re-living", "re-experiencing" - he posited
60 ibid., p.110, with reference to Wach, "'Nür.' 
Gedanken über den Psychologismus." Zeitschrift für 
Missionskunde und Religionswissenschaft, 39 (1924) p.212.
61 ibid., p.123. v. also above p.266 for a similar 
criticism, and also Segal, "In Defense of Reductionism". 
Eliade's "equation of the actor's point of view with an 
irreducibly religious one proves entirely arbitrary. 
Indeed it becomes hard to see why his interpretation of 
the actor's point of view is any less reductionistic than 
the interpretations of religion he opposes as 
reductionistic". p.99.
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Verstehen, "understanding", as the peculiar method 
of the human sciences, (p.122.)
Even in the special province of the interpretation of
texts, Alles argues, this "reign of meaning" is
inadequate and must end. Hermeneutics is inadequate
because even text are
complex instruments; their production and use 
requires non-semantic acts and structures without 
which text could not exist, acts which condition 
both their content and their interpretation [and] 
even the most complex hermeneutics will insist on 
subordinating these acts to the meaning of the text, (pp.123f.)
Eliade is guilty not only of reducing the study of
religion to the study of meaning ("to count as religious,
an activity had somehow to be meaningful"), (pp.l22f.)
but of simultaneously claiming that this constituted the
totality of the religious phenomenon and that the
religious phenomenon is a totality at all. The myth of
meaning is, granted, the myth par excellence of the
twentieth century West. That is certainly not to say
that it is untrue. Meaning is the myth and language is
the symbol. The myth is the narrative constructed from
the words (paroles) of the language (langue) of
symbolism. Furthermore it is the best narrative
possible, the one met with the most positive possible
valorisation.
Regarding the totality, Alles paraphrases Eliade as
claiming that
the irruptions of the Sacred constitute a totality, 
an integral, coherent system that crosses the bounds 
of culture and history. ... every hierophany tends 
to reveal the Sacred in its totality. As a result,
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to be understood, every hierophany must be placed in 
the context of the Sacred as a totality, (p.115.)
Unfortunately this, which is the heart of Alles'
identification of a "totality" in Eliade's thought, is an
erroneous reading of the text. Alles' source for his
paraphrase is Patterns, pp.8 and 26 where in fact Eliade
says that, although hierophanies are heterogeneous in
origin and in form, in history and in structure, the
historian of religions should
make use of all these kinds of evidence. .. In this 
way we shall get a coherent collection of common 
traits which, as we shall see later, will make it 
possible to formulate a coherent system of the 
various modalities of the vegetation cult. We shall 
see in this way that every hierophany in fact 
supposes such a system.62
The fact is that, in the first case, and by implication
in all other cases, it is we as the interpreters of
hierophanies who "formulate" the system. Granted that
there is a system presupposed by the recognition of every
hierophany, but that system is none the less formulated
by the human agent in his or her particular embodied
human existential situation. There is, of course, a
paradox of the chicken-and-egg type involved here, but
that paradox has never prevented chickens from laying
eggs. No more does Eliade say that every hierophany
tends to reveal the sacred in its totality and can only
be understood in the context of that totality. Rather,
the sacred expresses itself through something other 
than itself; it appears in things, myths or symbols, 
but never wholly or directly. ... in every case the
62 Patterns , p. 8. Emphasis added.
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sacred manifests itself limited and incarnate.63 
The value which Eliade accords this formulation of all 
hierophanies as being part of a whole is this: "it would 
preserve the older hierophanies, by according them value 
on a different religious level, and the performance of a 
function there", (ibid.) In other words, this 
recognition of hierophanies as part of a whole system 
which we formulate has the specific function of allowing 
for the valorisation of archaic hierophanies as 
hierophanies, which the insistence upon only some events 
as revelatory of the real does not do. Furthermore, as 
we have seen, this relation of parts to a whole is not 
exhaustive of Eliade's concept of meaning.
Alles has mistakenly interpreted Eliade's "system" 
as necessarily referring to an "autonomous intended 
object" and to "autonomous" or "disembodied meanings"64 
whose activity constitutes the whole of religion. 
However, "the history of religions must include the 
entire interaction of the subject and the object, human 
activity as well as divine", (p.119.) By my
63 ibid., p.26. It should be pointed out once again 
that the language of the original French does not have 
the same active impact as the English translation. "la 
manifestation du sacré à travers quelque chose d'autre 
que lui-mème; il apparaît dans des objects ... en se 
manifestant le sacré s'est limité..." (Traité, pp.35f.) 
This allows for a considerably more passive function of 
the sacred than Rosemary Sheed's translation. Eg., "The 
manifestation of the sacred appears through objects, ... 
as it is manifest the sacred is limited..." which in 
turn allows for a more active function of the human
subject for whom a given phenomenon is an hierophany.
64 Alles, pp.119, 124, 130.
interpretation, which accords more closely to Eliade's 
own words, the latter is precisely what Eliade does. In 
fact some would say that this interpretation allows too 
great a possibility of overemphasising the human side of 
the equation and actually excluding the divine as an 
independent agent.
In the same way Alles can be seen to have 
misinterpreted the one irreducible element to which 
Eliade seeks to do justice. It is not so much the 
"intended object" as the recognition of that intentional 
object by specific individuals, i.e., not the intended 
object, but the act of intention. All religion involves 
the act of intention of the real, the true, the 
significant, in some object or event which does not, and 
cannot, autonomously, and automatically communicate that 
intentionality to all observers. This certainly could be 
criticised as an a prioristic assumption, for such is 
what it is. Given the extreme dubiety of ever 
"bracketing" our critical contentions and other 
assumptions, it is an eminently practical assumption to 
make that a religious text which has been cherished for 
millennia, or a native myth which permeates the total 
life of a tribe, is apprehended as possessed of real 
meaning. In Alles' case, however, we are presented with 
no such assumptions and thus we are left with no apparent 
means of identifying what religion is. Alles' whole 
critique of totality has, from the outset, refused to 
allow that, if the word religion be given a specific
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definition then the group of cases to which that 
definition refers constitutes a totality. This does not 
make competing concepts of totality incompatible, as 
Bubner's quotation (above, p.294) suggests, but does 
challenge competing definitions which circumscribe a 
differing totality. The problem arises if, and only if, 
the concept be mistaken for the object. Eliade's concept 
of the totality of religious phenomena, being 
circumscribed by his implicit definition of religion, 
cannot exclude anyone else's concept and thus cannot 
exclude anyone else's totality. It can have different, 
and possibly preferable, characteristics, however.
Alles seems to have likewise misapprehended Eliade's 
concept of meaning. As I have argued in my chapter on 
the Implicit Religion of Meaning, Eliade's conception of 
meaning is finally related to the response to an 
exemplary pattern. It is a human action, or becomes 
meaningful in activity. He cannot "idolise meaning" as 
Alles fears, precisely because he recognises the 
manifestation of the real in all hierophanies and thus in 
all "competing" meanings. The fundamental error in 
Alles' analysis is to react against a concept of 
"autonomous meaning" where none exists.
Furthermore, Eliade thus provides us with act (or, 
as Alles calls for it, "event") as the architectonic 
category which Alles desires for the history of 
religions, (p.125.) Alles calls for an escape from the 
"preoccupation with meaning" (p.123.) implying that it is
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a provincial Western concept artificially foisted upon 
all religions. This might be true of a narrower concept 
of meaning, such as that ascribed to Dilthey and Wach of 
the relation of parts to the whole. However, one which 
is grounded in human activity in such a way escapes this 
provincialism. (I might add that anyone familiar with 
Eliade's journals would recognise his horror of such 
provincialism.)
While Alles' desire to escape provincialism, to 
allow the Shinto priests to dance, rather than trying to 
force our theology upon them,65 is wholly admirable, it 
is in some ways naive. One might insist that life is 
greater than language, but as a colleague of mine 
responded, "try and convince me of that - without using 
language". This is no mere quip; it is through language, 
and through language alone, that we can become aware of 
life's greatness. It is no mere attempt to elevate 
humanity to a fallacious "higher" status by a 
preoccupation with a mere form of communication when we 
distinguish ourselves from other sentient beings as a 
language-using animal. (Nor is this a denial that other 
animals can use language.) In his attempt to install the 
event as the grounding category of religious studies 
Alles fails to recognise that the concepts of space, 
time, and consciousness of which the event is "a
65 V. the anecdote related by both Eliade and Joseph 
Campbell, Autobiography vol.II p.199 and in the 
Introduction to Campbell's videotape of The Power of 
Myth.
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constellation" (p.125.) are themselves socially 
constructed concepts, as, of course, is event. How can 
we then put the event before the "linguistic code" which 
determines it?
Alles affirms that he
deliberately correlate[s] [t]his view with a 
metaphysics that assigns priority to actuality 
rather than to potentiality and an anthropology that 
sees thought as activity, (ibid.)
But in so doing he seems to be unaware that thought is 
the activity par excellence which is governed by 
exemplary models, by mythic structures, and thus by 
structures of language and meaning. His desire to escape 
the inescapable leads him into the finally self­
contradictory position of claiming that "the obsession 
with meaning is yielding to topics that assume greater 
significance", and to recommending Michael Baxandall1s 
book Patterns of Intention as avoiding the notion of 
meaning.66 Only the narrowest possible definition of 
meaning could escape restoration as intention or 
significance, and Eliade's concept of meaning is, 
whatever else may be the case, not that narrow.
In fact, as I have interpreted Eliade's thought he 
provides us precisely with all that Alles seeks in the 
history of religions. Human activity as the grounding 
category of the historical study (as we have seen); an 
extraverted rather than introverted discipline (because 
all humanity can be seen as religious so the reliqiosi do
66 ibid., pp.126, 137, n.32.
not receive privileged status, and the original meanings 
of other peoples' myths are sought rather than our own 
meanings); and a critical and self-critical study 
(because Eliade encourages us to inspect the dialectical 
sources of our own hierophanies as constituted in a 
similar way to those of exotic and archaic peoples).
I cannot spend more time on Alles' critique than is 
strictly necessary, but I would like to point out that I 
respect deeply his attack on scientism, analytical 
economism, technologism and Western provincialism.
However, I would contend that his insistence on history 
and event, extraversión, and critical thought does not 
counter these trend as effectively as Eliade's emphasis 
on coherence, original meaning, totality, and 
hermeneutics. Finally, Alles has been less than 
extravert himself in attributing his own meanings (of 
history, of religion, of hermeneutics, and of meaning 
itself) to Eliade rather than seeking to disclose 
Eliade's meanings. It is this combination of Eliade's 
words and Alles' meanings which results in procrustean 
fittings, inadequacy, and subordinating acts to the 
meanings of the text. Eliade's act in producing his 
oeuvre was an attempt to communicate a constellation of 
thought which was to him coherent, adequate, and tailored 
to an enormous experience, both personal and literary. 
Alles subordinates that act to the meaning which he 
derives from the texts, in this case, Patterns, The 
Quest, and Shamanism and secondary sources.
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7.7 Relativism
The major problem which occurs in the light of the
foregoing analysis and critical defence is that of
relativism. Is it not the case that my defence of
Eliade, by deferring the question of the ontology of the
sacred, by reducing the questions of religion from
reality to being and meaning, and particularly by making
truth dependent on belief, open Eliade's thought to
accusations of relativism? Previous critics have stopped
short of accusing Eliade of relativism precisely because
of his apparent insistence on the sacred as real. Robert
Segal, for example, has said that
Eliade declares that a believer's belief in the 
transcendent is true because it corresponds to 
external reality, Wittgensteinian fideists would 
declare that belief is true only because it is as 
coherent as a non-believer's.67
Thus if the external reality of "the transcendent" be
taken away as the preceding arguments seem to contend,
Eliade is left in the same relativist trap as the
fideists with no criteria of judgement other than pure
subjectivity. Certainly subjectivism has been prominent
67 "In Defense of Reductionism," p.106.
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in the charges levelled against the Romanian historian of
religions, and as Roger Trigg has pointed out
the term "relativism" is often used without any 
great precision, and it sometimes appears to be no
more than a synonym for "subjectivism". The
subjectivist thinks that what I think is true for me 
and what you think is true for you. He is making 
truth relative to individuals rather than to groups 
of people.68
Furthermore, it is noticeable that Mac Ricketts had
appealed to precisely this relativist aspect of Eliade's
thought in his article, "In Defense of Eliade".
Eliade has misled some readers by his definition of 
the sacred as the "real". Some have thought that 
this means that Eliade himself regards the sacred as 
Reality: that is that he is making a theological 
statement. Eliade would deny this. All he means 
here is that for the believer, that which is sacred 
for him is the Real, the True, the meaningful in an 
absolute sense, (p.28.)
In order to clarify and adjudicate in this issue I
would firstly like to consider briefly the nature of
"relativism" before attempting to decide whether or not 
this appellation is applicable to Eliade.
7.7.1 What is Relativism?
Keith Yandell has described "simple relativism" as 
the contention that "a proposition P is true if and only 
if it is true for me".69 "Complex relativism" Yandell 
sees as the same contention but concerning truth "for" a 
society rather than "for" an individual. These two forms
68 Reason and Commitment, p . 3 .
69 "Some Varieties of Relativism," p.62.
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of relativism can, although not exactly, be assimilated
to conceptual relativism and cultural relativism
respectively. Finally, Yandell describes "a more
sophisticated relativism" in which it is held that
if both of radically different worldviews can be 
immune to external rational assessment and are 
internally coherent and not observationally 
disqualified, according to whatever their possibly 
quite different internal standards (if any) require, 
then each, the suggestion goes, passes what muster 
one can rationally ask a worldview to pass and if 
one person accepts one and another accepts the 
other, neither is more rational in so doing than the 
other. A person who must choose between one such 
worldview and another had best hope that tossing a 
coin is included in his present perspective (so he 
can make a choice) and in both worldviews he is 
choosing between (so that once he has chosen he can 
still understand how it was he, conceptually 
speaking, came to be where he is), (ibid., p.65.)
Roger Trigg clearly points out one of the conclusions of
both conceptual and cultural relativism; "truth is then
made to depend on what groups of people happen to
believe. The possibility of false beliefs is ruled out".
(op. cit., p.2.) Yandell echoes these words with, "one
simply cannot be wrong, if relativism is right", and
indicates one of the further "alleged benefits" of
relativism, which is that
the enterprise of trying to rationally assess 
religious, ethical, philosophical, etc. traditions 
and claims, insofar as these deal with basic issues 
at any rate, is no longer necessary, (op. cit., 
p . 70 . )
Both scholars are agreed that once one defers to the 
relativism of truth and belief one relinquishes all 
appeal to rational criteria of judgement and to truth as
corresponding to an external, objective reality.70 
(Yandell refers to the example of a virus which causes a 
disease, quite irrespective of the belief of the infected 
person, or of the medical community, op. cit., p.74.)
William C. Sheperd refers to another consequence of 
the relativist tendency. In Berger and Luckmann's Social 
Construction of Reality he detects an "extreme form" of 
"anthropological circumspection" which argues that
there is no such thing as human nature, only the
manifold varieties of human natures, culturally
relative artifacts.71
Such extreme forms of relativism which categorically 
repudiate the possibility of a universally valid 
conception of human nature have been more or less 
critically devastated. As Yandell says of cultural 
determinism, "that horse is dead, and it need not be 
beaten more - one need only put up a memorable 
gravestone", (ibid., p.74.) However, it is an 
unavoidable consequence of extreme conceptual relativism 
that the denial of an objective reality leads to the 
denial of a universal human nature. As Trigg insists, 
"relativism does not lead to the denial of objectivity 
since that is itself the very essence of the relativist 
position", and "the denial of objectivity is the denial
B. S. Rennie Relativism 308
70 As W. W. Bartley has said, "if relativism is 
inescapable then a consistent rationalism becomes 
intellectually impossible." The Retreat to Commitment, 
p .xxv.
71 "Cultural Relativism, Physical Anthropology, and 
Religion," p.159.
of any kind of independent reality".72 Thus it would 
seem that if cultural determinism is an unavoidable 
consequence of relativism, and cultural determinism has 
been critically devastated, then relativism cannot be an 
acceptable stance. In this light it must be determined 
whether or not Eliade can be said to be a relativist.
7.7.2 Eliade's Relativism.
As I have already mentioned, Mac Ricketts in "In
Defense of Eliade", makes reference to what can be seen
as a relativist aspect of Eliade's thought, the truth for
the believer is what is apprehended as the sacred.
Reality for the believer is what is revealed in
hierophany, it is what symbols and myths refer to, by
definition. This certainly appears to make truth and
reality dependent on personal or communal belief rather
than upon an external, objective reality. The fact that
the capacity to perceive the sacred in certain specific
hierophanic objects or events is conditioned by prior
personal religious experience further smacks of cultural
determinism. Also, Eliade has asked,
which is the true meaning of Durga and Siva - what 
is deciphered by the initiates, or what is taken up 
by the mass of the faithful? In this book I am 
trying to show that both are equally valuable.73
Likewise, he has stated,
idolatry and its condemnation are thus attitudes
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that come naturally to a mind faced with the 
phenomenon of the hierophany; there is justification 
for both positions. To anyone who has received a 
new revelation ... the earlier hierophanies have not 
only lost their original meaning ... but they have 
now become obstacles to the development of religious 
experience, (ibid., p.25.)
These simultaneous avowals of competing positions as
equally true, valuable, or justifiable seem to be
characteristic of relativism's inability to recognise any
belief as false. So does Eliade's insistence that
for the historian of religions, every manifestation 
of the sacred is important: every rite, every myth, 
every belief or divine figure reflects the 
experience of the sacred and hence implies the 
notion of being, of meaning, and of truth.74
If all manifestations of religion imply the notions of
being, meaning, and especially truth, has Eliade not
fallen into the relativist trap of relinquishing all
access to rational, objective criteria of truth by making
applicable criteria internal to each religious system?
Certainly Eliade himself did not openly espouse the
relativist stance, in fact he seems to attack it. In The
Sacred and the Profane he describes
man's desire to take up his abode in the objective 
reality, not to let himself be paralysed by the 
never-ceasing relativity of purely subjective 
experiences, to live in a real and effective world, 
and not in an illusion, (p.28.)
In The Myth of the Eternal Return, he seeks to avoid the
discussion of a philosophy of history that "should
definitely transcend relativism", (p.150.) But he points
out that
74 History of Religious Ideas, vol.I. p.xiii.
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in vain did [Wm. Dilthey] proclaim an allqemeine 
Lebenserfahrunq as the final means of transcending 
this relativity. ... In vain did Meinecke invoke 
"examination of conscience" ... Heidegger had gone 
to the trouble of showing that the historicity of 
human existence forbids all hope of transcending 
time and history, (ibid.)
Later he points out that
a sociology of knowledge, that is, the study of the 
social conditioning of ideologies, could avoid 
relativism only by affirming the autonomy of the 
spirit - which, if we understand him aright, Karl 
Mannheim did not dare to affirm, (ibid., p.159, 
n .15 . )
This does not immediately clarify the issue. Eliade 
considers the relativity of purely subjective experience 
"paralysing" and indicates the inability of historicism 
and sociology of knowledge to avoid relativism to be 
failures, but he does not explicitly describe how he 
himself might escape from it.
However, the implication is that the historical 
situation of humanity, that is to say the exhaustive 
identification of reality with history (in this case both 
actual temporal antecedents and personal physical 
experience), is what give relativism its cutting edge.
As long as historicism is accepted, as Eliade argues 
Heidegger to have demonstrated, relativism cannot be 
transcended. The question must be, how does positing the 
autonomy of the human spirit, as Eliade certainly does, 
through creativity and imagination, achieve the escape 
from relativism which he seems to desire?
One indication of an answer can be found in 
Yandell's discussion of "simple relativism" mentioned
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above. He considers that this "simple relativism"
carries the power of positive thinking to the final 
degree, since if I can only persuade myself that I 
am an indestructible and wise billionaire, I am one, 
and in order to have the perfect marriage I need 
only believe that I have one. (op. cit., p.62.)
It must be seen that the two examples given differ 
enormously; in one the external state of affair is 
necessarily involved; one's physical reaction to being 
struck by a falling safe, one's ability to give sound 
advice to others, the amount of money stored in one's 
bank; whereas in the other the mental state of the 
experiencing subject could be sufficient, the external, 
physical world is not necessarily involved. It may, 
indeed, be the case that it is the necessary and 
sufficient condition of perfect marriage that one 
believes one's marriage to be perfect (even if one's 
spouse does not). Similarly, the conditions of religion 
do not necessarily involve the external, physical/ 
temporal world, as has been consistently argued. Belief 
can be the necessary and sufficient condition for 
salvation (or Moksa, nirvana, etc.). In these non­
physical (spiritual), non-temporal (eternal) worlds the 
human spirit is autonomous and effective.
It should also be noted that Yandell operates with 
exactly the modern view of "belief" which Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith critiques as spurious; that belief = 
acceptance of a propositional truth.75 Yandell is aware
75 W. C. Smith, Belief and History, esp. ch.2.
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of the problem this engenders for relativism; if 
relativism is the contention that a proposition is true 
if and only if someone believes it, then, since 
"believes" means "accepts as true", the word "true" 
appears in both definiens and definiendum, rendering the 
definition valueless. However, he does not consider the 
alternative; if belief is held to mean "to hold dear, to 
prize, to give allegiance, to value highly" (Smith, op. 
cit., p.41.) then a positive definition is made. It is 
one in which "truth" is seen as a function of the human 
will, which restores the older sense of the word "true", 
as "true love", a "true socialist", and so on. That is 
to say a mode in which the actual conforms to the ideal. 
Along with the restoration of the older concept of truth 
goes the older concept of belief as "I believe in 
non-violence", or "I believe in marital fidelity", etc. 
That is to say, not a propositional affirmation, but a 
commitment to an ideal state of affairs.
The gradual shift of the words "believe" and "true" 
towards propositional accuracy and correspondence to 
external data can be seen to reflect exactly Eliade's 
apprehension of the gradual camouflage of the sacred in 
the profane. That in which we believe has been 
increasingly identified with that which we cannot 
propositionally deny, i.e. material existence. The real 
has been increasingly identified with the physical and 
manifest, valorising what is. over what we desire, so that 
"true" human existence is now equated with the profane,
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mundane, and gross, whereas previously the "true" nature 
of humanity was apprehended as a desired ideal of 
nobility, responsibility, humaneness, etc. It is this 
"myth" of objective reality, that is to say the 
uncritical valorisation of the actual over the ideal, and 
the concomitant exhaustive equation of truth with 
actuality, which renders relativism, the understanding of 
"truth" as dependent on "belief", unacceptable. As 
Yandell has it, "for realism belief is truth's prisoner; 
for relativism, truth is properly the product of belief", 
(op. cit., p.68.) From this alternative viewpoint both 
these statements would be acceptable, each depending on 
the systematic definition of belief and truth operative 
in the (pre-reflective) system of the realist or the 
relativist.
However, this seems to raise exactly the problematic 
position of two conflicting and mutually exclusive 
worldviews and a hapless subject with no way other than 
arbitrary random selection to choose between them. But 
surely this is a radical fiction designed specifically to 
increase the attractiveness of the proffered criteria of 
assessment, the "rational". None of us starts from 
nowhere and chooses between total and preformed 
worldviews. The process of acquisition is gradual and 
recursive. Elements and expressions of worldviews are 
assessed, based on prior experience, and interpreted and 
incorporated into our pre-existent worldview. Yandell 
evinces one of the basic positions of those who oppose
B . S . Rennie Relativism 315
relativism. He accepts as a "necessary truth" that "if
P is true, then P is either true or false", (op. cit.,
p.67.) However, to one who apprehends the coincidentia
oppositorum to be a symbol of absolute reality, to be
expressive of the nature of the real, then that P is true
would imply that P might be either true for all people,
or false for some people, i.e. that P is both true and
false, certainly not either true or false.
Another answer can be given in relation to Trigg's
statement that the "seeds of relativism" are sown when
"the emphasis is moved from a question about reality to
one about our response to that reality".76 This too can
be seen to apply to Eliade; he certainly shifts the
emphasis from the sacred per se to the human reaction to
the sacred. In fact he seems to consider this a
procedural necessity for a discipline which would study
the human response to reality, that is to say, those
expressions and activities of humanity which are
classified as religious (the history of religions), as
opposed to a discipline which would study the nature of
ultimate reality (theology, the philosophy of religion,
or philosophy tout court). Trigg insists that this leads
to the conclusion that
only a participant can properly understand a 
society, which can never be judged by external 
standards. Each society has its own conceptual 
scheme, and reality for that society is what the 
scheme says it is. This is conceptual relativism, 
(p.302.)
76 "Religion and the Threat of Relativism," p.301.
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However, Eliade's insistence on archetypal intuitions, or 
fundamental, transhuman experiences, or the universal 
basis of the human existential situation, allows a common 
ground from which all societies can be (begun to be) 
understood. That is not to say by external standards 
however; the point is that we, as humans, are not totally 
external to other human societies, and that all human 
conceptual schemes overlap precisely because they are 
human. External standards are not required to understand 
an exotic society, internal standards, given by our human 
biology, our similar personal histories (birth, language 
acquisition, cultural conditioning), will suffice.77 
Each society may have its own conceptual scheme but no 
such human conceptual scheme will be utterly opaque to 
another human being because we are human. As Eliade 
indicated to Claude-Henri Roquet in the conversations 
published as Ordeal by Labyrinth,
that is why I am so very proud of being a human
77 William Sheperd points out (op. cit., p.170) the 
human constant of birth, which "quite simply orders that 
paradisal interuterine omnipotence be suddenly and 
dramatically left behind in favour of a world far less 
happy". This constant is evidently comparable to 
Eliade's constant of nostalgia for paradise or the 
religious constant of the "fallen" (etc.) world. As well 
as this human constant there is the subsequent process 
which we all undergo of language acquisition and the 
dependent period of culturally specific learning. This 
is possibly sufficient to account for the ubiquity of the 
symbolic. All humans have experienced a period in which 
they were not adept verbal language users, in which they 
were dependent upon pre-verbal understanding. We have 
all undergone a period of pre-logical (or at least 
pre-verbal) mentality in which symbolic signification 
would have been our only way of understanding the world 
at large.
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being, not because I am a descendant of that 
prodigious Mediterranean culture, but because I can 
recognise myself, as a human being, in the existence 
taken upon himself by an Australian Aborigine. And 
that is why his culture interests me, and his 
religion, his mythology, (p.137.)
7.7.3 Conclusions.
Although Eliade manifests the primary 
characteristics of the relativist in seeing alternative 
worldviews as each true, and of making truth a function 
of meaning and meaning a function of belief, although he 
might accept that there are truths relative to systems, 
his understanding of the ultimately common basis of human 
nature reduces the implications of relativism from 
complete incommensurability to partial and temporary 
unintelligibility, and thus evades the thrust of the 
major arguments against total relativism. As Trigg says, 
"total relativism is incoherent".78 This is precisely 
the point. Total, or absolute, relativism is incoherent 
almost by definition. It is a contradiction in terms. 
What is critiqued by Trigg and others who would warn us 
of the dangers of absolute relativism, is not an actual 
position held by actual people, but a logical extension 
of the trend of relativism, a sort of monopolar 
relativism which is held to exist without reference to 
its other pole of absolute realism. In such a form 
relativism is absurd, but in such a form relativism does 
not seriously make any claims to our attention. Such
78 "Religion and the Threat of Relativism," p.305.
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relativism might claim that "people can believe what they
like [and] there is no point believing one thing rather
than another", (ibid., p.305.) Eliade certainly does not
make such a claim.79 Rather it is fundamental to his
understanding that one is prepared by one's religious
experience and cultural background to apprehend the real
in certain modalities. Thus there is no "choice" in
one's apprehension. The real appears to impose itself
upon one's perceptions as a self-authenticating
experience. However, this does not issue in total
cultural relativism since humanity is universal in human
culture and thus we all have a similar preparation and
inhabit a similar reality. Thus Trigg goes too far when
he claims that
once it is stressed that different cultures have 
different concepts, and that their members see the 
world differently, it is no very great step to 
saying that there is no right way of seeing the 
world and that it is pure arrogance to assume that 
one's own society's understanding of things is the 
correct one. It thus becomes impossible to judge 
other cultures at all.80
This type of criticism, usually accompanied by "it is
then a very small step" or some such phrase, is common
throughout Trigg's analysis.81 My point is that it does
79 For example, "I oppose with all my strength 
Hegel's "historic" vision." Journal I, p.54.
80 Reason and Commitment, p . 6 .
81 v. also p. 32, "it is only a short step from this 
to saying that the meaning is the commitment," and p.146, 
"there is only a short step from this admission to the 
view that the rational man does himself make a non- 
rational commitment."
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not matter how small a step it is if it is not made.
This kind of logic could state that it is a small step
from open-heart surgery to murder. The step from
culturally conditioned difficulties in communication to
absolute conceptual incommensurability is one which
Eliade's whole life was dedicated to disproving.
The extremes of conceptual relativism ensuing from
interpretations of Wittgenstein are resolved in this
interpretation of Eliade. Trigg has said that
according to Wittgenstein, our basic religious or 
moral commitments can make no claim to truth. The 
only way to adjudicate between them is for us to 
adopt one and reject the others. We can never tell 
someone who does not share our commitment that he is 
wrong, (ibid., p.53.)
The understanding that all people are already religious
emphasised by Eliade's work resolves the problem of such
a statement; we do adjudicate between religious and moral
commitments precisely by virtue of the fact that we have
already made a religious commitment to our present
understanding of the world. The view that rational
people are not religious and have made no such commitment
is itself the cause of the basic problem here; if we have
no such commitment we cannot adjudicate between
commitments and we will never know what commitment to
make. Once again the linguistic metaphor is applicable;
if we do not assume that words are meaningful we will
never be able to begin the process of language
acquisition. Likewise, without some prior commitment to
some conceptual system (which, it must be recalled,
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Eliade held actually to precede rational reflection) we 
will not be able to adjudicate between competing 
concepts. However, the point is that we do utilise pre- 
reflective modes of coming to a decision, and the 
commitment to rationalism can itself be seen as such a 
commitment. At this point it becomes apparent that the 
word commitment could be rather misleading. It could be 
seen as implying a conscious and reasoned decision, 
whereas it is crucial to the understanding of this theory 
that the deference to a given conceptual schema is pre- 
critical. The fact that rationalists would hold that 
their commitment to reason is wholly rational and 
conscious in no way lessens the possibility that that 
commitment occurred prior to its rational analysis and 
justification.
Finally, it must be said that we can, of course, 
tell someone who does not share our commitment that they 
are wrong. We cannot, however, persuade them to change 
or somehow force them to accept that they are wrong. No 
doubt if everyone were absolutely reasonable we could, by 
applying the rules of reason, persuade any dissenters 
that they were simply mistaken in their application of 
those rules.82 The empirical fact is that certain people
82 Trigg states that "the presence of reason does not 
force us to adopt any particular position. No reason can 
have any influence until it is recognised by someone to 
be a reason. ... Men would still be free to assess such 
reasons as they wish and to ignore or reject what are in 
fact perfectly good reasons ..." (ibid., p.134.)
However, do their decisions to ignore good reasons 
themselves have (good) reasons? The point is that our
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(in fact, the majority) find themselves emotionally 
committed to a conceptual schema which does not clearly 
and entirely correspond to the dictates of rationalism. 
They are not so committed to rationalism that this 
failing persuades them to alter their commitment. The 
further empirical fact is that these people can lead 
entirely well-adjusted lives, some of them even managing 
to be productive and beneficial to society in a purely 
practical manner, some of them even being successful 
scientists.83 Thus any rationalist claim to exclusive 
viability finds no empirical support, but is itself only 
supported by the internal criterion of coherence within 
its own dictates.
This is not to say that the rationalists' commitment 
to reason is itself unreasonable. No such claim is being 
made; it is absolutely reasonable. The point is that 
reason is not experienced by the majority of humanity as 
fully adequate for the management of their lives, 
certainly not to the fundamental adjudication of their
reasons are compelling or they are not finally 
reasonable. Absolute rationality removes the human 
freedom which is part of our experience of life and is 
thus finally as absurd as the absolute relativism against 
which Trigg argues.
83 It should be noted that although Trigg points out 
that the extreme relativist position on the 
"incommensurability" of different conceptual systems 
results in the religious scientist suffering from a 
"totally crazy compartmentalisation of understanding", 
(ibid., p.120) he himself can provide no more acceptable 
description. His ongoing argument seems to be that 
science and religion are fundamentally incommensurable 
which does not account for the empirical facts.
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basic conceptual systems. Reason is not experienced as 
hierophanic to the majority of humanity, it is not an 
exemplary revelation of the real. This could quite 
conceivably be because most people do not have any really 
clear grasp of what "reason" is and so do not know 
exactly how to apply it to the formulation or adaptation 
of their conceptual systems. Alternatively, it could be 
because many people accept that the formulation of belief 
systems occurs on a sub-conscious level where reason is 
not entirely dominant. My purpose here cannot be to 
adjudicate between absolute reason and relative reason 
but to point out that the criticisms of relativism 
operative here amount to little more than the statement 
that relativism is not absolutely rational and thus fails 
to permit the reasonable adjudication of all decisions.
Of course absolute relativism is not absolutely rational. 
The point is that truth is capable of more than a 
singular interpretation. There is truth which refers to 
the actual states of external reality, but there are also 
truths which refer to the internal worlds of human 
creativity and imagination. There are truths which can 
be determined by wholly rational criteria and there are 
truths which can only be assessed through internal 
criteria of meaning.
Both Trigg and Yandell can be seen to argue from an 
unyielding position of unequivocality as regards the 
meaning of truth but a more fluid or polyvocal concept of 
truth permits of a far more fertile understanding. Mark
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Taylor's courageous and well-argued case, for example, is
for a much more subtle relativism; "a relativistic
epistemology and a relational ontology".84 Although
related to the work of Paul Ricoeur, Taylor's conceptions
can be seen to agree largely with Eliade's as I have
interpreted them here. Meaning is seen as contextualised
and holistic, "truth is relative because meaning is
contextual and being is relational", (ibid., p.53.) Even
though truth is seen to be
the unity of thought and being, the coincidence of 
subjectivity and objectivity, the coadunation [sic] 
of sense and reference, (ibid.)
Taylor sees that
consequently the meaningfulness of truth necessarily 
entails a dialectical relation with contrasting 
frames of interpretation and is constantly subject 
to reformulation, (ibid., p.54.)
While the attack on extreme relativism reopens the 
possibility of a panculturally viable conception of human 
nature (and of religion) closed by radical conceptual 
relativism, that same attack has reduced the likelihood 
of such a conception by discouraging the deference to 
relational concepts of meaning and truth. Eliade's 
concept of human nature, humanity as homo religiosus, in 
proposing a universally valid schema for humanity does so 
precisely via the relationality of meaning and truth; the 
subjective and self-validating experience of the Real 
through the Hierophany. The potential to detect,
84 "Towards an Ontology of Relativism," Abstract, 
p.42 and conclusion, p.55.
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actually to apprehend, the real, the sacred, in a
particular profane object or event is culturally
conditioned, but it is also affected by, and effected
through, the creativity of the human imagination, and
thus it is not culturally determined. Meaning, truth,
reality, sacrality are defined inter-referentially and
culturally relationally, however, this is done in the
context of a unified vision of human nature based in our
physical existential situation in this particular biology
in this particular environment. The truth of this vision
is maintained through the insistence upon the external
world as the locus of hierophany; only what is can reveal
the nature of being.
In this context it is worthwhile to make mention of
Richard Bernstein's book, Beyond Objectivism and
Relativism. It is Bernstein 's "central thesis that we
are witnessing and participating in a movement beyond
objectivism and relativism" and that this can be seen in
the works of Gadamer, Habermas, Arendt, and Rorty.
Rorty, for example,
claims that it is a illusion to think that there is 
a permanent set of ahistorical standards of 
rationality which the "philosopher" or 
epistemologist can discover and which will 
unambiguously tell us who is rational and who is 
not. (p.67.)
This would be thought to be the worst form of relativism 
to one entrenched in the "Cartesian persuasion" of the 
search for an assured foundation for knowledge, but in 
fact actually corresponds to a redefinition of
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rationalism as an effective, but not inescapable, form of 
persuasion. In Rorty's discussion of the controversy 
between Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine he points out 
that
much of the 17th century's notion of what it was to 
be a "philosopher", and much of the Enlightenment's 
notion of what it was to be "rational", turns on 
Galileo being absolutely right and the church 
absolutely wrong.85
"Lurking in the background here" Bernstein points out,
is a false dichotomy: either permanent standards of 
rationality (objectivism) or arbitrary acceptance of 
one set of standards or practices over against its 
rival (relativism). We need to alter our 
understanding of how rational argumentation (and the 
history of forms of argumentation) works, to realise 
that there are times when there are disagreements 
that we cannot immediately resolve by appeal to 
fixed standards, (p.68.)
He further refers to "The Recovery of the Hermeneutical
Dimension of Science" as one of "the areas in which there
has been a significant movement beyond objectivism and
relativism", (p.30) I would suggest that Eliade, in
attempting to assert the hermeneutical dimension of the
history of religion, was likewise attempting a
transcendence of the specious dichotomy of objectivism
and relativism by rejecting the Cartesian dilemma and
asserting this liberation in and through the creativity
of human nature. Like Gadamer, Eliade operates with an
understanding of truth which "is not exhausted by the
achievements of scientific method and which is available
to us through hermeneutical understanding". (p.151.)
85 From Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.328, 
Bernstein, op. cit., p.66.
7.8. The Retreat to Commitment
7.8.1. The Problem
One final criticism which arises in part out of the 
preceding consideration of relativism is the inherent 
attitude to commitment implied by my interpretation of 
the thought of Mircea Eliade. Not only do I follow the 
lead of Eliade's thought in claiming the finally 
religious nature of all human apprehension of reality, 
but I also explicitly argue for the prior commitment 
involved in all coherent thought, specifically in the 
recognition of phenomena or events as meaningful. I have 
argued that "without some prior commitment to some 
conceptual system we will not be able to adjudicate 
between competing concepts", (above pp.320f.) This will 
undoubtedly be apprehended by rationalist and realist 
critics as a restatement of the neo-orthodox argument 
that everyone, all human thought, is eventually dependent 
upon a commitment to an ultimately non-rational, 
intuitive or emotional stance, and that thus Christian 
faith is as acceptable as rationalism. Arguments put
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forward ostensibly to support a position are in fact ex 
post facto attempts to justify, or to persuade others to 
adopt, that position which is actually held independently 
of its "supporting" arguments. All positions are 
positions of faith, including modern science, and, 
finally, justification is by faith alone.
William Warren Bartley III has traced the 
development, implications, and criticisms of this 
argument in great detail in a fascinating book called The 
Retreat to Commitment, and it is in the context of a 
consideration of this book that I would like to assess 
the relevance of this argument to the thought of Mircea 
Eliade.
As Bartley has incisively pointed out this argument
concerns the problem of the limits of rationality. It is
the argument relied upon by both Karl Barth and Soren
Kirkegaard, and can also be referred to as the dilemma of
ultimate commitment and the problem of presuppositions.
"The argument provides a rational excuse for irrational
commitment," as Bartley states, calling it the tu quoque
(you also) argument, since it claims that all people are
in the same final position of irrational commitment.
Simply stated, it is this;
(1) for certain logical reasons, rationality is so 
limited that everyone must make a dogmatic 
irrational commitment; (2) therefore, the Christian 
has a right to make whatever commitment he pleases; 
and (3) therefore, no-one has a right to criticise 
him (or anyone else) for making such a commitment. 
The theologian can reply "tu quoque" to his critic, 
and remind him that people whose own rationality is 
limited should not admonish others for admitting
that the limitation exists.86 
The relation to Eliade's position is this; if Bartley is 
right and this argument proves to be finally specious, 
then the position which Bartley describes as "pancritical 
rationalism" does not rely upon prior irrational (or non- 
rational) commitment to the nature of reality as it is 
apprehended to be in "archetypal" (or any other type of) 
intuitions. That is to say it is not dependent upon the 
real as mediated through hierophany, symbol, and myth and 
is thus not religious, even in the broad sense implied by 
Eliade's terms. The fully rational person need have no 
recourse to pre-rational, pre-critical, or pre-reflective 
judgement. Pancritical humanity is not homo reliqiosus, 
and Eliade's claim (or rather my claim through this 
interpretation of Eliade) to a universally valid 
comprehension of human nature is overthrown.
7.8.2. The Tu Ouoque Argument
Although I cannot do justice to all the issues 
discussed in Barley's engrossing book, especially the 
second, enlarged edition, I hope to assess fairly the 
specific points of argument relevant to my interpretation 
of Eliade. Bartley indicates the historical harmony of 
Protestant and rationalist thought; it has only been 
during the twentieth century that the relationship 
between the two has broken down. Since that schism, he
86 All these quotations are from Bartley, op. cit., 
p.72 with the exception of the final sentence, p.78.
B. S. Rennie The Retreat to Commitment 328
B. S. Rennie The Retreat to Commitment 329
would claim, the only "rational" excuse available to the
religiously-minded for their commitment to an
"independent starting ground" in faith is the problem of
ultimate commitment and the limits of rationality.
Bartley sees the real schism as having resulted from the
"Quest for the Historical Jesus". Schweitzer's study
particularly finally revealed that Jesus could not be the
practical and moral leader of Protestant liberal thought
but rather a radical, mystical apocalyptist,87 The real
problem then is that
a truly Christian identity, it was plausibly argued, 
demanded assent to the person of the historical 
Jesus - as he actually had been, not as one might 
have liked him to be. To the extent that honest 
identification with the rationalist tradition 
required that one withhold assent to the newly 
discovered historical Jesus, it became impossible 
for a man to be, in good conscience, both a 
Protestant Christian and a rationalist, (p.35.)
This brings us to the position that Protestant liberal
Christians have refused to relinquish their belief, even
when their supportive argument was removed. They are
thus not rational.
When a person sees no reason to abandon a position 
when an argument put forward to support it is 
refuted, that indicates that his position, far from 
depending on the argument, was held independently of 
it. (p.71.)
As Bartley then goes on to say,
the "truth" of one's beliefs is then ultimately 
rooted not in their self-evidence or in their 
universality but in one's whim, or in the belief, 
say, that God has commanded one to accept these 
standards, (p.74.)
87 Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical 
Jesus r London: A. & C. Black, 1910.
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This finally irrational basis for faith is given a
pseudo-rational justification, or rather excuse, via the
tu quoque argument as it is outlined above. This,
however, has unfortunate repercussions; one
ironic consequence of using the tu quoque is rarely 
noticed. To the extent that anyone employing it 
strengthens his own position by insuring that it is 
parallel to his opponent's, to that extent he 
increases the invulnerability of the opponent to 
criticism. ... Ultimately, the use of the tu quoque 
makes nonsense of the idea of the historical 
development and change of ideas in the face of 
criticism, (p.79.)
Like the criticism of relativism this criticism of the tu
quoque argument targets the final inability to adjudicate
between conflicting truth claims and the incapacitation
of criteria of rational judgement and contributes to the
problem of pluralism. As Bartley concisely states the
case:
in sum, the belief that rationality is ultimately 
limited, by providing an excuse for irrational 
commitment, enables a Protestant, or any other 
irrationalist, to make an irrational commitment 
without losing intellectual integrity. But, at the 
same time, anyone who makes use of this excuse pays 
a high price for it. For anyone who uses it may no 
longer, in integrity, criticise the holder of a 
different commitment. One gains immunity from 
criticism for one's own commitment by making any 
criticism of commitments impossible, (p.82.)
Bartley, as representative of the whole rationalism-as
opposed-to-religion school of thought, considers a (if
not the) crucial problem of contemporary philosophy to be
showing that it is possible to choose in a non- 
arbitrary way among competing, mutually exclusive 
theories, and - more broadly speaking - among 
competing "ways of life", (p.83.)
and thus of defeating the tu quoque argument. In the
B. S. Rennie The Retreat to Commitment 331
hope of achieving this Bartley rejects panrationalism,
which he characterises by two rules,
(1) A rationalist accepts any position that can be 
justified or established by appeal to the rational 
criteria or authorities; and (2) he accepts only 
those positions that can be so justified, (p.87.)
The "rational criteria" are either intellectualist or
empiricist, but Bartley can accept neither because,
as Kant showed with his "antinomies", clear and 
distinct ideas could lead to two contradictory 
theories. It would be impossible, therefore, on the 
basis of clear and distinct ideas alone, to decide 
rationally between such theories. The fact that 
one's beliefs had been deduced from clear and 
distinct ideas was a distinctly insufficient 
guarantee of their rationality. [Likewise] Hume's 
arguments ... showed that ... the empiricist 
criterion was inadequate; it excluded not only 
belief in God and the angels but also belief in 
scientific laws, memory, and other people. None of 
these could be reduced to sense experience: 
empiricism in effect reduced to solipsism. 8
He further attacks this species of rationalism on the
grounds that the first rule is not, itself, "justifiable
by sense experience, by intellectual intuition of clear
and distinct ideas, or by any other rational authority".
Furthermore such justification, even if possible, would
carry no weight except "to those persons who had already
adopted the belief that arguments should count". Since
the rationality of the first statement cannot be proven,
then these statements cannot both be held. All these
88 p.89. It should be noted here that Bartley is 
aware that for post-Humean empiricists submission to the 
rational authority of sense experience became "an 
irrational procedure." (p.93.) As will become apparent, 
in his inspection of rationalism Bartley loses more and 
more apparent allies to the irrational.
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arguments militate towards a compromised form of 
rationalism whose integrity Bartley attempts to rescue by 
his appeal to "pancritical" rationalism, (pp.93-94.)
7.8.3. Bartley's Pancritical Rationalism
This "pancritical rationalism" is a development from
Karl Popper's critical rationalism. Bartley also refers
to it as "fallibilism" since it holds that even its own
basic tenets are open to error and revision.
By dropping the comprehensive claim that all 
legitimate positions must be rationally justifiable 
and by candidly admitting his supposed limitations 
the critical rationalist saves himself ... from a 
crisis of integrity, (p.97.)
Bartley will not accept any position which, like A. J.
Ayer's, claims to evade the requirement of proof.
Ayer fails to show anything of the sort. Why, on 
his account, do our standards of rationality not 
need rational justification? Simply because any 
such standard "could be irrational only if there 
were a standard of rationality which it failed to 
meet; whereas in fact it goes to set the standard.
... There can be no proof that what we take as good 
evidence really is so, [thus] it is not sensible to 
demand one".89 Thus [Bartley concludes] Ayer's 
discussion begs the question and is itself a variety 
of fideism. (p.98.)
Fideism to Bartley seems to be any position which assumes
that its basic tenets are correct or that its particular
standards of rationality are true. (p.99)
If some particular standards of rationality are 
correct, then there can exist no other standards 
which are also correct but which can nevertheless 
invalidate the former as irrational ... this is 
precisely what is at issue, (ibid.)
89 A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge. Baltimore: 
Penguin Books, 1956, pp.75, 81.
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He concludes that "the rationalist position, unable to be
rationally based or justified, is finally based on
irrational moral commitment", (p.100.) In fact he goes
further to state that
the position of arch rationalists and anti­
theologians like Ayer and [Morton] White are closely 
parallel not only, as might be expected, to 
fideistic positions like contemporary Oxford 
theology, but also to that of the arch theologian 
and belligerently fideistic irrationalist, Karl 
Barth, (p.101.)
The question, of course, must be whether Bartley himself
escapes this structural similarity and establishes his
own logical starting point critically. Even Popper is
regarded as "fideistic". He has said,
the fundamental rationalist attitude is based upon 
an irrational decision, or upon faith in reason. 
Accordingly our choice is open. We are free to 
chose some form of irrationalism, even some radical 
or comprehensive form. But we are also free to 
choose a critical form of rationalism, one which 
frankly admits its limitations, and its basis in an 
irrational decision . . .90
Bartley is obviously close to Popper and influenced by
him, this, however is a major point of disagreement.
Apparently Bartley convinced Popper to accept the
former's distinction between justification and criticism
(p.105) and to change the terminology of the Open
Society, chapter 24 and to add an addendum against
relativism. However, Bartley's point here is that
an unjustifiable commitment to accept the results of 
argument is not strictly parallel to the 
unjustifiable commitment that existentialists, 
Protestant theologians, or Marxists speak about.
90 The Open Society and its Enemies, pp. 416-417. 
Also in Conjectures and Refutations, p.357.
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(p,106.)
This is because any argument on behalf of any position 
presupposes a precommitment to accept the results of 
argument.
Bartley proposes a "new framework" which
permits a rationalist to be characterised as one who 
is willing to entertain any position and holds all 
his positions, including his most fundamental 
standards, goals, and decisions, and his basic 
philosophical position itself, open to criticism; 
one who protects nothing from criticism by 
justifying it irrationally; one who never cuts off 
an argument by resorting to faith or irrational 
commitment, (p.118.)
This is "pancritical rationalism". As can be seen, it is
an integral part of Bartley's argument that positions
cannot finally be justified at all, since justification
is an archaic remnant of a bygone authoritarianism.
(p.89.) So final justification is not an element of his
new framework but rather critical assessment. As he puts
it :
if all justification - rational as well as 
irrational - is really abandoned, there is indeed no
need to justify irrationally a position that is
rationally unjustifiable. The position may be held 
rationally without needing any justification at 
all - provided that it can be and is held open to 
criticism and survives severe examination. The 
question of how well a position is justified differs 
utterly from the question of how criticizable it is, 
and how well it is criticised, (p.119.)
7.8.4. A Consideration of Bartley's Argument
As described by Bartley the difficulty for the 
liberal protestant theologian who would affirm the 
equality of reason (or unreason) in Christian (or any)
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religious commitment lies in the inability of the 
rationalist to assent to the historical Jesus, an assent 
that Bartley takes as a priori necessary to Christianity. 
However, (1) the position that no coherent picture is 
possible (accepted by Bartley, p.33) is more than a mere 
convenience to fideist Christian thought. It is itself 
the product of critical scholarship. As such it is 
fruitless to argue about the nature of the historical 
Christ. And (2), assent to the historical Jesus is 
typical of Eliade's identification of the concealment of 
the sacred in the profane; the replacement of 
traditional-mythical by historical authority, the 
identification of the historical as the real. The 
problem that
a truly Christian identity, ... demanded assent to 
the person of the historical Jesus - as he actually 
had been, not as one might have liked him to be, 
(above, p.330)
is a clear example of Eliade's notion. However, Bartley 
points out that Kirkegaard explicitly rejects this 
History/Sacrality equation. "History," Kirkegaard 
writes, "makes out Christ to be other than he truly 
is."91 In agreement with Kirkegaard, Bartley considers 
that any form of Christianity which is this-worldly and 
ethical rather than relying on special revelation is "in 
danger of losing its identity", (p.41.) The real 
irrationality of Barth (as presented by Bartley, v.p.45)
91 Quoted in Bartley, p. 41. The source of the 
quotation is unclear; perhaps Philosophical Fragments.
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lies in this insistence on a historical authority, or 
rather the restriction of the Word of God to a single 
event, the insistence on that event as total and 
exhaustive revelation of the sacred.
The limitation of reason may be the only serious 
argument upon which Kirkegaard and Barth relied, and it 
may be that these are the most influential of Christian 
scholars, (this may be why Christianity lacks influence 
among Western philosophers), but this is not the only 
serious argument for Christian commitment today. 
Bartley's whole argument shows this a prioristic turn, 
defining the problem to justify his own solution; 
throughout Bartley insists that the Protestant is 
irrational (eg. p.78), without having proven other than 
that Barth and Kirkegaard can be called this. As he 
rightly says, "Kirkegaard stresses not simply the 
existence but even the necessity of a conflict between 
religion and reason", (p.43.) However, in the light of 
this interpretation of Eliade, could it not be said that 
one is not aware of the full range and extent of the 
"reasons" which persuade one to a specific conclusion? 
One is aware of many supportive arguments, none of which 
are necessary or sufficient. The fact that committed 
believers can lose faith indicates that their commitment 
is supported by something frangible, it is dependent on 
something but not on conscious reason alone. If the 
rationalists themselves were supported by reason alone, 
would they not find more consensus amongst themselves?
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That they do not agree stems from the inability to define 
reason and rationality acceptably.
By rationalism Bartley does not mean the seventeenth 
century sense of the opposition to empiricism, but rather 
"the tradition whose members are dedicated to the task of 
trying to learn more about the world through the practice 
of critical argument", (p.xxvi n.3.) Also he states that 
rationalists are "eager to make all their decisions - 
moral, scientific or otherwise - rationally, on rational 
grounds, or with good reasons", (p.76.) This is not 
necessarily exclusive of religious conviction, both by 
empirical and logical derivation, unless the irrational 
commitment to doctrine be an a priori condition of being 
"religious". A belief of the "general revelation" kind 
could easily square the two. There are good and 
sufficient reasons for one's commitment, involved in 
one's interpretation of one's experience of life, though 
they may be too subtle, complex and personal to 
communicate. If there are such grounds for belief, 
despite their incommunicable nature, then the 
"irrationalist" is not "free" as Bartley suggests, but is 
just as constrained by environmental factors as the 
"rationalist". There are, in fact, no grounds for 
accepting that commitments are "necessarily arbitrary" 
rather than based on subtle, complex and personal data. 
Such a view is suggested by the fact that "Protestant 
existentialists often deny that this is a matter of 
picking and choosing, stressing that we are chosen", as
Bartley recognises.92
Rejecting "self-evidence" or "universality" as 
grounds for religious conviction, and having assumed a 
rejection of reason, Bartley can only conceive "whim" as 
the foundation of belief. Although this is not actually 
an argument but a statement dressed as such ("any belief 
which is not rooted in reason, self-evidence, or 
universality is mere whim"), it should be considered. Is 
religious conviction based on some support other than 
mere whimsy? If so what? (Are people willing to suffer 
and die on a whim?) Are self-evidence and universality 
the only arbiters of reason? Do rationalists hold only 
those opinions rooted in self-evidence and universality? 
This restores the tu quoque in a slightly different form. 
Not that all opinions are finally irrational, but that in 
experiential fact people do accept profound convictions 
which are not based on the conscious application of a 
reasoned process. A committed religious believer assumes 
that there are good and sufficient reasons for their 
belief, Bartley assumes that there are not. The 
difference may be mainly that the former has a tendency 
to accept that the grounds of belief will be mysterious, 
inaccessible, the latter insists that they must be 
accessible. This establishes a slightly different form 
of the argument, evading all these difficulties by
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92 p.77, n.9. This can be likened to asking whether 
we actually "free to choose" our aesthetic preferences, 
for example.
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stating that the reasons for one's convictions transcend 
argumentative logic in the holistic sense that the 
commitment is greater than the sum of the supportive 
reasons since one cannot adequately, consciously, 
consider all reasons simultaneously in detail and in all 
their complex relations. Although this is still an 
argument from the limits of rationality, it is not a 
formal but an existential limitation. It is rarely 
adequate to transfer such an existential problem of 
conflicting truth beliefs into the forum of pure logic. 
Although this does still tend to a form of relativism the 
issue can still be addressed by verbal argument, exposing 
opponents to the reasons which add to one's own 
convictions to discover whether those reasons carry more 
weight than opposing ones. This certainly does not make 
nonsense of historical development etc. but is integral 
with it. Bartley himself accepts that even the 
"pancritical rationalist" still "holds countless 
unexamined propositions and assumptions, many of which 
may be false", (p.121.) Assessments of validity are 
already made, based on non-conscious, complex reasons.93 
The fact is that most people do establish their own 
"ultimate concerns" without conscious rational procedures 
- thus empirical, logical procedures should lead us to 
the conclusion that the establishment of ultimate
93 I.e. "chaotic" in the sense of pre-formal and 
unpredictable. This itself lends a new revalorisation to 
the symbolic structure of order out of chaos.
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concerns is not consciously rational. That is to say not 
describable in terms of logical rational argument. So 
the establishment qua establishment of ultimate concerns 
may be beyond criticism, but elements of experience 
claimed to be constitutive and supportive can be 
personally assessed and judged, and one's concurrence can 
be (and is) given or withheld.
In further clarifying his position on rationality 
Bartley quotes the Fontana/Harper Dictionary of Modern 
Thought that rationalism denies "the acceptability of 
beliefs founded on anything but experience and reasoning, 
deductive or inductive", (p.86.) My point is that all 
beliefs are so founded, although not necessarily on 
direct experience and conscious reasoning. Different 
life experience and different styles of reason, deeply 
conditioned by cultural tradition, will produce different 
beliefs. These differences need not be justified by 
appeal to irrational criteria. According to Bartley's 
reasoning they cannot be justified at all, since 
justification is an archaic remnant of a bygone 
authoritarianism. That the same critique can produce 
different reactions in different auditors leaves the 
pluralist position unscathed. Eliade's theory seems to 
be that the decipherment of the existential situation 
reveals the relationship of the individual with the 
sacred (i.e., that which is apprehended as the real, the 
true, etc.), and therefore conditions what one apprehends 
to be the rules of reason. The existential situation is
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one's own personal experience, and the means of 
decipherment are the rules of reason. It is questionable 
whether the latter have ever been successfully 
universalised, and even if they were, since the former 
cannot be universalised, the resulting relationship 
revealed thereby will always be relative to the 
individual. Of course, standardising the rules of reason 
would be desirable if only for the increase in effective 
communication, but we cannot standardise experience, and 
so we cannot hope for complete consensus of the beliefs 
"founded upon experience and reason".
7.8.5. Conclusions
As we have seen, Bartley's argument is forced to 
consign most thinker who would wish to be considered 
rational to the same fate as the "irrationalists", even 
Ayer and Popper. On the other hand he has shown 
committed "irrationalists" like Barth to be dependent on 
rational forms of argument and attempted "justification". 
It would seem that as irrationalism is "infected" with 
rationalism, so rationalism is infected with 
irrationalism. A schema such as underlies Eliade's work, 
recognising a presystematic rationale, a coherence which 
precedes methodic thought, would account for this. 
Rationality is suffused with irrationality and vice 
versa, since both are based on a perceived coherence 
which preceded rational reflection, yet which was itself 
possessed of a system, and thus was in some way rational.
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Because of this any attempt to distinguish absolutely 
between reason and unreason will inevitably run into 
difficulty. This is precisely what happens to Bartley.
As he says,
it is not irrational to hold a belief that cannot be 
derived from - i.e., justified by - the rational 
authority unless its denial can be derived from the 
rational authority, (p.116.)
This creates a confusion of authoritarian
justificationism and criticism:
to criticise a position, one must show either that 
it cannot be derived from, or else it conflicts 
with, the rational authority, which is not itself 
open to criticism, (ibid.)
The question, of course, is as to the source of the
"rational authority". Since he states that a
position may be held rationally without needing any 
justification at all - provided that it can be and 
is held open to criticism and survives severe 
examination, (above, p.335)
Bartley's answer to the question of the establishment of
rational authority is constant criticism. But since more
than one position on the same point evidently can survive
severe examination, and constant criticism, relativism
becomes an unavoidable outcome of "pancritical
rationalism". Two persons, even applying the same
criteria of reason to their differing personal
experience, will achieve differing conclusions, which
will nevertheless be equally correct for each of them.
Bartley himself says that the
objective structure of belief will be relative to 
the basic critical statements we accept ... If we 
were to make these basic critical statements at 
which we stop absolute, then we would get
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subjectivity or relativism of the vicious kind. But 
this we have not done. (p.122, n.14.)
Apparently Bartley and Eliade are finally in agreement
that the real problem of rationalism, or of any form of
human thought, is to assume one's own absolute
unquestionable and complete correctness, (v. below ch.9,
§.7) As observed above (p.331) Bartley takes fideism to
be any position which assumes that its basic tenets are
correct or that its particular standards of rationality
are true. (p.99.) Similarly, although more in the style
of an historian of religions than a philosopher, Eliade
states,
if Time, seen as Maya, is itself a manifestation of 
the Divinity, to believe in Time is not itself a 
"bad action": "bad action" is to believe that 
nothing else exists, nothing outside of time.94
Thus, commitment, in the sense of insisting that I am
absolutely and exhaustively and exclusively correct in my
apprehension of the real, and thus cannot be criticised
and need never alter my beliefs even if I am, is a
position repugnant to both scholars. However,
commitment, in the sense of having recourse to a prior
apprehension of the real (a hierophany in Eliade's terms,
for Bartley evidently the apprehension that constant
criticism should provide rational authority) is also
basic to both scholars. Bartley accepts, along with
"countless unexamined propositions and assumptions" that
"pancritical rationalism" is desirable. He believes in
94 Images and Symbols , p . 91.
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it and to that extent he is committed to it and one must 
say, "tu quoque, Professor Bartley". His insistence that 
his commitment is not absolute, unquestionable, or 
unchangeable is wholly admirable. However, his claim 
that "pancritical rationalism" is the only fully rational 
position, that is that it exclusively makes full use of 
the exercise of reason, which is our only guarantee of 
the truth and hence "reality" of our beliefs, smacks of 
the very exclusivism which he seems to attack.
Certainly, these arguments do not finally convince 
me that Bartley himself, or any true "pancritical 
rationalist" escapes religious commitment in the sense 
which it has been interpreted here, and hence do not 
disprove any of the contentions made concerning the 
ubiquity of religious belief and behaviour, or disrupt 
the coherence of Eliade's thought. That that commitment 
is ir-rational and thus not open to criticism is not a 
necessary concomitant of that thought. Rather it is pre- 
rational and not open to conscious inspection as it 
happens. It can certainly, and I would agree with 
Bartley that it should, be open to later consideration 
and criticism. I am forced to speculate as to what 
precisely Bartley means by "uncriticizable" or "accepted 
as uncriticizable"? It would appear that he means not 
open or susceptible to rejection despite severe 
criticism. As long as one person holds a position 
(despite the critical argument which have swayed all 
others away from it) then that position could be said to
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be uncriticizable. Contrariwise if a million people hold 
a position (despite the critical arguments that have 
swayed one other away) then that position could still be 
said to be uncriticizable. No argument is guaranteed to 
achieve the rejection or acceptance of a position, so 
acceptance of any position which is rejected by any other 
can be seen as "cutting off an argument by resorting to 
faith", (p.118). The basic point of the tu quoque as I 
have reformulated it is that the conclusion of any and 
all arguments is a position of faith since no argument is 
the source of apodictic knowledge. Since apostasy does 
occur - even amongst Barthians - it can be argued that 
despite their protestations to the contrary they do not 
accept uncritically their own faith. The question is: at 
what point does criticism become conviction? Granted the 
tu quoque argument loses its sting against one who 
insists that all his convictions are open to revision or 
rejection, however, does not the very possibility of a 
lapse of faith indicate that even a committed Barthian, 
for example, is also open to revision and rejection in 
fact?
Just as early Christian apologists used their moral 
life as an argument for their theological justification 
so Bartley is using the intellectual life of the 
"pancritical rationalist" for the philosophical 
justification of his position. The fact that the 
pancritical rationalist (claims) to hold all convictions 
open does not and cannot philosophically elevate his
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position above all others. How many would accept the 
title pancritical rationalist in this sense but still 
disagree with each other? Are we not all pancritical 
rationalists in fact, despite an occasionally expressed 
desire to be other? What does it mean, apart from the 
admittedly honest methodology of admitting that one could 
always "change one's mind"? And what, then, is 
commitment apart from the equally honest admission that 
one does not wish to change one's mind?
Chapter Eight 
Ivan Strenski's Support for Eliade's Theory of Myth.
In the preceding considerations of some of Eliade's 
critics I have generally restricted myself to answering 
their objections. However, it has, I think, been 
increasingly evident that Eliade's thought, interpreted 
in this way, is capable not only of sustaining itself as 
coherent and resisting these criticisms, but of itself 
providing an explanation for the source of both the 
misapprehensions and the antipathy which fuel the 
critics. In a more detailed consideration of one of 
Eliade's most recent and most virulent critics I hope now 
to make that implication explicit.
In his book Four Theories of Myth in Twentieth 
Century History and in his earlier article in Adrian 
Cunningham (ed.), The Theory of Myth: Six Studies, Ivan 
Strenski gives a powerful critique of Mircea Eliade's 
theory of myth. He concludes that Eliade disdains 
history, disregards falsifiability, assumes the a priori 
reality of the activity of the sacred, makes
B. S. Rennie Strenski's Support 348
methodological prescriptions which are disastrous for the 
study of religion, and he argues that the traditionalist 
and mythico-religious feelings of the Romanian right-wing 
Iron Guard have produced Eliade's ontological and 
religious viewpoint. It is my contention that close 
scrutiny of Strenski's work reveals not only a lack of 
familiarity with the materials in question and thus a 
partial autonomy from historical and cultural data, but 
also a degree of polemical zeal which actually supports 
Eliade's understanding of myth. Finally, I will argue, 
the application of Strenski's critique to Eliade can only 
serve to reduce the significance of the latter's 
writings, whereas the application of Eliade's theory 
lends greater significance, not only to myth itself, but 
also to Strenski's work.
In Four Theories of Myth, Strenski suggests that 
"myth" is, in fact, non-existent. Or, rather, it is a 
fabrication of "the myth industry" whose real "export" is 
literature in two classes, critical theory and "applied" 
writing about myths, (p.2.) In this book, as the title 
suggests, he probes the work of four theorists: Ernst 
Cassirer, Bronislaw Malinowski, Mircea Eliade, and Claude 
Lévi-Strauss. Recognizing that theorists "assume and 
apply far more than they let on; they trade in the 
currency of their cultures much more than even they 
perhaps realise", (ibid.) Strenski
propose[s] a radical shift from the "textual"
approach to the search for common ground in the
study of myth: not just "text" but text in context,
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informed by intention ... appreciating the role of 
authorial intention ... (p.9.)
He then goes on to ask the questions,
given a certain context or framework of 
significance, what did our theorists intend to 
accomplish? Why did they care about "myth"? Why 
did they care as they did? Given an understanding 
of the contextual conventions making sense of 
discourse about "myth" at a crucial time in the 
lives of our theorists, why did they bother to 
engage the subject? Why did they intend to engage 
it as they did? (p.10.)
This is an admirable proposal and the questions raised
are important and meaningful ones, particularly the
further question, "do any of our modern theorists
understand why past theorists thought they were right?".
(p.5.)
It was, perhaps, stylistically unfortunate, spoiling
the excitement of the chase, the dramatic suspense of
original research, that Strenski had already answered the
question concerning his subjects' understanding of
earlier theorists in the negative and had anticipated the
answer to his questions concerning motivations with the
statement that
like Malinowski, Lévi-Strauss simply asserts another 
viewpoint amid the plurality, without giving us a 
sense of why this view is compelling ... They want 
to dominate the field. Thus, the secret locked up 
in the ploys of our theorists is their move to 
corner the "market", their intellectual imperialist 
grab for power, (p.5.)
Eliade and Lévi-Strauss are considered equally guilty of
this "intellectual imperialism" and its concomitant grab
for power, (p.7.) Here, before the case is considered,
is Strenski's final reply to the above questions.
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Shifting his metaphors between capitalism and 
imperialism, he has concluded that the motivating factors 
of his four chosen theorists are personal and selfish, 
based in a desire to "corner the market" and in a "grab 
for power". This, he is suggesting, is what they 
intended to accomplish, this is why they cared, this is 
why they engaged the subject. Why they engaged the 
subject "precisely as they did" Strenski seeks to answer 
by way of a consideration of the lives and backgrounds 
which are contexts to the theories produced. This must,
I feel, be a valid approach as the institutional settings 
and personal intentions which condition a scholar's 
expressions are all too often ignored.1
Having no great depth of acquaintance with his other 
three subjects but being specifically concerned with the 
thought of Mircea Eliade I will inspect Strenski's 
attempt to substantiate his aggressive claims in that 
specific instance. His case, as I said, proposes "a 
measure of contextualism informed by an appreciation of 
the role of authorial intention in helping us understand 
theories". One of his expressed desires is to understand 
"why past theorists thought they were right", (p.5.)
This promises to be both widely informed and sensitive; 
to consider the whole context of the scholar as well as
1 This approach had already been successfully applied 
by, for example, L.S. Feuer, who shows how the cultural 
context of Nils Bohr's youth could have helped his 
decision to look for a non-mechanistic model of the atom; 
Einstein and the Generation of Science. New York: Basic 
Books, 1974.
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providing a sympathetic insight into his subjective 
motivation. Strenski's conclusions are based on several 
elements, some of which are actually "textual" and some 
of which are "contextual".
Strenski begins his analysis
by asking what Eliade takes a "myth" to be. [He 
does] so because [Eliade] himself never offers a 
fully ramified statement on the matter, (p.71.)
This is not actually a criticism considering Strenski's
opening statement that
myth is everything and nothing at the same time ... 
there is no such "thing" as myth. There may be the 
word "myth", but the word names numerous and 
conflicting "objects" of inquiry, not a "thing" with 
its name written on it. (p.l.)
Accepting this to be the case, offering a fully ramified
statement is hardly a feasible aim; however, there is, as
Strenski recognises, a complex understanding of "myth"
involved in Eliade's writings.
In his earlier article Strenski stated, "besides
functioning to bring about ontological orientation, myths
originate in the need for and experience of the same".2
Now he states solely that myths "originate in the human
experience of a yearning for such a fundamental
orientation".3 He has neglected the contention that
myths originate in the experience of an orientation as
well as in the yearning for (further) orientation. This
2 "Mircea Eliade: Some Theoretical Problems," in 
Adrian Cunningham (ed.), The Theory of Myth: Six Studies,
p.64. Emphasis added.
3 Four Theories, p.l.
addition alone would suffice to give Eliade's concept of
myth a significant content, indicative of the existential
situation of mankind, to which Strenski henceforward pays
no heed. Thus, while Strenski is quite correct that
Eliade does make this existential experience of
orientation a focal point in cross-cultural comparisons
of mythologies, he neglects to deal with the experience
of orientation as experience. For example, the
experience of orientation in three dimensions, largely
due to humanity's vertical posture,4 may be similar to
Tylor’s notion of animism in seeking to provide a cross-
cultural universal, but unlike Tylor1s notion it is not
so easily contested.
Given certain of Eliade's statements it is
understandable how Strenski can reach the conclusion that
he does concerning Eliade's belief in creation:
narrowly speaking, Eliade believes both that a real 
creation of things in time occurred, and that all 
subsequent "creation" stories, in the broad sense, 
actuallv refer to the first creation of the world bv 
God.5
Eliade states, for example, that "the creation of the 
world being the pre-eminent instance of creation, the 
cosmogony becomes the exemplary model for 'creation' of 
every kind".6 However, further reading of Eliade soon 
reveals that, in context, Eliade's references to
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5 Four Theories, p.73.
6 Myth and Reality, p.21.
"creation" could equally indicate Biblical Genesis or the 
Big Bang. The idea that the cosmogony is the exemplary 
model for all creation myths does not necessarily imply 
belief in a specific cosmogony. The narrative model of 
the cosmogony is intended rather than any specific 
description of the origins of the cosmos. This is 
clearly indicated by Eliade's observation that "the 
cosmogonic myth is 'true' because the existence of the 
world is there to prove it", (ibid., p.6.) This cannot 
apply exclusively to any particular cosmogony, but only 
generally to the narrative model of cosmogony. While the 
temporal and ontological priority of cosmogony are 
undeniably claimed to be characteristics of the 
narrative, nothing which Strenski quotes, or which I have 
read from Eliade, exceeds this claim. Only when we are 
faced with seriously conflicting cosmologies does the 
logic of the cosmos justifying the cosmogony become 
problematic, and this is a specific problem of "modern" 
humanity. As has already been mentioned, "traditional" 
humanity deferred to the authority of tradition, by 
definition, (p.53, n.33) It could be said that 
"traditional" humanity lived in a "monomythic" world, and 
was not faced with a plurality of conflicting myths which 
demanded contradictory valorisations.
The very fact that Eliade could be interpreted as 
referring to a specific cosmogony which is the model of 
all creation stories is characteristic of his style: he 
writes in such a way as to admit coherence to belief in a
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cosmogony in its own sphere of reference, without 
deferring to any specific cosmogony and to the 
provincialism that this would entail. However this may 
be, Strenski refuses to allow that Eliade's "interest in 
the priority of creation stories" might be phenomenal or 
taxonomic. "If it were," Strenski insists, "his view 
would be just as arbitrary and/or conventional as any 
other."7 Yet he criticises Eliade precisely because his 
view is. finally arbitrary, being based on "personal 
intuition" and little more,8 thus reinstating the 
possibility that the latter's concepts are phenomenal and 
taxonomic. This does leave the charge of potential 
arbitrariness, as Eliade himself was certainly aware. In 
the preface to From Primitives to Zen, he has stated,
"any thematic classification of religious documents 
implies a certain amount of arbitrariness". That charge 
is resisted by an appeal to precisely those historical 
documents which Strenski takes Eliade to disdain.
That Eliade disdained historical documents is a 
charge which has been levelled by several critics as we 
have seen and which is taken up by Strenski under the 
label of "anti-historicism". Actually, this epithet was 
originally applied to Eliade by a more supportive 
scholar, Guildford Dudley III, with reference to Eliade's
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7 Four Theories, p. 73.
8 Strenski reports from Prof. P. Hammond of the 
University of California at Santa Barbara that Eliade 
admitted this himself. Ibid., p.70, n.2.
opposition to the post-Hegelian philosophy of history and 
never implied a disdain for documentary evidence. 
Strenski's case for the accusation of "anti-historicism" 
is most clearly stated in his earlier article where he 
contends that history is disqualified from Eliade's 
explanations of religion because it "neglects some 
constituent 'interior' dimension of human existence".9 
In fact, Strenski and Eliade appear to agree that if 
history were, in Strenski's words, "to exclude some vital 
feature from its account, such as human intentions", then 
it would be inadequate as an explanation, (ibid, p.45.) 
Strenski quotes Eliade as saying that "the historian of 
religion sensu stricto can never ignore that which is 
historically concrete".10 He further refers to Eliade's 
criticism of the aim of history as "merely to piece 
together an event or series of events", which, he 
protests "history proper" does not do.11 Why should he 
then accuse Eliade of "disdaining history" when he agrees 
that history proper "is not all positivist history",12 
and thus that the history of religions is inadequate if 
reduced to a mere chronicle?
That Strenski seeks further to support his claim 
that Eliade "disdains" history with the quotation that
9 "Some Theoretical Problems," p.45.
10 ibid., p.45. Eliade, Images and Symbols. Studies 
in Religious Symbolism, pp.32f.
11 Patterns in Comparative Religion, p.5.
12 "Some Theoretical Problems," p.45.
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"religious documents are at the same time historical 
documents",13 shows that marvellous aptitude for 
perceiving facts to fit preconceived theories that one is 
more accustomed to encountering in religious polemics.
So does his attempt to ascribe to Eliade the logically 
incoherent view that "a plenary history gives meaning 
both "internal" and "external" but it falls short of the 
higher, transcendent, "prehistoric" meanings which 
condition the lower or historical meanings".14 This 
concept of a "plenary" history is introduced with no 
explanation or textual support (surely, the only 
"plenary" history is the event itself, all later 
description is historiography and necessarily limited by 
its persective). Then Strenski proceeds to attempt to 
make Eliade responsible for the self-contradictory phrase 
"a plenary history ... falls short". He goes on in this 
earlier article to interpolate phrases into Eliade's 
writings which were never there. With no more support 
than an unquoted reference to The Myth of the Eternal 
Return, pp. 34-35, where Eliade discusses the nature of 
archaic ontology, Strenski proceeds to read "logical, 
chronological and ontological" into Eliade's thought, 
(ibid., p.46.) Surely, a scholar should exercise extreme 
caution before slipping a word such as "ontologically" 
into a context where an author did not actually use it.
B. S. Rennie Strenski's Support 356
13 The Two and the One, p.196.
14 "Some Theoretical Problems," pp.46f.
As I pointed out in my detailed consideration of The Myth 
of the Eternal Return the opening sentence of that book 
states clearly that Eliade intends to study the 
"conceptions" of ontology that "can be read from the 
behaviour" of archaic humanity, (p.3.) This in no way 
justifies the ascriptions of ontological assumptions 
which Strenski, like da Silva and Allen, proceeds to 
make.
What is the reason for such a concerted effort to 
discredit Eliade's thought? To adapt Strenski's own 
words, given a certain context or framework of 
significance, what does he intend to accomplish? Why 
does he care as he does? Given an understanding of the 
contextual conventions making sense of (academic) 
discourse, why did he engage Eliade as he did? I will 
return to these questions later.
Now, however, I wish to pass from a consideration of 
the "textual" analysis of Eliade's thought to the 
"contextual". The contemporary history of Eliade's 
native Romania is not as obscure as Strenski seems to 
think. Mac Linscott Ricketts's Mircea Eliade; The 
Romanian Roots goes a great distance towards revealing 
Eliade's sources and the context of his early years. 
Unfortunately it was not available when Strenski first 
published his Four Theories of Myth. It must, however, 
be stated that Strenski's misinterpretations of Eliade's 
historical context cannot simply be explained by lack of 
information. For example, volume one of the
B. S. Rennie Strenski's Support 357
B . S . Rennie Strenski's Support 358
Autobiography, published in 1981, makes it clear that 
Eliade did not "detach himself from the Indian scene of 
1932 in order to devote himself to writing", as Strenski 
states.15 In fact he was recalled to Romania to fulfil 
his national service, a duty which he felt himself 
compelled to discharge.16 Nor was his "detachment" from 
Romania entirely a matter of choice. Strenski actually 
quotes him as saying, "it was a departure which saved my
life".17 Why then does Strenski insist that "we can know
little of the real significance of Eliade's choice to
leave his own country", (ibid., p.88.)
His consideration of Eliade's fictional production 
also suffers from conflict with recorded history. The 
claim that "creating fiction seems not only to have been 
Eliade's first love, but perhaps his truest", is 
unsubstantiated. While writing in general was compulsive 
for Eliade, and he considered occasional immersion in 
fantasy and fiction as necessary for his mental health, 
both Eliade's own words18 and the testament of his 
literary legacy bear out the fact that "scientific"
15 Four Theories , p.88.
16 Autobiography, vol.I. Journey East, Journey West. 
1907-1938, p.208.
17 Four Theories , p.101.
18 In a letter of 1934, after the publication of the 
novels Isabel si apele diavolului, Maitreyi, and Lumina 
ce se stinge. Eliade referred to his work on Yoga as "my 
first book." His other publication he refers to as, "a 
mere passe-temps, a safety valve against overwork." V. 
Ricketts, Romanian Roots, vol. I, p.745.
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analysis of the human existential situation as recorded
by the documents of historical religions was indeed his
greatest obsession. In fact, it seems that he almost
gave up fiction in 1948, despairing of an audience since
he felt capable of producing literature only in Romanian,
until his wife, Christinel, persuaded him otherwise.19
Strenski is also aware that Eliade's "longstanding
affection for dream and fantasy may have been put aside
for a while in the 1930s".20 How, then, can he justify
his conclusion?
Similar defects beset Strenski's characterization of
Ionescu's philosophy. The description of the latter's
"irrationalism" as inferring that
salvation was possible only if people gave up their 
desire for knowledge and sacrificed their intellects 
on the altar of religious faith, (ibid., p.93.)
betrays a striking ignorance of Ionescu's philosophy of
mutually exclusive "planes" or "levels" of existence.21
It also reveals the real villain of the piece: Strenski's
major motivation seems to be to oppose any appeal to
19 Autobiography. vol.II, p.132.
20 Four Theories , p . 9 7 .
21 V. Ricketts, op. cit. pp. 91-126 on the philosophy 
of Ionescu. Esp. p.102. "Ionescu's reputation for being 
an "irrationalist" is well founded, then, in the sense 
that he opposed all rationalistic "philosophies" which 
affirmed explicitly or by implication that the world of 
time and space - which for him is the realm proper to 
reason - is the only realm, or that the only means of 
cognition is by inductive reasoning from sense data."
[The text erroneously reads "denied explicitly." Prof. 
Ricketts has confirmed this erratum.]
intuition or "introspectively-detected information"22 as 
utterly removing a stable basis of knowledge. Strenski 
has wrongly assumed that "Eliade has taken the self­
authentication of intuition and introspection as the 
epistemological grounds for his discipline", (ibid., 
p.49.) If that were the case Eliade would not have 
stressed the need for the generalist historian of 
religion to be constantly aware of the developments in 
specialised fields and to diligently return to original 
sources whenever possible.23 Confusion is possible, 
however, since Eliade seems to assume that for homo 
religiosus the self-authenticating appearance of 
intuitions24 permits the recognition of the sacred/real 
in the profane/contingent. In Strenski's case it appears 
that he has his own self-authenticating intuition, which 
some of us do not share, as regards the plausibility of 
immediate empirical and falsifiable claims. It is this 
observable tendency to accept one's own intuitions as 
self-authenticating which is given logical priority in 
Eliade's understanding of religious data.
It is not the case that the historian of religion's 
own intuitions as regards his data have logical priority
22 "Some Theoretical Problems," p.49.
23 v. eg. The Sacred and the Profane, p.15; The 
History of Religious Ideas, p.xiii; Images and Symbols, 
p.163; and also Seymour Cain, "Mircea Eliade; Attitudes 
Towards History," p.13, and Charles Long, "The 
Significance for Modern Man of Mircea Eliade's Work," 
p.133.
24 esp. "archetypal intuitions," v. Ricketts, p.1151.
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and are thus the epistemological foundation of his 
discipline. The foundation is, and always has been, the 
original source documents and the researches of 
specialists, including fieldwork. Exercising Strenski's 
own "contextual" approach it would be interesting to 
investigate how Strenski came to these conclusions, since 
this cannot be directly inferred from a reading of 
Eliade's works. Unfortunately I lack the data to do so. 
Thus it is merely internally-generated speculation to 
suggest that he has perhaps encountered supposed 
"followers" of Eliade who did apply this cavalier, 
authentication-by-intuition approach to the history of 
religions.
Whatever may be the case, this fear of "autonomy
from historical and cultural data" seems to be a negative
influence on Strenski's scholarly deportment. Although
he has said that
if "influences" are claimed one needs to show that 
there are true similarities between the thinkers in 
question, some sort of awareness of their 
"influences", and significant dependence on the 
thought of the "influence",25
he continues as if merely stating such an admirable 
methodological caveat were sufficient. He certainly does 
not seem to put it into practice. This is true of Nae 
Ionescu's influence on the young Eliade and it is doubly 
so of the influence of the Romanian extreme rightist 
movement, the Legion of the Archangel Michael, frequently
25 Four Theories , p. 9.
referred to as the Iron Guard.26 Strenski is well aware
of the dubious and speculative nature of his case.
"Readers," he says, "should also be cautious in drawing
inferences concerning Ionescu's (and especially Eliade's)
involvement in legionary politics."27 Where Strenski
fails to attempt to prove any "significant dependence" on
the thought of Ionescu, he fails to indicate even a
"similarity" with the Iron Guard. However, this does not
prevent his boldly stated conclusion that the
traditionalism and mythico-religious feelings of the
Romanian right "become" Eliade's ontological judgment of
the world and the basis of his dominant religious
viewpoint, (ibid., p.102.) The only logical support for
this is that, the historical facts of Eliade's life
having been considered,
none of this denies the affinity between the ideas 
of the Legion and the Romanian right-wing 
irrationalist traditionalists, nor the intellectual 
home Eliade found there, (p.97.)
Not only has Strenski failed to establish such a
connection, he has failed, as we saw above pp. 350-4, to
demonstrate an accurate understanding of what Eliade's
judgment and viewpoint might be. Thus he cannot be in a
position to determine accurately what affinities that
judgement may or may not have with other ideas.
Certainly Eliade was influenced by his existential
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below, appendix A.
27 Four Theories, p . 9 6 .
situation and his particular cultural background as was 
argued above (pp.l76f., p.190). His experiences as a 
citizen of a nation "marked by the fatality of history"28 
unquestionably influenced his attitude to the "terror of 
history", for example. However, it is a considerable 
progression from this to the attribution of the basis of 
Eliade's judgement of the world to a specific political 
movement.
It should be recognised that Strenski's 
consideration of the affinities between Eliade and the 
philosopher-poet, Lucian Blaga is considerably more 
reasonable and justified. I imagine that Eliade would 
not have objected to such a comparison.29 Strenski's 
conclusions, however, still bear the stamp of a . &  
polemical attitude. For example, he has stated that the 
traditional Romanian poem, the Mioritza. concerns "a 
nuptial death for the sake of others". It is about 
"death both as a defiant gesture and as an heroic, 
selfless act of comradeship".30 Nothing could be further 
from the truth. The text of the Mioritza (a prose 
translation of which can be found on pp.227-8 of Eliade's 
Zalmoxis, which Strenski cites) concerns rather a 
shepherd's transformation of a meaningless death, which 
benefits no-one except his murderers, into a mythical
28 The Myth of the Eternal Return, p.152, n. 11.
29 On Eliade and Lucian Blaga see Ricketts, Romanian 
Roots, pp.857-864.
30 Four Theories , p. 99.
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identification with Nature. A creative valorisation of
an otherwise meaningless event. A frequent criticism of
this ballad was, in fact, that it valorised a submissive
resignation to death. Nor does Eliade at any point in
his consideration of the scholarship centred upon this
ballad indicate it to be "part of universal human
nature", (ibid., p.127.) In fact Eliade concludes,
the "adherence" of a whole people to this folk 
masterpiece nevertheless remains significant, and it 
is impossible to conceive of an adequate history of 
Romanian culture which should fail to analyze and 
interpret that profound kinship.31
This misreading of the Mioritza, carried over into
Strenski's discussion of Blaga and "Volkish" themes,
serves further to falsely associate Eliade with some
"heroic", violent ideal reminiscent of the "aryan" ideals
of Nazi Germany. Considerable light can be thrown on
Eliade's conception of the Mioritza by a reading of his
play Iphiqenia. (v. above pp.223f.)
Despite the accepted importance of context, text, as
the deliberate statement of the author's intention, is
still of enormous significance. Having failed to
establish the extent of Eliade's connection with the
Romanian right, having repeatedly warned against
"political labels" and "leaping to conclusions",32
Strenski, with no more support than the assertion that
history does not deny his intuition, requires more than a
31 Zalmoxis, the Vanishing God, p.256. Emphasis 
added.
32 Four Theories, pp.96 & 213, n. 97.
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questionable textual understanding of Eliade before
leaping to the conclusion, whence, in fact, he started.
He has taken an admirable and viable methodological
stance and rached over-simplified, hastily drawn
conclusions based on insufficient data and by failing to
control his own preconceptions.
Strenski's misreadings and debatable contextualising
aside, his major objection against Eliade's viewpoint is
that, conditioned by his antipathy to actual history as
evinced by his literary device of subsuming history in
fantasy, Eliade is led to a
disregard for a crucial canon of good behaviour in 
the present scholarly community— falsifiability.
Say what one will about the word "history", Eliade's 
decision to operate with methodological notions such 
as the "transhistorical" and "non-temporal" 
effectively means that his claims are unfalsifiable 
by any criterion grounded in the human world of time 
and space, (p.108)
This unfalsifiability eventually leads to "granting the
same plausibility to transcendent religious claims as to
any other", (ibid.) As Strenski said in his earlier
article, "any valid explanation of religion requires, to
Eliade's mind, the assumption of the reality of the
activity of the sacred".33 This is evidently such an
horrendous methodological sacrilege (and I use the word
advisedly, as I hope will become clear), that Strenski is
prepared to engage it as violently as he does. His
belief that Eliade's "methodological prescriptions are
disastrous for the study of religion" (ibid., p.42.)
33 "Some Theoretical Problems," p.47.
inspired his analysis. But was he right in 1973? Is his 
assumption in his more recent analysis, founded as it is 
in his own "internal" and "external" contexts, 
justifiable?
In fact, the best examples Strenski could adduce 
from Eliade's actual writing in support of this claim of 
the assumed ontology of the sacred are from Images and 
Symbols, p.32f, that man's existential situation "is not 
always a historic one in the sense of being conditioned 
solely by the contemporaneous historical moment", and 
from The Two and the One, pp.196f, that a complete 
description of the history, diffusion and evaluation of 
the symbol of the sacred tree, does not exhaust its 
significance, "the meaning of this symbol, what it 
reveals. what it shows in its quality as a religious 
symbol". Neither of these really supports Strenski's 
claim. Man is. conditioned by other than "the 
contemporaneous historical moment". He is conditioned by 
his awareness of the past and by his expectations of the 
future, that is not to say the actual historical past and 
future which collapse into the immediate historical 
moment, but the meanings which both may have for a 
specific individual. Those meanings are realised by the 
interpretations of the human mind as it actively 
constitutes inter-related systems of significance. Even 
though those significations are conditioned by humanity's 
real experience (that is to say revelations of reality in 
hierophanies) they are none the less original and
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unpredictable. They thus transcend the purely causal 
relationships of physical reality.34
Similarly, the symbol of the sacred tree is not 
exhausted by such descriptions because they do not 
dictate its present and future significance. In order to 
apply to novel situations not specifically considered 
earlier when the symbol, myth, or ritual came into being, 
the significance of a myth must be "open" to novel 
interpretations and applications. It must transcend the 
limitations of formal logical definition. That is to say 
its meaning remains potential,35 A statement or 
narrative may come to mean something which it does not 
yet mean when it is applied under new circumstances. 
Religious faith consists, in part, in the ascription of 
the possibility of such infinite future significance to 
particular symbols, myths, and rituals.
Although there is a sense in which Eliade does 
require the assumption of the reality of the sacred, this 
is because he identifies reality and the sacred.36 The 
sacred is that which is apprehended as the real by homo 
reliqiosus, humanity in so far as we apprehend reality.
34 For further exposition of determined but 
unpredictable phenomena, v. James Gleick, Chaos: Making a 
New Science, pp.250-255.
35 Cf. Culianu's insistence that one cannot finally 
succeed in deciphering religious symbols, p.208 above.
36 Egs. "Cosmical Homology and Yoga, p.188; Myths, 
Dreams and Mysteries, pp.14,23; "The Structure of 
Religious Symbols," p.506; The Sacred and the Profane, 
pp.12,28.
This is an eminently sound procedural assumption which 
becomes problematic only when "real" is equated with 
"available to sensory perception;" an old saw which has 
lost more than a few teeth. It is unnecessary to go into 
the question of the constitutive characteristics of 
"reality" here. Suffice it to say that Strenski's 
implicit a priori rejection of the reality of the sacred 
is a less than helpful methodological assumption which 
militates towards a perception of the adherents of any 
religion (other than my own) as at best misguided (where 
I have access to the true guide) or at worst stark mad 
(where I, of course, am sane).
According to Eliade's methodological postulate of 
the equation of the sacred and the real, those who 
believe that they have an unshakable, apodictic authority 
by which to guarantee the reality of their own claims are 
operating a belief of a religious nature. Actually, the 
"plausibility" of any claim, transcendental or otherwise, 
can only be objectively measured by the number of people 
who make that claim.37 Strenski's unqualified 
restriction of the "human world" to that of "time and 
space" (above, p.362), itself a strangely ill-defined 
concept except in the context of relativity theory, where 
its application to the human world becomes problematic,
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37 Similarly, the significance of any folkloric or 
mythic element is, in some measure, indicated by the 
scope of its geographical and temporal dissemination, its 
"capacity to adapt to geographical and regional 
realities". Eliade, Zalmoxis. p.240.
is itself a metaphysical and therefore transcendent 
claim. This immediately goes beyond Ninian Smart's 
"methodological agnosticism", and is diametrically 
opposed to the concept of "planes" which Eliade does seem 
to have inherited from Ionescu. Perhaps we do not know, 
or cannot yet express, the nature and extent of the human 
world, but to restrict it to "time and space" is to 
assume the prior implausibility of other transcendent 
religious claims. This is simultaneously to practice an 
unconsidered bias and to ignore the phenomenal fact that 
millions of people in various existential situations do 
find plausible their own religious claims.
The exercise of an uninspected bias and the wilful 
ignorance of historical fact have long been considered 
the worst, most pernicious characteristics of an 
entrenched religious attitude. And, according to 
Eliade's methodological assumptions, that is precisely 
what is at work here.
Exercising this understanding of religion one can 
see how Strenski's attitude, his equation of "time and 
space" with "the human world", his implicit insistence 
that transcendent religious claims (other than his own) 
are a priori implausible, is an example of the complete 
concealment of the sacred in the profane. Not only is it 
an example of a religious attitude which is so deeply 
entrenched as to be unaware of its own existence, it is 
also a case of identifying absolute and exhaustive 
reality (i.e., the sacred) with the phenomenal world of
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time and space (i.e., the profane).
In the earlier article Strenski moves from Eliade's
attempts to "explain the modality of the sacred that that
hierophany discloses",38 and the latter's statement that
"before making the history of anything we must first have
a proper understanding of what it is. in and for
itself",39 to his own statements regarding "the discovery
of the necessary laws of religion".40 This reveals
Strenski's equation of sacrality and being with
"necessary laws". Perhaps to him "the real" is
exhaustively equated with the "laws" of physics. His
religion is that of modern man, the equation of the
sacred with the profane. However, the descriptions of
modern physics are increasingly perceived as limited and
arbitrary. In Order Out of Chaos, for example, Prigogine
and Stengers state,
there is an irreducible multiplicity of 
representations for a system, ... Various possible 
languages and points of view about the system may be 
complementary. They all deal with the same reality, 
but it is impossible to reduce them to one single 
description. The irreducible plurality of 
perspectives on the same reality expresses the 
impossibility of a divine point of view from which 
the whole of reality is visible.41
Even the belief in the discoveries of modern science as
revelatory of the real may be seen as one faith among
38 Patterns, p . 5 .
39 Images and Symbols, p . 29 .
40 Four Theories , pp. 4 8 -4 9 .
41 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers. Order Out 
of Chaos, pp.224-225.
many, or one complementary description among others.
Strenski recognises the "perhaps unthinking" 
acceptance of the distinction between "faith" and 
"reason", between "belief" and "knowledge" and states 
that "how and why these distinctions themselves arose is 
still a matter of some dispute".42 However, it seems to 
me that Eliade's inherent understanding of the 
perception/intuition of the real can go some way to 
settling the dispute. "Reason" can be seen as that which 
produces "knowledge" for those for whom "reality" is 
exhaustively identified as the world of historical time 
and physical space. "Faith" is that which produces 
"belief" for people who believe other than this. This 
also helps to explain the trials of modern liberal 
Christians who identify the world of space and time with 
reality, the redemption of man in time by the historical 
Christ, but cannot quite find their God in physical space 
and historical time, and so suffer from an inability to 
separate "belief" from "knowledge". In fact, belief and 
knowledge are not mutually exclusive categories. That 
which we know and that which we believe interpenetrate 
each other. The theory of the social construction of 
reality allows for a gradual realisation of our own 
positive valorisations. This is particulary clear if one 
considers Wilfred Cantwell Smith's definition of believe 
as "to hold dear, to prize, to give allegiance to, to be
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42 Four Theories , p . 108 .
loyal to, to value highly".43
The major weakness of Eliade's understanding is its
reliance upon "archetypal intuitions", a weakness which
Strenski was not slow to exploit. Such a reliance on
"intuition" or "introspectively-detected information", he
suggested, gives the historian of religion absolute
license to make pronouncements about religion.
It is as if, once possessed, this introspectively- 
detected information allowed one to make assertions 
about religion with the same force that one makes 
certain statements about one's own mind.44
This is, as we have seen, not the case. Intuitions are
the experiences which commend themselves most highly as
experiences of the real. That they so commend themselves
is not open to dispute. What is later said to be
commended is. open to dispute. Thus the information that
the speed of light is a constant to all possible
observers was introspectively-detected by Einstein. That
he had an intuition of the real, an hierophany in
Eliade's terms, was at no point open to doubt. What was
revealed, which is to say, the ensuing expressions of the
real, of course, was open to doubt. Without making
grandiose claims for Eliade it is true to say that his
insight has certain parallels to Einstein. Where
Einstein took the problem of the invariable measurement
of lightspeed and transformed it into the postulate of
his theory, Eliade has likewise taken the problem of
43 Belief and History, p . 41.
44 Four Theories , p . 4 9 .
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conflicting truth-claims about reality and faith in 
unverifiable, "transcendent" propositions and transformed 
it into the postulate of his theory. In the same way, 
Newton "did not try to explain gravitation; he took it as 
a fact. Similarly, each discipline should then take some 
central unexplained fact as its starting point".45
Religion always concerns hierophany, that is the 
apprehension of the sacred in the profane. The sacred is 
that which is apprehended as the real, as such it is "an 
element in the structure of human consciousness".46 As 
such the sacred is the real. This does not mean to state 
that "the world was created by God" any more than it 
means to claim that the sun was vomited up by Bumba, 
creator deity of the Boshengo.47 It is an effective 
methodological presupposition which approaches religion 
as an accessible and comprehensible phenomenon. It 
explains, amongst many other things, why Ivan Strenski 
should become so incensed by his apprehension of 
unverifiable, unfalsifiable elements in the method of 
Eliade that he would neglect the constraints of rational 
scholarship. Eliade's approach challenges Strenski's own 
basic intuition of the identity of the real with the 
spatio-temporal and gives equal plausibility to
45 Prigogine and Stengers, op. cit., pp.28-29.
46 Eliade, The Quest, p.i; "The Sacred in the 
Secular World," p.101; The History of Religious Ideas, 
vol. 1. p.xiii.
47 Eliade, From Primitives to Zen: a Sourcebook in 
Comparative Religion, p.91.
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alternative intuitions. While Strenski's analysis of 
Eliade does not make Eliade's thought any more meaningful 
to his readers, the application of Eliade's 
methodological presuppositions to Strenski's writing does 
serve to explain an otherwise puzzling intensity of 
invective and tendency to disregard his own procedural 
admonitions.
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusions
The whole development of the study of religion may 
have been beset by contemporary "mythic" valorisations 
such as those discussed above, implicit by virtue of 
their currently valid status or acceptance, mythic by 
virtue of their finally pre-reflective persuasion. For 
example, the clamour for "origins".1 The etiological 
function of myth (possibly the mythic nature of etiology) 
is one of the best known, most clearly documented and 
obvious factors in the field of religion; seen in the 
Book of Genesis, the introductory cosmologies of the 
Puranas, the explanatory, origin-stories of "primitive" 
myths, among others. Yet it is still not easy to see our 
own contemporary search for origins and explanations as 
itself religious in nature. As with Barth's 
religion/revelation dichotomy the tendency is to separate 
one's own mythic structure, the contemporary, current 
myth, from the recognised structures of (geographically, 
culturally, socially or temporally) foreign myth. In 
general, myth (as an emotional, pre-rational persuasion 
or support for a specific Weltanschauung) will be
1 cf. Australian Religions, p.xiv.
9.1 Myth in the Study of Religion
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effective if it is etiological and will be firmly- 
separated from the mass of other myths by virtue of 
acceptance as valid. My myth is not myth, any more than 
my religion is religion. Scientific approaches to the 
study of religion are also susceptible to this criticism. 
Although they might accuse theological approaches of 
invalidating themselves by beginning from an assumed 
given of divine revelation, the scientific mind begins 
from the "real" given of material existence and personal 
experience. The confidence of empiricism is profoundly 
suspicious. "Facts" are held to be real and true because 
they are experienced. All the Cartesian method appears 
to have achieved was to call into doubt confidence in the 
senses and to transfer that confidence to the intellect, 
to reason.
The introduction of phenomenological techniques into 
the study of religion seems to have constituted an 
attempt to free the study from the worst tendencies of 
its own subject matter: the tendency to unquestioning 
adherence to and absolute valorisation of an orthodoxy 
(the "right" opinion). This aim may be seen to have been 
only partially successful. While phenomenology has 
operated as a necessary "Interimsmethode", liberating the 
scholar from the despotic dictates of institutionalised 
religions, it has failed to liberate from the equally 
despotic though more insidious dictates of a currently 
quasi-scientific orthodoxy. (I say "quasi" advisedly 
since such dictates are under constant attack within the
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scientific fields.)
9.2 The Myth of Science
Assuming this attitude of "scientific" valorisation 
to be reflective of genuinely religious tendencies, what 
does it imply for Eliade's central thesis of "eternal 
return?" While it accords with his analysis of myth as 
the repository of the real, the true, and the powerful, 
it does not appear to accord with any desire to "escape 
history", certainly not to return to a previous time of 
pure beginnings. The proponents of this approach do not 
hark after a period in the past when the clear and 
coherent flow of thought was unclouded by the muddying 
effluvium of subjectivity. However, they do seem to 
infer such a period to be both potentially achievable and 
desirable. They "believe" in the "scientific" method in 
W. C. Smith's sense, they hold it in high esteem as a 
means of radically changing human life, actually in the 
technological revolution of the past and potentially in 
their own academic field. In this respect their attitude 
fits Eliade's understanding of religion. They recognise 
a basic human failing for which they claim to have the 
solution. Their illud tempus appears to be a period 
which although not held to have actually occurred at some 
time in the past is at least a potential if the mores of 
truly "scientific" enquiry be followed. This does, in 
fact, accord with Eliade's conception of illud tempus as 
the logic of this other time is neither linear nor
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strictly rational. It is by definition the time sought 
after, the period of our desires, the condition which 
would prevail should all people do as they ought to do. 
The fact that many religious traditions have held this 
period to have existed in fact at some previous point is 
a result of a less linear conception of time itself and a 
less hidebound attitude to self expression. The desire 
to stress the very real potentiality of this condition 
naturally leads to the expression of its actual prior 
existence. The expression of illud tempus as actually 
having occurred already permits a persuasive, if 
circular, logic in which the illud tempus was lost 
because of some fault, which has led to the current 
undesirable period. The reversal or redemption of that 
fault will then lead to the "restoration" of illud 
tempus. This allows for the fault and its correction to 
be described from both the point of view of the "fall" it 
has caused and the improvement it could effect. The 
"myth of science", because of its involvement with 
historicism, may repudiate the circularity of this 
traditionally religious argument, but it eventually uses 
the same mythic, i.e. pre-reflectively valorised, 
argument in which the reversal of the human fault of 
irrationality is seen to lead to the sought-for paradise 
of perfect understanding.
The very exclusivity of the objectivist/realist, 
"scientific" position smacks of a religious stance. That 
this should be the correct manner of progress which will
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suffer no alternative, right for all people at all times, 
the solution to the problem is an absolutist valorisation 
of a relative position characteristic of the religious 
devotee of recent western disapproval. Since the advent 
of phenomenology discouraged openly exclusivist displays 
of religious affiliation in the academic field, the 
problem has not disappeared but has become more subtle 
and difficult both to recognise and to avoid. In other 
words, the sacred has been camouflaged and it has become 
unrecognisable.
Furthermore, a scientific study relies on a con­
trolled, restricted body of data or of types of 
phenomena. It is a specific method for the solution of 
specific problems which have undergone specific 
definition. Religion, in this interpretation, relates to 
the total experience of human existence, the total 
hermeneutics of the totality of human apprehensions of 
the real. It is what-I-am added to all others to make 
what-we-are, and thus the methodology developed for the 
solution of well-defined problems is not (and this 
accepts perhaps not yet) generally applicable. Both 
scientific and traditional attitudes to the religious 
would accept that religion includes par excellence that 
which we do not understand: primordial origins, abstract 
concepts such as justice (theodicy) and morality, 
experience (as a brute fact), existence (likewise). 
Scientific methodology commences from a delineated group 
of phenomena (radiation, chemical interactions,
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mechanical relations, man in society, the mental life); 
hence the ultimate importance to the scientific method of 
analysis - the division of data into coherent, restricted 
groups or entities - is necessarily prior to such a 
method. Religion is immune to such restriction a priori 
since, holistically, every element of all religious 
phenomena implies reference to a cosmic, self-contained, 
all-embracing system, the sum total of (human) existence, 
and thus defies final analysis into a restricted 
classification.
Of course, certain areas of religion can be studied 
in this restricted scientific manner: historically or 
geographically restricted phenomena and specific social 
or psychological effects. But the phenomena of religion 
as operant in contemporary experience defy such 
restriction. Attempts to enforce such a restriction have 
led to the various misappropriations of the study, the 
countless and costly inadequate definitions,2 the 
insensitivity to the personal involvement of the scholar.
It is crucial that we understand as we restrict, as 
each such restriction will tend to reinforce the 
Weltanschauung from which it is made. Denial of the 
workings of the intuitive is disastrous because as it 
does work to considerable effect. The attempt of the 
scientific to be exclusive is potentially as disastrous 
as any other exclusivity in academic studies: it creates
2 v. eg. H. Mol, Identity and the Sacred, pp.If.
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an orthodoxy and thence a dogma essentially opposed to 
the development of knowledge.
While it is frowned upon for scholars to predispose 
the direction of their studies by any declaration of 
specific religious commitment, some scholars are actively 
arguing for a similar predisposition along the lines of 
a scientific, objective predisposition. This is 
troublingly close to a claim of possession of The Truth 
such as has been held to disqualify the institutionally 
religious from a realistic study of the phenomena of 
religion. That disqualification would not apply 
exclusively to the institutionally religious if it were 
seen that the secular scientific approach can be as 
"religious" and "mythological" as older forms of faith. 
The real grounds of disqualification from the process of 
the apprehension of the truth is the inability to admit 
to the relativity of one's own apprehensions. As Eliade 
maintains, "ignorance is, first of all, this false 
identification of Reality with what each one of us 
appears to be or to possess".3 It is absolutely crucial 
to this understanding of Eliade to realise that he 
challenges the common fundamental categories of thought: 
objectivity, reality, history, knowledge. Of the history 
of religions he has pointed out that
we wanted at all costs to present an objective
history of religions, but we failed to bear in mind
that what we were christening objectivity followed
3 Images and Symbols, p.59.
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the fashion of thinking in our times.4 
He is thus working from a point of view which resembles 
the sociology of knowledge but insists upon the creative 
autonomy of the human spirit and the factual possibility 
of escaping from the brute conditioning factors of 
embodied existence.
9.3 General Revelation
The preceding position does not argue for the
complete unattainabilty of truth. Rather it allows for
the recognition of truth in both visions of the real. As
Roger Trigg has said
the emphasis on commitment and the dismissal of the 
notion of reasons for it derives in part from the 
contrast drawn with science. Religious belief, it 
is thought, is radically different from the 
entertaining of a scientific hypothesis. ... [the] 
point is that science and religion just involve 
different systems of thought, and what counts as 
"truth" in each is radically different.5
Eliade's indication of the fundamental equivalence (not
identity) of science and religion, and finally all human
attitudes to the real, does more than militate against
this distinction. Even though it recognises the
difference between scientific and religious truth, and
between Christian and Buddhist truth, it insists on a
universal humanism which also militates against the
pernicious consequences of patronising conceptual
toleration which are manifest as extreme relativism.
4 Images and Symbols, p.28.
5 Roger Trigg, Reason and Commitment. p.36.
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It is worth recalling that Eliade has said "the 
great cosmic illusion is an hierophany".6 In other 
words, the whole of profane time and existence is itself 
revelatory of the reality which underlies it. This is a 
sentiment that the most hardline of positivists would 
hardly deny. Yet it is one which supports the whole of 
Eliade's view of the religious. Here it can be clearly 
seen that Eliade subscribes to a doctrine of "general 
revelation". Both religious revelation and scientific 
methodology are reactions to a real state of affairs and 
are descriptive of a real, although subjective, 
orientation. For the believer the existence of God is a 
real and positive effect upon life, and for the sceptic 
the explanation for the assumed existence of God is 
likewise a positive and beneficial recognition of the 
truth. The question, but which is true? holds no real 
validity outside of the paradigmatic structure 
necessarily adopted prior to the recognition of the 
"truth" of each statement. The truth of each conception 
stands in relation to the special revelations, the 
hierophanies, which animate each one.
While it exceeds the scope of this study to argue 
for the relativisation of all truths, the relativisation 
of truths concerning (supposed) realities external to our 
embodied experience and to the empirical world is 
certainly not an unreasonable claim to make. Nor does
6 Images and Symbols, p.91.
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this result in a final loss of all criteria of judgement 
concerning the validity or utility of such conflicting 
"truths". I believe Eliade to have accepted the criteria 
of geographical and temporal extent.7 These factors have 
much to say about the applicability of religious 
paradigms or worldviews. However, it can soon be seen 
that even these criteria are founded in similar and 
equally relative or non-justified paradigmatic 
assumptions. To assume that a religious worldview which 
was evidently acceptable for thousands of people for 
thousands of years must still have much to offer to the 
constantly changing human condition is not based on any 
apodictic logic. But likewise to assume the superiority 
of the more recent materialist worldview which succeeds 
in increasing the immediate physical security of a 
privileged few while threatening the long-term security 
of the totality of global life (and does that without 
securing the mental contentment of even those few) is 
hardly more logically founded. This attitude to general 
revelation in which the contents of personal experience 
(the scientists' experience of cyclotron experiments as 
well as the mystics experience of ecstasy) are open to 
creative interpretation capable of uncovering real and 
valid meanings, preserves a meaningful access to the true 
and the real. One is constantly confronted with the true
7 v. eg. Zalmoxis, p.240, where he speaks of the 
Mioritza's capacity for adaptation to "geographical and 
regional realities."
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and the real if only one can interpret them suitably.
9.4 Religion and Literature
Eliade repeatedly states that literary criticism 
would be the richest source of "inspiration" for the 
interpretation of religion rather than anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, etc. thus locating both religion 
and its study in the world of the arts rather than the 
sciences. The artistic attitude allows for the 
fundamentally intuitive basis of all methodology, whereas 
the "scientific" approach depends on a covert intuitive 
assumption of an apodictic basis and point of departure 
in the empirical method.
In Ordeal by Labyrinth Claude-Henri Rocquet points 
out that
if the religions and masterpieces of our culture are 
akin, then a hermeneutic stance is clearly 
unavoidable. Because, after all, it is obvious to 
everyone that linguistic analysis cannot exhaust our 
relationship with Rilke or Du Bellay. We all know 
that a poem cannot be reduced to its mechanics or to 
the historical conditions that made it possible, 
and if we do reduce it to those things, then so much 
the worse for us! If we understand that in the case 
of poetry, then why can we no longer understand it 
in the case of a religion? (p.138.)
Eliade heartily agrees. He makes the interpretation of
literary and other creative, fictional, or poetic
products of human culture (and it should be recalled that
these words all have the same fundamental meaning of
human fabrication) the model for the interpretation of
religion. To say this in a slightly different way; in
Eliade's view, language itself is an hierophany. It is
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revelatory of the real mode of human being in the world.
One consequence of this is that
the "sacred history" of the Primitives ought to be 
considered a work of the human mind, and not to be 
demythologised in order to reduce it to a 
"projection" of psychological, sociological, or 
economic conditions. Reductionism as a general 
method for grasping certain types of "reality" may 
help to solve Western man's problems, but it is 
irrelevant as a hermeneutical tool. [We must] take 
seriously these oeuvres - in the same way we take 
seriously the Old Testament, the Greek tragedies, or 
Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe.8
Rocquet calls Eliade "a very reserved, very reticent
person, if not actually secretive",9 which rather
conflicts with Eliade1s publication of his journals. One
of his stated reasons for publishing was
to oppose that academic superstition, which is still 
alive in Anglo-Saxon countries and even in the 
United States, which consists in a tendency to 
depreciate the act of the literary imagination. As 
though a spontaneous, free creation is valueless in 
comparison with a purely scientific procedure. It's 
a very damaging superstition.
In support of his positive valorisation of the act of
literary creation Eliade refers to a statement of
Bronowski that
the step by which a new axiom is added cannot itself 
be mechanised. It is a free play of the mind, an 
invention outside the logical processes. This is 
the central act of imagination in science, and it is 
in all respects like any similar act in 
literature.10
It is this belief in the central importance of the
8 Australian Religions, p.xvii.
9 Ordeal by Labyrinth, p.179.
10 Preface to the English edition of Forbidden 
Forest. p.vi, also Symbolism, the Sacred, and the Arts, 
p. 155
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creative activity of the imagination which leads Eliade 
to
rebel against this so-called scientific positivism 
of academics who claim that literary creation is no 
more than a game, unconnected with cognitive 
activity. I believe just the opposite.11
Evidently he homologises the processes of creative
language use to his understanding of religion. In so
doing he has produced his own creative interpretation of
religious data. This interpretation reveals hitherto
unrecognised significance in our experience of religious
pluralism.
9.5 Contemporary Religion
The religious life appears complex even at the most 
archaic stages of culture. Among the people still 
in the stage of food-gathering and hunting small 
animals (Australians, Pygmies, Fuegians etc.) the 
belief in a Supreme Being or "Lord of the Animals" 
is intermingled with beliefs and culture heroes and 
mythological ancestors.12
Likewise religious life must be complex now. "Western
Man" cannot be a clear-cut case of "living cut off from
an important part of oneself, made up of fragments of a
spiritual history he is incapable of deciphering,"13 any
more than homo reliaiosus can be simply the alternative
to this, or "economic man"14 a third type. Rather we are
11 Ordeal by Labyrinth, p.179.
12 "Structures and Changes in the History of 
Religions," p.351.
13 v. The Two and the One, p.14.
14 Patterns , p.127.
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all complexes of these potential modes of being. Perhaps 
Eliade would have done better to bring this out more 
clearly as I am convinced he did accept it. His writings 
often appear more complicated than is strictly necessary.
This apparent identification of contemporary, non- 
technological cultures with "archaic man" has led to much 
criticism of Eliade's anthropological approach. It takes 
too much for granted to be acceptable and is rejected by 
most contemporary anthropologists. It was also rejected 
by Eliade himself.15 Modern hunter-gatherers are still 
just that, contemporary people who live in a non- 
technological culture, and have a cultural history 
correspondingly longer than their archaic counterparts. 
However, the point stands that all contemporary religion 
appears complex, from sophisticated technologies to self- 
subsistent, hunting-gathering communities.
Eliade's language is undoubtedly misleading on the 
point of the identification of contemporary non- 
technological and "inferior" ancient societies. He 
speaks of "advanced cultures", "superior cultures", "more 
highly evolved societies, (totemistic hunters, paleo- 
cultivators, pastoral nomads)".16 He does clarify his 
position on this point,17 and although we might deplore 
the apparent value-judgement implied by such terms, it
15 v. Australian Religion, pp.xivf.
16 "Structures and Changes," pp.351,353.
17 in Australian Religions, p.xii, n.2.
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must be borne in mind that they are used to refer to 
extant, not extinct, cultures. (Eliade was well aware 
that "we do not have any documents concerning an ultimate 
'first phase’ of the religious life of primitives".)18 
These terms have a contemporary ontological referent. 
Although it may be dubious whether they are of any 
historical value, insofar as they serve to understand 
past events, they do possess validity as regards current 
religious phenomena.
In the light of Eliade’s attempt to understand 
contemporary thought, many of his theories assume renewed 
significance. For example, his thoughts concerning "the 
disappearance of the cult of the Supreme Being and the 
substitution of other divine figures", (ibid., p.354.) 
applies just as readily to his view of the contemporary 
situation as to the historical. That the Supreme Being 
of "primitive societies" has become a deus otiosus upon 
whom people only call in extremis is perhaps as much 
expressive of the current condition in which self­
professed non-religious people will call upon the god of 
their own cultural background only in crisis situations. 
Eliade cites a prayer of the Selk1nam of Tierra del 
Fuego: "do not take away my child; he is too little" 
(ibid., p.355.) addressed to the normally ignored supreme 
Being, a deus otiosus in Eliade’s parlance. Surely we 
can all recognise here the contemporary situation of
18 "Structures and Changes," p.352.
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modern parents, usually thoroughly "secular", who will, 
internally if nothing else, call upon "God" to spare the 
endangered life of their child, at least to make the 
situation meaningful, to account for "why" such terrible 
events must be. It is unquestionably true that modern 
people are just as likely to call upon the otherwise 
otiose concept of a Supreme Being in a crisis.
Much of Eliade's writing can likewise be read as 
more authentically expressive of modern humanity than of 
any specific historical situation, more self-expressive 
and symbolic than previously recognised, despite its 
scholarly nature. His fear of dilettantism and of 
reducing the academic impact of his analyses of religious 
phenomena by having them connected to his fictional 
oeuvre led him to attempt to divorce the two aspects of 
scholarly and creative writing completely, and although 
he has expressed regret that he did not attempt to write 
"beautifully" in his scholarship, he believed that he had 
succeeded in separating his scholarly from his literary 
work in a substantial sense. However, can one person 
ever be so split? The suggestive mode of his fictional 
authorship seems to carry over into his factual. He 
states that
ultimately, what I have been doing for the last 
fifteen years [1945-60] is not totally foreign to 
literature. It may be that my research will be 
regarded one day as an attempt to rediscover the 
forgotten sources of literary inspiration.19
19 No Souvenirs . p.119.
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It certainly seems to be the case that his homo
reliqiosus functions more as a symbol of humanity in its
religious mode than as any actual example of human
behaviour. To criticise Eliade as though his homo
reliqiosus were a putative past phase of human culture,
represented now by contemporary, non-literate or non-
technological tribes, is to misunderstand the
implications of his thought20 and necessarily generates
logical fallacies.
Similarly, I would suggest that other of Eliade's
assertions might be better applied as a description of
the contemporary situation than as a general laws of the
historical development of religions. For example,
the disappearance of the Supreme Being from the cult 
indicates man's desire to enjoy a religious 
experience which is "stronger", more "dramatic", 
and, though it is often aberrant, more human.21
The move from dependence on a supreme being and from
mythic cosmogony to more "human" religious experience
expresses a discovery of greater responsibility in the
existential situation of humanity. The "aham Brahmasmi"
of the Kenopanisad as well as modern psychological
research into the active nature of perception (and the
human embodiment of God in the Incarnation) indicate this
same tendency towards the authenticity of human
responsibility.
20 v. Australian Religions, preface.
21 "Structures and Changes," p. 357.
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9.6 Religious Belief as Significant
The insistence that the events of religious belief 
must have occurred in historical time to have 
significance for contemporary humanity can be seen as 
symptomatic of the post-Christian world's obsession with 
historical time. It is primarily this obsession with the 
significance of historical event which fuels the problems 
of pluralism and exclusivism in contemporary religious 
studies. When a religious tradition is seen as a network 
of significant details, of texts, rituals, buildings, 
institutions, traditions, and faith, it has no necessary 
conflict with another tradition. But when it is seen as 
issuing from an historical event (the truth of which 
cannot be disputed as this truth is the final source of 
the tradition's authority) then disputes concerning the 
historical accuracy of interpretations are all too 
likely.22 As Origen recognised, the possibility of 
establishing historical apodicticity, even of factual 
events, is tenuous indeed. He recognised the near­
impossibility of "an attempt to substantiate the truth of 
almost any story as historical fact, even if the story is 
true, and to produce complete certainty about it".23
One of the implications of this interpretation is
22 v. The Quest. pp.66ff. on accepting the 
existential significance of religious statements rather 
than challenging their historical or empirical accuracy.
23 Contra Celsum 1,42. v. R. M. Grant, The Earliest 
Lives of Jesus, pp.lOff.,65,71 v. Myth and Reality.
p.165.
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the suspension of any belief in the necessarily greater 
significance of historically accurate description and the 
concomitant acceptance of the relative insignificance of 
"mere" human creation or "fictions".24 The steady 
devaluation of the products of the human imagination has 
accompanied the valorisation of historical factuality 
which Eliade sees as a product of Judaeo-Christianity.
It is a religious apprehension specific to one cultural 
tradition although gaining ascendancy via "first world" 
colonialism and technological supremacy.
In this interpretation, religious rather than 
historical language can be seen as the language of 
significance. When a believer states that Jesus of 
Nazareth is God Incarnate, he states concisely and in 
traditional language, the significance of Jesus. (It 
should go without saying that significance is always 
significance to ...) In these terms it is pointless for 
the non-believer to claim that Jesus is not historically 
God Incarnate since this is simply a statement of his or 
her personal affirmation of the significance of 
historical facticity. The fact remains that Jesus 
possesses this transcendent significance to certain 
people.
Unfortunately, modern believers are all too likely 
to confuse traditional with historical language, to
24 v. eg. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary - 
"Fiction - act of fashioning, to shape, fashion, feign - 
la: something invented by the imagination or feigned; 
specif: an invented story."
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attempt to restrict significance to the realm of the 
historical, to commit the historicist error of grounding 
their faith in a presumption of historical factuality, 
and thus to fall prey to the terror of history.
Confronted with modern technology and research 
techniques, claims of strict historicity are difficult to 
substantiate; thus a religious tradition whose 
significance is seen to reside in historical events of 
the distant past will suffer a loss of credibility. 
Rather, for the academic interpreter, the significance 
must be seen to reside in elements present to the 
experience: the meanings of the traditional narratives, 
arts, and rituals, accessible through interpretation, the 
ability of the institution to assist in the spiritual 
life of the individual and the community, and so on.
9.7 Reduction, Demystification, Fundamentalism
Within the academic study of religion Eliade
considers reductionism and "demystification" to be
roughly homologous. Referring to the common belief that
the village, temple, or house is situated at the centre
of the world, he says,
there is no sense in trying to "demystify" such a 
belief by drawing the attention of the reader to the 
fact that there exists no Centre of the World and 
that, in any case, the multiplicity of such centres 
is an absurd notion because it is self­
contradictory. ... On the contrary it is only by 
taking this belief seriously ... that one succeeds 
in comprehending the existential situations of a man
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who believes that he is at the centre of the
world.25
If my interpretation of Eliade's approach be allowed then 
such a statement can be made, mutatis mutandis, for all 
religious claims. Only by "taking seriously" (ie. 
accepting as significant rather than challenging as 
historically inaccurate) the various beliefs of a 
religion under consideration might one succeed in 
comprehending the existential situation of the people who 
hold those beliefs. The question raised here is whether 
this increase in mutual understanding can be seen as a 
valid goal for the study of religion.
Generally "demystification does not serve 
hermeneutics", (ibid.) particularly when seeking to 
comprehend the existential situation of people who hold 
beliefs different to one’s own. The facts are that 
different people experience the same events and objects 
as possessing different significance and articulate their 
existential situations in different ways. If we seek to 
understand these situations, to assimilate the new data, 
we must not focus on traditional beliefs of our own which 
prevent us from appreciating the significance perceived 
by the people under consideration (such as the 
identification of historical accuracy with truth).
Instead we must attempt to "take seriously" the 
perceptions of significance, the articulations of the 
existential situations. Not only does Eliade equate
25 The Quest, p.69.
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reduction with demystification as discussed here, he also 
equates it with fundamentalism. He describes the 
reductionist method as "the reduction of all possible 
significations to only one proclaimed 'fundamental.'"26 
In combination with his understanding of ignorance being 
firstly the false identification of reality with 
appearance it can be seen that reductionism is 
homologised to fundamentalism in the religious sense.
For Eliade there is one universal fault: the dogmatic 
insistence on the equation of opinion with reality.
9.8 The Academic Environment of Religious Studies
The study of religion, far from being an undertaking 
of the individual scholar who then consents to publish or 
lecture on his or her findings, is an institutional 
affair. Most scholars are employed by institutions of 
education for the specific purpose of lecturing, of 
communicating their understanding of religious phenomena 
to students who, one way or another, pay for the 
privilege. The sine qua non of such an organisation is 
that the lecturer is more informed about the subject than 
the students and that the students will thus benefit from 
their exposure to their lectures. This is true of all 
subjects. In the field of the study of religion, our 
fundamental position is one in which the observable facts 
are that throughout recorded history and across the
26 Symbolism, the Sacred, and the Arts, p . 6 .
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terrestrial globe, human societies have produced systems 
founded in the imaginative manipulation of non-empirical 
elements which explain and encourage particular reactions 
to existential situations. Individuals react to these 
systems in differing ways and to differing degrees. Some 
devote their lives completely to the pursuits recommended 
by religion; some largely ignore the spiritual 
exhortations of their traditional cultures. It is an 
evident recommendation of contemporary Western cultural 
tradition, and one with which I agree, to inspect 
critically especially those recommendations which are 
made most strongly and with least empirical support - 
that is, what I have been identifying as myth.
However critical our assessment of the mythic 
traditions of our own and of other cultures may be, it 
can hardly be adequate to the demands of institutional 
education simply to acquiesce in our own inability to 
respond positively to the mythic valorisations of 
cultural traditions other than our own. We cannot 
respond to the inquiries of students regarding the 
meanings of religious phenomena with the assertion that, 
since they have no meaning to us, then they have no 
meaning. To give an example: a scholar of religion could 
lecture on South East Asian Buddhism and point out that 
the Buddhist Sangha receive considerable charitable 
support from the impoverished laity, in return for which 
the laity receive "spiritual merit". That scholar has, 
after perhaps years of careful research, found no
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acceptable meaning to the term "spiritual merit" and thus 
utilises it as an empty phrase, devoid of any meaning 
save as a means of persuading the peasants to part with 
their hard-earned material wealth. The student audience 
will then be confronted with a religious system at whose 
centre resides a vacuum of insignificance. The lack of 
meaning of the term "spiritual merit" will evacuate the 
whole cultural phenomenon of inherent significance and 
into this vacuum will be drawn the pre-existent cultural 
biases of the student: perhaps the understanding that 
anyone who persuades another to part with goods for a 
non-existent exchange is a "confidence trickster" and 
should be punished under law.
In order to avoid this situation, in which the bare 
phenomenal facts of religion become empty vessels to be 
filled with our own preconceived ideas, it is necessary 
to attempt to explicate the meaning of those facts. It 
is necessary to assume that those facts do have a 
meaning, even if we are presently utterly incapable of 
its recognition. (The alternative in this case is to 
assume that the peasants of S. E. Asia have been 
consistently deceived by a criminal organisation for over 
two thousand years. Whereas, of course, some of us in 
the West have thrown off the oppressive yoke of 
superstitious ideology.) It could be argued here that if 
a religious phenomenon has no meaning to the scholar, 
especially after some time of study, then there is no 
meaning there. It must be accepted that in some ways
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this is true, but this is precisely why Eliade exhorts 
the scholar of religion to seek for meanings "even if 
they aren't there". This statement seems to provoke some 
disgust in Ivan Strenski.27 However, when it is seen in 
the sense of limited semantic relativism implied here, it 
is not as offensive as would be the ex nihilo creation of 
meaning which Strenski seems to fear. Rather, the 
assumption is that the religious datum in question did 
(or does) have meaning for the believers in question and 
it is the task of the interpreter to seek to expound that 
meaning. Thereby the whole religious structure involved 
in the examination will be imbued with its own 
significance, rather than dominated by predispositions.
In this way both scholars and students will come to 
realise meanings which are new to them, rather than 
simply reiterating pre-existent semantic structures and 
relationships. In this context it is crucial to realise 
that, as with Eliade's analysis of symbol, the meanings 
of religious phenomena are polyvalent, (p.93 above) Thus 
there is no singular, correct meaning to which the 
scholar is restricted (or to which Eliade claimed to have 
access28) . Of course, particular meanings for particular 
people do exist and, insofar as they are capable of 
verification, they are open to debate. To return to the 
previous example, a scholar could be right or wrong in
27 Eliade, No Souvenirs, p.85. Strenski, "Love and 
Anarchy in Romania," pp.392ff.
28 v. Strenski, op. cit., p. 401.
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seeking to describe the meaning of "spiritual merit" for 
actual people in an actual town in Thailand.
9.9 The Aim of the Study of Religion
It is Eliade's advice that "an historian of 
religions must resist the temptation to predict what will 
happen in the near future".29 Evidently predictability 
is not a criterion of evaluation in which he puts any 
great store. From the context in which this statement is 
made, it is clear that he considers prediction to be the 
stock in trade of the astrologers. This is, in fact, an 
extremely significant statement, made in a surprisingly 
nonchalant manner. If the interpretations of the 
historian of religions cannot be verified by accurate 
prediction, then what is the criterion of accuracy, 
truth, success, or whatever it may be termed? Judging 
from internal evidence, I think the answer is 
significance, meaning, reality. In other words, the 
sacred. So the hermeneutical circle closes in in the 
sense that the very "faculty" which recognises the sacred 
per se at the outset of the process of interpretation is, 
finally, the same criterion which recognises the value of 
the conclusion. Thus Eliade's position, too, requires 
some positive initial and intrinsic valorisations. It, 
too, is mythic to that extent; it, too, is religious.
To those critics of Eliade who might greet this
29 Occultism, p. 67.
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statement with some relish, receiving it as proof that 
Eliade is proposing another religion amongst many rather 
than an objective way of assessing religion as a 
phenomenon, it must be said that this is wholly 
consistent with his procedural assumptions. Humanity is 
initially seen as inherently religious. Religion is the 
expression of the fact of our embodied existence in the 
world and our constant and ongoing interaction with the 
reality encountered in that world. Eliade insists that 
"to be, or to become, human means to be religious".30 
Having made such a contention, he could hardly be 
expected to somehow escape his own classification of 
humanity. Nor is the closing of the hermeneutical circle 
evidence of its vicious tautology. Within that circle 
has been inscribed all actual human experience of the 
world (the history) and all coherent imaginary universes 
which express the valorisation of that experience (of 
religion). Empirical criteria of evaluation of religious 
phenomena have been suggested - their temporal and 
geographical extension and the ability of the religious 
phenomenon to generate new appraisals, new significances, 
new meanings which ensures this spread. This 
interpretation also implies a methodology which I feel to 
have been clearly demonstrated by this inspection of the 
reactions to and interpretations of the thought of Mircea 
Eliade. In order to understand the universes of
30 The Quest, preface.
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religion, a certain critical but positive and imaginative 
valorisation is required. If one enters on the quest for 
truth in the interpretation of religious data convinced 
that one already possesses the only infallible criterion 
of evaluation, be it faith in a venerable text or a 
particular system of pan-critical rationalism, one is 
hardly predisposed to recognise the true meaning of what 
other people have apprehended as the real, the true, and 
the Sacred.
9.10 A Pragmatic Pluralism
Eliade's system cannot support the valorisation of 
any exclusive religion, but rather of religion itself, of 
religiousness, which he perceives to be a human 
universal. His thought is inherently, almost a priori 
pluralist. It thus militates against "areligiousness" as 
a form of self-deception (typical, I may say of the 
"modern" consciousness which paradoxically seeks 
radically to dissociate itself from the very history 
which it valorises so highly), but it cannot militate for 
any specific form of religion. It does, however, imply a 
series of criteria by which different forms can be 
compared. These include the extent to which religious 
belief relieves the pain and suffering occasioned by the 
embodied experience of the human individual (the "terror 
of history"), which is directly related to the personally 
apprehended meanings and significations of that belief, 
which in their turn contribute to the geographical and
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temporal spread of specific beliefs.
The equation of the sacred and the real in the 
history of religions has one crucial, a priori assumption 
and intention: it places all individual human 
apprehensions on an initially equal level of opinion 
(doxa) rather than granting any one (usually one's own) a 
privileged access to the real. Assuming this attitude, 
one can never begin a study with the presumption that one 
knows, finally and certainly, what "the real" actually 
is. Not only is this in consonance with much modern 
philosophical speculation concerning epistemology and the 
collapse of foundationalist methodologies and 
correspondence theories of truth, but it also allows an a 
priori sympathy with conflicting belief systems. Rather 
than commencing with the attitude that I know what 
"truth" and "reality" are, and thus that I know that 
beliefs which conflict with my apprehensions are 
positively "wrong", the historian of religion then 
commences with the self-knowledge of what he or she 
believes to be the real and the recognition that others 
equally believe their apprehensions to be of "the real". 
Given this assumption of what we might call "foundational 
equality" we are then quite free to apply those criteria 
of judgement which we have established. Hopefully 
through critical and empirical methods, we can discern 
the significance of belief systems and their concomitant 
behaviourial patterns without the dangerously misleading 
assumption that those criteria are somehow possessed of a
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superhuman warrant.
The whole process of thought whereby these 
conclusions were attained might be seen as a personal 
reenactment of the developments within the history of 
religions, which began as a process of Christians 
inspecting pagans and evolved through those stages which 
W. C. Smith has characterised as "us/them, me/you, 
we/all".31 It is in order to attain to this "we/all" 
understanding that the scholar of religions adopts a 
humanist approach which concedes that no one body of 
people has exclusive and sole access to any divine Truth 
and is thus distinguished above all other people. (In 
making such an assumption of exclusivity one certainly 
becomes the champion of a mythical belief rather than the 
scholar of human religiousness.) Whether exclusive 
access is established by way of special revelation 
through a traditionally venerated text or through a 
scientific or empirical methodology is quite 
inconsequential. It is the immensely destructive power 
of the concomitant assumption of justification thus 
avoided which is of consequence. In adopting such a 
position scholars are not deprived of all relation to 
truth and reality. We are forced to accept, however, 
that our personal relationship to the real, the sacred, 
is one of belief rather than one of certain knowledge.
31 "Comparative Religion - Whither, and Why?" p.34.
Appendix A 
The Political Career of Mircea Eliade: 
a response to Adriana Berger.
Abstract.
The paper read on Adriana Berger's behalf at the annual 
meeting of the American Academy of Religion in November 
1990 continues her attack on Eliade's connection with the 
Romanian right-wing movement, the Iron Guard, or Legion 
of the Archangel Michael. This paper and the earlier 
article, "Fascism and Religion in Romania", make much of 
certain British Foreign Office documents which I have 
inspected in detail. Not only do these documents fail to 
corroborate Berger's conclusions but they cast real doubt 
on Berger's critical detachment. Her claim that "Eliade 
was detained in England because of his political 
activities on behalf of the Iron Guard and also of Nazi 
Germany", is without foundation. Likewise, other 
insinuations which she makes about Eliade's political 
motivations are subject to alternative interpretations. 
Her insistence that Eliade "was not a Cultural Attaché 
(or secretary) as he has stated", attempts to make a liar 
out of Eliade by wholly ignoring the fact (which she 
recognises in the earlier article) that Eliade was 
appointed Secretaire presse at the Romanian legation in 
Portugal. While Eliade undoubtedly was over- 
enthusiastically nationalist in his youth, Berger has 
resorted to fabricating evidence in order to justify 
these accusations of "anti-Judaism" and active fascism.
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"Anti-Judaism and Anti-Historicism in Eliade's 
Writings," a paper written by Adriana Berger and 
presented on her behalf at the American Academy of 
Religion Annual Meeting in New Orleans in November of 
1990 continues the attack on Eliade's political and 
personal history made in her article of 1989, "Fascism 
and Religion in Romania". (Annals of Scholarship, 6 
no.4, (1989):455-465.) Despite its questionable 
relevance to the significance of Eliade's work as a 
historian of religion, this attack should not go 
unanswered, especially after its airing at such a 
prestigious gathering. Although I am not myself a reader 
of Romanian and thus cannot check all of Berger's 
references, I am familiar with much of the material 
relating to Eliade's thought and history and believe that 
I can give an adequate assessment of the argument and 
much of the detail given in Berger's articles. In both 
these articles, for example, Berger makes much of the 
British Foreign Office material relating to Eliade's 
posting at the Romanian Legation in London in 1940 and 
the suspicions of the British Government concerning his 
political sympathies. These documents are preserved at 
the Public Records Office in London and I have been able 
to inspect them and assess the degree to which they 
support Berger's conclusions and the picture they give of 
that period of Eliade's life. As to the other material,
I can do no better than to refer the reader to Eliade's
B. S. Rennie Eliade's Political Career 407
own Autobiography vol.II, chs. 15, 16, and 17, the 
relevant sections of the Journals vol.I, and to Ricketts, 
Mircea Eliade: the Romanian Roots, especially chs. 22,
24, and 27, which deal quite openly and clearly with 
Eliade's perhaps misguided nationalism and his anti­
democratic tendencies. Also worthy of note in this 
context is the article by Seymour Cain, "Mircea Eliade, 
the Iron Guard, and Romanian Anti-Semitism", in the 
Jewish journal, Midstream, 35 (1989):27-31.
Before the AAR Berger claimed that "official 
biographies" make "a deliberate effort to conceal" 
Eliade's "collaboration with the Iron Guard and Romania's 
Nazi governments". ("Anti-Judaism," p.13) This must 
refer to Ricketts' volumes as the only biography in the 
English language. Her earlier article was actually a 
review article focused on the second volume of Eliade's 
Autobiography and on Ricketts' work. In it she has made 
a more direct attack on Ricketts' contribution, 
complaining that he "begins with Eliade's childhood and 
early youth rather than with a survey of the historical 
and cultural climate from which Eliade emerged". (462)
In order to avoid this type of criticism allow me to give 
a brief synopsis of the political situation in which 
Eliade found himself prior to his "exile" in Paris. 
Romania had gained its independence only following the 
first World War in 1918 and had subsequently been 
governed as a monarchy. In the turmoil of inter-war 
Europe, dominated by the rise of German and Italian
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fascism to the West and Russian communism to the East, 
Romanian nationalism had given birth to the "Legion of 
the Archangel Michael", a movement founded by Cornelia 
Zelia Codreanu and his father in 1927. Although 
explicitly committed to a religious and spiritual 
renovation of the Romanian people this movement was 
capable of overt violence and was responsible for the 
assassination of the Romanian Prime Minister, I. G. Duca, 
in 1933. Codreanu was at the time cleared of complicity 
in that crime. The Legion spawned a para-military 
organisation, popularly called the "Iron Guard".
Threatened from all sides, the monarchy under King 
Carol II imposed a fascist inspired dictatorship in 
February of 1938, with Patriarch Miron as President and 
Armand Calinescu as minister of the interior. Together 
they set out to crush their popular rival, the Iron 
Guard. On the grounds of slander against the Romanian 
scholar, Nicolae Iorga, Codreanu was arrested and 
imprisoned for six months. This was soon increased to 
ten years at hard labour and eventually, in November of 
that year, the King and Calinescu ordered his execution. 
Other Legionary leaders, and their intellectual 
supporter, Eliade's friend and mentor, Nae Ionescu, were 
arrested in April.
To quote Ricketts at this point,
between January 1937 and the imposition of the royal 
dictatorship in February 1938, Eliade gave open and 
enthusiastic support, through his periodical 
writings, to the Legionary movement. Because of the 
eight or ten explicitly pro-Legionary articles he
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wrote in this period of slightly more than a year, 
and because of the close association with Nae 
Ionescu who had been a Legionary supporter (though 
he was never a member) since late 1933, Eliade 
became suspect in the eyes of the government. (op. 
cit. p.882. This is hardly seeking to conceal 
Eliade's connection with the Legion.)
In mid-June of 1938 Eliade's house was searched and
papers were taken away, mainly correspondence in English
from scholars such as Ananda Coomaraswamy and Raffaele
Pettazzoni who were contributing to Eliade's journal of
Comparative Religion, Zalmoxis. Eliade himself managed
to evade arrest by retiring to the country after an
anonymous telephone call warning him of the impending
search. General M. M. Condeescu, the president of the
Society of Romanian Writers, and related to Eliade
through his first wife, Nina, contacted Calinescu, who
assured him that there were no accusations against
Eliade, who accordingly returned to Bucharest. However,
on July 14th his house was raided by the Siqurantza and
Eliade was taken to their headquarters for questioning.
He was held there for three weeks and told that he could
leave as soon as he signed a "declaration of
dissociation" from the Iron Guard. Eliade refused to do
so on the grounds that to dissociate himself from this
popular movement at that time was to dissociate himself
from his entire generation. In the first week of August
he was transferred to the internment camp at Miercurea
Ciucului where many other Legionary supporters were being
held. Eliade was treated relatively well, despite having
to sleep on the floor of a permanently lighted cell at
B. S. Rennie Eliade's Political Career 410
the Siqurantza H.O. for three weeks, he was not actually- 
tortured. It seems likely that Calinescu's regime were 
primarily interested in him as a spokesman of the 
Romanian youth. He was 31 at the time and his popularity 
had been well established by the publication of his best­
selling novel, Maitreyi four years earlier. Thus his 
dissociation from the Legion would have been a useful 
propaganda coup for the royal dictatorship, of which 
Eliade did not fully approve, mainly because of its 
acceptance of Western, fascist ideology.
When Eliade began coughing blood in October of that 
year it seems equally clear that that government did not 
want his death in internment for exactly the same 
reasons. Fearing tuberculosis they had him transferred 
to a clinic at Moroeni. As it transpired the blood was 
from a ruptured vein in his throat, a relatively minor 
condition brought on by excessive coughing, in turn 
caused by incipient pleurisy, which could easily have 
developed into T.B. had the government not acted so 
quickly. He was given a clean bill of health and on 
November 12th, almost four months after his arrest, he 
was simply released. However, his employment at 
Bucharest University as the assistant of Nae Ionescu was 
lost and Eliade was without work. For some time he 
worked at the Society of Romanian Writers, but the 
unexpected death of General Condeescu in the spring of 
1939 removed his "protector". He still had friends, 
however, and Prof. Alexandru Rosetti prevailed upon
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Constantin Giurescu, the minister for propaganda of the 
Carol regime, to send Eliade to Britain to work for the 
Romanian Legation there in the office of Press and 
Propaganda. It is worthy of note that this same Giurescu 
who helped Eliade later enjoyed some favour under the 
communist Ceausescu government.
Eliade and Nina set out for London in early April
and it is at this point that the documents kept at the
Public Records Office begin to be relevant.
Unfortunately, there are no records of diplomatic 
appointments kept by the British Foreign Office for the 
year of 1940. The documents referred to by Berger as 
revealing that "the inclusion of his name among the names 
at the Romanian Legation raised objections from the 
British Foreign Office" ("Anti-Judaism," p.9. "Fascism 
and Religion," p.459, n.9) no longer exist. The index of 
records (see appendix) does list these files 
(T7026/318/383), but only as referring to Eliade as "on 
the staff of the Romanian Legation", with no mention of 
any objections to this. The other file to which Berger
refers (T6561/1522/378) is a later file referring to his
visa for Portugal. This explains why Berger refers to 
these files but does not quote them.
Since his arrival at the Romanian Legation in London 
on the 15th of April, 1940 Eliade's diplomatic status had 
not been recognised by the British Government. 
Unfortunately the actual reasons for this refusal of 
recognition are not given in any of the documents
B. S. Rennie Eliade's Political Career 412
preserved in the Public Records Office. There are, 
however, several possible explanations. His recent 
incarceration as a sympathiser of the Legion of the 
Archangel Michael is not the least among these. But 
there are others. Although Viorel Virgil Tilea was not 
appointed as Minister until February 1st, 1939 he, and 
other members of the Legation under him, had been in 
Britain for some years and their loyalties were assured, 
or at least known. Tilea himself had been President of 
the Anglo-Romanian Society in Romania and along with D. 
Mateescu, for example, was regarded as zealously 
anglophile. New arrivals, favoured by the current 
regime, were automatically regarded with suspicion. The 
very fact that they had been appointed to the Legation 
after the establishment of the fascist inspired royal 
dictatorship was enough to connect them with anti-British 
sympathies. And yet it was this very fascist/royalist 
dictatorship which had had Eliade incarcerated for four 
months. It should be noted that both the regime which 
imprisoned Eliade and the movement which he was 
imprisoned for refusing to disown are now called fascist.
King Carol abdicated in 1940 and General Ion 
Antonescu and Horia Sima declared a "National-Legionary" 
state. Tilea was recalled from his position as Romanian 
Minister in London but refused to return. Thereafter all 
Romanians who continued to show allegiance to the 
Legation under the acting Chargé d 1Affaires, Radu 
Florescu, were eventually seen by some as those who
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"threw in their lot with the Iron Guard by remaining on 
the Romanian Legation under M. Florescu".1 Florescu was 
evidently regarded with deep suspicion and a Foreign 
Office note of 21st of September, 1940 reads, "we must 
request his removal as soon as M. Stoica takes up his 
duties".2 However, Florescu's removal was never 
effected. On the first of September, 1940, Eliade's 
appointment at the Legation in London ceased and in mid- 
September he and his wife and several other Romanians 
moved to Cambridge to escape the Blitz. Shortly 
thereafter he was appointed Secretaire Presse at the 
Romanian Legation in neutral Portugal.3
However, while Eliade's application for an exit 
permit was still under consideration the suspicion of his 
political sympathies surfaced. When six British subjects 
were arrested by "Iron Guard Police" in Romania and 
brutally treated and tortured, the possibility arose of 
arresting some Romanians in direct retaliation.4 Messrs 
Treacy, Anderson, Young, Brassier, Miller, and Clark 
presented accounts to the Foreign Office which indicate 
that during five days of detention they were
1 FO 371 29993, R1424, p.138. Telegram to H. L. d'A.
Hopkinson at the Foreign Office, February 19th, 1941. Note that 
the British government habitually refers to foreign diplomats as 
Monsieur (abbreviated M.).
2 FO 371 24989, p.14.
3 FO 371 24996, R7698/6850/37, p.143.
4 Times, 28th Sept. and 7th Oct., 1940, FO 371 24989,
pp.5 3 f f., 184.
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significantly ill-treated by the Iron Guard although the 
official civil authorities showed them proper respect.5
Mr. P. J. Dixon of the Foreign Office wrote to Sir 
Norman Kendal at New Scotland Yard on the 4th of October, 
1940 that
when we heard of the first arrests of British 
subjects in Romania last week, M.I.5 were asked to 
produce a list of suitable Romanians in this country 
for possible arrest as a retaliatory measure. M.I.5 
finally admitted that they were unable to produce 
any names since their card index of Romanians had 
unfortunately been destroyed by hostile action.
They added that so far as they knew there were very 
few undesirable Romanians in the country and that a 
good many of them were Jews.
I then approached New Scotland Yard, who have now 
produced a list of eleven possible candidates. I 
have since spoken to Mr. Howe who is dealing with 
the matter. He says that very little is known about 
these people but he hopes to produce further details 
by Monday. I asked him to bear the following points 
in mind:-
(a) We would not wish to arrest any Jews;
(b) It would be useful to know if any of the 
candidates are known to be pro-British, since it 
would be a mistake to arrest them;
(c) The ideal candidate would be persons against 
whom something is known, particularly if it 
concerned anti-British activities.6
Eliade was not included on this particular list,
which was made up of businessmen and women and excluded
all diplomatic staff. Evidently the government was
taking the standard quid pro quo approach and seeking to
arrest only civilians, rather than to expose their own
diplomatic staff in Romania to the danger of retaliatory
5 FO 371 29992, R 80/80, pp.2ff.
6 FO 371 24989, R 7624, p.167.
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arrest. However, the Romanian legation included several 
people, like Eliade, whose status was not recognised. 
Although he was listed as an "official in active service 
of the Legation" attached to the Press and Propaganda 
Office by Radu Florescu in a document of 28th of October, 
1940, when Florescu called on Lord Dunbar on the 2nd 
December he was told that it was impossible to place 
Eliade on the Diplomatic List.7 Florescu continued quite 
strenuously to try to obtain Eliade's inclusion on the 
Diplomatic List, but to no avail.
Sir Reginald Hoare, head of the British Mission in 
Bucharest, had telegraphed Dixon on the 7th of October to 
say that the "arrest of any six Romanian nationals merely 
[as] hostage would in no way strengthen my hand". On the 
bottom of this telegram, which is preserved at the Public 
Records Office, P. L. Rose, Dixon's immediate junior at 
the Foreign Office, has written "I still think we might 
arrest perhaps one or two hangers-on at the legation - 
such as M. Eliade who is known to have Iron Guard 
sympathies: it would evidently be useless to do six 
indiscriminate arrests". Dixon, however, adds to this,
"I doubt whether, in the light of the considerations 
adduced by Sir R. Hoare, it is worth pursuing this 
question".8 Yet the very fact that he had been 
considered for such retaliatory arrest would ensure that
7 FO 371 29999, R119/119, p.10. Unfortunately the actual 
reasons are not stated in this document.
8 ibid. p.175.
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Eliade would never be accorded diplomatic status. Berger 
has made some political meat of the application of this 
term, "hanger-on", to Eliade ("Anti-Judaism," p.9, 
"Fascism and Religion," p.459.). However, the Foreign 
Office used the term even for British citizens attached 
to their Legation in Romania, quite legitimately, but 
without diplomatic status.
Dixon's recommendation notwithstanding, the question 
of Eliade's possible arrest was pursued. A note from 
Commander Croghan of Naval Intelligence Division which 
considers the attitudes and sympathies of several members 
of the Romanian Legation indicates that this option was 
being kept open.9 It is this same Croghan who describes 
the telegram cited by Berger in both articles. In this 
telegram, which itself is not extant, Eliade reportedly 
denounces one Dimancescu of the Romanian Legation as 
Anglophile, and requests that he (Eliade) be appointed in 
the latter's stead. He also is said to have "added to 
his message the Romanian equivalent of 'Heil Hitler.1" 
("Fascism and Religion," p.459, "Anti Judaism," p.10.) 
These events are quite possible, and quite explicable. 
Several of the members of the Legation were actively 
Anglophile, as we have seen, and were seeking to continue 
to be paid by their government for the privilege of 
remaining in Britain with no intention of serving their 
government. Some people might consider this "deserving"
9 FO 371 24996, R7624, p.122.
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of denunciation. The government of the royal dictator, 
Carol, had actually been overthrown by General Antonescu, 
with the backing of the Iron Guard and considerable 
popular support, and recognition of the "conducator" was 
a condition of loyalty to the current government. It 
seems that Croghan's informant in this matter was 
Dimancescu himself, who was evidently motivated by fear 
for his employment and fear of returning to his own 
country. The former fear seems to have had grounds as he 
is not mentioned in a list of salaried members of the 
Legation sent to the Foreign Office in October and it 
appears that he may have indeed been replaced by Eliade. 
However, in the same file which refers to this telegram 
Dixon said of Eliade, "There is considerable disagreement 
as to his sympathies and a minute has just reached us 
from the P.I.D. urging that he is a man who might be 
useful to us".10 One Captain Campeanu, who is also 
mentioned in the N.I.D. document, left no such doubt in 
the minds of British Intelligence. He was arrested by 
M.I.5 on the 7th of November and incarcerated in 
Pentonville Prison.11 He was finally released only when 
his transport out of Britain had been assured on the 28th 
of March, 1941.12 Eliade, on the other hand, although 
clearly thought to be connected to the Iron Guard, was
10 ibid. p.127.
11 ibid., R8543, p.204.
12 ibid., R8410, p.197, R8543, pp.202-207, FO 371 28953,
W3656 .
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viewed rather differently. Specifically, he was known to
be anti-German and thus potentially useful to the British
Government.13 Mr. Philip B. B. Nichols, Dixon's
immediate senior at the Foreign Office, wrote concerning
a discussion he had had with members of the Romanian
Legation on the 28th of September, 1940,
I asked what was the position of M. Eliade, 
concerning whom we had a request from Prof. Mitrani 
that we should facilitate his departure. M. Styrcea 
said that M. Eliade was an intellectual with Iron 
Guard leanings. He had written a book on Yogi in 
India. He thought it possible that if he returned 
to Romania he might well become closely identified 
with Iron Guard activities.
On October 1st, 1940 Nichols further asked Tilea
about the possible return to Romania of Eliade.
M. Tilea made it plain that he hoped it would be 
possible for H. M. Government to refuse facilities 
for the return of any of his Romanian personnel.
His reason was that if we facilitated the departure
of M. Eliade, the Romanian government would then 
inquire how it was not possible for eg. Captain
Iliescu and M. Styrcea to return; and he was
strongly of the opinion that these two latter would 
be of more use in this country.14
In another Naval Intelligence document Eliade is 
mentioned in a list of Romanian Legation personnel who 
would require passage out of Britain. Everyone listed, 
it states
with the exception of M. Eliade, are anxious for 
their departure to be postponed as long as 
possible... Captain Iliescu...is known to be very 
pro-British; he therefore fears that he will be 
killed, if he returns to Romania. M. Eliade is an 
intellectual, to some extent a supporter of the Iron
13 FO 371 24996, R7858/6850, p.146.
14 ibid., R7698/6850, p.133.
Guard, and is willing to return to Romania.15
Professor Mitrani, referred to by Mr. Nichols above, 
was then at Balliol College, Oxford as a Fellow of the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs. He has written 
widely on political theory and the political history of 
Romania and southeastern Europe. According to a note 
from Mr. Dixon he "frequently assured us that Eliade is a 
friend", but his word alone could not be relied upon in 
such matters of diplomacy.16 Beginning in late September 
1940 Mitrani made several polite requests on Eliade's 
behalf for permission to leave the country, but was 
equally politely refused by Philip Nichols, initially in 
deference to Tilea's tacit request, but eventually quite 
truthfully because the U.K. to Lisbon service was 
over-subscribed and seats were being given to people on 
important government business.
Although pressure was still being brought to bear 
from Rose in the Foreign Office, from Mr. White of M.I.5, 
and particularly from Dimancescu, to detain Eliade, Dixon 
and Nichols were not convinced. "It will be seen that 
the suggestion is that to allow Eliade to return to 
Romania will be dangerous for the loyal Romanians 
remaining in this country," wrote Mr. Nichols, having 
considered the others' arguments. However, he continued, 
"I do not myself believe there is much in this,
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15 ibid. , p . 135 .
16 FO 371 29995, R119/119, p.8.
particularly if Eliade stays in Lisbon".17 It was 
eventually decided, in response to some pressure from the 
Romanian government, to allot two seats for Eliade and 
his wife on the Bristol to Lisbon service on the 9th of 
February, at least four months after he had made his 
first moves to leave the country.18 At this time 
Dimancescu wrote to the Foreign Office suggesting that if 
they wished to delay Eliade's departure further, they 
could simply make one seat only available to him on the 
flight. Eliade would not leave his wife behind and so 
would be prevented from leaving the country, whilst the 
British government would be seen to have fulfilled their 
political obligations.19 I believe this speaks for 
itself as regards Eliade's loyalty to his wife, and as a 
condemnation of Dimancescu's underhand tactics, probably 
inspired by the loss of his salary. The British 
government did not act on his recommendation.
The members of the British Legation to Romania were 
in the process of withdrawing, a state of war having been 
declared between the two countries effective from 7th 
December, 1940. Under such conditions the British 
government was responsive to requests concerning the 
movements of Romanian Legation members to avoid 
retaliation impeding the movement of their own diplomats.
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17 FO 371 29999, R119/119, p.19.
18 FO 371 24996, R7858/6850, pp.144, 164,165.
19 FO 371 2999, R119/119, p.19.
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On the 13th of November Dixon wrote to a Mr. McCombe of 
the treasury that "unless and until relations are broken 
off with Romania, it seems to us that members of the 
Romanian Legation must be treated in these matters as 
representatives of any other neutral government".20 
Despite Radu Florescu's petitions and despite Eliade's 
appointment as Secretaire Presse to the Press and 
Propaganda Office in Lisbon, the British Government never 
did acknowledge Eliade as having diplomatic status. 
Florescu tried sometimes dubious means to ensure Eliade's 
diplomatic recognition, at one time simply writing that 
"M. Eliade who according to my previous communication has 
been granted diplomatic privilege", when this was not 
so.21 It is noteworthy that even Tilea joined in the 
voices speaking out for Eliade's departure and invoking 
the latter's "tuberculosis" as grounds for granting an 
exit permit.22 However, the initial suspicions of 
Military Intelligence, fuelled by Dimancesu's 
protestations, had never been allayed. Thus when Eliade 
presented himself at the airport in Bristol claiming 
diplomatic status, carrying a courier's passport stamped 
"diplomatique" but not signed by the relevant British 
authorities, and carrying a diplomatic bag, he was 
treated by the Security Control Officer as something of a
20 FO 371 29993, R8031, p.336.
21 FO 371 29995, R978/119, p.9.
22 FO 371 24996, p.219.
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fraud. Military Intelligence, whose job it is to act on 
suspicions, were suspicious that Eliade would leave the
country with sensitive documents and had ordered in 
advance that all his belongings be thoroughly searched. 
The Romanian Legation, in fact the whole Romanian 
Government, were treating Eliade as a bona fide member of 
the Legation and of diplomatic status. One wonders 
whether Florescu had actually admitted to Eliade his 
failure to secure the Foreign Office's recognition, 
although Tilea claimed that he had warned Eliade not to 
carry any couriers..23 It is hardly surprising then that 
an embarrassing incident ensued.
Eliade, considering himself to be a member of the 
Legation, was incensed at being stripped and searched, 
and thought the refusal by the Security Control Officer 
to allow him to carry his diplomatic bag out of the 
country without search to be a breach of protocol. He 
evidently complained bitterly to his home government. On
the 13th of February the Foreign Office received a 
telegram from Sir Reginald Hoare, the third paragraph of 
which read:
it appears that Mr. Eliade who, according to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is cultural attaché of 
the Romanian Legation and bearer of a diplomatic 
passport was most rigorously searched at Bristol 
airport a few days ago and [the] diplomatic bag 
which he was carrying was returned to the Legation. 
It is obvious that any repetition of this treatment 
will lead to reprisals here.24
23 FO 371 29999, R119/119, p.3.
24 FO 371 29993, R1061, p.50.
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Evidently the Romanian Government were consistently
insisting on Eliade's diplomatic status at the highest
level. The British Government were just as consistently
refusing to recognise it and immediately replied to Sir
Reginald that
the facts are as followss-
Mr. Eliade was not, as has been claimed, 
cultural attaché to the Romanian Legation in London 
and had no diplomatic status, a request by the 
Romanian Chargé d'Affaires to have him placed on the 
Diplomatic List having twice been refused. On being 
questioned at the airport, Mr. Eliade first claimed 
that he was Press Attaché, but subsequently admitted 
that this was not so. A place was reserved for him 
on the aeroplane to Lisbon at the urgent request of 
the Romanian Government, but no prior notification 
was received that he was to carry a diplomatic bag. 
An examination of his courier's passport and of his 
ordinary passport showed that the Legation had not 
complied with the regulations regarding temporary 
couriers with which all Missions in London are fully 
acquainted. The Security Control Officer 
accordingly invited him to obtain his Legation's 
confirmation of his bona fides. Mr. Eliade refused 
to return to London for this purpose, but stated 
that he would burn his bag. The S.C.O. refused to 
allow this, and Mr. Eliade then handed in the bag 
for return to the Romanian Legation and it was duly 
returned to them. It will be clear from the above 
that the diplomatic bag was not taken away from Mr. 
Eliade and that the incident was due entirely to his 
not possessing diplomatic status and to the failure 
of the Legation to obey the regulations regarding 
temporary couriers.25
Thus the British Government justified its actions 
without breach of protocol, ensuring Eliade's departure 
from Britain without any possibility of his transporting 
sensitive information, and forestalling, as far as 
possible, any direct retaliatory action against British 
diplomats still in Romania. This was in fact successful
25 ibid., W3239/2008/49 .
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and the British Legation left Romania without serious 
incident on the 15th of February, after which date all 
diplomatic relations with Romania ceased. Eliade states 
that his first knowledge of the severance of diplomatic 
relations came on the evening of February 10th, the same 
day he flew to Lisbon (Autobiography vol.II, p.89.)
Such an action was not without risk, however, and a 
further telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in Bucharest on 
the 14th of March again refers to the incident.
Our contact with the authorities concerned make 
it clear that the suspicion is hardening that the 
British authorities are not putting themselves out 
to provide places on planes to Lisbon for the 
remaining members of the Romanian Legation and their 
families who wish to leave. This coupled with a 
smouldering resentment over the treatment reported 
accorded to a member of the Legation and his family 
who departed before the British Minister left here 
may lead to serious misunderstandings and 
consequences. The report of the official in 
question has been received from Lisbon and states 
that both he and his family were stripped and 
searched and their possessions upset and thrown 
about, and a bag of diplomatic correspondence taken 
away from him. The attitude of the Romanian 
authorities is that Sir Reginald Hoare and the large 
party of British who accompanied him were permitted 
to depart on the personal pledge of the British 
Minister that every effort would be made to 
facilitate the departure of all members of the 
Romanian Legation in London who wished to leave.26
There is possibly a clash of styles of diplomacy
here between the British who proceeded very cautiously
and correctly, "by the book", and the Romanians who
seemed to consider a certain amount of bluff and bluster,
exaggeration and occasional downright lies, to be the
normal stuff of foreign relations. The diplomatic
26 FO 371 29993, R1467, p.147.
B. S. Rennie Eliade's Political Career 425
necessity of presenting the facts in the light most 
favourable to one's own government causes occasional 
questionable statements, such as the Foreign Office's 
claim above that "the diplomatic bag was not taken away 
from Mr. Eliade" when it obviously was, and their refusal 
to recognise that he was secretaire presse to the 
Legation in Lisbon. That Eliade exaggerated the 
treatment he received on his departure from Britain is 
hardly damning evidence.
That the suspicions which fell upon Eliade were 
finally unfounded seems to be indicated by the pattern of 
events which followed upon his departure from London. 
There is no evidence that the Legation staff who remained 
in Britain suffered any persecution at his instigation. 
Eliade only once again visited Romania and there is no 
evidence that he was particularly highly regarded by or 
involved with the increasingly fascist regime, or with 
the Iron Guard. Otherwise he did remain in Portugal 
until the end of the war as Nichols had hoped, when his 
break with Romanian politics was final. Radu Florescu 
was allowed to remain in Britain, despite the low opinion 
in which he had been held, when he offered his services 
"in the matter of pursuing an activity controlled by your 
institutions which aims at the re-birth of the Romanian 
nation in self-determination with Great Britain's help 
and wisdom".27 Evidently the suspicion with which he was
27 FO 371 29993, R1467, p.147.
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regarded and which had fallen on Eliade by association 
was eventually dispelled. Even the Iron Guard, initially 
suspected to be "merely German tools" of whom General 
Antonescu was "completely the prisoner",28 were regarded 
with less suspicion. Following further intelligence, 
including the interception of Guardist literature en 
route for Detroit, U.S.A., they were seen rather as a 
dangerous, over-emotional, popular and religious movement 
whose nationalism occasioned an inherent anti-German 
tendency and thus British Intelligence "suggests that 
attempts should be made in Romania at securing the 
adherence of the Iron Guard".29 Of course the violent 
anti-semitic atrocities of which the Iron Guard were 
guilty occurred some time after Eliade had left the 
country and he cannot be realistically seen to share any 
culpability in respect of such actions. When the Iron 
Guard assassinated Nicolae Iorga, to whom Berger refers 
as "the anti-semite, Iorga ("Anti-Judaism," p.6.) in 
November, 1940 Eliade deemed them to have "nullified the 
religious meaning of the 'sacrifice' made by the 
Legionaries executed under Carol and had irreparably 
discredited the Iron Guard". (Autobiography vol.II 
p.69.) Also, the fact that after the execution of C. Z. 
Codreanu, his father established an alternative Legionary 
movement in opposition to Horia Sima's Iron Guard
28 FO 371 24989, p.64.
29 FO 371 29993, R1600/G, p.185a.
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suggests a change in the nature of the Guardist movement 
with which some of its original leaders, let alone 
possible sympathizers, could not tolerate. The British 
historian, Seton-Watson, originally recognised that 
Eliade was pro-British although a sympathiser of this 
"milder" wing of the Guard. Under the influence of 
Dimancescu and in the increasing paranoia of an embattled 
nation he later became profoundly suspicious of Eliade as 
a potential spy. However, this does seem unlikely, even 
though any descriptions of war damage which Eliade sent 
back from Britain to Romania certainly could have been 
used as propaganda, whether or not this was his intent.
Although these documents do not give hard evidence 
either way about Eliade's connection with the Guardist 
movement, circumstantial evidence; the fact that the 
British did not see fit to arrest him; their eventual 
reconciliation with Radu Florescu, who was likewise under 
suspicion; the fact that Eliade remained in Portugal; and 
the possible alternative explanations, serves to minimise 
the significance of any such connection.
One conclusion which can be drawn from this 
inspection of the available information is inescapably 
that Berger has been strongly biased in her treatment and 
presentation. She has referred to Foreign Offices files 
which, although listed in the index, are no longer extant 
and which thus cannot provide any real evidence. 
(T6561/1522/378; T7026/318/383) She has quoted several 
references the Eliade's being "a member of the Iron
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Guard" without reporting that the same sources admit that 
there was "considerable disagreement as to his 
sympathies", (n.10 above.) and, in fact, she can adduce 
no hard evidence that Eliade ever was a member of the 
Guard. She has made statements which are completely 
unsupportable, such as; "Eliade was detained in England 
because of his political activities on behalf of the Iron 
Guard and also of Nazi Germany". ("Fascism and Religion," 
p.459, "Anti-Judaism," p.9.) This is clearly not the 
case, Eliade was detained in Britain originally at the 
request of V. V. Tilea and later because of suspicions 
that were never confirmed of his anti-British 
propagandising. She has failed to recognise even the 
possibility that Eliade's actions could be more easily 
accounted for by his loyalty to the country of his birth 
than by any malice against anyone. While we must guard 
against the situation which Seymour Cain reports in 
Romania of Eliade being "idolised by the public, and no 
real criticism of his work is allowed", we must just as 
zealously guard against personal antipathies being 
allowed to bias our presentation of the facts. To baldly 
state that "Eliade was not a Cultural attaché (or 
Secretary) as he had stated in interviews, diaries, and 
in his Autobiography", ("Anti-Judaism," p.9) is to
attempt to make a liar out of Eliade by wholly ignoring 
the fact that he was appointed to the Press and 
Propaganda Office of the Lisbon Legation, a fact which 
Berger accepted in her earlier article. ("Fascism and
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Religion," p.460) Berger has completely failed to 
indicate any actual activity in which Eliade might have 
been involved which might justify the slur of 
"anti-Judaism". Seymour Cain's article on exactly this 
topic is a level-headed contribution to this debate, and 
he makes the clear statement that he "never saw the 
slightest sign of anti-Semitism in [Eliade's] works or in 
his person. He always impressed me as a good man as well 
as a great creative scholar, and above all, as a 
treasurable human being". ("Mircea Eliade, the Iron 
Guard, and Romanian Anti-Semitism," p.27.) I should hope 
that such a personal assessment is actually more weighty 
evidence than such a tendentious rendition of "factual 
history" as Berger present us in her papers. Finally, 
when Berger writes that Ricketts distorts Eliade's 
articles and quotes them out of context ("Fascism and 
Religion," p.463) I can only assume after an inspection 
of this data that she is wrongly assuming Ricketts to use 
the method which she so clearly applies herself.
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Appendix B. 
Public Records Office index of files relating to Eliade.
[--] indicates Public Records Office file reference 
numbers.
  indicates files referred to by Berger.
References in bold type are to files extant at the P.R.O.
1939 - no references
1940 - "On staff of Romanian Legation."
MI5 file
T5104/T6167/T7401/318/383
- "Exemption from alien restrictions."
T5878/5839/5593/377 
T6167/318/383
- "Inclusion of name in diplomatic list.
Activities."
T7401/T7026/318/383
- "Request by Romanian government for facilities for 
his return to Romania."
R8800/6850/37 in [FO 371 24996]
- "Proposed expulsion from U.K."
R7 790/392/37 
R7 624/37
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- "Portuguese visa facilities."
T6561/1522/378
-"Facilities to travel to Portugal. Activities. 
Attitude of H. M. Government toward."
R7858/R7698/6850/37 in [FO 371 24996]
1941 - "Departure from U.K.: effort at airport to 
persuade local officers of diplomatic privilege to which 
he was not entitled: passport etc. stamped diplomatic: so 
called diplomatic bag left at aerodrome."
R978/119/37
R1087/80/37 in [FO 371 29995]
[This episode is also recorded in R1061, in FO 371 29993, 
although this is not mentioned in the index.]
- "Use of as temporary Romanian courier."
W3239/2008/49 in [FO 371 28953]
- "Priority of passage on Plane to Lisbon."
Y171/Y 469/7311/2 650
- "Request for facilities for his departure and 
anti-British outlook."




This first section contains publications of Eliade's not 
translated into English. Although some have been 
translated into French and are thus accessible to me (v. 
eg. §.D . below) the majority have not been translated 
from the original Romanian, and thus I have not read 
them. I include this list for completeness of 
bibliographic reference and to give the reader a more 
accurate impression of Eliade's early publishing career. 
This section includes novels, travel writing, personal 
philosophy, and technical publications on the history of 
religions, but exclude a considerable volume in 
periodical publications. For these see the Allen and 
Doeing bibliography of 1980 and the forthcoming 
bibliographic edition of M. L. Ricketts and Mircea 
Handoca.
Isabel si Apele Diavolului. ("Isabel and the Devil's 
Waters.") Bucharest: Editura Nationala Ciornei, 1930.
Soliloquii. ("Soliloquies.") Bucharest: Editura Cartea cu 
Semne, 1932.
Intr'o manastire din Himalaya. ("In a Himalayan 
Monastery.") Bucharest: Editura Cartea Romaneasca, 1932.
Maitreyi. ("Maitreyi.") Bucharest: Editura Cultura
Nationala, 1933.
Intoarcerea din Rai. ("Return from Paradise.") Editura 
Nationala Ciornei, 1934.
Lumina ce se Stinqe. ("The Light Which Fails.")
Bucharest: Editura Cartea Romaneasca, 1934.
Oceanoqrafie. ("Oceanography.") Bucharest: Editure 
Cultura Poporului, 1934.
India. Bucharest: Editura Cugetarea, 1934.
Alchimia Asiatica. ("Asiatic Alchemy.") Bucharest: 
Editura Cultura Poporului, 1934.
Santier. ("Work in Progress.") Bucharest: Editura 
Cugetarea, 1935.
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Huliqanii. ("The Hooligans.") 2 vols. Bucharest:
Editura Nationala-Ciornei, 1935.
Domnisoara Christina. ("Mistress Christina.")
Bucharest: Editura Cultura Nationala, 1936.
Sarpele. ("The Snake.") Bucharest: Editura Nationala- 
Ciornei, 1937.
Scriere literare. morale si politice de B. P. Hasdeu. 
("The Literary, Moral, and Political Writings of B. P. 
Hasdeu.") 2 vols. Bucharest: Editura Fundatia Regala 
pentru Arta si Literatura, 1937.
Cosmologie si Alchimie Babiloniana. ("Babylonian 
Cosmology and Alchemy.") Bucharest: Editura Vremea,
1937.
Nunta in Cer. ("Marriage in Heaven.") Bucharest:
Editura Cugetarea, 1938. [This novel was translated into 
Italian in 1983 and won the Elba-Brignetti prize for the 
best novel in Italian in 1984. V. Ricketts, Romanian 
Roots for an English language précis of the novel.]
Fragmentarium. ("Essays.") Bucharest: Editura Vremea, 
1939.
Mitul Reintegrarii. ("The Myth of Reintegration.") 
Bucharest: Editura Vremea, 1942.
Salazar si revolutia in Portugalia. ("Salazar and the 
Revolution in Portugal.") Bucharest: Editura Gorjan, 
1942.
Comentarii la legenda Mesterului Manóle. ("Commentaries 
on the Legend of Master Manóle.") Bucharest: Editura 
Publicom, 1943.
Insula lui Euthanasius. ("The Island of Euthanasius.") 
Bucharest: Editure Fundatia Regala pentru Arta si 
Literatura, 1943.
Nuvele. ("Short Stories.) Madrid: Editura Destin, 1963.
(Throughout the remainder of this bibliography I have 
mainly restricted myself to works of Eliade available in 
English. However, I have included works in French where 
I have consulted these, and, rarely, works of importance 
in other languages. In this next section initial dates 
are of first publication, regardless of language. 
Brackets contain alternative titles.)
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B. Non-Fiction: Books
1936 Yoga: Essai sur les origines de la mystique
Indienne. Paris: Guenther, 1936. (This is a French 
translation of Eliade's PhD thesis presented in 
Bucharest in 1933.)
1949 Patterns in Comparative Religion. London, Sheed
and Ward, 1958. (Traité d'Histoire des Religions.) 
Trans, from the Fench by Rosemary Sheed.
Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954. Trans, 
from the French by Willard Trask.
1951 Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964. Trans, from the 
French by Willard Trask.
1952 Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbolism. 
London: Harvill Press, 1961. Trans, from the French 
by Philip Mairet.
1954 Yoga, Immortality and Freedom. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1958. Trans, from the French by 
Willard Trask. This work has considerable 
alterations from the earlier French publication.
1956 The Forge and the Crucible. London: Rider and Co., 
1962. (Forgerons et Alchimistes.) Trans, from the 
French by Stephen Corrin.
1957 Myths, Dreams and Mysteries: the Encounter between 
_____ Contemporary Faiths and Archaic Realities. London:
Harvill Press, 1960.
The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion. 
London, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1959. (Das 
Heilege und Das Profane.̂  Trans, from the French by 
Willard Trask.
1958 Rites and Symbols of Initiation. London: Harvill 
Press, 1958. (Birth and Rebirth.) Trans, from the 
French by Willard Trask.
1962 Pataniali and Yoga. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 
1969. Trans, from the French by Charles Lam 
Markmann.
The Two and the One. Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1965. (Méphisophélès et le Androgyne.)
Trans, from the French by J.M. Cohen.
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1963 Myth and Reality. New York: Harper and Row, 1963. 
(Aspects du Mvthe.) Trans, from the French by 
Willard Trask.
1967 From Primitives to Zen: a Sourcebook in Comparative
_____ Religion. New York: Harper and Row, 1967. English
Original.
1969 The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion. London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1969. (Revised as La 
Nostalgia des Origins, 1971.) English original.
1970 Zalmoxis, the Vanishing God. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1972. (De Zalmoxis a Ghengis Khan.) 
Trans, from the French by Willard Trask.
1971 Australian Religion. London: Cornell University 
Press, 1973. English original.
1975 Myths, Rites and Symbols. A Mircea Eliade Reader. 
Beane, W.C. and W.G. Doty, (eds.) New York: Harper 
and Row, 1975.
1976 Occultism, Witchcraft and Cultural Fashions.
Chicago: Chicago U. P., 1976. English original.
The History of Religious Ideas, vol. I, From the 
Stone Age to the Elusinian Mysteries. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1978. (Paris: Payot, 
1976.) Trans, from the French by Willard Trask.
1978 The History of Religious Ideas, vol. II, From 
Gautama Buddha to the Triumph of Christianity. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982. (Paris: 
Payot, 1978.) Trans, from the French by Willard 
Trask.
1980 What is Religion. (eds. with David Tracy.) 
Edinburgh: T. and T. Clarke, 1980.
1982 Ordeal by Labyrinth, conversations with Claude-Henri 
Rocquet. Chicago: Chicago U.P., 1982. Trans, from 
the French by Derek Coltman.
1983 The History of Religious Ideas, vol. Ill, From 
Muhammad to the Age of the Reforms. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1985. (Paris: Payot, 
1983.) Trans, from the French by Alf Hiltebeitel 
and Diane Apostolos-Cappadona.
1985 Briser le Toit de la Maison. Lausanne: Gallimard, 
1985. French original.
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1986 Symbolism, the Sacred, and the Arts. (ed. Diane 
Apostolos-Cappadona.) New York: Crossroad, 1986. 
Translations from the French by Diane Apostolos- 
Cappadona and Frederica Adel, Derek Coltman, and 
from the Romanian by Mac Linscott Ricketts.
1987 Encyclopedia of Religion. (Editor in Chief.) New 
York: Macmillan, 1987.
1990 Dictionaire des Religions. (with loan Culianu.) 
Paris: Plon, 1990.
C. Articles
"Cosmical Homology and Yoga." Journal of the Indian 
Society of Oriental Art 5 (1937): 188-203.
Review of Religion in Essence and Manifestation by G. van 
der Leeuw in Review d'Histoire de Religions 138 (1950): 
108-111.
"Techniques de 1'Extase et Langages Secrets." Confirenze 
di Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.
Vol.II (1953): 1-23.
"The Yearning for Paradise in Primitive Tradition." 
Diogenes, Summer 1953. Reprinted in Daedalus 88(1959): 
258, 261-266.
"Les Représentations du Mort chez les Primitifs." 
Temoinages. Cahier de la Pierre-qui-vire 41 (1954): 
166-174.
"La Tere-Mère et les hiérogamies cosmiques." Eranos 
Jahrbuch, 22 (1954).
"Mythology and the History of Religions." Diogenes 9
(1955): 96-113.
"The Structure of Religious Symbols." Proceedings of the 
IX International Congress for the History of Religions, 
Tokyo, (1958): 506-512.
"Encounters at Ascona." in Spiritual Disciplines, Papers 
from the Eranos Jahrbuch, Bollingen series, vol. 4,
(1959):xvii-xxi.
"Structures and Changes in the History of Religion." In 
City Invincible - a Symposium of Urbanisation and 
Cultural Development in the Ancient Near East. C . 
Kraeling and R. Adams (eds.) Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1960.
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"History and the Cyclical View of Time." Perspectives 5 
( 1960): 11-14 .
"Recent Works on Shamanism: a Review Article." History of 
Religions 1 ( 1962):152-186 .
"Cargo Cults and Cosmic Regeneration." In Millenial 
Dreams in Action, Thrupp, S. (ed.) The Hague: Mouton, 
1962. (reproduces much material from The Two and the 
One, pp.125-140.)
"Yoga and Modern Philosophy." Journal of General 
Education 2 (1963): 124-37.
"Paul Tillich and the History of Religions." in Paul 
Tillich: The future of Religion. ed. J. C. Brauer, New 
York: Harper and Row, 1966.
"In Memoriam: Paul Tillich." Criterion 5 (1966): 11-14.
"Briser le toit de la Maison: Symbolisme Architechtonique 
et Physiologie Subtile." Studies in Mysticism and 
Religion, E.E.Urbach (ed.) Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967: 
131-9.
"Historical events and Structural Meaning in Tension." 
Criterion 6 (1967): 29-31.
"Marc Chagall et l'amour du Cosmos." XXieme Siècle 29 
( 1967): 137-139 .
"Comparative Religion: its Past and Future." In 
Knowledge and the Future of Man. Walter J. Ong SJ, (New 
York: Holt, Rhinehard and Winston, 1968.)
"The Forge and the Crucible: a Postscript." History of 
Religions 8 (1968):74-88.
"Preface." Munson, T. N., Reflective Theology. New 
Haven: Yale U. P. 1968.
"Notes on the Symbolism of the Arrow." In Religions in 
Antiquity, Neusner, J. (ed.) Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968, 
pp.463-475.
"South American High Gods, part I." History of Religions 
8 (1969):338-352.
"Notes for a Dialogue." In The Theology of T. J. J. 
Altizer. Cobb, J. B. (ed.) Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1970.
"South American High Gods, part II." History of 
Religions 10 (1971): 234-266.
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"The Dragon and the Shaman. Notes on a South American 
Mythology." In Man and his Salvation, Sharpe, Eric J. 
and John R. HInnells, (eds.) Manchester University 
Press, 1972, pp.99-105.
"Foreword" to The Rise of Modern Mythology, 1600-1800, by 
R. D. Richardson, London: Indiana University Press, 1972.
"On Structural Archetypes: a Conversation Between Mircea 
Eliade and John Wilkinson." Unpublished paper provided 
by Dr. Ricketts.
"On Prehistoric Religions." History of Religions 14 
(1974): 140-147 .
"The Sacred in the Secular World." Cultural Hermeneutics 
1 (1973): 101-113. (Renamed Philosophy and Social 
Criticism after 1978.)
"Some Observations on European Witchcraft." History of 
Religions 14 (1975): 149-172.
"Sacred Tradition and Modern Man." Parabola 1 no.3
(1976): 74-80.
"The Myth of Alchemy." Parabola 3 no.3 (1978): 6-23.
"Some Notes on Theosophia Perennis: Ananda K.
Coomaraswamy and Henry Corbin." History of Religion 19
(1979): 167-176.
Interview by Leslie Maitland, New York Times, 4 Feb.
1979 .
"History of Religions and "Popular" Cultures." History 
of Religions 20 no.l (1980): 1-26.
"Preface." Kligman, Gail, Calus: Symbolic Transformation 
in Romanian Ritual. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981.
"Guiseppe Tucci (1895-1984)" History of Religions 24 no.2 
(1984): 157-159.
"Homo Faber and Homo Religiosus." The History of 
Religions: Retrospect and Prospect, ed. Joseph Kitagawa. 
New York: Macmillan, 1985.
"American Paradise." Art Papers, 10 no.6, 1986.
Interview by Delia O'Hara, Chicago 35 no.6 (June 1986): 
147-151, 177-180.
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(The following articles reappear in major works in §.B. 
above and are included for the sake of completeness and 
to avoid possible confusion.)
"Durohana and the Waking Dream." Art and Thought: a 
Volume in Honour of the Late Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswami. 
London, 1947, pp.209-213. In Myths, Dreams, and 
Mysteries, pp.115-122.
"Nostalgia for Paradise: symbolism of the centre and the 
ritual approach to immortality." Parabola 1 no.l (1967): 
6-15. (Adapted from Images and Symbols, ch. 1.)
"Time and Eternity in Indian Thought." In Man and Time, 
ed. J. Cambell, New York: Pantheon 1957. (Images and
Symbols. pp.57-91.)
"La Vertu Creatrice Du Mythe." Eranos Jahrbuch XXV
(1956): 59-85. (The Sacred and the Profane, ch.2.)
"Archaic Myth and Historical Man." McCormick Quarterly 
18 (Special Supplement, Myth and Modern Man, 1965):
23-36. (The Sacred and the Profane, ch. 4 Myth and 
Reality, chs. 1&2.)
"Bi-unité et Totalité dans la Pensée Indienne." Acta 
Philosophica et Theologica, 1958. (Pataniali et le Yoga, 
ch. 2 . )
"Survivais and Camouflages of Myth." Diogenes 41 (1963): 
1-25. (Myth and Reality, ch.9.)
"Mythologies of Memory and Forgetting." History of 
Religions 2 (1963): 329-344. (Myth and Reality, ch. 7.)
"Some Methodological Remarks on the Study of Religious 
Symbolism." in History of Religions: Problems of 
Methodology, ed. Eliade and Kitagawa. Chicago: Chicago 
U.P. 1959. (Appears as "Observations on Religious 
Symbolism," in The Two and the One, ch.5.)
"The History of Religions and a New Humanism." History of 
Religions 1 (1961): 7-8. (The Quest, ch.l.)
"The History of Religions in Retrospect; 1912-1962." 
Journal of Bible and Religion. XXXI No.2 (April 1963): 
98-109. (The Quest, ch.2.)
"The Quest for the Origins of Religion." History of 
Religions 4 (1964): 154-169. (In The Quest, ch.3.)
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"Crisis and Renewal in the History of Religions."
History of Religions 5 no.l (1965): 1-17. (The Quest, 
ch. 4 . )
"Cosmogonic Myth and Sacred History." Religious Studies 
2 (1967): 171-183.(orig. lecture in Fr. in Geneva, 1966. 
(The Quest, ch.5.)
"Paradise and Utopia." In Utopias and Utopian Thought, 
F.E. Manuel ed. Boston: Houghton Miflin 1966. (Quest, 
ch. 6.)
"Initation et le monde modern." Initiation, ed. C. J. 
Bleeker. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965. (The Quest, ch.7)
"On Understanding Primitive Religion." Festschrift fur 
Ernst Benz, G. Muller and W. Zeller (eds.) Leiden:
E.J.Brill, 1967. (Australian Religion, Preface.)
"Spirit, Light, and Seed." History of Religions 11
(1971): 1-30. (Occultism, Withcraft, and Cultural 
Fashions.)
"Le Symbolisme des Ténèbres dans les Religions Archaics." 
Polarités du Symbol, Études Carmelitains 39 (1960):
15-28. (Symbolism, the Sacred, and the Arts, Pt. I.)
"Divinities, Art and the Divine." Encyclopedia of World 
Art. Vol.4 (1961): cols.382-387. (Symbolism, the 
Sacred, and the Arts, Pt.II.)
"The Sacred and the Modern Artist." Criterion 4, Spring 
1965: 22-23. ("Sur la Permanence du Sacré dans l'Art 
Contemporain." v. XXieme Siecle Nr.24 (1964) Symbolism, 
the Sacred, and the Arts, Pt. II.)
"Literary Imagination and Religious Structure."
Criterion 17 (1978): 30-34. (Symbolism, the Sacred, and 
the Arts, Pt.IV)
D. Fiction
(Initial dates are of composition rather than 
publication.)
1933 La Nuit Bengali. Lausanne: Gallimard, 1950.
(Maitreyi.) Trans, from the Romanian by Alain 
Guillermou.)
1935 Mademoiselle Christina. Paris: L 'Herne 1978.
(Domnisoara Christina, French introduction, Eliade, 
1978.)
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1936 Andronic et le Serpente. Paris: L 'Herne 1979.
(Sarpele, French introduction by Sorin Alexandresco, 
undated.)
1939 Iphiqenia. Play, first published as Iphiqenia: 
piesa in trei acte. Valle Hermosa, Argentina: 
Editura Cartea Pribegnei, 1951. Also published as 
Ifiqenia: peisa in trei acte: cinci tablouri. 
Bucharest: 1974. Unpublished English translation by 
M. L. Ricketts based on the revised version of the 
Argentinian edition.
1940 Nights at Serampore. Trans, from the Romanian by 
William Ames Coates, in Two Strange Tales. Boston 
and London: Shambala, 1986.
The Secret of Dr. Honiqberqer. Trans, from the 
Romanian by William Ames Coates, in Two Strange 
Tales. Boston and London: Shambala, 1986.
1943 Men and Stones. Play. Unpublished translation 
provided by M. L. Ricketts.
1945 A Great Man. Trans, from the Romanian by Eric
Tappe. In Fantastic Tales. London: Dillon's, 1969.
1952 Twelve Thousand Head of Cattle. (with Mihai
Niculescu.) Trans, from the Romanian by Eric 
Tappe. In Fantastic Tales. London: Dillon's, 1969.
1954 The Forbidden Forest. Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1978. (Noaptea de Sanziene. 
Trans, from the Romanian by M. L. Ricketts and Mary 
Park Stevenson.)
1955 The Captain's Daughter. Published in La tiganci si 
alte povestiri, Bucharest: Editura pentru 
Literatura, 1969. Unpublished English tanslation by 
Mac Linscott Richetts.
1960 With the Gypsy Girls. Trans, from the Romanian by 
William Ames Coates. In Tales of the Sacred and 
Supernatural. Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1981.
1963 A Fourteen Year Old Photograph. The Louisberg
College Journal, vol. VIII (1974): 3-15. Trans, 
from the Romanian by M. L. Ricketts. Originally 
published in Eliade's Nuvele, Madrid; Colectia 
Destin, 1963.
The Bridge. Unpublished English tanslation by Mac 
Linscott Richetts.
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1967 The Old Man and The Bureaucrats. Notre Dame and
London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979. (Pe
Strada Mantuleasa. Trans, from the Romanian by Mary 
Park Stevenson.)
1970 The Endless Column. Play, in Dialectics and
Humanism 10 no.l (1983): 44-88. Trans, from the
Romanian by Mary Park Stevenson.
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